[1038b]
[1]
Since the subject of our inquiry is
substance, let us return to it. Just as the substrate and the essence
and the combination of these are called substance, so too is the
universal. With two of these we have already dealt, i.e. with the
essence1 and the substrate2; of the latter we have said that it
underlies in two senses—either being an individual thing (as
the animal underlies its attributes), or as matter underlies the
actuality.The
universal also is thought by some3 to be in the truest sense
a cause and a principle. Let us therefore proceed to discuss this
question too; for it seems impossible that any universal term can be
substance.First, the substance of
an individual is the substance which is peculiar to it and belongs to
nothing else; whereas the universal is common; for by universal we
mean that which by nature appertains to several things.Of what particular, then, will
the universal be the substance? Either of all or of none. But it
cannot be the substance of all; while, if it is to be the substance of
one, the rest also will be that one; because things whose substance is
one have also one essence and are themselves one.Again, substance means that which is not predicated
of a subject, whereas the universal is always predicated of some
subject.But perhaps although the
universal cannot be substance in the sense that essence is, it can be
present in the essence, as "animal" can be present in "man" and
"horse."Then
clearly there is in some sense a formula of the universal. It makes no
difference
[20]
even if
there is not a formula of everything that is in the substance; for the
universal will be none the less the substance of something; e.g.,
"man" will be the substance of the man in whom it is present. Thus the
same thing will happen again4; e.g. "animal" will be the substance of that in which it
is present as peculiar to it.Again, it is impossible and
absurd that the individual or substance, if it is composed of
anything, should be composed not of substances nor of the individual,
but of a quality; for then non-substance or quality will be prior to
substance or the individual. Which is impossible; for neither in
formula nor in time nor in generation can the affections of substance
be prior to the substance, since then they would be
separable.Again, a substance will be present in
"Socrates," who is a
substance; so that it will be the substance of two things. And in
general it follows that if "man" and all terms used in this way are
substance, none of the elements in the formula is the substance of
anything, nor can it exist apart from the species or in anything else;
I mean, e.g., that neither "animal" nor any other element of the
formula can exist apart from the particular species.If we
look at the question from this standpoint it is obvious that no
universal attribute is substance; and it is also clear from the fact
that none of the common predicates means "so-and-so,"
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1933, 1989.
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