This text is part of:
Search the Perseus Catalog for:
[1049a]
[1]
E.g.,
is earth potentially a man? No, but rather when it has already become
semen,1 and perhaps not even then; just as not
everything can be healed by medicine, or even by
chance, but there is some definite kind of thing which is capable of
it, and this is that which is potentially healthy.The
definition of that which as a result of thought comes, from existing
potentially, to exist actually, is that, when it has been willed, if
no external influence hinders it, it comes to pass; and the condition
in the case of the patient, i.e. in the person who is being healed, is
that nothing in him should hinder the process. Similarly a house
exists potentially if there is nothing in X, the matter, to prevent it
from becoming a house, i.e., if there is nothing which must be added
or removed or changed; then X is potentially a house;and similarly in all other
cases where the generative principle is external. And in all cases
where the generative principle is contained in the thing itself, one
thing is potentially another when, if nothing external hinders, it
will of itself become the other. E.g., the semen is not yet
potentially a man; for it must further undergo a change in some other
medium.2 But when, by its own generative principle, it has
already come to have the necessary attributes, in this state it is now
potentially a man, whereas in the former state it has need of another
principle;just as
earth is not yet potentially a statue, because it must undergo a
change before it becomes bronze.It
seems that what we are describing is not a particular thing, but a
definite material; e.g., a box is not wood, but wooden material,3
[20]
and wood is not earth, but earthen material; and
earth also is an illustration of our point if it is similarly not some
other thing, but a definite material—it is always the latter
term in this series which is, in the fullest sense, potentially
something else.E.g., a box
is not earth, nor earthen, but wooden; for it is this that is
potentially a box, and this is the matter of the box—that
is, wooden material in general is the matter of "box" in general,
whereas the matter of a particular box is a particular piece of
wood.If there is some primary
stuff, which is not further called the material of some other thing,
this is primary matter. E.g., if earth is "made of air," and air is
not fire, but "made of fire," then fire is primary matter, not being
an individual thing.For
the subject or substrate is distinguishable into two kinds by either
being or not being an individual thing. Take for example as the
subject of the attributes "man," or "body" or "soul," and as an
attribute "cultured" or "white." Now the subject, when culture is
induced in it, is called not "culture" but "cultured," and the man is
called not whiteness but white; nor is he called "ambulation" or
"motion," but "walking" or "moving"; just as we said that things are
of a definite material.Thus where "subject" has this sense, the ultimate substrate is
substance; but where it has not this sense, and the predicate is a
form or individuality, the ultimate substrate is matter or material
substance. It is quite proper that both matter and attributes should
be described by a derivative predicate,
1 This is inconsistent with Aristotle's doctrine that the semen is the formal element in reproduction. Cf. Aristot. Met. 8.4.5, Aristot. Met. 6.9.5.
2 This is inconsistent with Aristotle's doctrine that the semen is the formal element in reproduction. Cf. Aristot. Met. 8.4.5, Aristot. Met. 9.6.5.
3 Cf. Aristot. Met. 7.7.10-12.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.