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1.
[3]
and that (a) an act is compulsory
when its origin is from without, being of such a nature that the agent, who is really
passive, contributes nothing to it: for example, when a ship's captain is carried
somewhere by stress of weather, or by people who have him in their power. 1.
[4]
But there is some doubt about actions
done through fear of a worse alternative, or for some noble object— as for
instance if a tyrant having a man's parents and children in his power commands him to do
something base, when if he complies their lives will be spared but if he refuses they will
be put to death. It is open to question whether such actions are voluntary or involuntary.
1.
[5]
A somewhat similar
case is when cargo is jettisoned in a storm; apart from circumstances, no one voluntarily
throws away his property, but to save his own life and that of his shipmates any sane man
would do so. 1.
[6]
Acts of
this kind, then, are ‘mixed’ or composite1; but they approximate
rather to the voluntary class. For at the actual time when they are done they are chosen
or willed; and the end or motive of an act varies with the occasion, so that the terms
‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ should be used with
reference to the time of action; now the actual deed in the cases in question is done
voluntarily, for the origin of the movement of the parts of the body instrumental to the
act lies in the agent; and when the origin of an action is in oneself, it is in one's own
power to do it or not. Such acts therefore are voluntary, though perhaps involuntary apart
from circumstances—for no one would choose to do any such action in and for
itself.
1 i.e., partly voluntary, partly involuntary.