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For the above
considerations seem to show that even if any good or evil does penetrate to them, the
effect is only small and trifling, either intrinsically or in relation to them, or if not
trifling, at all events not of such magnitude and kind as to make the unhappy happy or to
rob the happy of their blessedness.
[6]
It does then appear that the dead are influenced in some measure by the good fortune of
their friends, and likewise by their misfortunes, but that the effect is not of such a
kind or degree as to render the happy unhappy or vice versa.12.
These questions being settled, let us consider whether happiness is one of the things we
praise or rather one of those that we honor1; for it is at all events clear that it is not a mere
potentiality.2
[2]
Now it appears that a thing which we praise is always praised because it has a certain
quality and stands in a certain relation to something. For we praise just men and brave
men, in fact good men and virtue generally, because of their actions and the results they
produce; and also we praise those who are strong of body, swift of foot and the like on
account of their possessing certain natural qualities, and standing in a certain relation
to something good and excellent.
[3]
The point is also
illustrated by our feeling about praises addressed to the gods: it strikes us as absurd
that the gods should be referred to our standards,
1 The definition of happiness is now shown to be supported by the current terms of moral approbation; apparently ἐπαινετον, ‘praiseworthy’ or ‘commendable,’ was appropriate to means , or things having relative value, and τίμιον, ‘valued’ or ‘revered,’ to ends, or things of absolute value.
2 i.e., not merely a potentiality of good but an actual good, whether as means or end.