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given the further condition that the
agent feels sorrow and regret for having committed it.1.
[20]
An involuntary action being one done under compulsion or through ignorance, a voluntary
act would seem to be an act of which the origin lies in the agent, who knows the
particular circumstances in which he is acting. 1.
[21]
For it is probably a mistake to say1 that acts
caused by anger or by desire are involuntary. 1.
[22]
In the first place, (1) if we do so, we can no
longer say that any of the lower animals act voluntarily, or children either. 1.
[23]
Then (2) are
none of our actions that are caused by desire or anger voluntary, or are the noble ones
voluntary and the base involuntary? Surely this is an absurd distinction when one person
is the author of both. 1.
[24]
Yet perhaps it is strange to speak of acts aiming at things which it is right to aim at
as involuntary; and it is right to feel anger at some things, and also to feel desire for
some things, for instance health, knowledge. 1.
[25]
Also (3) we think that involuntary actions are
painful and actions that gratify desire pleasant. 1.
[26]
And again (4) what difference is
there in respect of their involuntary character between wrong acts committed deliberately
and wrong acts done in anger? 1.
[27]
Both are to be avoided;
1 Plat. Laws 683b ff., coupled anger and appetite with ignorance as sources of wrong action.