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and profligate might at the outset have
avoided becoming so, and therefore they are so voluntarily, although having become unjust
and profligate it is no longer open to them not to be so.
[15]
And not only are vices of the soul voluntary, but in some cases bodily defects are so as
well, and we blame them accordingly. Though no one blames a man for being born ugly, we
censure uncomeliness that is due to neglecting exercise and the care of the person. And so
with infirmities and mutilations: though nobody would reproach, but rather pity, a person
blind from birth, or owing to disease or accident, yet all would blame one who had lost
his sight from tippling or debauchery.
[16]
We see then that
bodily defects for which we are ourselves responsible are blamed, while those for which we
are not responsible are not. This being so, it follows that we are responsible for
blameworthy moral defects also.
[17]
But suppose somebody says: “All men seek what seems to them good, but they are
not responsible for its seeming good:
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
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