Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
H. Rackham, Ed.

Now a person is thought to be great-souled if he claims much and deserves much; he who claims much without deserving it is foolish, but no one of moral excellence is foolish or senseless. The great-souled man is then as we have described. 3. [4] He who deserves little and claims little is modest or temperate, but not great-souled, 3. [5] since to be great-souled involves greatness just as handsomeness involves size: small people may be neat and well-made, but not handsome. 3. [6] He that claims much but does not deserve much is vain; though not everybody who claims more than he deserves is vain.¹ 3. [7] He that claims less than he deserves is small-souled, whether his deserts be great or only moderate, or even though he deserves little, if he claims still less. The most small-souled of all would seem to be the man who claims less than he deserves when his deserts are great; for what would he have done had he not deserved so much?3. [8]

Though therefore in regard to the greatness of his claim the great-souled man is an extreme,² by reason of its rightness he stands at the mean point, for he claims what he deserves; while the vain and the small-souled err by excess and defect respectively.3. [9]

If then the great-souled man claims and is worthy of great things and most of all the greatest things, Greatness of Soul must be concerned with some one object especially. 3. [10] ‘Worthy’ is a term of relation: it denotes having a claim to goods external to oneself. Now the greatest external good we should assume to be the thing which we offer as a tribute to the gods, and which is most coveted by men of high station, and is the prize awarded for the noblest deeds;