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the quality in virtue of which we call men ‘persons
of understanding’ or ‘of good understanding,’ is not the
same thing as Scientific Knowledge in general （nor yet is it the same as Opinion,
for in that case everybody would have understanding）, nor is it any one of the
particular sciences, as medicine is the science of what pertains to health and geometry
the science concerned with magnitudes.
[2]
For Understanding
does not deal with the things that exist for ever and are immutable, nor yet with all of
the things that come into existence, but with those about which one may be in doubt and
may deliberate. Hence it is concerned with the same objects as Prudence. Understanding is
not however the same thing as Prudence; for Prudence issues commands, since its end is a
statement of what we ought to do or not to do, whereas Understanding merely makes
judgements. （For Understanding is the same as Good Understanding; a
‘man of understanding’ means a man of good
understanding.）1
[3]
Thus Understanding does not mean either the possession or the acquisition of Prudence;
but when we employ the faculty of Opinion to judge what another person says
about matters that are in the sphere of Prudence, we are said to understand
（that is, to judge rightly for right judgement is the same as
good understanding）, in the same way as learning a thing is termed
understanding it when we are employing the faculty of Scientific Knowledge.
[4]
In fact, the use of the term Understanding to denote
the quality that makes men ‘persons of good understanding’ is derived
from understanding as shown in learning; in fact we often use ‘to
learn’ in the sense of ‘to understand.’2
11.
The quality termed Consideration,3 in virtue of which men are said to be
considerate,
1 This parenthesis would come better in the first section, after the words ‘of good understanding.’ It merely points out that the qualification ‘good’ need not be repeated.
2 μανθάνειν is idiomatically used of understanding what another person says.
3 The writer here strains the meaning of words by connecting under one sense （1） γνώμη, judgement in general or good judgement in particular, and its derivatives （2） εὐγνώμων, ‘well-judging’ in the sense of considerate and kindly, and （3） συγγνώμη, literally ‘judgement with’ or on the side of others, and hence, sympathy, lenience, forgiveness.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
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