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for it does not ask how anything comes into existence. Prudence, it
must be granted, does do this; but what do we need it for? seeing that it studies that
which is just and noble and good for man, but these are the things that a good man does by
nature. Knowing about them does not make us any more capable of doing them, since the
virtues are qualities of character; just as is the case with the knowledge of what is
healthy and vigorous—using these words to mean not productive of health and
vigor but resulting from them: we are not rendered any more capable of healthy and
vigorous action by knowing the science of medicine or of physical training.
[2]
If on the other hand we are to say that Prudence is useful not in helping us to act
virtuously but in helping us to become virtuous, then it is of no use to those who are
virtuous already. Nor is it of any use either to those who are not, since we may just as
well take the advice of others who possess Prudence as possess Prudence ourselves. We may
be content to do as we do in regard to our health; we want to be healthy, yet we do not
learn medicine.
[3]
Moreover it would seem strange if Prudence, which is inferior to Wisdom, is nevertheless
to have greater authority than Wisdom: yet the faculty that creates a thing1 governs and gives orders to it.
Let us now therefore discuss these difficulties, which so far have only been stated.
1 See 13.8, where it is implied that Prudence stands in the same relation to Wisdom as medicine to health: it provides the conditions for its development.