[
1301a]
[19]
1Almost all the
other subjects which we intended to treat
[20]
have now been discussed. There must follow the consideration of
the questions, what are the number and the nature of the causes that give rise
to revolutions in constitutions, and what are the causes that destroy each form
of constitution, and out of what forms into what forms do they usually change,
and again what are the safeguards of constitutions in general and of each form
in particular, and what are the means by which the safeguarding of each may best
be put into effect.
2
And
we must first assume the starting-point, that many forms of constitution have
come into existence with everybody agreeing as to what is just, that is
proportionate equality, but failing to attain it (as has also been said
before). Thus democracy arose from men's thinking that if they are
equal in any respect they are equal absolutely (for they suppose that
because they are all alike free they are equal absolutely), oligarchy
arose from their assuming that if they are unequal as regards some one thing
they are unequal wholly (for being unequal in property they assume that
they are unequal absolutely); and then the democrats claim as being equal to participate
in all things in equal shares, while the oligarchs as being unequal seek to have
a larger share, for a larger share is unequal. All these forms of constitution
then have some element of justice, but from an absolute point of view they are
erroneous; and owing to this cause, when each of the two parties has not got the
share in the constitution which accords with the fundamental assumption that
they happen to entertain, faction ensues. And of all men those who excel in
virtue would most justifiably stir up faction, though they are least given to
doing so;
[
1301b]
[1]
for they alone can with the fullest reason be deemed absolutely
unequal. And there are some men who being superior in birth claim unequal rights
because of this inequality; for persons who have ancestral virtue and wealth
behind them are thought to be noble.
These then roughly speaking are the
starting-points and sources of factions, which give rise to party strife
(and revolutions due to this take place in two ways: sometimes they are
in regard to the constitution, and aim at changing from the one established to
another, for instance from democracy to oligarchy, or to democracy from
oligarchy, or from these to constitutional government and aristocracy, or from
those to these; but sometimes the revolution is not in regard to the established
constitution, but its promoters desire the same form of government, for instance
oligarchy or monarchy, but wish it to be in their own control. Again it may be a question of degree; for
instance, when there is an oligarchy the object may be to change to a more
oligarchical government or to a less, or when there is a democracy to a more or
to a less democratic government, and similarly in the case of the remaining
constitutions, the aim may be either to tighten them up or to relax them. Or
again the aim may be to change a certain part of the constitution, for example
to establish or abolish a certain magistracy, as according to some accounts
Lysander
[20]
attempted to abolish the
kingship at
Sparta and the king
Pausanias the ephorate
3; and also at
Epidamnus the constitution was altered in
part, for they set up a council instead of the tribal rulers, and it is still
compulsory for the magistrates alone of the class that has political power to
come to the popular assembly when an appointment to a magistracy is put to the
vote; and the single supreme magistrate was also an oligarchical feature in this
constitution). For party strife is everywhere due to inequality, where
classes that are unequal do not receive a share of power in proportion
(for a lifelong monarchy is an unequal feature when it exists among
equals); for generally the motive for factious strife is the desire for
equality. But equality is of two
kinds, numerical equality and equality according to worth—by
numerically equal I mean that which is the same and equal in number or
dimension, by equal according to worth that which is equal by proportion
4; for instance numerically 3 exceeds 2
and 2 exceeds 1 by an equal amount, but by proportion 4 exceeds 2 and 2 exceeds
1 equally, since 2 and 1 are equal parts of 4 and 2, both being halves. But
although men agree that the absolutely just is what is according to worth, they
disagree (as was said before
5) in that some think that if they are
equal in something they are wholly equal, and others claim that if they are
unequal in something they deserve an unequal share of all things. Owing to this two principal varieties of
constitution come into existence, democracy and oligarchy; for noble birth and
virtue are found in few men, but the qualifications specified
6 in more:
[
1302a]
[1]
nowhere are there a hundred men nobly born and good, but there
are rich men
7 in many places. But for the constitution to be
framed absolutely and entirely according to either kind of equality is bad. And
this is proved by experience, for not one of the constitutions formed on such
lines is permanent. And the cause of this is that it is impossible for some evil
not to occur ultimately from the first and initial error that has been made.
Hence the proper course is to employ numerical equality in some things and
equality according to worth in others. But nevertheless democracy is safer and more free from
civil strife than oligarchy; for in oligarchies two kinds of strife spring up,
faction between different members of the oligarchy and also faction between the
oligarchs and the people, whereas in democracies only strife between the people
and the oligarchical party occurs, but party strife between different sections
of the people itself does not occur to any degree worth mentioning. And again
the government formed of the middle classes is nearer to the people than to the
few, and it is the safest of the kinds of constitution mentioned.
And since we
are considering what circumstances give rise to party factions and revolutions
in constitutions, we must first ascertain their origins and causes generally.
They are, speaking roughly, three in number,
8 which we must first define in outline
separately.
[20]
For we must ascertain
what state of affairs gives rise to party strife, and for what objects it is
waged, and thirdly what are the origins of political disorders and internal
party struggles.
Now the principal cause, speaking
generally, of the citizens being themselves disposed in a certain manner towards
revolution is the one about which we happen to have spoken already. Those that
desire equality enter on party strife if they think that they have too little
although they are the equals of those who have more, while those that desire
inequality or superiority do so if they suppose that although they are unequal
they have not got more but an equal amount or less (and these desires may be felt justly, and they
may also be felt unjustly); for when inferior, people enter on strife
in order that they may be equal, and when equal, in order that they may be
greater. We have therefore said what are the states of feeling in which men
engage in party strife.
The objects about which it
is waged are gain and honor, and their opposites, for men carry on party faction
in states in order to avoid dishonor and loss, either on their own behalf or on
behalf of their friends.
And the causes and origins of the disturbances which
occasion the actual states of feeling described and their direction to the
objects mentioned, according to one account happen to be seven in number, though
according to another they are more. Two of them are the same as those spoken of
before although not operating in the same way: the motives of gain and honor
also stir men up against each other not in order that they may get them for
themselves, as has been said before,
[
1302b]
[1]
but because they see other men
in some cases justly and in other cases unjustly getting a larger share of them.
Other causes are insolence, fear, excessive predominance, contempt,
disproportionate growth of power; and also other modes of cause
9 are election intrigue,
carelessness, pettiness, dissimilarity. Among these motives the power possessed by insolence and
gain, and their mode of operation, is almost obvious; for when the men in office
show insolence and greed, people rise in revolt against one another and against
the constitutions that afford the opportunity for such conduct; and greed
sometimes preys on private property and sometimes on common funds. It is clear
also what is the power of honor and how it can cause party faction; for men form
factions both when they are themselves dishonored and when they see others
honored; and the distribution of honors is unjust when persons are either
honored or dishonored against their deserts, just when it is according to
desert. Excessive predominance causes faction, when some individual or body of
men is greater and more powerful than is suitable to the state and the power of
the government; for such are the conditions that usually result in the rise of a
monarchy or dynasty. Owing to this
in some places they have the custom of temporary banishment,
10 as at
Argos and
Athens;
yet it would be better to provide from the outset that there may be no persons
in the state
[20]
so greatly predominant,
than first to allow them to come into existence and afterwards to apply a
remedy. Fear is the motive of faction with those who have inflicted wrong and
are afraid of being punished, and also with those who are in danger of suffering
a wrong and wish to act in time before the wrong is inflicted, as the notables
at
Rhodes banded together
11 against the people because of the
law-suits that were being brought against them. Contempt is a cause of faction and of actual attacks, upon
the government, for instance in oligarchies when those who have no share in the
government are more numerous (for they think themselves the stronger
party), and in democracies when the rich have begun to feel contempt
for the disorder and anarchy that prevails, as for example at
Thebes the democracy was destroyed owing to
bad government after the battle of Oenophyta,
12 and that of the Megarians was
destroyed when they had been defeated owing to disorder and anarchy,
13 and at
Syracuse before the tyranny
14 of
Gelo, and at
Rhodes15 the common people had fallen into
contempt before the rising against them. Revolutions in the constitutions also take place on
account of disproportionate growth; for just as the body
16 is
composed of parts, and needs to grow proportionately in order that its symmetry
may remain, and if it does not it is spoiled, when the foot is four cubits long
and the rest of the body two spans, and sometimes it might even change into the
shape of another animal if it increased disproportionately not only in size but
also in quality,
17 so also a state is composed of parts,
[
1303a]
[1]
one of which often grows without its being noticed, as for
example the number of the poor in democracies and constitutional states.
And sometimes this is also
brought about by accidental occurrences, as for instance at
Tarentum when a great many notables were
defeated and killed by the Iapygians a short time after the Persian wars a
constitutional government was changed to a democracy, and at
Argos when those in the seventh tribe
18 had been destroyed by the Spartan Cleomenes the
citizens were compelled to admit some of the surrounding people, and at
Athens when they suffered
disasters by land the notables became fewer because at the time of the war
against
Sparta the army was drawn
from a muster-roll.
19 And this happens also in
democracies, though to a smaller extent; for when the wealthy become more
numerous or their properties increase, the governments change to oligarchies and
dynasties.
20
And revolutions in constitutions
take place even without factious strife, owing to election intrigue, as at
Heraea21 (for they made their magistrates
elected by lot instead of by vote for this reason, because the people used to
elect those who canvassed); and also owing to carelessness, when people
allow men that are not friends of the constitution to enter into the sovereign
offices, as at Oreus
22 oligarchy was
broken up when Heracleodorus became one of the magistrates, who in place of an
oligarchy
[20]
formed a constitutional
government, or rather a democracy. Another cause is alteration by small stages;
by this I mean that often a great change of institutions takes place unnoticed
when people overlook a small alteration, as in
Ambracia the property-qualification was small, and finally men
hold office with none at all, as a little is near to nothing, or practically the
same. Also difference of race is a
cause of faction, until harmony of spirit is reached; for just as any chance
multitude of people does not form a state, so a state is not formed in any
chance period of time. Hence most of the states that have hitherto admitted
joint settlers or additional settlers
23 have split into factions; for example Achaeans
settled at
Sybaris24 jointly with
Troezenians, and afterwards the Achaeans having become more numerous expelled
the Troezenians, which was the Cause of the curse that fell on the Sybarites;
and at Thurii Sybarites quarrelled with those who had settled there with them,
for they claimed to have the larger share in the country as being their own, and
were ejected; and at
Byzantium
the additional settlers were discovered plotting against the colonists and were
expelled by force of arms; and the people of
Antissa25 after admitting the Chian
exiles expelled them by arms; and
the people of
Zancle26 after admitting settlers from
Samos were themselves expelled; and the people
of
Apollonia on the
Euxine Sea after bringing in additional
settlers fell into faction; and the Syracusans after the period of the
tyrants
27
[
1303b]
[1]
conferred citizenship on their foreign troops and mercenaries and then faction
set in and they came to battle; and the Amphipolitans having received settlers
from
Chalcis were most of them
driven out by them.
28
(And in oligarchies civil strife is
raised by the many, on the ground that they are treated unjustly because they
are not admitted to an equal share although they are equal, as has been said
before, but in democracies it begins with the notables, because they have an
equal share although they are not equal.)
29
Also
states sometimes enter on faction for geographical reasons, when the nature of
the country is not suited for there being a single city, as for example at
Clazomenae
30 the people near Chytrum are in feud with the inhabitants of
the island, and the Colophonians and the Notians
31; and
at
Athens the population is not
uniformly democratic in spirit, but the inhabitants of
Piraeus are more so than those of the
city. For just as in wars the fording of watercourses, even quite small ones,
causes the formations to lose contact, so every difference seems to cause
division. Thus perhaps the greatest division is that between virtue and vice,
next that between wealth and poverty, and so with other differences in varying
degree, one of which is the one mentioned.
32
Factions arise therefore not about but out of small matters; but they are
carried on about great matters. And even the small ones grow extremely violent
when they spring up among men of the ruling class,
[20]
as happened for example at
Syracuse in ancient times. For the constitution underwent a
revolution as a result of a quarrel that arose
33 between two young men, who belonged to the ruling class, about a
love affair. While one of them was abroad the other who was his comrade won over
the youth with whom he was in love, and the former in his anger against him
retaliated by persuading his wife to come to him; owing to which they stirred up
a party struggle among all the people in the state, enlisting them on their
sides. On account of this it is
necessary to guard against such affairs at their beginning, and to break up the
factions of the leaders and powerful men; for the error occurs at the beginning,
and the beginning as the proverb says is half of the whole, so that even a small
mistake at the beginning stands in the same ratio
34 to mistakes
at the other stages. And in general the faction quarrels of the notables involve
the whole state in the consequences, as happened at Hestiaea
35 after the Persian
wars, when two brothers quarrelled about the division of their patrimony; for
the poorer of the two, on the ground that the other would not make a return of
the estate and of the treasure that their father had found, got the common
people on his side, and the other possessing much property was supported by the
rich. And at
Delphi the beginning of all the factions
that occurred afterwards was when a quarrel arose out of a marriage;
[
1304a]
[1]
the
bridegroom interpreted some chance occurrence when he came to fetch the bride as
a bad omen and went away without taking her, and her relatives thinking
themselves insulted threw some articles of sacred property into the fire when he
was performing a sacrifice and then put him to death as guilty of sacrilege. And
also at
Mitylene36 a faction that arose out
of some heiresses was the beginning of many misfortunes, and of the war with the
Athenians in which Paches captured the city of
Mitylene: a wealthy citizen named Timophanes left two
daughters, and a man who was rejected in his suit to obtain them for his own
sons, Doxander, started the faction and kept on stirring up the Athenians, whose
consul he was at
Mitylene. And among the Phocians when a faction
arising out of an heiress sprang up in connection with Mnaseas the father of
Mnason and Euthykrates the father of Onomarchus,
37 this faction proved to be
the beginning for the Phocians of the Holy War. At Epidamnus also circumstances
relating to a marriage gave rise to a revolution in the constitution
38; somebody had betrothed his daughter, and the father of the
man to whom he had betrothed her became a magistrate, and had to sentence him to
a fine; the other thinking that he had been treated with insolence formed a
party of the unenfranchised classes to assist him. And also revolutions to oligarchy and democracy and
constitutional government arise from the growth in reputation or in power of
some magistracy or some section of the state;
[20]
as for example the Council on the Areopagus having risen in
reputation during the Persian wars was believed to have made the constitution
more rigid, and then again the naval multitude, having been the cause of the
victory off
Salamis and thereby of the
leadership of
Athens due to her
power at sea, made the democracy stronger; and at
Argos the notables having risen in repute in connection with
the battle against the Spartans at
Mantinea took in hand to put down the people; and at
Syracuse the people having been the cause of the victory in the
war against
Athens made a revolution
from constitutional government to democracy; and at
Chalcis the people with the aid of the
notables overthrew the tyrant Phoxus
39 and then immediately seized the government; and again at
Ambracia similarly the people
joined with the adversaries of the tyrant Periander in expelling him and then
brought the government round to themselves.
40
And indeed in general it must not
escape notice that the persons who have caused a state to win power, whether
private citizens or magistrates or tribes, or in general a section or group of
any kind, stir up faction; for either those who envy these men for being honored
begin the faction, or these men owing to their superiority are not willing to
remain in a position of equality. And constitutions also undergo revolution when
what are thought of as opposing sections of the state become equal to one
another,
[
1304b]
[1]
for instance the rich and the people, and there is no middle
class or only an extremely small one; for if either of the two sections becomes
much the superior, the remainder is not willing to risk an encounter with its
manifestly stronger opponent. Owing to this men who are exceptional in virtue
generally speaking do not cause faction, because they find themselves few
against many. Universally then in connection with all the forms of constitution
the origins and causes of factions and revolutions are of this nature.
The means
used to cause revolutions of constitutions are sometimes force and sometimes
fraud. Force is employed either when the revolutionary leaders exert compulsion
immediately from the start or later on—as indeed the mode of using
fraud is also twofold: sometimes the revolutionaries after completely deceiving
the people at the first stage alter the constitution with their consent, but
then at a later stage retain their hold on it by force against the people's
will: for instance, at the time of the Four Hundred,
41 they deceived the
people by saying that the Persian King would supply money for the war against
the Spartans, and after telling them this falsehood endeavored to keep a hold
upon the government; but in other cases they both persuade the people at the
start and afterwards repeat the persuasion and govern them with their
consent.
Speaking generally therefore in
regard to all the forms of constitution, the causes that have been stated are
those from which revolutions have occurred.
But in the light of these
general rules we must consider the usual course of events
[20]
as classified according to each different kind of
constitution. In democracies the principal cause of revolutions is the insolence
of the demagogues; for they cause the owners of property to band together,
partly by malicious prosecutions of individuals among them (for common
fear brings together even the greatest enemies), and partly by setting
on the common people against them as a class. And one may see this taking place in this manner in many
instances. In Cos the democracy was overthrown
42 when evil demagogues had arisen there,
for the notables banded themselves together; and also in
Rhodes,
43 for the demagogues used to provide pay for public
services, and also to hinder the payment of money owed
44 to the naval captains, and these
because of the lawsuits that were brought against them were forced to make
common cause and overthrow the people. And also at
Heraclea45 the people were put down
immediately after the foundation of the colony because of the people's leaders;
for the notables being unjustly treated by them used to be driven out, but later
on those who were driven out collecting together effected their return and put
down the people. And also the
democracy at
Megara was put down in
a similar manner
46;
the people's leaders in order to have money to distribute to the people went on
expelling many of the notables, until they made the exiles a large body, and
these came back and defeated the people in a battle and set up the oligarchy.
And the same thing happened also at Cyme
[
1305a]
[1]
in the time of the democracy
which Thrasymachus put down
47, and in the case of other states also examination
would show that revolutions take place very much in this manner. Sometimes they
make the notables combine by wronging them in order to curry favor, causing
either their estates to be divided up or their revenues by imposing public
services, and sometimes by so slandering them that they may have the property of
the wealthy to confiscate. And in
old times whenever the same man became both leader of the people and general,
they used to change the constitution to a tyranny; for almost the largest number
of the tyrants of early days have risen from being leaders of the people. And
the reason why this used to happen then but does not do so now is because then
the leaders of the people were drawn from those who held the office of general
(for they were not yet skilled in oratory), but now when
rhetoric has developed the able speakers are leaders of the people, but owing to
their inexperience in military matters they are not put in control of these,
except in so far as something of the kind has taken place to a small extent in
some places. And tyrannies also used
to occur in former times more than they do now because important offices were
entrusted to certain men, as at
Miletus a tyranny
48 arose out
of the presidency (for the president had control of many important
matters). And moreover, because the cities in those times were not
large but the common people lived on their farms
[20]
busily engaged in agriculture, the people's champions when they
became warlike used to aim at tyranny. And they all used to do this when they
had acquired the confidence of the people, and their pledge of confidence was
their enmity towards the rich, as at Athens Pisistratus made himself tyrant by
raising up a party against the men of the plain, and Theagenes at
Megara by slaughtering the cattle of the
well-to-do which he captured grazing by the river, and Dionysius
49
established a claim to become tyrant when he accused Daphnaeus and the rich,
since his hostility to them caused him to be trusted as a true man of the
people. And revolutions also take
place from the ancestral form of democracy to one of the most modern kind; for
where the magistracies are elective, but not on property-assessments, and the
people elect, men ambitious of office by acting as popular leaders bring things
to the point of the people's being sovereign even over the laws. A remedy to
prevent this or to reduce its extent is for the tribes to elect the magistrates,
and not the people collectively.
These then are
the causes through which almost all the revolutions in democracies take
place.
Oligarchies undergo revolution principally through two ways
that are the most obvious. One is if they treat the multitude unjustly; for
anybody makes an adequate people's champion, and especially so when their leader
happens to come from the oligarchy itself, like Lygdamis at
Naxos, who afterwards actually became tyrant
of the Naxians.
[
1305b]
[1]
Faction
originating with other people also has various ways of arising. Sometimes when
the honors of office are shared by very few, dissolution originates from the
wealthy themselves,
50 but not those that are in office, as for example has
occurred at
Marseilles,
51 at
Istrus,
52 at
Heraclea,
53 and in other states; for those who did not share in the
magistracies raised disturbances until as a first stage the older brothers were
admitted, and later the younger ones again (for in some places a father
and a son may not hold office together, and in others an elder and a younger
brother may not). At
Marseilles the oligarchy became more constitutional, while at
Istrus it ended in becoming
democracy, and in
Heraclea the
government passed from a smaller number to six hundred. At
Cnidus
also there was a revolution
54 of the oligarchy caused by a
faction formed by the notables against one another, because few shared in the
government, and the rule stated held, that if a father was a member a son could
not be, nor if there were several brothers could any except the eldest; for the
common people seized the opportunity of their quarrel and, taking a champion
from among the notables, fell upon them and conquered them, for a party divided
against itself is weak. Another case
was at Erythrae,
55 where at the time of the oligarchy of the
Basilidae in ancient days, although
[20]
the persons in the government directed affairs well, nevertheless the common
people were resentful because they were governed by a few, and brought about a
revolution of the constitution.
On the other hand,
oligarchies are overthrown from within themselves both
56 when from motives of rivalry they play
the demagogue (and this demagogy is of two sorts, one among the
oligarchs themselves, for a demagogue can arise among them even when they are a
very small body,—as for instance in the time of the Thirty at
Athens, the party of Charicles
rose to power by currying popularity with the Thirty, and in the time of the
Four Hundred
57 the party
of Phrynichus rose in the same way,—the other when the members of the oligarchy curry
popularity with the mob, as the Civic Guards at
Larisa58 courted popularity with the mob because it elected them, and in
all the oligarchies in which the magistracies are not elected by the class from
which the magistrates come but are filled from high property-grades or from
political clubs while the electors are the heavy-armed soldiers or the common
people, as used to be the case at
Abydos, and in places where the jury-courts are not made up
from the government
59—for there members of the
oligarchy by courting popular favor with a view to their trials cause a
revolution of the constitution, as took place at
Heraclea on the Euxine
60; and a
further instance is when some men try to narrow down the oligarchy to a smaller
number, for those who seek equality are forced to bring in the people as a
helper.) And revolutions in oligarchy also take place when they
squander their private means by riotous living; for also men of this sort seek
to bring about a new state of affairs, and either aim at tyranny themselves or
suborn somebody else
[
1306a]
[1]
(as Hipparinus put forward Dionysius
61 at
Syracuse, and at
Amphipolis62 a man named Cleotimus led the
additional settlers that came from
Chalcis and on their arrival stirred them up to sedition
against the wealthy, and in
Aegina the
man who carried out the transactions with Chares attempted to cause a revolution
in the constitution for a reason of this sort
63); so sometimes
they attempt at once to introduce some reform, at other times they rob the
public funds and in consequence either they or those who fight against them in
their peculations stir up faction against the government, as happened at
Apollonia on the Black Sea.
On the other hand, harmonious oligarchy does not easily cause its own
destruction; and an indication of this is the constitutional government at
Pharsalus, for there the ruling
class though few are masters of many men
64 because on good
terms with one another. Also
oligarchical governments break up when they create a second oligarchy within the
oligarchy. This is when, although the whole citizen class is small, its few
members are not all admitted to the greatest offices; this is what once occurred
in
Elis, for the government being in
the hands of a few, very few men used to become members of the Elders,
65 because
these numbering ninety held office for life, and the mode of election was of a
dynastic type
66 and resembled that of the Elders at
Sparta.
Revolutions
[20]
of oligarchies occur both during war and in
time of peace— during war since the oligarchs are forced by their
distrust of the people to employ mercenary troops (for the man in whose
hands they place them often becomes tyrant, as Timophanes did at
Corinth,
67 and
if they put several men in command, these win for themselves dynastic
power), and when through fear of this they give a share in the
constitution to the multitude, the oligarchy falls because they are compelled to
make use of the common people; during peace, on the other hand, because of their
distrust of one another they place their protection in the hands of mercenary
troops and a magistrate between the two parties, who sometimes becomes master of
both, which happened at
Larisa in the
time of the government of the Aleuadae led by Simus,
68 and at
Abydos in the time of the political
clubs of which that of Iphiades was one. And factions arise also in consequence of one set of the
members of the oligarchy themselves being pushed aside by another set and being
driven into party strife in regard to marriages or law-suits; examples of such
disorders arising out of a cause related to marriage are the instances spoken of
before, and also the oligarchy of the knights at
Eretria was put down
69 by Diagoras when he had
been wronged in respect of a marriage, while the faction at
Heraclea and that at
Thebes arose out of a judgement of a
law-court, when the people at
Heraclea
justly but factiously enforced the punishment against Eurytion on a charge of
adultery
[
1306b]
[1]
and those at
Thebes
did so against Archias; for their personal enemies stirred up party feeling
against them so as to get them bound in the pillory in the market-place.
Also many governments have been
put down by some of their members who had become resentful because the
oligarchies were too despotic; this is how the oligarchies fell at
Cnidus70 and at
Chios.
And revolutions also occur from an accident, both in what is called a
constitutional government and in those oligarchies in which membership of the
council and the law-courts and tenure of the other offices are based on a
property-qualification. For often the qualification first having been fixed to
suit the circumstances of the time, so that in an oligarchy a few may be members
and in a constitutional government the middle classes, when peace or some other
good fortune leads to a good harvest it comes about that the same properties
become worth many times as large an assessment, so that all the citizens share
in all the rights, the change sometimes taking place gradually and little by
little and not being noticed, but at other times more quickly.
Such then
are the causes that lead to revolutions and factions in oligarchies
(and generally, both democracies and oligarchies are sometimes altered
not into the opposite forms of constitution but into ones of the same class, for
instance
[20]
from legitimate
democracies and oligarchies into autocratic ones and from the latter into the
former).
In aristocracies factions arise in some cases because
few men share in the honors (which has also been said
71 to be the cause of
disturbances in oligarchies, because an aristocracy too is a sort of oligarchy,
for in both those who govern are few—although the reason for this is
not the same in both—since this does cause it to be thought that
aristocracy is a form of oligarchy). And this is most bound to come
about when there is a considerable number of people who are proud-spirited on
the ground of being equals in virtue (for example the clan called the
Maidens' Sons
72 at Sparta—for they were
descended from the Equals—whom the Spartans detected in a conspiracy
and sent away to colonize
Tarentum); or
when individuals although great men and inferior to nobody in virtue are treated
dishonorably by certain men in higher honor (for example Lysander by
the kings
73); or when a person of manly nature has no share in the
honors (for example Cinadon,
74
who got together the attack upon the Spartans in the reign of
Agesilaus). Faction in aristocracies also arises when some of the
well-born are too poor and others too rich (which happens especially
during wars, and this also occurred at
Sparta at the time of the Messenian War—as appears
from the poem of Tyrtaeus entitled
Law and Order;
[
1307a]
[1]
for some
men being in distress because of the war put forward a claim to carry out a
re-division of the land of the country). Also if a man is great and
capable of being yet greater, he stirs up faction in order that he may be sole
ruler (as Pausanias who commanded the army through the Persian war
seems to have done at
Sparta, and
Hanno
75 at
Carthage).
But the actual overthrow of both
constitutional governments and aristocracies is mostly due to a departure from
justice in the actual framework of the constitution. For what starts it in the
case of a constitutional government is that it does not contain a good blend of
democracy and oligarchy; and in the case of an aristocracy it is the lack of a
good blend of those two elements and of virtue, but chiefly of the two elements
(I mean popular government and oligarchy), for both
constitutional governments and most of the constitutions that are called
aristocracies aim at blending these. For this
76 is the point of distinction between
aristocracies and what are called constitutional governments, and it is owing to
this that some of them
77
are less and others more stable; for the constitutions inclining more towards
oligarchy men call aristocracies and those inclining more to the side of the
multitude constitutional governments, owing to which those of the latter sort
are more secure than the others, for the greater number is the stronger, and
also men are more content when they have an equal amount, whereas the owners of
wealthy properties, if the constitution gives them the superior
position,
[20]
seek to behave
insolently and to gain money. And
speaking broadly, to whichever side the constitution leans, that is the side to
which it shifts as either of the two parties increases its own side—a
constitutional government shifts to democracy and an aristocracy to oligarchy,
or to the opposite extremes, that is, aristocracy to democracy (for the
poorer people feeling they are unjustly treated pull it round to the
opposite) and constitutional governments to oligarchy (for the
only lasting thing is equality in accordance with desert and the possession of
what is their own). And the
change mentioned
78
came about at
Thurii, for because
the property-qualification for honors was too high, the constitution was altered
to a lower property-qualification and to a larger number of official posts, but
because the notables illegally bought up the whole of the land (for the
constitution was too oligarchical, so that they were able to grasp at
wealth) . . .
79 And
the people having been trained in the war overpowered the guards, until those
who were in the position of having too much land relinquished it.
Besides, as
all aristocratic constitutions are inclined towards oligarchy, the notables
grasp at wealth (for example at
Sparta the estates are coming into a few hands); and
the notables have more power to do what they like, and to form marriage
connections with whom they like (which was the cause of the fall of the
state of
Locri, as a result of the
marriage with Dionysius,
80 which would not have
taken place in a democracy; nor in a well-blended aristocracy).
[
1307b]
[1]
And aristocracies are most liable to undergo revolution
unobserved, through gradual relaxation, just as it has been said in what has
gone before about all forms of constitution in general, that even a small change
may cause a revolution. For when they give up one of the details of the
constitution, afterwards they also make another slightly bigger change more
readily, until they alter the whole system. This occurred for instance with the constitution of
Thurii. There was a law that the
office of general could be held at intervals of four years, but some of the
younger men, becoming warlike and winning high repute with the mass of the
guards, came to despise the men engaged in affairs, and thought that they would
easily get control; so first they tried to repeal the law referred to, so as to
enable the same persons to serve as generals continuously, as they saw that the
people would vote for themselves with enthusiasm. And though the magistrates in
charge of this matter, called the Councillors, at first made a movement to
oppose them, they were won over, believing that after repealing this law they
would allow the rest of the constitution to stand; but later, though they wished
to prevent them when other laws were being repealed, they could no longer do
anything more, but the whole system of the constitution was converted into a
dynasty of the men who had initiated the innovations.
And constitutions of all
forms
[20]
are broken up some times
from movements initiating from within themselves, but sometimes from outside,
when there is an opposite form of constitution either near by or a long way off
yet possessed of power. This used to happen in the days of the Athenians and the
Spartans; the Athenians used to put down oligarchies everywhere and the Spartans
democracies.
We have then approximately stated
the causes that give rise to revolutions in the constitutions of states and to
party factions.
The next thing to speak about is security both in general and
for each form of constitution separately. First then it is clear that if we know
the causes by which constitutions are destroyed we also know the causes by which
they are preserved; for opposites create opposites, and destruction is the
opposite of security. In well-blended constitutions therefore, if care must be
taken to prevent men from committing any other breach of the law, most of all
must a small breach be guarded against, for transgression of the law creeps in unnoticed, just as
a small expenditure occurring often ruins men's estates; for the expense is not
noticed because it does not come all at once, for the mind is led astray by the
repeated small outlays, just like the sophistic puzzle, ‘if each is
little, then all are a little.’
81 This is true in one way but in another it is not;
for the whole or total is not little, but made up of little parts. One thing
therefore that we must guard against is this beginning; and the next point is
that we must not put faith in the arguments strung together for the sake of
tricking the multitude,
[
1308a]
[1]
for they are refuted by the facts (and
what sort of constitutional sophistries we refer to has been said
before). And again we must
observe that not only some aristocracies but also some oligarchies endure not
because the constitutions are secure but because those who get in the offices
treat both those outside the constitution and those in the government well, on
the one hand by not treating those who are not members of it unjustly and by
bringing their leading men into the constitution and not wronging the ambitious
ones in the matter of dishonor or the multitude in the matter of gain, and on
the other hand, in relation to themselves and those who are members, by treating
one another in a democratic spirit. For that equality which men of democratic
spirit seek for in the case of the multitude is not only just but also expedient
in the case of their compeers. Hence
if there are a greater number in the governing class, many of the legislative
enactments of a democratic nature are advantageous, for example for the offices
to be tenable for six months, to enable all the compeers to participate in them;
for the compeers in this case are as it were the people (owing to which
demagogues often arise even among them, as has been said already), and
also oligarchies and aristocracies fall into dynasties less (for it is
not so easy to do wrongs
[20]
when in
office for a short time as when in for a long time, since it is long tenure of
office that causes tyrannies to spring up in oligarchies and democracies; for
either those who are the greatest men in either sort of state aim at tyranny, in
the one sort the demagogues and in the other the dynasts, or those who hold the
greatest offices, when they are in office for along time). And constitutions are kept secure not only
through being at a distance from destroyers but sometimes also through being
near them,
82 for
when they are afraid the citizens keep a closer hold on the government; hence
those who take thought for the constitution must contrive causes of fear, in
order that the citizens may keep guard and not relax their vigilance for the
constitution like a watch in the night, and they must make the distant near.
Again, they must also endeavor to guard against the quarrels and party struggles
of the notables by means of legislation, and to keep out those who are outside
the quarrel before they too have taken it over; since to discern a growing evil
at the commencement is not any ordinary person's work but needs a statesman.
And to deal with the revolution
from oligarchy and constitutional government that arises because of the
property-qualifications, when this occurs while the rates of qualification
remain the same but money is becoming plentiful, it is advantageous to examine
the total amount of the rated value of the community as compared with the past
amount, in states where the assessment is made yearly, over that period,
[
1308b]
[1]
and three years or five years ago in the larger states, and if
the new total is many times larger or many times smaller than the former one at
the time when the rates qualifying for citizenship were fixed, it is
advantageous that there should be a law for the magistrates correspondingly to
tighten up or to relax the rates, tightening them up in proportion to the ratio
of increase if the new total rated value exceeds the old, and relaxing them and
making the qualification lower if the new total falls below the old. For in oligarchies and constitutional
states, when they do not do this, in the one case
83 the result
is that in the latter an oligarchy comes into existence and in the former a
dynasty, and in the other case
84 a constitutional government turns into a
democracy and an oligarchy into a constitutional government or a government of
the people. But it is a policy common to democracy and oligarchy [and
to monarchy],
85 and every form of constitution not to raise
up any man too much beyond due proportion, but rather to try to assign small
honors and of long tenure or great ones quickly
86 (for officials grow corrupt, and not
every man can bear good fortune), or if not, at all events not to
bestow honors in clusters and take them away again in clusters, but by a gradual
process; and best of all to try so
to regulate people by the law that there may be nobody among them specially
pre-eminent in power due to friends or wealth, or, failing this, to cause their
periods out of office to be spent abroad.
[20]
And since men also cause revolutions through their private
lives, some magistracy must be set up to inspect those whose mode of living is
unsuited to the constitution—unsuited to democracy in a democracy, to
oligarchy in an oligarchy, and similarly for each of the other forms of
constitution. And also sectional prosperity in the state must be guarded against
for the same reasons; and the way to avert this is always to entrust business
and office to the opposite sections (I mean that the respectable are
opposite to the multitude and the poor to the wealthy), and to endeavor
either to mingle together the multitude of the poor and that of the wealthy or
to increase the middle class (for this dissolves party factions due to
inequality). And in every
form of constitution it is a very great thing for it to be so framed both by its
laws and by its other institutions that it is impossible for the magistracies to
make a profit. And this has most to be guarded against in oligarchies; for the
many are not so much annoyed at being excluded from holding office (but
in fact they are glad if somebody lets them have leisure to spend on their own
affairs) as they are if they think that the magistrates are stealing
the common funds, but then both things annoy them, exclusion from the honors of
office and exclusion from its profits. And indeed the sole way in which a combination of
democracy and aristocracy is possible is if someone could contrive this
arrangement
87;
[
1309a]
[1]
for it would then be possible
for the notables and also the multitude both to have what they want; for it is
the democratic principle for all to have the right to hold office and the
aristocratic one for the offices to be filled by the notables, and this will be
the case when it is impossible to make money from office; for the poor will not
want to hold office because of making nothing out of it, but rather to attend to
their own affairs, while the wealthy will be able to hold office because they
have no need to add to their resources from the public funds; so that the result
will be that the poor will become well-off through spending their time upon
their work, and the notables will not be governed by any casual persons.
Therefore to prevent peculation
of the public property, let the transfer of the funds take place in the presence
of all the citizens, and let copies of the lists be deposited for each
brotherhood,
88 company
89 and tribe; and to get men to hold office without
profit there must be honors assigned by law to officials of good repute. And in
democracies it is necessary to be sparing of the wealthy not only by not causing
properties to be divided up, but not incomes either (which under some
constitutions takes place unnoticed), and it is better to prevent men
from undertaking costly but useless public services like equipping choruses and
torch-races
90 and all other similar
services, even if they wish to;
[20]
in an oligarchy on the other
hand it is necessary to take much care of the poor, and to allot to them the
offices of profit, and the penalty if one of the rich commits an outrage against
them must be greater than if it is done by one of themselves,
91 and inheritance must not go
by bequest but by family, and the same man must not inherit more than one
estate, for so estates would be more on a level, and more of the poor would
establish themselves as prosperous. And it is expedient both in a democracy and in an oligarchy to assign to those
who have a smaller share in the government—in a democracy to the
wealthy and in an oligarchy to the poor—either equality or precedence
in all other things excepting the supreme offices of state; but these should be
entrusted to those prescribed by the constitution exclusively, or to them for
the most part.
There are some three qualities which those who are to hold the
supreme magistracies ought to possess, first, loyalty to the established
constitution, next, very great capacity to do the duties of the office, and
third, virtue and justice—in each constitution the sort of justice
suited to the constitution (for if the rules of justice are not the
same under all constitutions, it follows that there must be differences in the
nature of justice also). It is a difficult question how the choice
ought to be made when it happens that all these qualities are not found in the
same person;
[
1309b]
[1]
for instance, if one man is a good military commander but a bad
man and no friend of the constitution, and the other is just and loyal, how
should the choice be made? It seems
that two things ought to be considered, what is the quality of which all men
have a larger share, and what the one of which all have a smaller share?
Therefore in the case of military command one must consider experience more than
virtue, for men have a smaller share of military experience and a larger share
of moral goodness; but in the case of a trusteeship or a stewardship the
opposite, for these require more virtue than most men possess, but the knowledge
required is common to all men. And somebody might raise the question, why is
virtue needed if both capacity and loyalty to the constitution are forthcoming,
as even these two qualities will do what is suitable? May not the answer be,
because those who possess these two qualities may possibly lack self-control, so
that just as they do not serve themselves well although they know how to and
although they love themselves, so possibly in some cases they may behave in this
way in regard to the community also? And broadly, whatever provisions in the laws we describe as advantageous to
constitutions, these are all preservative of the constitutions, and so is the
supreme elementary principle that has been often stated, that of taking
precautions that the section desirous of the constitution shall be stronger in
numbers than the section not desirous off it. And beside all these matters one
thing must not be overlooked which at present is overlooked by the,
deviation-forms
92 of
constitution—the middle party;
[20]
for many of the institutions thought to be popular destroy
democracies, and many of those thought oligarchical destroy oligarchies.
But the adherents of the
deviation-form, thinking that this form is the only right thing, drag it to
excess, not knowing that just as there can be a nose that although deviating
from the most handsome straightness towards being hooked or snub nevertheless is
still beautiful and agreeable to look at, yet all the same, if a sculptor
carries it still further in the direction of excess, he will first lose the
symmetry of the feature and finally will make it not even look like a nose at
all, because of its excess and deficiency in the two opposite qualities
(and the same is the ease also in regard to the other parts of the
body), so this is what happens about constitutions likewise; for it is possible for an oligarchy and a
democracy to be satisfactory although they have diverged from the best
structure, but if one strains either of them further, first he will make the
constitution worse, and finally he will make it not a constitution at all.
Therefore the legislator and the statesman must not fail to know what sort of
democratic institutions save and what destroy a democracy, and what sort of
oligarchical institutions an oligarchy; for neither constitution can exist and
endure without the well-to-do and the multitude, but when an even level of
property comes about, the constitution resulting must of necessity be another
one,
[
1310a]
[1]
so that when men destroy these classes by laws carried to
excess they destroy the constitutions. And a mistake is made both in democracies and in
oligarchies—in democracies by the demagogues, where the multitude is
supreme over the laws; for they always divide the state into two by fighting
with the well-to-do, but they ought on the contrary always to pretend to be
speaking on behalf of men that are well-to-do, while in democracies the
oligarchical statesmen ought to pretend to be speaking on behalf of the people,
and the oligarchics ought to take oath in terms exactly opposite to those which
they use now, for at present in some oligarchies they swear, “And I
will be hostile to the people and will plan whatever evil I can against
them,”
93 but
they ought to hold, and to act the part of holding, the opposite notion,
declaring in their oaths, “I will not wrong the people.”
But the greatest of all the
means spoken of to secure the stability of constitutions is one that at present
all people despise: it is a system of education suited to the constitutions. For
there is no use in the most valuable laws, ratified by the unanimous judgement
of the whole body of citizens, if these are not trained and educated in the
constitution, popularly if the laws are popular, oligarchically if they are
oligarchical; for there is such a thing as want of self-discipline in a state,
as well as in an individual.But to
have been educated
[20]
to suit the
constitution does not mean to do the things that give pleasure to the adherents
of oligarchy or to the supporters of democracy, but the things that will enable
the former to govern oligarchically and the latter to govern themselves
democratically. But at present in the oligarchies the sons of the rulers are
luxurious, and the sons of the badly-off become trained by exercise and labor,
so that they are both more desirous of reform and more able to bring it about;
while in the democracies
thought to be the most democratic the opposite of what is expedient has come
about. And the cause of this is that they define liberty wrongly (for
there are two things that are thought to be defining features of democracy, the
sovereignty of the majority and liberty); for justice is supposed to be
equality, and equality the sovereignty of what ever may have been decided by the
multitude, and liberty doing just what one likes. Hence in democracies of this
sort everybody lives as he likes, and ‘unto what end he
listeth,’ as Euripides
94 says. But this is bad; for to live in
conformity with the constitution ought not to be considered slavery but
safety.
This therefore, speaking broadly, is a
list of the things that cause the alteration and the destruction of
constitutions, and of those that cause their “security and
continuance.”
It remains to speak of monarchy, the causes
that destroy it and the natural means of its preservation.
[
1310b]
[1]
And the things
that happen about royal governments and tyrannies are almost similar to those
that have been narrated about constitutional governments. For royal government
corresponds with aristocracy, while tyranny is a combination of the last form of
oligarchy
95
and of democracy; and for that very reason it is most harmful to its subjects,
inasmuch as it is a combination of two bad things, and is liable to the
deviations and errors that spring from both forms of constitution. And these two different sorts of monarchy
have their origins from directly opposite sources; royalty has come into
existence for the assistance of the distinguished against the people, and a king
is appointed from those distinguished by superiority in virtue or the actions
that spring from virtue, or by superiority in coming from a family of that
character, while a tyrant is set up from among the people and the multitude to
oppose the notables, in order that the people may suffer no injustice from them.
And this is manifest from the
facts of history. For almost the greatest number of tyrants have risen, it may
be said, from being demagogues, having won the people's confidence by slandering
the notables. For some tyrannies were set up in this manner when the states had
already grown great, but others that came before them arose from kings departing
from the ancestral customs and aiming at a more despotic rule,
[20]
and others from the men elected to fill the supreme
magistracies (for in old times the peoples used to appoint the popular
officials
96 and the sacred embassies
97 for long terms of office), and others from
oligarchies electing some one supreme official for the greatest magistracies.
For in all these methods they
had it in their power to effect their purpose easily, if only they wished,
because they already possessed the power of royal rule in the one set of cases
and of their honorable office in the other, for example Phidon in
Argos98 and others became
tyrants when they possessed royal power already, while the Ionian tyrants
99 and Phalaris
100 arose from offices of honor, and
Panaetius at Leontini and Cypselus at
Corinth and Pisistratus
101 at
Athens and
Dionysius
102 at
Syracuse and others in the
same manner from the position of demagogue. Therefore, as we said, royalty is ranged in correspondence
with aristocracy, for it goes by merit, either by private virtue or by family or
by services or by a combination of these things and ability. For in every
instance this honor fell to men after they had conferred benefit or because they
had the ability to confer benefit on their cities or their nations, some having
prevented their enslavement in war, for instance Codrus,
103 others having set them free, for instance Cyrus,
104 or having settled or acquired territory, for instance the kings
of
Sparta and
Macedon and the Molossians.
105
And a king wishes to be a guardian,
[
1311a]
[1]
to protect the owners of estates from suffering injustice and
the people from suffering insult, but tyranny, as has repeatedly been said, pays
regard to no common interest unless for the sake of its private benefit; and the
aim of tyranny is what is pleasant, that of royalty what is noble. Hence even in
their requisitions money is the aim of tyrants but rather marks of honor that of
kings; and a king's body-guard consists of citizens, a tyrant's of foreign
mercenaries. And it is manifest that
tyranny has the evils of both democracy and oligarchy; it copies oligarchy in
making wealth its object (for inevitably that is the only way in which
the tyrant's body-guard and his luxury can be kept up) and in putting
no trust in the multitude (which is why they resort to the measure of
stripping the people of arms, and why ill-treatment of the mob and its expulsion
from the city and settlement in scattered places is common to both forms of
government, both oligarchy and tyranny), while it copies democracy in
making war on the notables and destroying them secretly and openly and banishing
them as plotting against it and obstructive to its rule. For it is from them
that counter-movements actually spring, some of them wishing themselves to rule,
and others not
[20]
to be slaves. Hence
comes the advice of Periander to Thrasybulus,
106 his docking of the prominent cornstalks, meaning
that the prominent citizens must always be made away with.
Therefore, as was
virtually stated,
107 the causes of revolutions in
constitutional and in royal governments must be deemed to be the same; for
subjects in many cases attack monarchies because of unjust treatment and fear
and contempt, and among the forms of unjust treatment most of all because of
insolence, and sometimes the cause is the seizure of private property. Also the
objects aimed at by the revolutionaries in the case both of tyrannies and of
royal governments are the same as in revolts against constitutional government;
for monarchs possess great wealth and great honor, which are desired by all men.
And in some cases the attack is
aimed at the person of the rulers, in others at their office. Risings provoked
by insolence are aimed against the person; and though insolence has many
varieties, each of them gives rise to anger, and when men are angry they mostly
attack for the sake of revenge, not of ambition. For example the attack on the
Pisistratidae took place because they outraged Harmodius's sister and treated
Harmodius with contumely (for Harmodius attacked them because of his
sister and Aristogiton because of Harmodius, and also the plot was laid against
Periander the tyrant in
Ambracia108 because when drinking
[
1311b]
[1]
with his favorite he asked him
if he was yet with child by him),and the attack on Philip by Pausanias
109 was because he allowed him to be insulted by Attalus and
his friends, and that on Amyntas the Little
110 by Derdas
because he mocked at his youth, and the attack of the eunuch on Evagoras of
Cyprus was for revenge, for he
murdered him as being insulted, because Evagoras's son had taken away his wife.
And many risings have also
occurred because of shameful personal indignities committed by certain monarchs.
One instance is the attack of Crataeas on Archelaus
111; for he was always
resentful of the association, so that even a smaller excuse became sufficient,
or perhaps it was because he did not give him the hand of one of his daughters
after agreeing to do so, but gave the elder to the king of Elimea when hard
pressed in a war against Sirras and Arrabaeus, and the younger to his son
Amyntas, thinking that thus Amyntas would be least likely to quarrel with his
son by Cleopatra; but at all events Crataeas's estrangement was primarily caused
by resentment because of the love affair. And Hellanocrates of
Larisa also joined in the attack for the same reason; for
because while enjoying his favors Archelaus would not restore him to his home
although he had promised to do so, he thought that the motive of the familiarity
that had taken place
[20]
had been
insolence and not passionate desire. And
Pytho and Heraclides of
Aenus made away with Cotys
112 to avenge
their father, and Adamas revolted from Cotys because he had been mutilated by
him when a boy, on the ground of the insult. And also many men when enraged by the indignity of
corporal chastisement have avenged the insult by destroying or attempting to
destroy its author, even when a magistrate or member of a royal dynasty. For
example when the Penthilidae
113 at
Mitylene went about striking people with their staves Megacles
with his friends set on them and made away with them, and afterwards Smerdis
when he had been beaten and dragged out from his wife's presence killed
Penthilus. Also Decamnichus took a leading part in the attack upon Archelaus,
being the first to stir on the attackers; and the cause of his anger was that he
had handed him over to Euripides the poet to flog, Euripides being angry because
he had made a remark about his breath smelling. And many others also for similar reasons have been made
away with or plotted against. And similarly also from the motive of fear; for
this was one of the causes we mentioned in the case of monarchies, as also in
that of constitutional governments; for instance Artapanes
114 killed Xerxes fearing
the charge about Darius, because he had hanged him when Xerxes had ordered him
not to but he had thought that he would forgive him because he would forget, as
he had been at dinner. And other attacks on monarchs have been on account of
contempt,
[
1312a]
[1]
as somebody killed Sardanapallus
115 when he saw him combing
his hair with his women (if this story told by the narrators of legends
is true—and if it did not happen with Sardanapallus, it might quite
well be true of somebody else), and
Dion attacked the younger Dionysius
116 because he despised
him, when he saw the citizens despising him and the king himself always drunk.
And contempt has led some even
of the friends of monarchs to attack them, for they despise them for trusting
them and think they will not be found out. And contempt is in a manner the
motive of those who attack monarchs thinking that they are able to seize the
government; for they make the attempt with a light heart, feeling that they have
the power and because of their power despising the danger, as generals
commanding the armies attack their monarchs; for instance Cyrus attacked
Astyages
117 when he
despised both his mode of life and his power, because his power had waned and he
himself was living luxuriously, and the Thracian Seuthes attacked Amadocus
118 when his general. Others again attack monarchs for more than
one of these motives, for instance both because they despise them and for the
sake of gain, as Mithridates
119 attacked Ariobarzanes.
120 And it is men of bold nature
and who hold a military office with monarchs who most often make the attempt for
this reason; for courage possessing power is boldness,
[20]
and they make their attacks thinking that with
courage and power they will easily prevail. But with those whose attack is prompted by ambition the
motive operates in a different way from those spoken of before; some men attack
tyrants because they see great profits and great honors belonging to them, but
that is not the reason that in each case leads the persons who attack from
motives of ambition to resolve on the venture; those others are led by the
motive stated, but these attack monarchs from a wish to gain not monarchy but
glory, just as they would wish to take part in doing any other uncommon deed
that makes men famous and known to their fellows. Not but what those who make the venture from this motive
are very few indeed in number, for underlying it there must be an utter
disregard of safety, if regard for safety is not to check the enterprise; they
must always have present in their minds the opinion of
Dion, although it is not easy for many men to
have it;
Dion marched with a small
force against Dionysius, saying that his feeling was that, whatever point he
might be able to get to, it would be enough for him to have had that much share
in the enterprise—for instance, if it should befall him to die as soon
as he had just set foot in the country, that death would satisfy him.
And one way
in which tyranny is destroyed, as is each of the other forms of constitution
also, is from without,
[
1312b]
[1]
if some state with an opposite constitution is
stronger (for the wish to destroy it will clearly be present in such a
neighbor because of the opposition of principle, and all men do what they wish
if they have the power)—and the constitutions opposed to
tyranny are, on the one hand democracy, which is opposed to it as (in
Hesiod's phrase
121) ‘potter to potter,’
because the final form of democracy is tyranny, and on the other hand royalty
and aristocracy are opposed to tyranny because of the opposite nature of their
constitutional structure (owing to which the Spartans put down a very
great many tyrannies, and so did the Syracusans at the period when they were
governed well.) But one
way is from within itself, when the partners in it fall into discord, as the
tyranny of the family of Gelo
122
was destroyed, and in modern times
123 that of the family of Dionysius
124—Gelo's, when Thrasybulus the
brother of Hiero paid court to the son of Gelo and urged him into indulgences in
order that he himself might rule, and the son's connections banded together a
body of confederates in order that the tyranny might not be put down entirely
but only Thrasybulus, but their confederates seizing the opportunity expelled
them all; Dionysius was put down by
Dion, his relative, who got the people on to his side and
expelled him, but was afterwards killed. There are two causes that chiefly lead men to attack
tyranny, hatred and contempt; the former, hatred,
[20]
attaches to tyrants always, but it is their being despised that
causes their downfall in many cases. A proof of this is that most of those that
have won tyrannies have also kept their offices to the end, but those that have
inherited them almost all lose them at once; for they live a life of indulgence,
and so become despicable and also give many opportunities to their attackers.
And also anger must be counted
as an element in the hatred felt for them, for in a way it occasions the same
actions. And often it is even more active than hatred, since angry men attack
more vigorously because passion does not employ calculation (and
insolence most frequently causes men to be led by their angry tempers, which was
the cause of the fall of the tyranny of the Pisistratidae and many
others), but hatred calculates more; for anger brings with it an
element of pain, making calculation difficult, but enmity is not accompanied by
pain. And to speak summarily, all the things that we have mentioned as causing
the down fall of unmixed and extreme oligarchy and of the last form of democracy
must be counted as destructive of tyranny as well, since extreme oligarchy and
democracy are in reality divided
125
tyrannies. Royal government on the
other hand is very seldom destroyed by external causes, so that it is
long-lasting; but in most cases its destruction arises out of itself. And it is
destroyed in two ways,
[
1313a]
[1]
one when those who participate in it quarrel, and
another when the kings try to administer the government too tyrannically,
claiming to exercise sovereignty in more things and contrary to the law. Royal
governments do not occur any more now, but if ever monarchies do occur they are
rather tyrannies, because royalty is government over willing subjects but with
sovereignty over greater matters, but men of equal quality are numerous and no
one is so outstanding as to fit the magnitude and dignity of the office; so that
for this reason the subjects do not submit willingly, and if a man has made
himself ruler by deception or force, then this is thought to be a tyranny.
In cases of hereditary royalty
we must also set down a cause of their destruction, in addition to those
mentioned, the fact that hereditary kings often become despicable, and that
although possessing not the power of a tyrant but the dignity of a king they
commit insolent outrages; for the deposition of kings used to be easy, since a
king will at once cease to be king if his subjects do not wish him to be,
whereas a tyrant will still be tyrant even though his subjects do not wish
it.
These causes then and others of the same
nature are those that bring about the destruction of monarchies.
On the other
hand it is clear that monarchies, speaking generally, are preserved in safety as
a result of the opposite causes to those by which they are destroyed. But taking
the different sorts of monarchy separately—royalties are preserved by
bringing them
[20]
into a more moderate
form; for the fewer powers the kings have, the longer time the office in its
entirety must last, for they themselves become less despotic and more equal to
their subjects in temper, and their subjects envy them less. For this was the
cause of the long persistence of the Molossian royalty, and that of
Sparta has continued because the office was
from the beginning divided into two halves, and because it was again limited in
various ways by Theopompus,
126 in particular by
his instituting the office of the ephors to keep a check upon it; for by taking
away some of the kings' power he increased the permanence of the royal office,
so that in a manner he did not make it less but greater. This indeed as the
story goes is what he said in reply to his wife, when she asked if he felt no
shame in bequeathing the royal power to his sons smaller than he had inherited
it from his father: “Indeed I do not,” he is said to have
answered, “for I hand it on more lasting.”
Tyrannies on the
other hand are preserved in two extremely opposite ways. One of these is the
traditional way and the one in which most tyrants administer their office. Most
of these ordinary safeguards of tyranny are said to have been instituted by
Periander
127 of
Corinth, and also many such
devices may be borrowed from the Persian empire. These are both the measures
mentioned some time back to secure the safety of a tyranny as far as
possible—the lopping off of outstanding men and the destruction of the
proud,—and also the prohibition of common meals and club-fellowship
and education and all other things of this nature,
[
1313b]
[1]
in fact the close
watch upon all things that usually engender the two emotions of pride and
confidence, and the prevention of the formation of study-circles and other
conferences for debate,
128 and the employment of every means that will
make people as much as possible unknown to one another (for familiarity
increases mutual confidence); and for the people in the city to be always visible and to
hang about the palace-gates (for thus there would be least concealment
about what they are doing, and they would get into a habit of being humble from
always acting in a servile way); and all the other similar devices of
Persian and barbarian tyranny (for all have the same effect);
and to try not to be uninformed about any chance utterances or actions of any of
the subjects, but to have spies like the women called
‘provocatrices’ at
Syracuse and the ‘sharp-ears’ that used to
be sent out by Hiero wherever there was any gathering or conference
(for when men are afraid of spies of this sort they keep a check on
their tongues, and if they do speak freely are less likely not to be found
out); and to set men at
variance with one another and cause quarrels between friend and friend and
between the people and the notables and among the rich. And it is a device of
tyranny to make the subjects poor, so that a guard
129
[20]
may not be kept, and also that the people
being busy with their daily affairs may not have leisure to plot against their
ruler. Instances of this are the pyramids in
Egypt and the votive offerings of the Cypselids,
130 and
the building of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the Pisistratidae
131 and of the temples at
Samos, works of Polycrates
132 (for all these
undertakings produce the same effect, constant occupation and poverty among the
subject people); and the
levying of taxes, as at
Syracuse
(for in the reign of Dionysius
133 the result of taxation used to be that in five years men
had contributed the whole of their substance). Also the tyrant is a
stirrer-up of war, with the deliberate purpose of keeping the people busy and
also of making them constantly in need of a leader. Also whereas friends are a
means of security to royalty, it is a mark of a tyrant to be extremely
distrustful of his friends, on the ground that, while all have the wish, these
chiefly have the power. Also the
things that occur in connection with the final form of democracy
134 are all favorable to
tyranny—dominance of women in the homes, in order that they may carry
abroad reports against the men, and lack of discipline among the slaves, for the
same reason; for slaves and women do not plot against tyrants, and also, if they
prosper under tyrannies, must feel well-disposed to them, and to democracies as
well (for the common people also wishes to be sole ruler).
Hence also the flatterer is in honor with both—with democracies the
demagogue (for the demagogue is a flatterer of the people),
and with the tyrants those who associate with them humbly, which is the task of
flattery.
[
1314a]
[1]
In fact owing to this tyranny is a friend of the base; for
tyrants enjoy being flattered, but nobody would ever flatter them if he
possessed a free spirit—men of character love their ruler, or at all
events do not flatter him. And the base are useful for base business, for nail
is driven out by nail, as the proverb goes.
135
And it is a mark of a tyrant to
dislike anyone that is proud or free-spirited; for the tyrant claims for himself
alone the right to bear that character, and the man who meets his pride with
pride and shows a free spirit robs tyranny of its superiority and position of
mastery; tyrants therefore hate the proud as undermining their authority. And it
is a mark of a tyrant to have men of foreign extraction rather than citizens as
guests at table and companions, feeling that citizens are hostile but strangers
make no claim against him.
136 These and
similar habits are characteristic of tyrants and preservative of their office,
but they lack no element of baseness. And broadly speaking, they are all included under three heads; for tyranny
aims at three things, one to keep its subjects humble (for a
humble-spirited man would not plot against anybody), second to have
them continually distrust one another (for a tyranny is not destroyed
until some men come to trust each other, owing to which tyrants also make war on
the respectable, as detrimental
[20]
to
their rule not only because of their refusal to submit to despotic rule, but
also because they are faithful to one another and to the other citizens, and do
not inform against one another nor against the others); and the third
is lack of power for political action (since nobody attempts
impossibilities, so that nobody tries to put down a tyranny if he has not power
behind him). These then in
fact are the three aims to which the wishes of tyrants are directed; for all the
measures taken by tyrants one might class under these principles—some
are designed to prevent mutual confidence among the subjects, others to curtail
their power, and others to make them humble-spirited.
Such then is the nature of
one method by which security is obtained for tyrannies. The other tries to
operate in a manner almost the opposite of the devices mentioned. And it can be
ascertained from considering the downfall of royal governments. For just as one
mode of destroying royalty is to make its government more tyrannical, so a mode
of securing tyranny is to make it more regal, protecting one thing only, its
power, in order that the ruler may govern not only with the consent of the
subjects but even without it; for if he gives up this, he also gives up his
position as tyrant. But while this must stand as a fundamental principle, all
the other measures he may either adopt or pretend to adopt by cleverly acting
the royal part. The first step is
to be careful of the public funds,
[
1314b]
[1]
not squandering presents such as
the multitudes resent, when tyrants take money from the people themselves while
they toil and labor in penury and lavish it on mistresses and foreigners and
craftsmen, and also rendering account of receipts and expenditure, as some
tyrants have done already (for this careful management would make a
ruler seem a steward of the state and not a tyrant, and he need not be afraid of
ever being at a loss for funds while he is master of the state; on the contrary, for those tyrants who go
abroad on foreign campaigns this is actually more expedient than to leave their
money there collected into one sum, for there is less fear of those guarding it
making an attempt on power; since for tyrants campaigning abroad the keepers of
the treasury are more to be feared than the citizens, for the citizens go abroad
with him but the others stay at home). Secondly he must be seen to
collect his taxes and benevolences for purposes of administration and to meet
his occasional requirements for military emergencies, and generally must pose as
guardian and steward as it were of a public fund and not a private estate.
And his bearing must not be
harsh but dignified, and also such as to inspire not fear but rather
respect
[20]
in those who encounter
him, though this is not easy to achieve if he is a contemptible personality; so
that even if he neglects the other virtues he is bound to cultivate military
valor, and to make himself a reputation as a soldier. And further more not only
must he himself be known not to outrage any of his subjects, either boy or girl,
but so also must everybody about him, and also their wives must similarly show
respect towards the other women, since even the insolences of women have caused
the fall of many tyrannies. And in
regard to bodily enjoyments he must do the opposite of what some tyrants do now
(for they not only begin their debaucheries at daybreak and carry them
on for many days at a time, but also wish to be seen doing so by the public, in
order that people may admire them as fortunate and happy), but best of
all he must be moderate in such matters, or if not, he must at all events avoid
displaying his indulgences to his fellows (for not the sober man but
the drunkard is easy to attack and to despise, not the wakeful man but the
sleeper). And he must do
the opposite of almost all the things mentioned some time back, for he must lay
out and adorn the city as if he were a trustee and not a tyrant. And further he
must be seen always to be exceptionally zealous as regards religious observances
(for people are less afraid of suffering any illegal treatment from men
of this sort,
[
1315a]
[1]
if they think that their ruler has religious scruples and pays
regard to the gods, and also they plot against him less, thinking that he has
even the gods as allies), though he should not display a foolish
religiosity. And he must pay such
honor to those who display merit in any matter that they may think that they
could never be more honored by the citizens if they were in dependent; and
honors of this kind he should bestow in person, but inflict his punishments by
the agency of other magistrates and law-courts. And it is a protection common to
every sort of monarchy to make no one man great, but if necessary to exalt
several (for they will keep watch on one another), and if
after all the ruler has to elevate an individual, at all events not take a man
of bold spirit (for such a character is most enterprising in all
undertakings); and if he thinks fit to remove somebody from his power,
to do this by gradual stages and not take away the whole of his authority at
once. And again he should carefully
avoid all forms of outrage, and two beyond all, violent bodily punishments and
outrage of the young. And this caution must especially be exercised in relation
to the ambitious, for while to be slighted in regard to property annoys the
lovers of wealth, slights that involve dishonor are what men of honorable
ambition and high character resent.
[20]
Hence the tyrant should either not consort with men of this kind, or appear to
inflict his punishments paternally and not because of contempt, and to indulge
in the society of the young for reasons of passion, not because he has the
power, and in general he should buy off what are thought to be dishonors by
greater honors. And among those who
make attempts upon the life of a ruler the most formidable and those against
whom the greatest precaution is needed are those that are ready to sacrifice
their lives if they can destroy him. Hence the greatest care must be taken to
guard against those who think that insolent outrage is being done either to
themselves or to those who happen to be under their care; for men attacking
under the influence of anger are reckless of themselves, as Heraclitus
137 also observed when he said that anger
was hard to combat because it would buy revenge with a life. And since states consist of two parts, the poor
people and the rich, the most important thing is for both to think that they owe
their safety to the government and for it to prevent either from being wronged
by the other, but whichever class is the stronger, this must be made to be
entirely on the side of the government, as, if this support for the tyrant's
interests is secured, there is no need for him to institute a liberation of
slaves or a disarming of the citizens, for one of the two parts of the state
added to his power will be enough to make him and them stronger than their
attackers. But to discuss each of
such matters separately is superfluous; for the thing to aim at is clear,
[
1315b]
[1]
that it is necessary to appear to the subjects to be not a
tyrannical ruler but a steward and a royal governor, and not an appropriator of
wealth but a trustee, and to pursue the moderate things of life and not its
extravagances, and also to make the notables one's comrades and the many one's
followers. For the result of these methods must be that not only the tyrant's
rule will be more honorable and more enviable because he will rule nobler
subjects and not men that have been humiliated, and will not be continually
hated and feared, but also that his rule will endure longer, and moreover that
he himself in his personal character will be nobly disposed towards virtue, or
at all events half-virtuous, and not base but only half-base.
Nevertheless
oligarchy and tyranny
138 are less lasting than any of the constitutional governments.
For the longest-lived was the tyranny at
Sicyon, that of the sons
139 of Orthagoras and of
Orthagoras himself, and this lasted a hundred years.
140 The cause of
this was that they treated their subjects moderately and in many matters were
subservient to the laws, and Cleisthenes because he was a warlike man was not
easily despised, and in most things they kept the lead of the people by looking
after their interests. At all events it is said that Cleisthenes placed a wreath
on the judge who awarded the victory away from him, and some say that the
statue
[20]
of a seated figure in the
market-place is a statue of the man who gave this judgement. And they say that
Pisistratus
141 also
once submitted to a summons for trial before the Areopagus. And the second longest is the tyranny at
Corinth, that of the Cypselids,
142
for even this lasted seventy-three and a half years, as Cypselus was tyrant for
thirty years, Periander for forty-four,
143 and Psammetichus son of Gordias for three years. And
the reasons for the permanence of this tyranny also are the same: Cypselus was a
leader of the people and continuously throughout his period of office dispensed
with a bodyguard; and although Periander became tyrannical, yet he was warlike.
The third longest tyranny is
that of the Pisistratidae at
Athens,
but it was not continuous; for while Pisistratus
144 was tyrant he twice fled into exile,
so that in a period of thirty-three years he was tyrant for seventeen years out
of the total, and his sons for eighteen years, so that the whole duration of
their rule was thirty-five years. Among the remaining tyrannies is the one
connected with Hiero and Gelo
145 at
Syracuse, but
even this did not last many years, but only eighteen in all, for Gelo after
being tyrant for seven years ended his life in the eighth, and Hiero ruled ten
years, but Thrasybulus was expelled after ten months. And the usual tyrannies
have all of them been of quite short duration.
The
causes therefore of the destruction of constitutional governments and of
monarchies and those again of their preservation have almost all of them been
discussed.
[
1316a]
[1]
The subject of revolutions is discussed by Socrates in the
Republic,
146 but is not discussed
well. For his account of revolution in the constitution that is the best one and
the first does not apply to it particularly. He says that the cause is that
nothing is permanent but everything changes in a certain cycle, and that change
has its origin in those numbers ‘whose basic ratio 4 : 3 linked with
the number 5 gives two harmonies,’—meaning whenever the
number of this figure becomes cubed,—in the belief that nature
sometimes engenders men that are evil, and too strong for education to
influence—speaking perhaps not ill as far as this particular dictum
goes (for it is possible that there are some persons incapable of being
educated and becoming men of noble character), but why should this
process of revolution belong to the constitution which Socrates speaks of as the
best, more than to all the other forms of constitution, and to all men that come
into existence? and why merely by
the operation of time, which he says is the cause of change in all things, do
even things that did not begin to exist simultaneously change simultaneously?
for instance, if a thing came into existence the day before the completion of
the cycle, why does it yet change simultaneously with everything else? And in
addition to these points, what is the reason why the republic changes from the
constitution mentioned into the Spartan form
147? For
all constitutions more often change into the opposite form than into
the
[20]
one near them. And the same
remark applies to the other revolutions as well. For from the Spartan
constitution the state changes, he says, to oligarchy, and from this to
democracy, and from democracy to tyranny. Yet revolutions also occur the other
way about, for example from democracy to oligarchy, and more often so than from
democracy to monarchy. Again as to
tyranny he does not say whether it will undergo revolution or not, nor, if it
will, what will be the cause of it, and into what sort of constitution it will
change; and the reason for this is that he would not have found it easy to say,
for it is irregular; since according to him tyranny ought to change into the
first and best constitution, for so the process would be continuous and a
circle, but as a matter of fact tyranny also changes into tyranny, as the
constitution of
Sicyon148 passed from the tyranny
of Myron to that of Cleisthenes, and into oligarchy, as did that of
Antileon
149
at
Chalcis, and into democracy, as
that of the family of Gelo
150 at
Syracuse, and
into aristocracy, as that of Charilaus
151 at
Sparta
[and as at
Carthage].
152
And constitutions change from
oligarchy to tyranny, as did almost the greatest number of the ancient
oligarchies in
Sicily, at Leontini to
the tyranny of Panaetius,
153 at Gelo to that of Cleander, at
Rhegium to that of Anaxilaus,
154 and in many other cities similarly. And it is also a strange
idea that revolutions into oligarchy take place because the occupants of the
offices are lovers of money and engaged in money-making,
[
1316b]
[1]
but not because
owners of much more than the average amount of property think it unjust for
those who do not own any property to have an equal share in the state with those
who do; and in many oligarchies those in office are not allowed to engage in
business, but there are laws preventing it, whereas in
Carthage, which has a democratic
government,
155 the magistrates go
in for business, and they have not yet had a revolution. And it is also a strange remark
156 that the oligarchical state is two states, one of rich men and one of
poor men. For what has happened to this state rather than to the Spartan or any
other sort of state where all do not own an equal amount of wealth or where all
are not equally good men? and when nobody has become poorer than he was before,
none the less revolution takes place from oligarchy to democracy if the men of
no property become more numerous, and from democracy to oligarchy if the wealthy
class is stronger than the multitude and the latter neglect politics but the
former give their mind to them. And although there are many causes through which
revolutions in oligarchies occur, he mentions only one—that of men
becoming poor through riotous living, by paying away their money in interest on
loans—as if at the start all men or most men were rich. But this is not true, but although when
some of the leaders have lost their properties they stir up innovations, when
men of the other classes are ruined nothing strange happens;
[20]
and even when such a revolution does occur it is no
more likely to end in a democracy than in another form of constitution. And
furthermore men also form factions and cause revolutions in the constitution if
they are not allowed a share of honors, and if they are unjustly or insolently
treated, even if they have not run through all their property . . .
157 because of being allowed to do whatever they like;
the cause of which he states to be excessive liberty. And although there are
several forms of oligarchy and of democracy, Socrates speaks of the revolutions
that occur in them as though there were only one form of each.