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[21] That which is not in excess1 is good, whereas that which is greater than it should be, is bad. [22] And that which has cost much labor and expense, for it at once is seen to be an apparent good, and such a thing is regarded as an end, and an end of many efforts; now, an end is a good. Wherefore it was said: “ And they would [leave Argive Helen for Priam and the Trojans] to boast of,2
” and, “ It is disgraceful to tarry long,3
” and the proverb, “[to break] the pitcher at the door.”4 [23] And that which many aim at and which is seen to be competed for by many; for that which all aim at was recognized as a good, and the majority may almost stand for “all.” [24] And that which is the object of praise, for no one praises that which is not good. And that which is praised by enemies; for if even those who are injured by it acknowledge its goodness, this amounts to a universal recognition of it; for it is because of its goodness being evident that they acknowledge it, just as those whom their enemies praise are worthless.5 Wherefore the Corinthians imagined themselves insulted by Simonides, when he wrote, “ Ilium does not blame the Corinthians.6
” [25] And that which one of the practically wise or good, man or woman, has chosen before others, as Athene chose Odysseus, Theseus Helen, the goddesses Alexander Paris, and Homer Achilles. [26] And, generally speaking, all that is deliberately chosen is good.
Now, men deliberately choose to do the things just mentioned, and those which are harmful to their enemies, and advantageous to their friends, and things which are possible. [27] The last are of two kinds: things which might happen,7 and things which easily happen; by the latter are meant things that happen without labor or in a short time, for difficulty is defined by labor or length of time. And anything that happens as men wish is good; and what they wish is either what is not evil at all or is less an evil than a good, which will be the case for instance, whenever the penalty attached to it is unnoticed or light. [28] And things that are peculiar to them, or which no one else possesses,8 or which are out of the common; for thus the honor is greater. And things which are appropriate to them; such are all things befitting them in respect of birth and power. And things which they think they lack, however unimportant; for none the less they deliberately choose to acquire them. [29] And things which are easy of accomplishment, for being easy they are possible; such things are those in which all, or most men, or those who are equals or inferiors have been successful. And things whereby they will gratify friends or incur the hatred of enemies. And all things that those whom they admire deliberately choose to do. And those things in regard to which they are clever naturally or by experience; for they hope to be more easily successful in them. And things which no worthless man would approve, for that makes them the more commendable. And things which they happen to desire, for such things seem not only agreeable, but also better. [30] Lastly, and above all, each man thinks those things good which are the object of his special desire,
1 Reading ὅ. The ordinary reading οὗ is taken to mean “that which does not permit excess,” that which is midway between two extremes, the mean. Another suggested rendering is, “that of which one cannot have too much.”
2 Hom. Il. 2.160. Addressed by Hera to Athene, begging her to prevent the Greeks departing from Troy and leaving Helen behind.
3 Hom. Il. 2.298. Spoken by Odysseus. While sympathizing with the desire of the army to leave, he points out that it would be “disgraceful after waiting so long” to return unsuccessful, and exhorts them to hold out.
4 Proverbial for “lost labor.” Cf. French “faire naufrage au port,” and the English “there's many a slip 'twixt cup and lip.”
5 Meaning that they cannot have done their duty against their enemies, who would then have blamed them. Another suggested reading is οὓς οἱ φίλοι ψέγουσι καὶ οὓς οἱ ἐχθροὶ μὴ ψέγουσι （“those whom their friends blame and whom their enemies do not blame.”）
6 In the Iliad Glaucus, a Corinthian, is described as an ally of the Trojans. Simonides meant to praise, but the Corinthians were suspicious and thought his words were meant satirically, in accordance with the view just expressed by Aristotle. The Simonides referred to is Simonides of Ceos （Frag. 50, P.L.G. 3, where the line is differently given）. Aristotle is evidently quoting from memory, as he often does, although not always accurately.
7 γενόμενα ἄν: Spengel omits ἄν: i.e. “things which have happened.”
8 “Or which no one else has done” （Jebb）.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 22, translated by J. H. Freese. Aristotle. Cambridge and London. Harvard University Press; William Heinemann Ltd. 1926.
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