[363a]
urge the
necessity of being just, not by praising justice itself, but the good repute
with mankind that accrues from it, the object that they hold before us being
that by seeming to be just the man may get from the reputation office and
alliances and all the good things that Glaucon just now enumerated as coming
to the unjust man from his good name. But those people draw out still
further this topic of reputation. For, throwing in good standing with the
gods, they have no lack of blessings to describe, which they affirm the gods
give to pious men, even as the worthy Hesiod and Homer declare,
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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