[477e]
or in what class do you put
it?” “Into this,” he said, “the most
potent of all1 faculties.” “And opinion—shall
we assign it to some other class than faculty.” “By no
means,” he said, “for that by which we are able to opine
is nothing else than the faculty of opinion.2” “But not long ago you
agreed that science and opinion are not identical.” “How
could any rational man affirm the identity of the infallible with the
fallible?” “Excellent,” said I, “and
we are plainly agreed
1 Cf. Protagoras 352 B, Aristotle Eth. 1145 b 24.
2 For the various meanings of δόξα Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 47 “ the word δόξα may be used in this neutral, psychological sense; it may be taken unfavorably to denote mere opinion as opposed to knowledge, or favorably when true opinions and beliefs are set in antithesis to the appetites and instincts.”
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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