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[385a]

Socrates
It may be that you are right, Hermogenes; but let us see. Whatever name we decide to give each particular thing is its name?

Hermogenes
Yes.

Socrates
Whether the giver be a private person or a state?

Hermogenes
Yes.

Socrates
Well, then, suppose I give a name to some thing or other, designating, for instance, that which we now call “man” as “horse” and that which we now call “horse” as “man,” will the real name of the same thing be “man” for the public and “horse” for me individually, and in the other case “horse” for the public and “man” for me individually? Is that your meaning? [385b]

Hermogenes
Yes, that is my opinion.

Socrates
Now answer this question. Is there anything which you call speaking the truth and speaking falsehood?

Hermogenes
Yes.

Socrates
Then there would be true speech and false speech?

Hermogenes
Certainly.

Socrates
Then that speech which says things as they are is true, and that which says them as they are not is false?

Hermogenes
Yes.

Socrates
It is possible, then, to say in speech that which is and that which is not?

Hermogenes
Certainly.

Socrates
But is true speech true only as a whole, [385c] and are its parts untrue?

Hermogenes
No, its parts also are true.

Socrates
Are the large parts true, but not the small ones, or are all true?

Hermogenes
All, in my opinion.

Socrates
Is there, then, anything which you say is a smaller part of speech than a name?

Hermogenes
No, that is the smallest.

Socrates
And the name is spoken as a part of the true speech?

Hermogenes
Yes.

Socrates
Then it is, according to you, true.

Hermogenes
Yes.

Socrates
And a part of false speech is false, is it not?

Hermogenes
It is.

Socrates
Then it is possible to utter either a false or a true name, since one may utter speech that is either true or false? [385d]

Hermogenes
Yes, of course.

Socrates
Then whatever each particular person says is the name of anything, that is its name for that person?

Hermogenes
Yes.

Socrates
And whatever the number of names anyone says a thing has, it will really have that number at the time when he says it?

Hermogenes
Yes, Socrates, for I cannot conceive of any other kind of correctness in names than this; I may call a thing by one name, which I gave, and you by another, which you gave. And in the same way, I see that states have their own different names for the same things, [385e] and Greeks differ from other Greeks and from barbarians in their use of names.

Socrates
Now, Hermogenes, let us see. Do you think this is true of the real things, that their reality is a separate one for each person, as Protagoras said with his doctrine


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