Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 10
D. Spillan, A.M., M.D., Cyrus Evans, Ed.

5. On receiving his message, the dictator ordered the standards to move, and the troops to follow in arms. [2] But [p. 633]every thing was executed more quickly, almost, than ordered. The standards and arms were instantly snatched up, and they were with difficulty restrained from running impetuously on; both indignation at their late defeat stimulated them, as well as the shouts striking their ears with increasing vehemence, as the contest grew hotter. [3] They therefore urged each other, and pressed the standard-bearers to quicken their pace. The dictator, the more eagerly he saw them push forward, took the more pains to repress their haste, and ordered them to march at a slower rate. [4] On the other side, the Etrurians, putting themselves in motion, on the first beginning of the fray had come up with their whole force; and several expresses came to the dictator, one after another, that all the legions of the Etrurians had joined in the fight, and that his men could not any longer withstand them: at the same time, he himself saw, from the higher ground, in how perilous a situation the party was. [5] Confident, however, that the lieutenant-general was able, even yet, to support the contest, and considering that he himself was at hand to rescue him from defeat, he wished to let the enemy be fatigued, as much as might be, in order that, when in that state, he might fall on them with his fresh troops. [6] Slowly as these marched, the distance was now just sufficient for the cavalry to begin their career for a charge. The battalions of the legions marched in front, lest the enemy might suspect any secret or sudden movement, but intervals had been left in the ranks of the infantry, affording room for the horses to gallop through. [7] At the same instant the line raised the shout, and the cavalry, charging at full speed, poured on the enemy, and spread at once a general panic. [8] After this, as succour had arrived, almost too late, to the party surrounded, so now they were allowed entire rest, the fresh troops taking on themselves the whole business of the fight. Nor was that either long or dubious. [9] The enemy, now routed, fled to their camp, and the Romans advancing to attack it, they give way, and are crowded all together in the remotest part of it. [10] In their flight they are obstructed by the narrowness of the gates, the greater number climbed up on the mounds and ramparts, to try if they could either defend themselves with the aid of the advantageous ground, or get over, by any means, and escape. [11] One part of the rampart, happening to be badly compacted, [p. 634]sunk under the weight of the multitude who stood on it, and fell into the trench. On which, crying out that the gods had opened that pass to give them safety, they made their way out, most of them leaving their arms behind. [12] By this battle the power of the Etrurians was, a second time, effectually crushed, so that, engaging to furnish a year's pay, and corn for two months, with the dictator's permission, they sent ambassadors to Rome to treat of peace. [13] This was refused, but a truce for two years was granted to them. The dictator returned into the city in triumph. I have seen it asserted, that tranquillity was restored in Etruria by the dictator, without any memorable battle, only by composing the dissensions of the Arretians, and effecting a reconciliation between the Cilnian family and the commons. [14] Marcus Valerius was elected consul, before the expiration of his dictatorship, many have believed, without his soliciting the office, and even while he was absent; and that the election was held by an interrex. In one point all agree, that he held the consulship with Quintus Appuleius Pansa.