Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 10
Benjamin Oliver Foster, Ph.D., Ed.

28. but, though so far it was a doubtful battle and Fortune had given no indication where she intended to bestow her might, the fighting was very different on the right wing from what it was on the left. [2] The Romans with Fabius were rather defending themselves than attacking, and were trying to prolong the struggle to as late an hour in the day as possible. [3] this was because their general was persuaded that both Samnites and Gauls fought fiercely at the outset of an engagement, but only needed to be withstood; [4] when a struggle was prolonged, little by little the spirits of the Samnites flagged, while the physical prowess of the Gauls, who could least of all men put up with heat and labour, ebbed away, and, whereas in the early stages of their battles they were more than men, they ended with being less than women. [5] so until the time should come when the enemy were wont to fail, he was keeping his men as fresh as he could contrive to do. [6] but Decius, with the greater impetuosity of his youth and spirits, expended all the strength he could muster in the first encounter. [7] and because the fighting of the infantry seemed to languish, he called on the cavalry to attack, and attaching himself to the bravest squadron of troopers besought the youthful nobles to join him in a charge. theirs, he said, would be a double share [p. 467]of glory, if victory should come first to the left wing¹ and to the cavalry. twice they drove the Gallic cavalry back. [8] The second time they were carried on for a considerable distance and soon found themselves in the midst of the companies of infantry, when they were subjected to a new and terrifying kind of assault; [9] for, standing erect in chariots and waggons, armed enemies came rushing upon them with a mighty clattering of hoofs and wheels, frightening the horses of the Romans with the unfamiliar din. [10] thus the victorious cavalry were scattered, as if by a panic fit of madness, and, suddenly fleeing, were overthrown, both horse and rider. from them the disorder was communicated to the standards of the legions, and many of the first line were trodden underfoot, as horses and chariots swept through their ranks. [11] no sooner did the Gallic infantry perceive the confusion of their enemies than they charged, without leaving them a moment to recover or regain their breath.

[12] Decius cried out to them to tell him whither they were fleeing, or what hope they had in flight; he endeavoured to stop them as they broke and ran, and to call them back; then, his exertions proving powerless to stay their rout, he cried aloud on the name of his father Publius Decius. “why,” he asked, “do I seek any longer to postpone the doom of our house? [13] it is the privilege of our family that we should be sacrificed to avert the nation's perils. now will I offer up the legions of the enemy, to be slain with myself as victims to Earth and the Manes.”

[14] on going down into the field of battle he had ordered Marcus Livius the pontifex not to leave his side. he now commanded this man to recite before [p. 469]him the words with which he proposed to devote² himself and the enemy's legions in behalf of the army of the Roman People, the Quirites. [15] he was then devoted with the same form of prayer and in the same habit his father, Publius Decius, had commanded to be used, when he was devoted at the Veseris, in the Latin war³ ; and having [16??] added to the usual prayers that he was driving before him fear and panic, blood and carnage, and the wrath of gods celestial and gods infernal, and should [17??] blight with a curse the standards, weapons and armour of the enemy, and that one and the same place should witness his own destruction and that of the Gauls and Samnites, —having [18] uttered, I say, these imprecations upon himself and the enemy, he spurred his charger against the Gallic lines, where he saw that they were thickest, and hurling himself against the weapons of the enemy met his death.