Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 29
Frank Gardener Moore, Professor Emeritus in Columbia University, Ed.

4. Such were the laments into which men had fallen in consequence of the recent news when impending alarm roused them again to deliberate how they should meet the dangers of the moment. [2] It was decided to hold levies speedily in city and country; to send men to hire African auxiliaries; to fortify the city, to bring in grain, to provide arms offensive and defensive, to equip ships and send them to Hippo to face the Roman fleet. [3] While they were already thus employed the news at last came that Laelius, not Scipio, had sailed across and only sufficient forces to raid the farms; that the bulk of the main army was still in Sicily. [4] So there was a breathing spell, and they set about sending embassies to Syphax and other princes, to cement an alliance. To Philip also envoys were sent to promise him two hundred talents of silver, on condition that he should cross over into Sicily or Italy.¹ [5] Men were sent likewise to their own commanders in Italy, that by every sort of alarm they should keep Scipio there. [6] Not only envoys were sent to Mago but twenty-five war-ships, six thousand infantry, eight hundred horsemen, seven elephants, and in addition a large sum of money to hire auxiliaries. Relying upon these resources he was to advance nearer to the city of Rome with his army and unite with Hannibal.

[7] Such were their plans and deliberations at Carthage [p. 225]when Masinissa, aroused by the report of a Roman² fleet, came with a few horsemen to Laelius,³ who was carrying off a vast amount of booty from territory that lacked troops and garrisons. [8] Masinissa complained that Scipio was conducting the war without spirit in not having already transported his army to Africa, while the Carthaginians were panic-stricken and Syphax was entangled in wars with neighbours. He was certain, he said, that if Syphax should be given time to settle his affairs to his own satisfaction, there would be no real loyalty in his dealings with the Romans. [9] Laelius should exhort and spur Scipio on to avoid delay. For himself, although he had been driven out of his kingdom, he would assist with no inconsiderable forces of infantry and cavalry. Laelius also must not tarry in Africa. A fleet, he believed, had sailed from Carthage, and with that fleet it was unsafe to engage in the absence of Scipio.