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[*] 2921. Combinations of μήν: ἀλλὰ μήν ( . . . γε) but surely; but yet; nay, indeed; well, in truth. Often used to add something of greater importance, or in transitions when a new idea is opposed to the foregoing. ἀλλὰ μήν is often separated by a negative. ἦ μήν verily, verily. Often to introduce an oath or a threat. καὶ μήν and verily or and yet according to the context. καὶ μήν frequently introduces a new fact or thought and hence often denotes transition, sometimes opposition (further, however, and yet). In tragedy this formula is used to mark the beginning of a new scene, as when the arrival of a newcomer is thus signalized (but here comes); as ““καὶ μὴν ἄναξ ὅδε” and lo! here is the king” S. O. C. 549. In replies, καὶ μήν usually confirms the last remark, accedes to a request, or denotes hearty assent; sometimes there is an adversative sense (and yet; and (yet) surely; oh, but). In enumerations, καὶ μήν adds a new fact (and besides). και μὴν . . . γε in transitions or enumerations marks something of still greater importance; but it is not so strong as καὶ μὲν δή. Here γέ emphasizes the word or words with which it is immediately connected. In replies, and indeed, and yet or oh, but; as ““καὶ μὴν ποιήσω γε” and yet I will do it” S. El. 1045. καὶ μὴν καί (neg. καὶ μὴν οὐδέ) and in truth also. ου᾽ μήν surely not, ου᾽ μὴν ἀλλά nevertheless (2767), ου᾽ μὴν οὐδέ nor again (2768), οὐδὲ μήν and certainly not. τί μήν; lit. what indeed (quid uero), as ἀλλὰ τί μὴν δοκεῖς; but what in truth is your opinion? P. Th. 162b. τί μήν; standing alone, has the force of naturally, of course. Thus, λέγουσιν ἡμᾶς ὡς ὀλωλότας, τί μήν; they speak of us as dead, and why should they not? A. Ag. 672. Often in Plato to indicate assent. τί μὴν οὔ; (why indeed not=) of course I do.
American Book Company, 1920.
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