Tribūnus
a tribune; a word that seems originally to have indicated an officer connected with a tribe
(
tribus), or who represented a tribe for certain purposes; and this is
indeed the character of the officers who were designated by it in the earliest times of Rome,
and may be traced also in the later officers of this name.
1.
Tribunes of the three ancient Tribes.— At the time when
all the Roman citizens were contained in the three tribes of the Ramnes, Tities, and Luceres,
each of these was headed by a tribune, and these three tribunes represented their respective
tribes in all civil, religious, and military affairs; that is to say, they were in the city
the magistrates of the tribes, and performed the sacra on their behalf, and in times of war
they were their commanders. The
Tribunus
Celĕrum was the commander of the
Celeres, the king's
body-guard, and not the tribune of the tribe of the Ramnes, as is supposed by some modern
writers. In what manner the Tribunus Celerum was appointed is uncertain, but it is probable
that he was elected by the tribes; for we find that when the imperium was to be conferred
upon the king, the Comitia were held under the presidency of the Tribunus Celerum; and in the
absence of the king, to whom this officer was next in rank, he convoked the Comitia: it was
in an assembly of this kind that Brutus proposed to deprive Tarquinius of the imperium. A law
passed under the presidency of the Tribunus Celerum was called a
lex
tribunicia, to distinguish it from one passed under the presidency of the king. The
tribunes of the three ancient tribes ceased to be appointed when these tribes themselves
ceased to exist as political bodies, and when the patricians became incorporated in the local
tribes of Servius Tullius. See
Tribus.
2.
Tribunes of the Servian Tribes.—When Servius Tullius
divided the commonalty into thirty local tribes, we again find a tribune at the head of these
tribes. The duties of these tribunes, who were without doubt the most distinguished persons
in their respective districts, appear to have consisted at first in keeping a register of the
inhabitants in each district, and of their property, for purposes of taxation, and for
levying the troops for the armies. When subsequently the Roman people became exempted from
taxes, the main part of their business was taken from them, but they still continued to
exist. The
Tribuni Aerarii, who occur down
to the end of the Republic, were perhaps only the successors of the
tribunes of the tribes. When (B.C. 406) the custom of giving pay (
stipendium) to the soldiers was introduced, each of the Tribuni Aerarii had to collect
the
tributum (q. v.) in his own tribe, and with it to pay the soldiers;
and in case they did not fulfil this duty, the soldiers had the right of
pignoris capio against them. In later times their duties appear to have been confined
to collecting the
tributum, which they made over to the military
quaestors who paid the soldiers. (See
Quaestor.)
The Lex Aurelia, B.C. 70, called the Tribuni Aerarii to the exercise of judicial functions
along with the senators and equites, as these tribunes represented the body of the most
respectable citizens. But of this distinction they were subsequently deprived by Iulius
Caesar.
3.
Tribūni Plebis (
δήμαρχοι).—The ancient tribunes of the plebeian tribes had undoubtedly
the right of convoking the meetings of their tribes, and of maintaining the privileges
granted to them by King Servius, and subsequently by the Valerian laws. But this protection
was very inadequate against the insatiable ambition and usurpations of the patricians. When
the plebeians, impoverished by long wars, and cruelly oppressed by the patricians, at last
seceded in B.C. 494 to the Mons Sacer, the patricians were obliged to grant to the plebeians
the right of appointing tribunes (
tribuni plebis) with more efficient
powers to protect their own order than those which were possessed by the heads of the tribes.
The purpose for which they were appointed was only to afford protection against any abuse on
the part of the patrician magistrates; and that they might be able to afford such protection
their persons were declared sacred and inviolable, and it was agreed that whoever invaded
this inviolability should be an outlaw, and that his property should be forfeited to the
Temple of Ceres. A subsequent law enacted that no one should oppose or interrupt a tribune
while addressing the people, and that whoever should act contrary to this ordinance should
give bail to the tribunes for the payment of whatever fine they should affix to his offence
in arraigning him before the commonalty; if he refused to give bail, his life and property
were forfeited. The tribunes were thus enabled to afford protection to any one who appealed
to the assembly of the commonalty or required any other assistance. They were essentially the
representatives and the organs of the plebeian order, and their sphere of action was the
Comitia Tributa. With the patricians and their Comitia they had nothing to do. The tribunes
themselves, however, were not judges, and could inflict no punishments, but could only
propose the imposition of a fine to the commonalty (
multam irrogare).
The tribunes were thus in their origin only a protecting magistracy of the plebs, but in the
course of time their power increased to such a degree that it surpassed that of all other
magistrates, and the tribunes then became a magistracy for the whole Roman people, in
opposition to the Senate and the oligarchical party in general, although they had nothing to
do with the administration or the government. During the latter period of the Republic they
became true tyrants, and may be compared to the National Convention of France during the
first Revolution. At first the number of the tribunes was only two, but soon afterwards they
were increased to five, one being taken from each of the five classes, and subsequently
to ten, two being taken from each of the five classes. This last number appears to have
remained unaltered down to the end of the Empire. The tribunes entered upon their office on
the 10th of December, but were elected, at least in the time of Cicero, on the 17th of July.
It is almost superfluous to state that none but plebeians were eligible to the office of
tribune; hence when, towards the end of the Republic, patricians wished to obtain the office,
they were obliged first to renounce their own order and to become plebeians; hence also,
under the Empire, it was thought that the
princeps (q. v.) should not be
tribune because he was a patrician. But the influence which belonged to this office was too
great for the emperors not to covet it. Hence Augustus was made tribune for life. During the
Republic, however, the old regulation remained in force, even after the tribunes had ceased
to be the protectors of the plebs alone. There is only one instance recorded in which
patricians were elected to the tribuneship, and this was probably the consequence of an
attempt to divide the tribuneship between the two orders. Although nothing appears to be more
natural than that the tribunes should originally have been elected by that body of Roman
citizens which they represented, yet the subject is involved in considerable obscurity. Some
writers state that they were elected by the Comitia Curiata; others suppose that they were
elected in the Comitia Centuriata; but whether they were elected in the latter or in the
Comitia of the Tribes, it is certain that at first the sanction of the curies to the election
was at all events necessary. But after the time of the Lex Publilia (B.C. 472) the sanction
of the curies is not heard of, and the election of the tribunes was left entirely to the
Comitia Tributa, which were convoked and held for this purpose by the old tribunes previous
to the expiration of their office. One of the old tribunes was appointed by lot to preside at
the election. As the meeting could not be prolonged after sunset, and the business was to be
completed in one day, it sometimes happened that it was obliged to break up before the
election was completed, and then those who were elected filled up the legitimate number of
the college by
coöptatio. But in order to prevent this
irregularity, the tribune L. Trebonius, in B.C. 448, got an ordinance passed, according to
which the college of the tribunes should never be completed by
coöptatio, but the elections should be continued on the second day, if they
were not completed on the first, till the number ten was made up. The place where the
election of the tribunes was held was originally and lawfully the Forum, afterwards also the
Campus Martius, and sometimes the area of the Capitol.
We now proceed to trace the gradual growth of the tribunitian power. Although its original
character was merely protection (
auxilium or
βοήθεια) against patrician magistrates, the plebeians appear early to have
regarded their tribunes also as mediators or arbitrators in matters among themselves. The
whole power possessed by the college of tribunes was designated by the name
tribunicia potestas, and extended at no time farther than one mile beyond the gates
of the city; at a greater distance than this they came under the imperium of the magistrates,
like every other citizen. As they were the public guardians, it was
necessary that every one should have access to them at any time; hence the doors of their
houses were open day and night for all who were in need of help and protection, which they
were empowered to afford against any one, even against the highest magistrates. For the same
reason a tribune was not allowed to be absent from the city for a whole day, except during
the Feriae Latinae, when the whole people were assembled on the Alban Mount. In B.C. 456 the
tribunes, in opposition to the consuls, assumed the right of convoking the Senate, in order
to lay before it a rogation, and discuss the same; for until that time the consuls alone had
had the right of laying
plebiscita before the Senate for approbation.
Some years after, B.C. 452, the tribunes demanded of the consuls to request the Senate to
make a
senatusconsultum for the appointment of persons to frame a new
legislation; and during the discussions on this subject the tribunes themselves were present
in the Senate. The written legislation which the tribunes then wished can only have related
to their own order; but as such a legislation would only have widened the breach between the
two orders, they afterwards gave way to the remonstrances of the patricians, and the new
legislation was to embrace both orders. From the second decemvirate the tribuneship was
suspended, but was restored after the legislation was completed, and now assumed a different
character from the change that had taken place in the tribes. (See
Tribus.) The tribunes now had the right to be present at the
deliberations of the Senate; but they did not sit among the senators themselves, but upon
benches before the opened doors of the senate-house. The inviolability of the tribunes, which
had before only rested upon a contract between the two estates, was now sanctioned and
confirmed by a law of M. Horatius. As the tribes now also included the patricians and their
clients, the tribunes might naturally be asked to interpose on behalf of any citizen, whether
patrician or plebeian. Hence the patrician ex-decemvir Appius Claudius implored the
protection of the tribunes. About this time the tribunes also acquired the right of taking
the auspices in the assemblies of the tribes. They also assumed again the right, which they
had exercised before the time of the decemvirate, of bringing patricians who had violated the
rights of the plebeians before the Comitia of the Tribes. By the Lex Valeria, passed in the
Comitia Centuriata (B.C. 449), it was enacted that a plebiscitum, which had been voted by the
tribes, should bind the patricians as well. While the college thus gained outwardly new
strength every day, a change took place in its internal organization which to some extent
paralyzed its powers. Before B.C. 394, everything had been decided in the college by a
majority; but about this time, we do not know how, a change was introduced, which made the
opposition (
intercessio) of one tribune sufficient to render a
resolution of his colleagues void. This new regulation does not appear in operation till 394
and 393 b.c.; the old one was still applied in B.C. 421 and 415.
From their right of appearing in the Senate, and of taking part in its discussions, and from
their being the representatives of the whole people, they gradually obtained the right of
intercession against any action which a magistrate might undertake during the time of his
office, and this even without giving any reason for it. Thus we find a tribune
preventing a consul from convoking the Senate, and preventing the proposal of new laws or
elections in the Comitia; they interceded against the official functions of the censors; and
even against a command issued by the praetor. In the same manner a tribune might place his
veto upon an ordinance of the Senate; and he could thus either compel the Senate to submit
the subject to a fresh consideration, or could raise the session. In order to propose a
measure to the Senate they might themselves convene a meeting, or when it had been convened
by a consul they might make their proposal even in opposition to the consul, a right which no
other magistrates had in the presence of the consuls. The Senate, on the other hand, had
itself, in certain cases, recourse to the tribunes. Thus, in B.C. 431 it requested the
tribunes to compel the consuls to appoint a dictator, in compliance with a decree of the
Senate, and the tribunes compelled the consuls, by threatening them with imprisonment, to
appoint A. Postumius Tubertus dictator. From this time forward we meet with several instances
in which the tribunes compelled the consuls to comply with the decrees of the Senate,
si non essent in auctoritate senatus, and to execute its commands. In their
relation to the Senate a change was introduced by the
plebiscitum Atinium,
which ordained that a tribune, by virtue of his office, should be a senator. When this
plebiscitum was made is uncertain; but we know that in B.C. 170 it was not yet in operation.
It probably originated with C. Atinius, who was tribune in B.C. 132. But as the quaestorship,
at least in later times, was the office which persons held previously to the tribuneship, and
as the quaestorship itself conferred upon a person the right of a senator, the law of Atinius
was in most cases superfluous.
In their relation to other magistrates we may observe, that the right of
intercessio was not confined to stopping a magistrate in his proceedings, but they
might even command their
viatores to seize a consul or a censor, to
imprison him, or to throw him from the Tarpeian Rock. When the tribunes brought an accusation
against any one before the people, they had the right of
prehensio, but
not the right of
vocatio; that is, they might command a person to be
dragged by their
viatores before the Comitia, but they could not summon
him. They might, as in earlier times, propose a fine to be inflicted upon the person accused
before the Comitia, but in some cases they dropped this proposal and treated the case as a
capital one. The college of tribunes had also the power of making edicts. In cases in which
one member of the college opposed a resolution of his colleagues nothing could be done, and
the measure was dropped; but this useful check was removed by the example of Tiberius
Gracchus, in which a precedent was given for proposing to the people that a tribune
obstinately persisting in his veto should be deprived of his office. From the time of the
Hortensian law the power of the tribunes had been gradually rising to such a height that at
length it was superior to every other in the State. They had acquired the right of proposing
to the Comitia Tributa or the Senate measures on nearly all the important affairs of the
State, and it would be endless to enumerate the cases in which their power was manifested.
Their proposals were indeed usually made
ex auctoritate senatus, or had
been communicated to and approved by it; but in cases in which the people
itself had a direct interest, such as a general legal regulation, granting of the franchise,
a change in the duties and powers of a magistrate, and others, might be brought before the
people, without their having been previously communicated to the Senate, though there are
also instances of the contrary. Subjects belonging to the administration could not be brought
before the tribes without the tribunes having previously received through the consuls the
auctoritas of the Senate. This, however, was done very frequently, and
hence we have mention of a number of plebiscita on matters of administration. It sometimes
even occurs that the tribunes brought the question concerning the conclusion of peace before
the tribes, and then compelled the Senate to ratify the resolution, as expressing the wish of
the whole people. Sulla , in his reform of the constitution on the early aristocratic
principles, left to the tribunes only the
ius auxiliandi, and deprived
them of the right of making legislative or other proposals, either to the Senate or the
Comitia, without having previously obtained the sanction of the Senate. But this arrangement
did not last, for Pompey restored to them their former rights. During the latter period of
the Republic, when the office of quaestor was in most cases held immediately before that of
tribune, the tribunes were generally elected from among the senators, and this continued to
be the case under the Empire. Sometimes, however,
equites also obtained
the office, and thereby became members of the Senate, where they were considered of equal
rank with the quaestors. The tribunes of the people continued to exist down to the fifth
century of our era, though their powers became naturally much limited, especially in the
reign of Nero. They continued, however, to have the right of intercession against decrees of
the Senate, and on behalf of injured individuals. See R. Müller,
Gesetz
der zehn Tribunen (Berlin, 1877); and the account in
Bouché-Leclercq,
Institutions Romaines (Paris, 1886);
Mommsen,
Röm. Staatsrecht (Leipzig, 1876); and for a
simpler treatment, see Marlot,
Précis des Institutions Politiques de
Rome (Paris, 1886).
4.
Tribūni milĭtum cum consulāri
potestate.—When in B.C. 445 the tribune C. Canuleius brought forward the
rogation that the consulship should not be confined to either order, the patricians evaded
the attempt by a change in the constitution; the powers which had hitherto been united in the
consulship were now divided between two magistrates—viz., the
tribuni militum cum consulari potestate and the censors. Consequently, in B.C. 444,
three military tribunes, with consular power, were appointed, and to this office the
plebeians were to be equally eligible with the patricians. For the years following, however,
the people were to be at liberty, on the proposal of the Senate, to decide whether consuls
were to be elected according to the old customs, or consular tribunes. Henceforth, for many
years, sometimes consuls and sometimes consular tribunes were appointed, and the number of
the latter varied from three to four, until in B.C. 405 it was increased to six, and, as the
censors were regarded as their colleagues, we have sometimes mention of eight tribunes. At
last, however, in B.C. 367, the office of these tribunes was abolished by the Licinian law,
and the consulship was restored. These consular tribunes were elected in the Comitia
Centuriata, and undoubtedly with less solemn auspices than the consuls.
5.
Tribūni Militāres. See
Tribūni Militum, p. 1601.
