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511. It will be noticed that when the leading condition is unreal (as in EUR. Supp. 1084, PLAT. Ap. 17 D, and DEM. iv. 1, above), this makes all subordinate past or present conditions also unreal, so far as the supposed case is concerned, without regard to their own nature. Thus, in DEM. iv. 1 and xxxiii. 25 we have two directly opposite suppositions both stated as contrary to fact, which could not be unless the leading supposition had made the whole state of things supposed in the sentence unreal like itself. It is obvious, therefore, that such a subordinate condition may refer to a case which is not in itself unreal, although it is part of a supposition which as a whole is unreal. This can be seen more easily in English. We can say, if he had been an Athenian, he would have been laughed at if he had talked as he did; but we are far from implying that the latter supposition (the subordinate one) is contrary to fact, although it would be expressed in Greek by εἰ ἔλεγεν. Still it is part of a supposed unreal state of things. This explains an apparent inconsistency in respect to sentences like εἰκὸς ἦν σε τοῦτο παθεῖν, you ought properly to have suffered this, when the opposite of the infinitive is implied (415), the expression being practically equivalent (as a conditional form) to τοῦτο ἔπαθες ἂν εἰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἔπαθες. As τοῦτο and τὸ εἰκός are here identical, the apodosis is denied in the denial of the protasis. But if a new unreal protasis is added, the opposite of the infinitive is not necessarily implied (see 422, DEM. 1); and if we add a concessive protasis and say καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἠδίκησας, εἰκὸς ἦν σε τοῦτο παθεῖν, even if you had done nothing unjust, you ought (still) to have suffered this, τοῦτο generally represents what actually took place (see 422, DEM. 2). Here a new chief protasis has come in and changed the whole relation of the apodosis to the sentence. This offers a satisfactory explanation of the apparent anomaly in SOPH. OT 221 , οὐ γὰρ ἂν μακρὰν ἴχνευον αὐτὸς, μὴ οὐκ ἔχων τι σύμβολον, where μὴ οὐκ ἔχων is obviously equivalent to the condition εἰ μὴ εἶχον, while there is yet no such opposite implied as but I have a clue. The chief condition lies in the emphatic αὐτός, which is especially forcible after ξένος μέν and ξένος δέ, and involves εἰ μόνος ἴχνευον. The meaning is, for I should not be very far on the track, if I were attempting to trace it alone without a clue. Thus without a clue becomes part of the unreal supposition without being itself contrary to fact, while μή in μὴ οὐκ ἔχων shows that ἔχων is conditional, and not merely descriptive (as if it were οὐκ ἔχων). For μὴ οὐ with the participle, see 818.

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