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[*] 599. The examples in 598 have one common character: in all of them the thought could be expressed equally well by ὥστε with the infinitive or ὥστε with a finite verb, for even in EUR. Ph. 1357 and DEM. liii. 1 a fact rather than a mere tendency is expressed. We can, therefore, easily suppose a mixture of two constructions by which, for example in EUR. Hel. 107, instead of ὥστε μὴ εἶναι or ὥστε οὐκ ἔστιν, either of which would express the sense, we have ὥστε οὐκ εἶναι.1 This occasional confusion would be made easier by familiarity with ὥστε οὐ and the infinitive in indirect discourse.
1 The explanation of ὥστε οὐ with the infinitive on the ground of oratio obliqua was first made, I believe, by Shilleto in the Appendix to his Demosthenes de Falsa Legatione (1844). It is also given by Madvig ( Synt.§ 205, Anm. 3), who confines ὥστε οὐ to clauses depending on the infinitive of oratio obliqua after verbs like φημί, οἶμαι, etc. (i.e. like the examples in 594). Shilleto's faith in his own explanation was somewhat shaken by finding that four of the passages quoted in 598 could not be brought under his canon. Under the influence of Shilleto's essay, I originally suggested the mixture of two equivalent constructions given above, as applicable to all cases of ὥστε οὐ, not appreciating the wide influence of the principle of oratio obliqua upon the construction.
Macmillan. London, Melbourne, Toronto. 1889. reprint edition:. St. Martin's Press. New York. 1965.
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