CHAPTER XXXIV
Protagoras gives up what he had contended for before, and
contents himself with saying that courage alone is quite different
from its sister virtues. Socrates endeavours to identify courage
and knowledge in a cumbrous proof, against the validity of
which Protagoras rightly protests.
2.
μόρια μέν. The antithesis to
μέν was already expressed in
ἔφησθα οὖν σὺ οὐκ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ ἑνὶ εἶναι 349B
4.
ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία κτλ. Protagoras therefore yields to Socrates'
arguments so far as they have yet gone, and takes his stand on
the only virtue the relation of which to the others has not yet
been discussed: see on
333Cand D and Introduction, p. xiii.
7.
ἀκολαστοτάτους—ἀνδρειοτάτους δέ: like Otho (Tac.
Hist. II. 49), apropos of whose death Merivale quotes the lines
of Byron, which well illustrate the sentiment of Plato:
And strange to say, the sons of pleasure,
They who have revelled beyond measure
In beauty, wassail, wine and treasure,
Die calm, and calmer oft than he
Whose heritage was misery.
8.
ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφερόντως. The extreme difference
(cf.
πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρον in l. 4) between courage and the other
virtues is brought out by representing those most lacking in the
other virtues as sometimes ‘supremely brave beyond all others’:
below in
359Bthe
διαφερόντως is omitted as unnecessary in a
recapitulation. Sauppe quotes
Tim. 23C ἡ νῦν Ἀθηναίων οὖσα πόλις
ἀρίστη πρός τε τὸν πόλεμον καὶ κατὰ πάντα εὐνομωτάτη διαφερόντως:
cf. also
Gorg. 487B αἰσχυντηροτέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος. Various
suggestions have been proposed, but the text is sound.
ἔχε δή. ‘Hac sistendi formula aut monetur, qui rectam
viam ingressus est, ut caveat, ut hic et Gorg. 460A, aut revocatur,
qui a recta aberravit, ut Prot.
349Drsquo; (Wohlrab on
Theaet. 186B).
9.
πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους κτλ. Socrates
proceeds by reasoning thus: (1)
ἀνδρεῖοι are
θαρραλέοι; (2)
ἐπιστήμονες are
θαρραλέοι (
349E l. 16 to
350B l. 25); (3) none who
are
θαρραλέοι without
ἐπιστήμη are
ἀνδρεῖοι (
350B ll. 25-30).
From this he infers that
σοφοί (i.e.
ἐπιστήμονες) are
ἀνδρεῖοι, i.e.
that
σοφία is
ἀνδρεία. The reasoning is far from cogent. In the
first place, we have to
assume (it is nowhere stated) that
θαρραλέοι contains two classes and no more, viz.
θαρραλέοι with
knowledge and
θαρραλέοι without knowledge: the assumption
would be (to Socrates) a
natural one, since (according to
the reasoning in ch. XIX ff.)
every one who is not
ἐπιστήμων is
ἀνεπιστήμων. Now as
ἀνδρεῖοι are
θαρραλέοι and no
ἀνεπιστήμονες (in the class
θαρραλέοι) are
ἀνδρεῖοι, it follows
that
ἀνδρεῖοι are
ἐπιστήμονες,
but even then the conclusion
of Socrates is not warranted—
that
ἐπιστήμονες are
ἀνδρεῖοι,
since
ἀνδρεῖοι may be only a
part of
ἐπιστήμονες. Socrates
—consciously or unconsciously—covers his erroneous reasoning
by another fallacy when about to draw his conclusion in
350B, ll. 31 and 34, where see note.
10.
καὶ ἴτας γ᾽, ἔφη: i.e. they not only have
θάρρος (which
may be quiescent) but they put it into action. In
ἰέναι Protagoras
contrives to give the derivation of
ἴτης: Sauppe refers to the
scholiast on
Ar. Clouds, 444 ἴτης. ἰταμός, ἀναιδής, καὶ δι᾽ αὐτῶν
χωρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων. ἀνδρεῖος is coupled with
ἴτης in
Symp.
203D and with
θρασύς in Ar.
Clouds, loc. cit.
11.
φέρε δή κτλ. This section (from
φέρε δή to
ὡς οἷόν τε
μάλιστα in l. 16) is intended to prepare the way for the proof
of the third proposition (see on l. 9) in
350B see note on l. 29,
and cf.
Laches, 192C, where the proof that
ἄφρων καρτέρησις is
not
ἀνδρεία is introduced in much the same way:
σχεδὸν γάρ τι
οἶδα—ὅτι τῶν πάνυ καλῶν πραγμάτων ἡγεῖ σὺ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.
14.
εἰ μὴ μαίνομαί γε: ‘as I'm a sane man’. This and
similar phrases are frequent in Plato, e.g.
Euthyd. 283E,
Rep. X.
608D (
εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε),
Gorg. 511B οἶδα—εἰ μὴ κωφός γ᾽ εἰμι.
τὸ μέν τι—τὸ δέ τι. See on
Euthyphr. 12A. Kroschel
quotes
Phileb. 13C
τὰς μὲν εἶναί τινας ἀγαθὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς δέ
τινας—κακάς.
17.
αολυμβῶσιν. This and the next example are given also
in
Lach. 193 B ff. Sauppe thinks that the object of such diving
(an art in which the Greeks were very expert: see Thuc. IV. 26. 8)
may have been to clean the wells and the like.
21.
τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες. See Introduction, p. xxxii.
24.
αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν—ἤ. The notion ‘than’ is expressed twice:
see note on
Crito, 44C καίτοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα ἢ
δοκεῖν κτλ., and cf. below,
350Eand (with Sauppe)
Hdt. VIII. 86
ἐγένοντο—μακρῷ ἀμείνονες αὐτοὶ ἑωυτῶν ἢ πρὸς Εὐβοίῃ.
29.
αἰσχρὸν μεντἄν—ἀνδρεία: and if
αἰσχρόν, not
ἀρετή
(which it is), since all
ἀρετή is
καλόν (
349E. Cf.
Lach. 182C ἡ δέ
γε ἀνδρεία ὡμολογεῖτο καλὸν εἶναι and with the general sentiment
Meno, 88B οἶον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀλλ᾽ οἶον
θάππος τι: οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαππῇ ἄνθπωρος, βλάρτεται, ὅταν δὲ
σὺν νῷ, ὠφελεῖται;
30.
λέγεις: the present is idiomatically used in referring to an
earlier part of a discussion not yet ended: see on
ὅπερ λέγω in
Apol. 21A. With
λέγεις followed by an accusative in this sense
compare
Symp. 199E πειρῶ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα εἰπεῖν: ὁ Ἔρως
ἔρως ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός;
31.
οὐχὶτοὺς θαρραλέους εἶναι. This Protagoras did not say,
but only that
οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι are
θαρραλέοι: see
349E For this reason
Sauppe and others reject
τούς before
θαρραλέους, and in favour
of this urge the reply of Protagoras (
καὶ νῦν γε): but inasmuch as
(1)
οὐκοῦν οὗτοι—μαινόμενοι φαίνονται seems to be intended to be
incompatible with
τοὺς ἀνδρείους οὐχὶ—εἷναι, (2)
θαρραλεώτατοι
δὲ ὄντες ἀνδρειότατοι in l. 35 clearly implies that
θαρραλέοι are
conceived of as
ἀνδρεῖοι (no less than
ἀνδρεῖοι as
θαρραλέοι), we
must, if we regard the argument as a whole, retain the MSS.
reading. Protagoras'
καὶ νῦν γε is an unwary admission: he does not
at first catch the difference between
οἱ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν οἱ θαρραλέοι
and
οἱ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι θαρραλέοι, and Socrates avails himself of his
opponent's slip to hasten to his conclusion—which but for this
misrepresentation could only be expressed as
ἀνδρεῖοι are
σοφοί
( =
ἐπιστήμονες), not
σοφοί are
ἀνδρεῖοι: see on
349Eand
350D
34.
ἐκεῖ, i.e. in the case of
θάρρος based on
σοφία, illustrated
in
350A Sauppe (after Schöne) reads
οἳ σοφώτατοι, οὗτοι κτλ.:
but
οἱ σοφώτατοι need not go closely with
οὗτοι (which is resumptive) any more than
οἱ οὕτω θαρραλέοι ὄντες with the preceding
οὗτοι. There is a kind of chiasmus in the order
οὗτοι—
οἱ—θαρραλέοι) (
οἱ σοφώτατοι οὗτοι.
36.
οὐ καλῶς—μνημονεύεις κτλ. Protagoras sees now that
‘All brave are bold’ is not equivalent to ‘All bold are brave’, and
rectifies his
καὶ νῦν γε by pointing out that he originally said only
‘All brave are bold’ but he confines his attention to this point,
without touching on the fundamental flaws in Socrates' argument from
349Eto
350B
39.
ὡμολόγησα: in
349E
40.
τότε ἤρου. So B and T. In
τότε there is perhaps a latent
contrast to
καὶ νῦν γε of l. 31. Protagoras is correcting his recent
slip—had you asked me then (viz. at
349E, I should have
answered rightly.
τοῦτο has inferior MSS. authority.
41.
τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν. The
οὐ
after
ὡς is due to a confusion between (1)
τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς
οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας and (2)
οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι ὡς
θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, τὸ ἐμὸν ὁμολόγημα, οὐδαμοῦ κτλ. The insertion of
οὐ is the more natural because after verbs of refuting and the
like the object clause gives what is maintained and not what is
refuted, whence
ἐλέγχειν ὡς οὐ, ἀντιλέγειν ὡς οὐ etc.
45.
καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἴει κτλ. Protagoras ignores Socrates'
third proposition in
350B(25-30), where it is shown that
θάρρος
without
ἐπιστήμη is not
ἀνδρεία; see next note.
48.
πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ κτλ., i.e. you might as well argue
(1)
οἱ ἰσχυροί are
δυνατοί, (2)
οἱ ἐπιστήμονες are
δυνατοί, therefore
οἱ ἐπιστήμονες are
ἰσχυροί. This would only be correct if for
(1) we substituted
οἱ δυνατοί are
ἰσχυροί. To make Protagoras'
picture of Socrates' argument complete, we should have to add
(3) none who are
δυνατοί without
ἐπιστήμη are
ἰσχυροί—but this
is not true, whereas Socrates' third proposition is. The completed picture therefore fails to represent correctly Socrates'
reasoning in each of its steps, but none the less are Protagoras'
objections strictly relevant, and indeed fatal to Socrates' conclusion as expressed in
350C(33-6), and that is why Socrates
makes no reply.
58.
ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης—τὴν δύναμιν κτλ. Protagoras says in
effect:
δύναμις and
ἰσχύς are of the body,
θάρσος and
ἀνδρεία of
the soul.
δύναμις may come from knowledge (as when one has
learnt how to wrestle: above
350E, or from madness or rage (as
in the feats of madmen, or men inspired with the thirst for
vengeance; such men have no real physical strength or
ἰσχύς as
it is presently defined, but excel themselves by virtue of
δύναμις).
ἰσχύς comes from natural constitution (
φύσις) and
proper nurture of the body (by gymnastics in the widest sense).
Similarly
θάρσος may result from art (
τέχνη is substituted for
ἐπιστήμη in view of the illustrations in
350A, from rage or
madness (as when Empedocles leapt into Etna);
ἀνδρεία comes
from the native character and proper nurture of the soul (cf.
Rep. III. 410D τὸ θυμοειδὲς—τῆς φύσεως—ὀρθῶς μὲν τραφὲν
ἀνδπεῖον ἂν εἴη, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἐπιταθὲν τοῦ δέοντος σκληπόν τε καὶ χαλερὸν
γίγνοιτ᾽ ἄν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός).
