James Adam, The Republic of Plato

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πότερον δίκᾳ -- ἀναβάς. The fragment (which appears tolerably often in ancient citations) is restored as follows by Bergk (Fr. 213) Πότερον δίκᾳ τεῖχος ὕψιον | ἢ σκολίαις ἀπάταις ἀναβαίνῃ | ἐπιχθονίων γένος ἀνδρῶν | δίχα μοι νόος ἀτρέκειαν εἰπεῖν. It is, I think, unlikely that θεσπέσιος βίος and κύριον εὐδαιμονίας below “si non a Pindaro, certe ex poetis petita sunt” (Bergk).

ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ has been commonly altered to ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ on the suggestion of Dobree and Boeckh (with a few inferior MSS): but the text is sound. We are dealing with ταῦτα πάντα— λεγόμενα κτλ.; and it has not been said that it is useless to be just, unless one is also believed to be just (ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ). This would imply that it is useful to be just, if one is also considered just; but what has been urged is that Justice is in itself never advantageous, although its εὐδοκιμήσεις (363 A) are: see 358 C, E, 360 C (οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδιᾳ ὄντος), 362 A (οὐκ εἶναι δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν δεῖ ἐθέλειν). The words ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ mean ‘if I also seem unjust,’ for οὐ δοκῶ δίκαιος εἶναι, not δοκῶ οὐ δίκαιος εἶναι, is the Greek idiom. This meaning suits exactly. What has to be established is that δοκεῖν prevails over εἶναι in human life (οὐκοῦν—βιᾶται). The proof is as follows. To be just and seem unjust is misery (see 361 E): to be unjust, and seem just is bliss (see 362 A, C): therefore δοκεῖν is everything, and ἐπὶ τοῦτο τρεπτέον ὅλως.

φασιν. Is τὰ λεγόμενα the subject? or is the sentence an anacoluthon? (“nam quo modo res ipsa comparata sit, nescio: quae quidem vulgo dicuntur, talia sunt, ut iusto mihi commodi quicquam fore negetur” Schneider). The latter view is the more likely. Similar anacolutha are cited by Engelhardt Anac. Pl. Spec. III p. 40.