James Adam, The Republic of Plato

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— 485 A We have now to shew that Philosophers, as defined by us, should be entrusted with the government. It is they alone who, by virtue of the Ideal in their souls, are able to guard the laws and institutions of a city. We shall therefore make them our Guardians, if they possess the necessary practical qualifications. A study of their nature will shew that it is possible for them to unite both kinds of requisites.

διὰ μακροῦ -- λόγου: ‘through the conclusion of a somewhat lengthy argument.’ διεξελθόντος is intransitive, as Schneider saw: cf. Laws 805 B ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἶπον τὸν μὲν λόγον ἐᾶσαι διεξελθεῖν, εὖ διελθόντος δὲ οὕτω τὸ δοκοῦν αἱρεῖσθαι δεῖν. (The reference in εἶπον is to 799 E κἂν ἡ διέξοδος αὕτη ὅλη σχοῦσα τέλος ἱκανῶς ἂν μηνύσειε κτλ.) Cf. also Dem. in Mid. 84. The word διεξελθόντος is not otiose, because it is not till the very end of the argument that the φιλόσοφος is discovered (V 480 A). The mistaken notion (held by Stallbaum) that the word must be transitive induced Herwerden (Mnem. N. S. XIX p. 333) to propose διεξελθοῦσι, a conjecture repeated also by Richards. Baiter (after Hermann and Ast) reads διεξελθόντες with three inferior MSS, as if the philosophers had “run the gauntlet of the argument through which their nature is revealed” (J. and C.). τοῦ λόγου (found in a few MSS) is favoured by Stallbaum, and suggested as an alternative also by Herwerden, as if διὰ μακροῦ τινὸς could mean ‘at some length.’ The first hand in Ξ omits διά, but it occurs in all the other MSS. None of these expedients is nearly so good as the reading of the best MSS, if Schneider's explanation be adopted. μακροῦ has also caused difficulty, since the investigation extends over only six pages of Stephanus: see Krohn Pl. St. pp. 105 ff. By Pfleiderer (Zur Lösung etc. p. 54), who maintains (in partial agreement with Spengel) that V 471 C—VII (inclusive) embodies the dialogue Φιλόσοφος announced in the beginning of the Politicus and Sophist, μακροῦ is hailed as a significant lapsus calami, and referred to the investigations of the Sophist, Euthydemus and Politicus. But μακροῦ is qualified by τινός, and surely 474 C—480 A may be described as ‘a somewhat lengthy enquiry.’ There is no allusion to the proverbial μακρὸς λόγος of which Aristotle speaks in Met. N 3. 1091^{a} 7 ff. ὁ Σιμωνίδου μακρὸς λόγος: γίγνεται γὰρ ὁ μακρὸς λόγος ὥσπερ ὁ τῶν δούλων, ὅταν μηδὲν ὑγιὲς λέγωσιν.

οἵ is found only in A and Π^{1}: all the other MSS have οἷοι. For οἵ cf. (with Schneider) 493 B and VIII 559 A.

πολλὰ κτλ. Herwerden conjectures πολλὰ <ἦν>, which would weaken the emphasis on πολλά. For the omission of ἦν see Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 33. From the standpoint of Books VI and VII it is impossible to say what ‘just life’ means unless we know the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ etc. (see 506 A): hence πολλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ διελθεῖν.

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πάντως κτλ. παντοίως was conjectured by Ast and is read by Stallbaum. It occurs as a late correction in Π as well as in A (see cr. n.), and has some insignificant MS authority besides. The difference is like that between ὅς and οἷος: see 484 A note With πλανώμενοι cf. πλανητόν in V 479 D. It is the fluctuation of the Object which makes the Subject fluctuate.

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καθιστάναι: “sc. λέγοντες h.e. κελεύοντες” Schneider.

τυφλῶν. They who cannot see the Ideas are blind: cf. Plato's retort to Antisthenes quoted on V 476 D.

καὶ μηδὲν κτλ. A transcendental παράδειγμα of which he knew nothing would be useless to the philosopherking. It does not however follow that the Ideas are not αὐτὰ καθ᾽ αὑτά, but merely that we are concerned with them in so far as they are known by the φιλόσοφος. See on V 476 A. ὡς οἷόν τε ἀκριβέστατα admits that he may not see them in all their fulness and purity.

εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον κτλ. Cf. 500 C, 500 E—501 C (where the same figure is employed). The political value of the philosopher's knowledge of the Idea is here for the first time explicitly affirmed and explained: see V 479 D note

ἐκεῖσε: because truth is ‘yonder’— in the Heaven of the Ideas. The philosopher must call it from Heaven to Earth, by assimilating to it ‘the earthly canons’ (τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμιμα).

οὕτω δή=‘then and not till then’ suggests that it is otherwise in existing States.

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ἐὰν δέῃ τίθεσθαι. If he has the happiness to be born ‘in his own country’ (IX 592 A), whose institutions are already modelled on the Ideas, he need only guard (φυλάττοντες suggests the φύλακες) and preserve what is already established. Otherwise he must himself become a legislator. Cobet's excision of τίθεσθαι is wholly gratuitous: his omission of τά in τὰ κείμενα is even worse, for the laws need not be of the philosopher's own making.

διαφέρει. It would be easy to write διαφέρειν (with q etc.), but διαφέρει may be impersonal, or Glauco may be substituting the singular for the plural: see on I 347 A and V 465 E. Cf. also infra 496 A.

ἐλλείποιντο. Cf. Xen. Mem. II 6. 5 μὴ ἐλλείπεσθαι εὖ ποιῶν τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας ἑαυτόν and Soph. 258 B.

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κἀκεῖνα: viz. τἄλλα, as defined in ἐμπειρίᾳ—ὑστεροῦντας.

ταῦτα: i.e. ‘the special attributes of the philosopher’ (J. and C.).

ἐλέγομεν. V 474 B.

δεῖ. See cr. n. and Introd. § 5.

485A - 487A The philosophic nature loves eternal and changeless Being in its entirety. It follows that the philosopher naturally loves Truth, despises the pleasures of the body, is temperate, free from avarice, high-minded, courageous, just and gentle. He is also quick to learn, retentive in memory, not given to extravagance in conduct, but modest and well-bred. To such men, when years and education have perfected their natural qualities, we may fairly entrust our city.

ff. This section should be compared on the one hand with II 375 A— 376 C, 377 B—III 391 E, and on the other with VII 535 A, B notes In Book II the natural qualities insisted on were primarily moral; here and in VII they are primarily intellectual. This is in harmony with the difference between the earlier and later schemes of education: for the basis of the first was ὀρθὴ δόξα, whereas that of the second is ἐπιστήμη. There is little or no indication to shew that even the ἄρχοντες of I—IV knew or aspired to the Ideas (see 497 C note) and the ἐπίκουροι certainly did not. Krohn is, in a certain sense, right when he maintains that in VI—VII we have “einen neuen Archontenstand und eine neue Archontendisciplin” (Pl. St. p. 107), but the distinction of the ‘golden’ and ‘silver’ races in III 415 A ff. prepares us for a more thorough-going discrimination between the two higher classes than was attempted in the earlier sketch, and we must of course remember that the new discipline is not intended to supersede, but to supervene upon the old. See also Hirzel Der Dialog I p. 236.

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ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας. For the genitive cf. IV 445 E note

γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς have not yet been employed in this half-technical sense (Krohn Pl. St. p. 112). The substance of the Ideas always ‘is’: that of phenomena ‘is driven to and fro by generation and destruction’—by generation when it becomes determined in one particular direction (e.g. καλόν, ἵππος, ἄνθρωπος), by destruction when it loses that particular determination and puts on another. Cf. V 479 A, B. Plato's form of expression seems to imply that there is a sort of οὐσία or substratum in phenomena. At a later stage he seems to have identified this with space—the ἐκμαγεῖον —κινούμενόν τε καὶ διασχηματιζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν εἰσιόντων, φαίνεται δὲ δἰ ἐκεῖνα ἄλλοτε ἀλλοῖον (Tim. 50 C): but of this there is no hint here. Cf. Zeller^{4} II 1. p. 725.

πάσης αὐτῆς: i.e. οὐσίας τῆς ἀεὶ οὔσης, not (as Ast) ἐπιστήμης or μαθήσεως.

οὔτε τιμιωτέρου κτλ. Cf. Parm. 130 C—E.

πρόσθεν. V 474 D—475 B.

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τὴν ἀψεύδειαν κτλ. Cf. III 389 B.

ἑκόντας εἶναι is ‘voluntarily,’ not ‘if it can be helped’ (D. and V.): cf. I 336 E note

ψεῦδος should be understood in its strict Platonic sense, as ‘ignorance in the soul respecting the truth’ (II 382 B notes). The politician who knows not the Ideal is, according to Plato, a liar, not the statesman who employs for example κλῆροί τινες κομψοί to attain his Ideal. There is absolutely no reason to suppose (with Bosanquet) that Plato means to withdraw from the regulations of V 460 A.

τὸν ἐρωτικῶς κτλ. Love me, love my friend. The Philosopher loves Wisdom, and Truth is Wisdom's kinswoman and familiar friend.

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ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα κτλ. The simile becomes almost an identification, as often in Greek: the desires are as it were a stream diverted εἰς ἕν τι. Cf. III 401 C (reading τις—ὥσπερ αὔρα), VII 519 A τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ξυγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας and VII 534 D note To explain ἀπωχετευμένον as for ἀπωχετευμέναι (with Stallbaum and others) is to obtrude our standpoint upon the Greeks. Schneider formerly agreed with Stallbaum, but afterwards drew back (Addit. p. 45) and translated “wie ein dorthin abgeleiteter Strom.”

τὰς δέ . τάς is probably an ‘internal accusative’ depending on ἐκλείποιεν, though rendered easier by the occurrence of περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν—εἶεν ἄν just before. Schneider carries on περί, but the preposition is difficult to supply when the two clauses have different verbs. Cf. IV 428 C note

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σώφρων κτλ. Cf. III 389 D —390 E.

ὧν γὰρ ἕνεκα: i.e. such bodily and other delights as money can buy.

χρήματα -- δαπάνης: ‘wealth with its accompaniment of lavish outlay.’ μετὰ πολλῆς δαπάνης should not, I think, be taken with σπουδάζεται (Schneider, D. and V., J. and C., although Jowett's translation takes the correct view), but rather with χρήματα. Herwerden formerly explained δαπάνης as=τῆς τοῦ δαπανᾶν ἐπιθυμίας, but afterwards (Mnem. N. S. XIX p. 333) took it to mean “pecunia cuius ope sumptus fieret” comparing inter alia VIII 550 D and Laws 718 A. This view agrees closely with mine, but it is not necessary to suppose that δαπάνη means more than simply ‘outlay.’

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ἀνελευθερίας . ἀνελευθερία or σμικρολογία is in Plato the antithesis of ὑπερηφανία: cf. II 391 C and Critias 112 C. The virtuous mean is μεγαλοπρέπεια, which is a sort of highmindedness (cf. 503 C): hence μεγαλοπρέπεια just below and μεγαλοπρεπής in the summary at 487 A. Plato does not, like Aristotle (Eth. Nic. IV cc. 4—6), restrict μεγαλοπρέπεια and its opposing vices to pecuniary dealings, although φιλοχρηματία, for example, is a symptom of ἀνελευθερία (II 391 C).

τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντός. Cf. Theaet. 173 E ff. This and the following sentence admirably describe the peculiar genius of Plato himself. See the eloquent words of Longinus περὶ ὕψους 35, and compare them with Goethe's noble characterisation of Plato: “Er dringt in die Tiefen, mehr um sie mit seinem Wesen auszufüllen, als um sie zu erforschen. Er bewegt sich nach der Höhe, mit Sehnsucht seines Ursprungs wieder theilhaft zu werden. Alles, was er äussert, bezieht sich auf ein ewig Ganzes, Gutes, Wahres, Schönes, dessen Forderung er in jedem Busen aufzuregen strebt.”

ᾗ -- διανοίᾳ . ᾧ—διανοίας (the reading of q and some other MSS, followed by Ast and Stallbaum) is an obvious ‘emendation,’ to suit τούτῳ below. It is much less elegant, notwithstanding the irregularity involved in τούτῳ, for which Schneider compares Gorg. 523 B, a precise parallel, in spite of Stallbaum's assertion to the contrary. Cf. also X 606 B note ᾗ οὖν is moreover found in the quotation of this passage by Marcus Aurelius, according to the text of Vaticanus A: see Stich's edition p. 87 note

μέγα τι δοκεῖν. Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV 7. 1123^{b} 32 τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα πράξει αἰσχρά, ᾧ οὐθὲν μέγα (of the μεγαλόψυχος).

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θάνατον κτλ. Cf. III 386 A ff.

ἀλαζών is a special case of φιλοψευδής (485 D). Cf. 489 E.

ἄδικος is used of course in the popular sense, not with the meaning assigned to it in Book IV.

ἥμερος -- ἀγρία. Cf. II 375 B ff.

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εὐμαθὴς κτλ. J. and C. wrongly supply εἰ ἄρα. πότερον is often omitted in such sentences: cf. Phaedr. 270 D and other examples in Ast's Lexicon s.v. πότερον.

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αὐτὴν -- εἶναι. The text is successfully defended by Vahlen (Hermes 1877 p. 196) who compares II 375 E οὐ παρὰ φύσιν ζητοῦμεν τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸν φύλακα and (for the pleonasm) Phaed. 101 E ἱκανοὶ γὰρ—δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς ἀρέσκειν. Madvig's proposal (adopted by Baiter) αὖ ἣν ζητοῦμεν δεῖ εἶναι is neat but unnecessary; still less should we (with Herwerden) bracket δεῖν εἶναι. With the sentiment Krohn (Pl. St. p. 363) compares Xen. Mem. IV 1. 2.

ἀσχήμονος. Herwerden should not have conjectured ἀμνήμονος. We are passing to a fresh point. ἀμουσία and ἀσχημοσύνη (‘bad form’) tend to ἀμετρία ‘excess,’ ‘extravagance’ in behaviour (cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV 8. 1125^{a} 12—16); and extravagant behaviour is a form of untruth, because it makes a man appear what he is not. The love of truth will therefore save the philosopher from selfassertion and bad manners.

φύσει κτλ. The antecedent of ἥν is διάνοιαν: and φύσει (‘by nature,’ ‘naturally’) should be taken with the adjectives ἔμμετρον and εὔχαριν. It might seem possible to translate: ‘Let us insist, then, on a modest and agreeable habit of mind for a nature whose innate disposition is to make it easy to lead to the Form of each essential Being,’ making φύσει the antecedent to ἥν: but the ordinary view gives a better sense. The preceding note will explain how ἐμμετρία inclines one to the love of Truth or the Ideas. Stallbaum connects ἑκάστου with τὸ αὐτοφυές, but cf. V 480 A ad fin. and 484 D (ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν). ἰδέαν is, I think, ‘Form,’ ‘Idea’ (so Schneider etc.), rather than ‘contemplation’ (as Stallbaum translates). The word however suggests ἰδεῖν: see on V 479 A.

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ἑπόμενα ἀλλήλοις is fully justified. The love of Truth begets the love of Wisdom (485 C) and the love of Wisdom Temperance (485 D, E). Highmindedness is connected with the contemplation τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντός (486 A), of which Courage is also a result (486 A, B). Justice and Kindness accompany the other moral virtues (486 B). Aptness to learn, memory, and the virtue of a modest and agreeable disposition also fit one for the study of the Ideas: cf. 486 D note It will be noticed that all the Virtues receive an intellectual colouring from their connexion —direct or indirect—with ‘amor intellectualis’: see above on 485 A ff.

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μνήμων κτλ. The summary is complete, μεγαλοπρεπής being the opposite of ἀνελεύθερος and σμικρόλογος (486 A note).

487A - 487E But, in point of fact, urges Adimantus, actual philosophers are regarded as useless, or worse. Socrates admits the correctness of this view, and proceeds to solve the difficulty by a parable.

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