[For obvious reasons, our Confederate generals did not publish during the war detailed statements of the strength of their armies.
The Federal authorities and Federal writers have almost invariably exaggerated our strength, our own people have been in profound ignorance of our real numbers, and there has been among some of our most distinguished leaders honest differences of opinion as to our strength at different periods.
[
's numbers during the seven days battles, has excited great attention, not only on account of the interest in the questions involved, but also because of the standing of the distinguished soldiers who were parties to it. We have been several times urged, by those whose opinions are entitled to weight, to give the discussion a place in our Papers, in order that it may be preserved.
We do so without note or comment, leaving our readers to draw their own conclusions.]
It is not fourteen years since our war began, and yet, who on either side of those who took part in it is bold enough to say that he knows the exact truth, and the whole truth, with reference to any of the great battles in which the armies of the North and South met each other?
censured by the Legislature of Massachusetts because, prompted in part at least, let us hope, by the love of truth, he renewed in the Senate of the United States after the war a resolution which in substance he had previously brought forward?
This resolution would erase from the colors of the United States army such names as those of Cold Harbor,
won those fights, and we wonder why a resolution of Congress should be necessary to blot them from the list of Union victories recorded on the standards of its armies.
, now in disgrace; because it was proved to the satisfaction of a Federal court-martial that half the Confederate army was not where we all
's “Contribution of materials for the use of the future historian of the war between the States,” and has any one risen from the perusal of that interesting book, without the conviction that its distinguished author is mistaken as to some of his statements, or that all contemporaneous history is in error?
I will venture to present only two of the perplexities in which “the future historian of the war between the States” will find himself involved when he comes to compare the “material” contributed
[
says — on p. 145 of his “Narrative” --“The authors of
, and some other biographies, represent, to my disparagement, that the army with which
fought in the ‘Seven Days’ was only that which I had commanded.
It is very far from the truth.
did not attack the enemy until the 26th of June, because he was employed from the 1st until then in forming a great army, by bringing to that which I had commanded,
states in a note the sources of his information.
's presence, just before the fight began on the 31st (of May), that he had that force (15,000 men) ready to join me when the
should give the order.”
He then refers to other evidence, which he says is in his possession, going to show that the reinforcements brought by
, and which took part in the “Seven days” battles, amounted to 15,000 men.
Now the “future historian” ought not lightly to doubt the accuracy of any statement of
, and upon that high authority he would record that before the battles of the “Seven days,”
, reinforcements to the number of thirty-seven thousand men, who took part in those engagements which resulted in dislodging
.
's narrative” with the official reports made at the time.
In the first volume of the official reports of the operations of the Army of Northern Virginia, published by authority of the Confederate Congress, at page 151, will be found
' statement of the number of men brought by him to take part in the battles around
with two regiments of seven hundred and fifty-two bayonets and two batteries of artillery, and adds: “The effective force under my orders thus amounted to
.
so informed him.
There may have been that number of men borne upon the rolls of the brigade, but we have
's official report of the number of troops under his command that actually took part in the battles around
.
, but before the “historian of the war” ventures to make use of this contribution to his materials, he will do well to look at the official reports, at page 270 of the first volume, where he will find that
.
— if he did take part in them — and therefore cannot compare the number assigned to
be correct, they brought less than 11,866 men to participate in those battles, instead of 26,000 as stated by
.
, according to their reports, had 5,866 men in the “Seven days” battles, instead of 11,000 according to
's narrative.
says he does not know, must have made up the rest of the twenty-two thousand men who we are informed came to
's and the unknown, must have numbered about sixteen thousand men.
told him his brigade was seven thousand strong, so that the unknown brigade must have numbered nine thousand to make up the twenty-two thousand from
.
It may have been so. There may have been a brigade in
's army nine thousand strong, but in speaking about it before you, I think it safer to refer to it as the “unknown brigade.”
And in this connection let me suggest to the future historian of the war, that before he writes
in the “Seven days” battles, it will be well for him to inquire whether that brigade
[
, and the army had marched northwards upon a new campaign.
He will find no trace of this brigade in the reports of the Seven Days battle, although they are so much in detail as to include the reports of captains of companies.
A Confederate brigade, seven thousand strong, would probably have taken some part worth reporting, and its name ought to appear in the official account.
's command will be found mentioned in the official reports of subsequent operations of the army at
.
As to the “unknown brigade,” that I think will turn out to be a small command under
.
General--Colonel Marshall's address was delivered before the
Virginia Division of the Association of the Army of Northern Virginia, of which
General Fitz. Lee was then and
General Pickett is now president.
I am president of the association at large, which has never met since its organization, but there is a provision in the constitution for divisions in each one of the States that had troops in the Army of Northern Virginia.
Your reply to
Col. Marshall has been filed with his address among the archives of the Southern Historical Society, of which I am president.
* * * * * * * * *
You have certainly been led into error in your estimates of
General Lee's strength, and of the number of troops brought to the army after
Seven Pines.
You have either misapprehended the information given you by the officers you mention, or they were themselves greatly mistaken, as I think I can demonstrate to you. In the first place, I must say that we have
General Longstreet's official report of the Battle of
Seven Pines, which has been furnished to the Southern Historical Society by
General E. P. Alexander, who undertook to write the history of
Longstreet's brigade, division and corps, at his instance.
It is in two forms--first, in his headquarter's book, in which all his reports were copied, and then in a separate copy made from the book; and the following is the statement of the losses sustained by the wing of the army he commanded, as given at the close of the report:
List of killed, wounded and missing.
| Officers. | Enlisted Men. | Aggregate. |
Killed | 61 | 755 | 816 |
Wounded | 209 | 3,530 | 3,729 |
Missing | 3 | 293 | 296 |
| | | |
| 273 | 4,578 | 4,851 |
Respectfully submitted,
(Signed)
You will perceive that he makes the loss in the portion of the troops commanded by him in the battle 1,851 more than you give it in your book.
You give the loss in
Longstreet's and
D. H. Hill's divisions at 3,000; yet
General Hill, in his report, which we also have, says: “Appended is a list of killed and wounded.
From this it appears that of less than 9,000 taken into action nearly 3,000 were struck down.”
Take
Longstreet's statement of his loss and your statement of
G. W. Smith's loss (1,223) and your total
[
416]
loss appears to have been at least 6,074.
It appears from the reports of
Pickett and
Wilcox, which we also have, that a portion of this loss was sustained on the second day. It also appears from
Hill's and
Pickett's reports that
Mahone and
Armistead's brigades, of
Huger's division, were seriously engaged on the second day, but whether
Longstreet includes
Huger's loss in his statement does not clearly appear.
In your book you state that your army at
Seven Pines was composed of 27 brigades, and they were as follows: 6 in
Longstreet's division, 6 in
A. P. Hill's division, 4 in
D. H. Hill's division, 6 in
Magruder's command (composed of 3 divisions of 2 brigades each), 3 in
Huger's division, and 2 in
Whiting's division — in all, 27.
General Lee had 39 brigades of infantry under his command in the battles around
Richmond — to wit: 6 in
Longstreet's division, 6 in
A. P. Hill's division, 5 in
D. H. Hill's division, including
Ripley's brigade; 6 in
Magruder's command, 4 in
Huger's division, including
Ransom's brigade from
Holmes' command; 3 in
Holmes' division, including
Wise's small brigade, and 9 under
Jackson, including his own division of 3 brigades,
Ewell's of 3 brigades,
Whiting's 2 brigades, and
Lawton's brigade — the twelve brigades added after
Seven Pines being
Ripley's,
Lawton's,
Ransom's,
J. G. Walker's,
Daniel's,
Wise's (2 regiments), and the 6 brigades of
Jackson and
Ewell — making the twelve.
All of this appears from the official reports contained in the first volume of the Reports of the Opetions of the Army of Northern Virginia for 1862.
Ripley's was the first brigade that arrived, and in his report (page 234) he says: “The aggregate force which entered into the series of engagements on the 26th of June was twenty-three hundred and sixty-six, including pioneers and the ambulance corps.”
But you suggest that the large brigades may have been divided, and a portion of them distributed in other brigades.
Ripley says: “In conclusion, I beg to remark that the troops of this brigade, arriving at
Richmond just after the Battle of
Seven Pines, were ordered immediately to the front, and performed picket and out-post duty, with slight intermission, until the march towards
Mechanicsville.
Two of the regiments — the First and Third North Carolina--had been some time in service, but not in action.
The Forty-fourth and Forty-eighth Georgia were new troops, and it is perhaps to be regretted, as the whole were engaged for the first time, that some further opportunity could not have been afforded for perfecting their organization and discipline as a brigade.”
The fair inference from this statement is, that the four regiments mentioned constituted the whole of his brigade when he brought it to
Richmond, and his report shows that the whole of them were still in the brigade.
The next brigades that came were
Holmes' three--to wit:
Ransom's,
J. G. Walker's and
Daniel's.
Ransom says, on page 365: “On the 24th ultimo the brigade left
Petersburg for
Richmond, with orders to report to
General Lee.
About 10 o'clock at night I reached
Richmond, with the Twenty-fifth
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North Carolina volunteers (
Colonel Rutledge), the Twenty-fourth, Thirty-fifth and Forty-ninth having preceded, the Twenty-sixth and Forty-eighth being left to follow.”
This, then, was his whole brigade, and on page 368 he repeats the enumeration of his regiments, stating that the Forty-eighth North Carolina was absent on duty with the brigade of
Walker.
He says: “The effective force present was about three thousand.”
He had in some previous skirmishes lost about 130 men in killed and wounded.
Taking the average for the strength of the absent regiment, and we make the whole force brought by him about 3,700.
On page 325
Colonel Manning, commanding
Walker's brigade, says: “The brigade, composed of the Third Arkansas, Thirtieth Virginia, Fifty-seventh Virginia, Twenty-seventh North Carolina and Fifty-sixth North Carolina regiments, and the Second Georgia battalion,
Captains French's and
Branch's light batteries, and
Captain Goodwin's cavalry company--in all amounting to about four thousand men and officers — crossed the pontoon bridge and reached
General Huger about 12 o'clock M. on Friday the 27th of June.”
The Fifty-seventh Virginia was subsequently transferred to
Armistead's brigade, and in its place was put the Forty-eighth North Carolina.
On page 151,
Holmes says the brigade returned to him on the 29th of June, with 3,600 effective men and two batteries.
On page 322
Daniel says his brigade, composed of the Forty-fifth, Forty-third and Fiftieth North Carolina regiments, two batteries of artillery and a battalion of cavalry, “in all about seventeen hundred effective men,” left Drury's Bluff on the 29th of June and crossed the river at the pontoon bridges.
Holmes says the infantry of
Daniel's brigade was 1,570 strong.
On page 319
Wise put his infantry at 814 and his artillery at 147--aggregate, 961.
This brigade properly belonged or had belonged to
Huger's division, and did not constitute a part of the troops brought by
Holmes to the army.
Holmes says the battalion of cavalry numbered 130 men; and on page 470 is a return by
Colonel Deshler, showing in the four batteries with
Walker's and
Daniel's brigades, an effective force of 296.
Taking the foregoing figures — to wit: 3,700 infantry in
Ransom's brigade, 3,600 in
Walker's, 1,570 in
Daniel's, 961 infantry and artillery in
Wise's; 130 cavalry and 296 artillerymen, and we have 10,257 as the whole force added to the army from
Holmes' command, including
Wise's, and without the latter, 9,296.
This latter number constituted the whole force brought by
Holmes from his department after
Seven Pines, even if the cavalry and artillery belonged to it. On page 270, in speaking of the charge of his brigade, the first it had been in,
Lawton says: “A continuous line of thirty-five hundred men moving forward in perfect order into the wood, and at once opening fire along its entire length (chiefly armed with Enfield rifles), made a decided impression, and promptly marked the preponderance of musketry sound on our side, as was observed by other commanders on the field.”
Lawton's brigade was composed of six
[
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regiments, and its organization was never changed.
It may have had near six thousand men on paper, but the above is the effective strength with which it came to
Virginia.
By inquiring of him you will find that I am correct.
From the
Battle of Sharpsburg it was in the division commanded by me, and it never after that time reached 3,000 men.
Drayton's brigade did not come to
Virginia until after the battles around
Richmond.
It was composed of the Fifteenth South Carolina and the Fiftieth and Fifty-first Georgia regiments and Third South Carolina battalion.
A part, if not all of it, was engaged in the fight at
Secessionville, South Carolina, on the 16th of June, 1862.
Its first engagement in
Virginia was on the
Rappahannock, the 25th of August, 1862.
After
Sharpsburg it was so small that it was distributed among some other brigades in
Longstreet's corps.
In a roster of
Longstreet's corps, published in the
Banner of the South, by
General Alexander, the history of the regiments composing
Drayton's brigade is given.
Coming to
Virginia after the Seven Days Battles it. of course, had no effect in increasing
General Lee's numbers at these battles.
There is some strange mistake on your part, or that of
General Drayton, about the brigade.
If it had 7,000 men in it when it came here, then the three regiments and the battalion composing it must have averaged 1,750 men each.
It lost only 93 men at
Second Manassas, and 541 at
South Mountain and
Sharpsburg — in all, 634.
Yet it was in a division of six brigades, commanded by
D. R. Jones at
Sharpsburg, and in his report (page 219, 2d volume, Reports,) he says that in his six brigades there were only 2,430 men on the morning of the 17th of September, 1862.
Evans' brigade arrived from
South Carolina in July, 1862, and its strength was 2,200.
This must have been the brigade which you could not name, as no others than those mentioned came from the
South during that summer.
There was a new brigade formed after the battles out of some
Louisiana regiments, which before were in other brigades.
General Lee had forty brigades of infantry at
Sharpsburg,
Daniel's having returned to
North Carolina,
Wise's being left near
Richmond, and
Drayton's,
Evans' and the new
Louisiana brigade making up the forty.
From the foregoing statement it will appear, then, that the troops received by
General Lee from the
South after
Seven Pines, and before the Seven Days Battles, consisted of those brought by
Holmes (9,296),
Ripley's brigade (2,366), and
Lawton's (3,500)--in all 15,162, instead of the 37,000 you make out by your estimate.
I must add that five companies of the First North Carolina cavalry, which had previously been with the army, returned from
North Carolina after the commencement of the battles.
It remains now to inquire into the strength of the divisions of
Jackson and
Ewell, which came from the
Valley, and which you put at 16,000.
There were three brigades in each division — in
Jackson's, the
Stonewall (
Winder's),
Taliaferro's, and
J. R. Jones's; and in
Ewells,
Elzey's,
Trimble's, and
Taylor's (
Louisiana). These brigades had gone through a very active and harassing campaign
[
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in the
Valley,
Jackson's having fought at
Kernstown,
McDowell,
Middletown,
Winchester, and
Port Republic, and
Ewell's having fought at
Front Royal,
Middletown,
Winchester,
Cross Keys, and
Port Republic; and all of them having done very rapid and extensive marching.
In
Jackson's three brigades there were 11 regiments and a battalion, and in
Ewell's, including the
Maryland regiment, there were 16 regiments and a battalion, equivalent in all to 28 regiments.
Your estimate would give an average of more than 2,600 to each brigade, and of about 570 to each regiment.
Can you think it possible that those brigades and regiments could have numbered that many in the field after the service they had gone through?
Longstreet had six brigades in division, and they had seen nothing like as hard service as
Jackson's and
Ewell's; yet the report of the strength of his six brigades, including a battery of artillery with each, and the Washington Artillery, as furnished by
General Alexander, shows an effective force of only 9,051 on the 26th of June, 1862.
Let us see how the facts stand on the reports:
Winder, in command of the Stonewall brigade, states, in his report of
Port Republic, that “the total strength of the brigade was one thousand three hundred and thirty-four, rank and file.”
There were five regiments in that brigade, and only six and a battalion in the other two brigades of the division.
The loss in the brigade was 199 at
Port Republic, leaving only 1,135 in it. That was the largest brigade in
Jackson's division, and, indeed, the other two were so small that they were not carried into action around
Richmond, though present with the division.
In
Ewell's division,
Elzey's brigade numbered seven regiments.
It had lost 243 before
Malvern Hill, and when I took command of it on the 1st of July, near
Malvern Hill, there were only 1,050 officers and men in it, as reported to me by regimental commanders.
One regiment (the Forty-fourth Virginia) had just 44 men present — the precise number of the regiment.
Trimble's and
Taylor's brigades were smaller than
Elzey's, having four regiments each and an extra battalion in
Taylor's; though there is a strange inconsistency in
General Trimble's reports, which, doubtless, is the result of an error in copying or printing.
In his report of
Cross Keys, page 80, volume I., he says: “My three regiments [Fifteenth Alabama, Sixteenth Mississippi, and Twenty-first Georgia], counting 1,348 men and officers, repulsed the brigade of
Blenker three times.”
His other regiment (the Twenty-first North Carolina) was not engaged, and his loss was 54.
In his report of Cold Harbor, page 311, he says: “The Fifteenth Alabama and Twenty-first Georgia, numbering 1,315 men, stood under a destructive fire for an hour or more,” &c.--and: “The Sixteenth Mississippi and Twenty-first North Carolina, numbering one thousand and two hundred and forty-four men, passed under as hot a fire an equal distance in fifteen minutes,” &c. If the statements in both reports be true, then, without taking into consideration the loss at
Port Republic, there could only have been thirty-five men and officers in the Sixteenth Mississippi, and
[
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there must have been one thousand two hundred and nine in the Twenty-first North Carolina, which would be preposterous.
It is evidently a mistake.
The latter statement would give two thousand five hundred and fifty-nine in his brigade, and yet when the Six-teenth
Mississippi (only thirty-five?) was subsequently taken from him, one of my regiments was taken to supply its place, and make his brigade something like equal to the others, though the largest number I had been able to get together in my brigade was about one thousand eight hundred.
The Second Virginia cavalry came with
Jackson, and the fact is that the whole command that came from the
Valley, including the artillery, the regiment of cavalry, and the
Maryland regiment and a battery, then known as the “
Maryland line,” could not have exceeded eight thousand men. With
Whiting's two brigades, and
Lawton's brigade, which came with
Jackson, the entire force of the latter may have been in the neighborhood of 16,000; but
Whiting's command constituted a part of the army when you left it, and
Lawton's brigade has already been counted with the troops brought from the
South.
So that the whole force received by
General Lee from all sources was about 23,000--about 30,000 less than your estimate.
Now, let us see if we cannot arrive at a true estimate of
General Lee's strength in another way. Four of
Longstreet's brigade commanders give their strength in their reports, and
Alexander gives the strength of the whole, including
Walton's battalion of Washington Artillery, at 9,051--
Alexander's statement corresponds precisely with those of the brigade commanders who give their strength, and he supplies the deficiency as to the other two and the Washington Artillery.
General D. H. Hill says in his report, page 187: “The following list of killed and wounded will show that we lost 4,000 out of 10,000 taken into the field.”
This includes
Ripley's brigade.
General Magruder says, on page 190: “I was in command of three divisions — those of
Major-General McLaws,
Brigadier-General D. R. Jones, and my own, each consisting of two brigades, the numerical strength being about 13,000 men.”
General Holmes, on page 151, gives his strength of all arms at 6,573.
This, of course, is exclusive of
Ransom, who was with
Huger.
Of
Huger's division,
Ransom gives his strength at 3,000, which, with the 130 previously lost, makes 3,130.
Mahone puts his strength (page 371) at 1,800.
Armistead only states his strength partially, but shows that after getting the Fifty-seventh Virginia from
Walker's brigade, his own brigade was very small.
Wright puts his strength at 2,000 (page 385). Give
Armistead 2,000, which is a very liberal estimate, and
Huger's strength will be 8,930.
Of
A. P. Hill's division,
Pender says (page 255): “The brigade left camp on the evening of the 25th with between twenty-three and twenty-four hundred, including
Andrews' battery.”
Archer says, page 256: “I have the honor to report that on the evening of the 26th of June, by direction of
Major-General Hill, I marched my brigade, 1,228 strong, into
Mechanicsville.”
[
421]
The other brigade commanders do not give their strength.
Field's brigade was a small one,
Gregg's not large, and
Anderson's and
Branch's were perhaps about the size of
Pender's. Give the latter 2,500 each, and
Field and
Gregg 2,000 each, and we have for
A. P. Hill's strength 12,628--say 13,000.
Lawton's brigade was 3,500.
Whiting's strength is not given, but his brigades were small — give 2,000 for each; and then, with
Jackson's and
Ewell's 8,000, we will have:
Longstreet, 9,051;
D. H. Hill, 10,000;
Magruder, 13,000;
Holmes, 6,573;
Huger, 8,930;
A. P. Hill, 13,000;
Whiting, 4,000;
Lawton, 3,500;
Jackson and
Ewell, 8,000.
Aggregate, 76,054.
Stuart had six regiments of cavalry, two small commands called “Legions,” and there were five companies of the First North Carolina cavalry. One of the regiments is shown to have numbered only 200 present, and 2,500 would be a large estimate for the whole.
Pendleton had four reserve battalions of artillery, the other artillery being counted with the brigades to which it was attached; 1,500 for the reserve artillery would be high.
Add the whole together, and we have 80,000, covering the whole o fGeneral
Lee's strength.
This estimate is probably too large by several thousand; and
Holmes' division really was of very little avail in the battles.
Let us take another mode of testing the result that has been reached.
General Lee's losses in the battles were as follows: In
Longstreet's division, 4,429--page 128; in
A. P. Hill's division, 3,870--page 179; in
Jackson's command, composed of his own division, including
Lawton's brigade,
Ewell's division,
Whiting's division and
D. H. Hill's division, 6,727--page 307. [In the statement furnished on the page referred to, the loss in
Elzey's brigade (afterwards my own) is put for that in
Ewell's entire division.
Correcting this according to
Ewell's statement on page 189, and then adding the loss in
Ripley's brigade at
Mechanicsville before
Jackson got up, and we have the entire loss in the troops that were under his command as above stated.] In
Magruder's command,
McLaws gives his loss at 654--pages 160 to 164;
D. R. Jones gives his loss at 832--page 172; but
Magruder fails to give the loss in his own division; taking the average for it, and it may be put at 750, which will give a total loss of 2,236.
In
Huger's division,
Ransom gives his loss at 630--pages 365 and 370;
Wright's was 634, pages 386 and 397, and
Mahone's loss was 415, pages 371 to 377.
Armistead gives only a partial statement of his loss — taking it at 450 and we will have the loss in
Huger's division 2,129.
The loss in
Holmes' division was 51, in
Stuart's cavalry 71, and in the reserve artillery 44.
The whole loss sums up as follows:
Longstreet's division, 4,429;
A. P. Hill's division, 3,870;
Huger's division, 2,129;
Jackson's command, 6,727;
Magruder's command, 2,236;
Holmes' division, 51;
Stuart's cavalry, 71; reserve artillery, 44.
Total, 19,557.
Mr. Swinton, the author of the
History of the army of the Potomac, examined the
Confederate returns in the
Archive Office at
Washington, and in June, 1876, published an abstract from
[
422]
them showing the strength of our armies at various times.
His statement shows that there were present for duty in the Department of Northern Virginia at the end of July, 1862, 69,559 men and officers.
This included not only all the commands which had been at the battles around
Richmond, except
Daniel's brigade of a little over 1,500 men, which had gone back, but also the brigade of
Evans, which had arrived, and
Drayton's if it had arrived, as well as the Forty-seventh and Forty-eighth Alabama regiments, which had arrived and been attached to
Taliaferro's brigade;
Robertson's cavalry brigade of three regiments, which had come from the
Valley; all the wounded at
Williamsburg,
Seven Pines, in the
Valley, and the Seven Days battles, who had returned to duty; convalescents returned from hospitals, and prisoners who may have been exchanged under the cartel then recently adopted.
Add the effective force for duty the last of July to the killed, wounded, and missing in the battles, and we have an aggregate of 89,116.
Certainly
General Lee's army, at the beginning of the battles, could not have exceeded this number; and from the various sources mentioned it is very certain that more than 10,000 men had come to the army after those battles.
I think this exhibit ought to establish conclusively, to any candid mind, that
General Lee's army, at the beginning of the battles, was under 80,000 effectives.
In your reply to
Colonel Marshall you say: “
Colonel Marshall says, on the evidence of subsequent returns, that the troops of
Holmes,
Ripley, and
Lawton, amounted to but 11,866 men. This is not evidence to be put against the statements of those officers.”
Now, the returns which
Colonel Marshall refers to, which are the same I have cited, are the contemporaneous reports of those officers themselves, made under circumstances which imposed on them the very highest obligations to be accurate.
Certainly you must admit that their statements in writing, made when the events were fresh in their minds, are of higher authority than oral statements when they did not speak from the record.
The pamphlet copy of
Colonel Marshall's address, which I send you, explains, in a note, the facts in regard to
Holmes' command, and shows, I think, how you might have been led into error in regard to his force.
You are likewise mistaken in assuming that
McClellan's army was increased by 19,000 after
Seven Pines.
His report, page 11, shows that on the 30th of April, 1862, he had 4,725 officers and 104,610 men for duty — in all 109,335; and that on the 26th of June he had 4,665 officers and 101,160 men — in all 105,825 for duty.
Dix's command never joined him. It was the same command which
Wool had at
Fortress Monroe when we were at
Yorktown.
The only change made in its
status was the assignment of
Dix to the command, on the 1st of June, 1862, in the place of
Wool, with orders to report to
McClellan; but no part of
Dix's command joined
McClellan.
The only accession
McClellan had after
Seven Pines and before the battles was
McCaul's division, 9,514 strong; and it did not make up for the
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losses in battle and by sickness.
General Lee certainly received accessions, including
Jackson's command, to the extent of about 23,000 men; and when the Seven Days battles began, the disparity between the forces had been diminished, as well by the decrease of
McClellan's army as by the increase of
General Lee's.
One strong reason why the attack could not be made sooner, was because
Jackson could not be withdrawn from the
Valley sooner.
He came as soon after
Port Republic as was practicable, it being necessary so to baffle and deceive the enemy as to prevent the union of
McDowell's force with that of
McClellan.
In showing, therefore, that the accession to
General Lee's army was not as great as you suppose, there can be no imputation upon his capacity as a general.
On the other hand, at least one writer has seized hold of your estimate of
General Lee's force and endeavored to prove that he was incompetent to command a great army in the field.
He assumes from the data given by you that
General Lee's army numbered at least 108,000 men, while
McClellan had only 105,000.
Certainly, if that were true, it would detract very much from the credit generally accorded the great commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, for the relief of the
Confederate capital from the siege of 1862.
If
General Lee had more men than
McClellan had, it would be impossible to explain why he did not destroy the army of the latter.
Hence it is that we, who were so long connected with that army, feel it incumbent on us to place the real facts before the world whenever they are incorrectly stated.
In doing so we feel that we are doing no wrong to any, for the fame of all our armies and their commanders must rest upon their own deeds, and that of none can be enhanced by depreciating others, or diminished by giving credit to those who are deserving of it. Every soldier of the Army of Northern Virginia who has not proved a renegade, feels that he has a personal interest in the fame of its great commander, and when error is propagated in regard to his campaigns and his history, we all feel that we have a right, nay, that there is a solemn duty incumbent on us to challenge it, from however high a source it may come, or by whatever motives it may be prompted.
In cherishing such sentiments in regard to him we so long followed, we still can and do feel a just pride in the fame of those who preceded him, and there is no true soldier of the Army of Northern Virginia who would desire to pluck one leaf from the chaplets that adorn the brows of our comrades of the other Confederate armies or their leaders.
I accept most readily and cheerfully the assurance given in your reply to
Colonel Marshall, as well as in your private letter to me, of your regard for the fame of
General Lee and of the absence of all desire to diminish it. I know that he reciprocated most heartily the sentiments of esteem you express, and I am sure that, if among us, he would frown most indignantly upon any effort to enhance his own reputation at the expense of yourself or any one else.
I beg, General, that you will not regard me as one who has officiously
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volunteered in a dispute in which he has no interest.
Having, in an address delivered at
Lexington on the 19th of January, 1872, undertaken to establish what was the strength of our army around
Richmond in June, 1862, and
Mr. Jones having done me the honor of promulgating that address to the world (in his
Personal Reminiscences of General Lee), I have felt that it was incumbent on me to vindicate the correctness of my estimates, which are so much at variance with your own. In doing so I have intended to be entirely respectful and courteous to you, and I trust you will so understand me.
With the assurance of my highest esteem, I am, very respectfully and truly, your obedient servant,