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Notes of a Confederate staff-officer at Shiloh.
Thomas Jordan, Brigadier-General (at Shiloh, Adjutant-General of the Confederate Army).
After 10 o'clock at night, on the 2d of April, 1862, while in my office as adjutant-general of the Confederate army assembled at
Corinth, a telegram was brought to me from
General Cheatham, commanding an outpost on our left flank at
Bethel, on the Mobile and Ohio railway, some twenty odd miles northward of
Corinth.-
General Cheatham had addressed it to
General Polk, his corps commander, informing him that a Federal division, under
General Lew Wallace, had been manoeuvring in his proximity during the day.
General Polk had in due course sent the message to
General Beauregard, from whom it came to me with his indorsement,
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A Confederate private of the West.
From a tintype. |
addressed to
General A. S. Johnston, in substance: “Now is the time to advance upon
Pittsburg Landing.”
And below were these words, in effect, if not literally: “
Colonel Jordan had better carry this in person to
General Johnston and explain the military situation.-G. T. B.”
At the time
Colonel Jacob Thompson, formerly
Secretary of the Interior of the
United States, was in my office.
I read the telegram aloud to him and immediately thereafter proceeded to
General Johnston's quarters, nearly a quarter of a mile distant, where I found the general surrounded by his personal staff, in the room which the latter habitually occupied.
I handed him the open dispatch and the indorsements, which he read without comment.
He then asked me several questions about matters irrelevant to the dispatch or what might naturally grow out of it, and rose, saying that he would cross the street to see
General Bragg.
I asked if I should accompany him. “Certainly,” was his answer.
We found that
General Bragg had already gone to bed, but he received us in dishabille,
General Johnston handing him the dispatch at once, without remark.
Bragg, having read it, immediately expressed his agreement with
Beauregard's advisement.
General Johnston thereupon very clearly stated strongly some objections, chiefly to the effect that as yet our troops were too raw and incompletely equipped for an offensive enterprise, such as an attack upon the
Federal army in a position of their own choosing, and also that he did not see from what quarter a proper reserve could be assembled in time.
As
General Beauregard had discussed with me repeatedly within a week the details of such an offensive operation in all its features, and the necessity for it before the
Federal army was itself ready to take the offensive, I was able to answer satisfactorily the objections raised by
General Johnston, including the supposed difficulty about a reserve — for which use I pointed out that the Confederate forces posted under
General Breckinridge at several points along the line of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, to the
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eastward of
Corinth, could be quickly concentrated at
Burnsville, and be moved thence direct to
Monterey, and there effect a junction with our main force.
General Johnston at last assented to the undertaking.
Thereupon I turned to a table in
General Bragg's chamber, and wrote a circular order to the three corps commanders,
Major-Generals Polk,
Bragg, and
Hardee, directing that each should hold his corps under arms by 6 A. M., on the 3d of April, ready to march, with one hundred rounds of ammunition; three days cooked provisions per man in their haversacks, with two more to be transported in wagons.
This circular also prescribed the ammunition for the artillery, and the number of tents each company should be provided with; all of which was approved by
General Johnston when I read the rough draught of it. Afterward the copies were made by an aide-de-camp on the staff of
General Bragg.
These orders were delivered to
Generals Polk and
Hardee by 1:40 A. M., as shown by their receipts, which I required to be taken.
The orders to
General Breckinridge were given by telegraph, he having been called by me to the military telegraph office nearest his headquarters to receive them and to answer queries regarding his command.
1 Thus did it happen that the Confederate army was brought to undertake the offensive at
Pittsburg Landing.
Ii.
Upon quitting
General Bragg's quarters I proceeded immediately to the tent of
Colonel A. R. Chisolm,
aide-de-camp to
General Beauregard, separated from my office by some thirty or forty yards, roused him from sleep, and asked him to inform the general at daylight that the order to advance at midday had been issued.
Soon after sunrise I was called to the quarters of
General Beauregard, whom I found with the notes of the plan of operations and orders of engagement.
These, I may add, had just been copied by
Colonel Chisolm from the backs of telegrams and envelopes upon which the general had made them during the night while in bed. Taking these notes and the general's sketch-map of the roads leading from all surrounding quarters to
Monterey and thence to
Pittsburg Landing, I returned to my office and began to draw up the order for the battle (Special Orders, No. 8), which will be found in the
Official Records, X., 392-395.
2
Called to my breakfast before the order could be framed, I met
General Johnston en route for
General Beauregard's quarters, where I said I would meet him as quickly as possible, and where I soon joined him.
General Beauregard was explaining the details as to the roads by which the several corps would have to move through the somewhat difficult, heavily wooded country, both before and after leaving
Monterey; and to make this clear, as
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I had from
General Beauregard the only sketch extant,
General Beauregard drew a rough sketch on his camp-table top. Meanwhile,
General Bragg and afterward
Generals Polk and
Hardee had joined the conference.
As I remarked that it would take me some time to formulate the order and issue all the requisite copies,
General Beauregard explained orally to the three generals their routes of march for the first day, so that they might not wait for receipt of the written orders, which would be in all proper hands before night.
Accordingly, these explanations were carefully made, and the corps commanders went away with distinct instructions to begin the movement at midday, as prescribed in the written orders subsequently issued.
Pursuant to the terms of the circular order which I had written and issued from
General Bragg's headquarters the night before, the troops were brought under arms before noon, by which time the streets and all approaches to the railway station, as well as the roads leading from
Corinth, were densely packed with troops, wagons, and field-batteries ready for the march.
But no movement was made;
General Polk's corps in some way blocked the line of march,--as was reported to
General Beauregard at a late hour in the afternoon by
General Hardee in person.
Thereupon, an aide-de-camp was sent to
General Polk, who, to the surprise of all, explained that he had kept his corps at a stand awaiting the written order.
Thus it was so late before the movement actually began, that, coupled with the really inexplicable tardiness with which
Bragg's corps was moved, it caused the arrival of the Confederate army in the near presence of their adversary twenty-four hours later than was intended, as, by reason of this tardiness, it was not until the late afternoon of the 5th of April that the head of the
Confederate column reached a point within less than two miles of the
Federal lines, instead of on the 4th, in which case the battle would have been fought with
General Grant alone, or without the material and moral help derived from the advent of
Buell on the field, as happened on the night of April 6th and morning of the 7th.
Iii.
General Beauregard with his staff left
Corinth the afternoon of the 4th of April, and reaching
Monterey, twelve miles distant, found the
Confederate corps massed in that quarter.
He was hardly encouraged, however, by the manner in which they had been handled to that stage in the operation.
General Johnston and his staff were already at the same point, in occupation of a house at which we dismounted just as some cavalry brought from the front a soldierly young Federal volunteer officer,
Major Le Roy Crockett, of the 72d Ohio, who had been captured a few hours before in a sharp skirmish in close proximity to the
Federal lines, brought on by a Confederate reconnoitering force pressed most indiscreetly from
General Bragg's corps almost upon the
Federal front line.
As this officer rode beside his captors through the mass of Confederate infantry and batteries, and his eyes rested intelligently on the warlike spectacle, he exclaimed, “This means a battle” ; and he involuntarily added, “They don't expect anything of this kind back yonder.”
He was taken
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in charge by myself, and, assisted by
Major Gilmer,
chief engineer on the staff, I interrogated him with the least possible semblance of so doing, with the result of satisfying me, as I reported to
Generals Johnston and
Beauregard, that we should have no earth-works to encounter, and an enemy wholly unaware of what was so near at hand.
Iv.
it has more than once been represented with pencil, as well as with pen, that there was a somewhat dramatic conference of the
Confederate generals around the camp-fire the night before the battle of the 6th of April.
The simple fact is this:
Hardee, whose corps was to be in the advance in the attack, having reached a point known to be somewhat less than two miles from our adversary, was halted and deployed in line of battle across the
Pittsburg road to await the arrival and formation in his rear of the rest of the army as prescribed in the battle order.
As this was not effected until after 3 o'clock, it was too late to make the attack that day. As a matter of course in such a contingency, the corps commanders were called to meet
Generals Johnston and
Beauregard, who, having gone from
Monterey together with the
general staff and their respective personal staffs, had taken a position, dismounted, on. the
Pittsburg road, somewhat to the rear of
Hardee's corps.
The meeting took place about 4 o'clock.
General Polk now reported that his men were almost destitute of provisions, having either already consumed or thrown them away.
General Bragg reported that his own men had been more provident, and therefore could spare enough for the emergency.
Deeply dissatisfied with the inexplicable manner in which both
Bragg's and
Polk's corps had been delayed, both before reaching and after leaving
Monterey, as well as by the injudicious manner in which a reconnoissance had been made with such aggressiveness and use of artillery as ought to have apprised any sharp-sighted enemy that an offensive army was not far distant,
General Beauregard--though it had been upon his urgent instance that the advance had been made — did not hesitate to say that, inasmuch as it was scarcely possible for the enemy to be unaware of our presence and purpose, should we attack next morning we would find the
Federals ready for us intrenched to the eyes; whereas the whole success of the movement had depended on our ability to assail our enemy unexpectedly.
Therefore he advised the return of the Confederate army to
Corinth, as it assuredly was not in a condition to attack an army superior in numbers and behind the intrenchments that would now be thrown up in expectation of our approach.
General Johnston listened attentively to what
General Beauregard said, and at length replied in substance that he recognized its weight; nevertheless; as he hoped the enemy was not suspecting our proximity, he felt bound, as he had put the army in motion for a battle, to venture the hazard.
Whereupon the officers rapidly dispersed to their respective commands for that venture.
As I have seen it.intimated, among others by
General Bragg, that this conference was a mere casual or “partly accidental meeting of general
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A Union Battery taken by surprise.
(see page 601.) |
officers,” it may not be amiss to recall that such a conference was the inevitable consequence of the arrival of the Confederate army at the point from which it was to spring upon the enemy, as it were from an ambush.
Naturally, moreover, by a conference with their corps commanders,
Johnston and
Beauregard could best ascertain the condition of all the troops and determine the best course to be pursued.
It was after the reports thus made with the mutual blame of each other of two of the corps commanders for the delay, that
Beauregard, confirmed in his apprehension that the campaign had miscarried, urged that its objective should be given up,--much as
Wellington once, in
Spain, after taking the field to attack
Massena, finding the latter more strongly posted and prepared than he had been misled to believe, had not hesitated to retire without fighting.
The course of events demonstrated the correctness of
Beauregard's judgment.
V.
That night, soon after supper, an aide-de-camp from
General Johnston informed me of the general's desire to see me, and guided me to where he was bivouacking in the open air. I was wanted to issue the order for the immediate transfer of
Maney's regiment of
Tennessee infantry from a brigade in
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Bragg's corps to a certain brigade in
Polk's corps, of which
Colonel Maney would have the command as senior officer, which order I wrote, in the absence of any table or other convenience, outstretched upon
General Johnston's blankets, which were spread at the foot of a tree.
After this was done, and the order dispatched by a special courier so that the transfer might be made in time to place
Colonel Maney at the head of the brigade in the coming battle, something led us to talk of the
Pacific Coast, in which quarter I had served eight years. Having been at
Washington during the momentous winter of 1860-61, I spoke of the fact that when
Colonel Sumner had been sent
via the
Isthmus of Panama to supersede him (
Johnston) in the command of the Department of the Pacific in April, 1861,
Sumner's berth in the steamer had been taken under an assumed name, so that the newspapers might not get and divulge the fact of his departure on that errand in time for intelligence of it to reach the
Pacific Coast by the overland route, and lead
General Johnston to act with a supposed powerful disunion party in
California in a revolt against the
Federal authority before
Sumner's arrival.
“Yes,” answered the general, with much quiet feeling in his manner, “while distrusting me sufficiently to act thus toward me, my former adjutant-general,
Fitz John Porter, was induced to write me of their great confidence in me, and to say that it was their purpose to place me in command of the
Federal army, immediately next to
General Scott.”
He had evidently been deeply hurt that his personal character had not shielded him from the suspicion of doing aught while holding a commission that could lead his superiors to suppose it necessary to undertake his supersedure by stealth.
[See p. 541.]
Vi.
The next morning, as the Confederate army, deployed in the three lines prescribed in the order of march and battle, moved before sunrise down the gentle wooded slope toward Shiloh Chapel,
Generals Johnston and
Beauregard, with the
general staff as well as aides-de-camp, stood upon a slight eminence, delighted with the evident alacrity, animated faces, and elastic gait with which all moved forward into action.
Hardly had the last line passed them before the rattle of musketry announced that
Hardee's corps was engaged.
General Johnston now informed
General Beauregard that he would go to the front with the troops engaged, leaving
General Beauregard to take the proper central position from which to direct the movement as the exigencies of the battle might require.
Then
General Johnston rode off with his personal staff exclusively, except possibly
Major Gilmer, the
chief engineer.
Soon the sound of battle became general; and, as during the
battle of Manassas, I had been left at headquarters to send reinforcements into action as they came up by rail, I reminded
General Beauregard of the fact, and requested to be dispatched to join
General Johnston.
He assented, and I set off, accompanied by my friend
Colonel Jacob Thompson.
In a little time I found that the-corps commanders were ahead of or separated from a material part of their troops, whom I repeatedly found halted for want of orders.
In all
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The last stand made by the Confederate line.
General Beauregard at Shiloh Chapel sending his aides to the corps commanders with orders to begin the retreat.
This was at two o'clock on Monday (see page 603). The tents are part of Sherman's camp, which was reoccupied by him Monday evening. |
such cases, assuming the authority of my position, I gave the orders in the name of
General Johnston.
At one time I had with me the chiefs-of-staff of
Polk,
Bragg, and
Hardee,
Colonel David Urquhart, the
chief aide-de-camp of
Bragg, and
Colonel William Preston, the
chief aide-de-camp of
General Johnston, all of whom I employed in assisting to press the
Confederate troops toward the heaviest firing, and to keep the batteries advancing.
Colonels Preston and
Urquhart remained with me the longer time and assisted greatly.
Finally, however,
Urquhart, learning from some of the troops encountered that he was in proximity to his chief,
General Bragg, left me to join him,
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while I, accompanied by
Colonel Preston, rode to the right wing in the direction of sharp battle.
Soon we came in near view of a deserted Federal encampment in an open field, with a Federal battery of four or six guns unlimbered and horseless, while in advance of it were to be seen a brigade of Confederate troops at a halt.
Urquhart now galloped up and informed me that
General Bragg had sent him to me with the request that I should find and order forward some troops to turn and capture some batteries just in his front which obstructed his advance.
I at once pushed across a deep ravine with
Urquhart and
Preston to the troops in view, which proved to be
Statham's brigade of the reserve under
General Breckinridge; but because it belonged to the reserve, I hesitated to take the responsibility to employ it, and said so; however, asking
Colonel Preston--the brother-in-law as well as aide-de-camp of
General Johnston--the hour, he replied, from his watch, twenty minutes after 2 o'clock. I then said that the battle ought to be won by that time, and “I think the reserve should be used.”
Colonel Preston expressed his agreement with me, and I rode at once to
General Breckinridge, who was not far to the rear of his troops, surrounded by a number of officers.
Accosting him, I said, “
General Breckinridge, it is
General Johnston's order that you advance and turn and take those batteries,” pointing in the direction indicated by
Urquhart, and where was to be heard the din of their discharges.
As the order was given,
General Breckinridge, clad in a well-fitting blouse of dark-colored
Kentucky jeans, straightened himself in his stirrups.
His dark eyes seemed to illuminate his swarthy, regular features, and as he sat in his saddle he seemed to me altogether the most impressive-looking man I ever had seen.
I then.
turned, accompanied both by
Urquhart and
Preston, with the purpose of going to the camp and battery previously mentioned, and from that point to observe the movement.
On reaching the ravine, which we had crossed,
Colonel Preston, who possibly had just heard from some of the officers of the command just set in motion of
General Johnston's recent presence with them, said to me, “I believe I will make another attempt to find
General Johnston,” and rode down the ravine toward the left, and as it so happened, did find
General Johnston, but already unconscious, if not dead.
General Johnston had received his death-wound near the very troops I had found standing at ordered arms, but who were unaware of the fact, and therefore were not, as has been written, brought to a stand-still by reason of that catastrophe, and who undeniably were put in effective forward movement by me within twenty minutes after his wounding.
A striking incident of the first day's battle may be here mentioned for its novelty on battle-fields.
A completely equipped Federal battery was so suddenly turned and environed by the
Confederates, that it was captured with all the guns limbered up en regle for movement as upon drill, before its officers could possibly unlimber and use its guns in self-defense.
The drivers were in their saddles, the gunners seated side by side in their
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places upon the ammunition-boxes of the caissons, grinning over the situation, and the officers with their swords drawn were mounted on their horses.
Not a horse had been disabled.
Vii.
At the time of the reception of the order given as the sun was setting on the 6th of April by
General Beauregard for his greatly disarranged and scattered troops to withdraw from action and reorganize for the next day's operations, I had reached a point very close to the
Tennessee River where it was densely wooded.
The large ordnance of the gun-boats was raking this position, creating more noise in some quarters than harm to the
Confederates, as the heavy projectiles tore and crashed in all directions through the heavy forest.
Riding slowly backward to the point at which I understood I should find
General Beauregard, it was after sunset when I dismounted at the tent of a Federal officer, before which the general was standing with some of his staff and with an officer in the uniform of a Federal general, to whom I was introduced.
It was
General Prentiss.
Several hours previously a telegraphic dispatch addressed by
Colonel Helm to
General Johnston (as well as I now remember, from the direction of
Athens, in Tennessee) was brought me from
Corinth by a courier, saying that scouts employed in observing
General Buell's movements reported him to be marching not toward a junction with
Grant, but in the direction of
Decatur,
North Alabama.
This assuring dispatch I handed to
General Beauregard, and then, at his order, I wrote a telegraphic report to the
Confederate adjutant-general,
Cooper, at
Richmond, announcing the results of the day, including the death of
Johnston.
Meanwhile, it had become so dark that I could barely see to write, and it was quite dark by the time
Generals Hardee and
Breckinridge came to see
General Beauregard for orders for the next day's operations.
General Bragg, who had also come from the front, had taken up his quarters for the night in a tent which
General Sherman had previously occupied at the
Shiloh Chapel.
This chapel, a rude log-hut of one story, was only two or three hundred yards distant from the spot at which I had found
General Beauregard.
Leaving
General Prentiss in my charge,
General Beauregard soon after dark took up his quarters for the night with
General Bragg.
The corps commanders had meanwhile been personally directed to assemble their respective commands at the earliest possible moment in the morning to be ready for the final stroke.
Colonel Thompson and myself, with
General Prentiss sandwiched between us, shared a rough makeshift of a bed made up of tents and captured blankets.
Prentiss and
Thompson had been old acquaintances, and the former talked freely of the battle, as also of the war, with a good deal of intelligence and good temper.
With a laugh, he said: “You gentlemen have had your way to-day, but it will be very different to-morrow.
You'll see!
Buell will effect a junction with
Grant to-night, and we'll turn the tables on you in the morning.”
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This was said evidently with sincerity, and was answered in the same pleasant spirit, and I showed him the dispatch that had reached me on the field.
He insisted, however, that it was a mistake, as we would see. Tired as we were with the day's work, sleep soon overtook and held us all until early dawn, when the firing first of musketry and then of field-artillery roused us, and
General Prentiss exclaimed: “Ah!
Didn't I tell you so!
There is
Buell!”
And so it proved.
VIII.
up to half-past 2 o'clock on the 7th of April, or second day's conflict,
General Beauregard had his headquarters at the
Shiloh Chapel, or immediately at
Sherman's former headquarters.
The Confederate troops, now hardly 20,000 men, were all either directly in advance of that position, or, to the right and left of it, somewhat in advance, hotly engaged, having only receded from the places occupied during the night sufficiently to be better massed and organized for fighting.
But our losses were swelling perilously, and the straggling was growing more difficult to restrain.
A little after two o'clock,
Governor Harris of
Tennessee, who, after the death of
General Johnston, had joined the staff of
Beauregard in action, taking me aside, asked if I did not regard the day as going against us irremediably, and whether there was not danger in tarrying so long in the field as to be unable to withdraw in good order.
I answered that I thought it would soon be our proper course to retreat.
Having an opportunity a moment later to speak to
General Beauregard in private, I brought the subject before him in almost these words:
“General, do you not think our troops are very much in the condition of a lump of sugar thoroughly soaked with water, but yet preserving its original shape, though ready to dissolve Would it not be judicious to get away with what we have .?”
“I intend to withdraw in a few moments,” was his reply.
Calling upon his aides-de-camp present, he dispatched them with orders to the several corps commanders to begin the rearward movement.
He also directed me to collect as many of the broken organizations as I could,--both of infantry and artillery,--post them in the best position I might find, and hold it until the whole army had passed to the rear of it. Such a position I quickly found on an elevated ridge in full view of the chapel and the ground to the right and left of it, and also somewhat more elevated, rising abruptly toward the enemy but receding gently toward
Corinth.
There I collected and posted some two thousand infantry, making them lie down at rest.
I also placed in battery some twelve or fifteen guns, so as to command and sweep the approach from the direction of the enemy.
There also I remained until after 4 o'clock, or until the entire Confederate force had retired,
General Breckinridge's troops being the last, and without seeing a single Federal soldier within the wide range of my eyes.
I then retired, carrying from the field the caissons loaded down with muskets and rifles picked up on the field.
