N. B. Pearce, Brigadier-General, C. S. A.
I style this short account of my personal recollections of the battle of “
Oak hills” (as the
Confederates named the engagement) as above, because I was identified with the
State of Arkansas and her soldiers.
I also believe that subsequent events, developed by the prominence of some of the commanders engaged in this fight, have had a tendency to obscure that just recognition which the
Arkansas troops so nobly earned in this, one of the first great battles of our civil war.
The ninth day of August, 1861, found the Confederate army under
General Ben. McCulloch, camped on
Wilson's Creek, ten miles south of
Springfield, in south-west Missouri.
It consisted of a Louisiana regiment under
Colonel Louis Hebert (a well-drilled and well-equipped organization, chiefly from the north part of the
State);
Greer's Texas regiment (mounted);
Churchill's Arkansas cavalry, and
McIntosh's battalion of
Arkansas mounted rifles (
Lieutenant-Colonel Embry), under the immediate charge of the
commanding general;
General Price's command of Missouri State Guards, with
Bledsoe's and
Guibor's batteries, and my three regiments of
Arkansas infantry, with
Woodruff's and
Reid's batteries.
More than half the Missourians were mounted, and but few of the troops in the whole command were well armed.
The army numbered in all about 11,500 men,--perhaps, 6000 to 7000 of whom were in semi-fighting trim, and participated in the battle.
The Federal forces under
General Nathaniel Lyon, between 5000 and 6000 strong, occupied the town of
Springfield, and
General McCulloch was expecting them to advance and give him battle.
General McCulloch's headquarters were on the right of the
Springfield road, east of
Wilson's Creek, rather in advance of the center of the camp.
General Price occupied a position immediately west, and in the valley of the creek, with his command mostly north of the
Springfield road.
I had established my headquarters on the heights east and south of
Wilson's Creek and the
Springfield road, with my forces occupying the elevated ground immediately adjacent.
Detailed reports as to the strength and movements of
Lyon's command were momentarily expected, through spies sent out by
General Price, as
[
299]
McCulloch relied upon the native
Missourians to furnish such knowledge; but it was not until late in the afternoon that two “loyal” ladies succeeded in passing out of the
Federal lines, by permission of
General Lyon, and, coming in a circuitous route by
Pond Springs, reached
General Price's headquarters with the desired information.
General McCulloch at once called a council of war of the principal officers, where it was decided, instead of waiting for the enemy, to march with the whole command, at 9 o'clock that night, and attack
General Lyon at
Springfield.
As soon as the orders of
General McCulloch had been properly published by his adjutant-general,
Colonel McIntosh, the camp was thrown into a ferment of suppressed excitement.
It was ordered that the advance be made in three divisions, under the separate commands of
General Price,
Adjutant-General McIntosh, and myself.
The scene of preparation, immediately following the orders so long delayed and now so eagerly welcomed by the men, was picturesque and animating in the extreme.
The question of ammunition was one of the most important and serious, and as the Ordnance Department was imperfectly organized and poorly supplied, the men scattered about in groups, to improvise, as best they could, ammunition for their inefficient arms.
Here, a group would be molding bullets-there, another crowd dividing
percussion-caps, and, again, another group fitting new flints to their old muskets.
They had little thought then of the inequality between the discipline, arms, and accouterments of the regular United States troops they were soon to engage in battle, and their own homely movements and equipments.
It was a new thing to most of them, this regular way of shooting by word of command, and it was, perhaps, the old-accustomed method of using rifle, musket, or shot-gun as gamesters or marksmen that won them the battle when pressed into close quarters with the enemy.
All was expectancy, and as the time sped on to 9 o'clock, the men became more and more eager to advance.
What was their disappointment when, as the hour finally arrived, instead of the order to march, it was announced that
General McCulloch had decided, on account of a threatened rain, which might damage and destroy much of their ammunition, to postpone the movement.
The men did not “sulk in their tents,” but rested on their arms in no amiable mood.
This condition of uncertainty and suspense lasted well through the night, as the
commanding officers were better informed than the men of the risks to be encountered, and of the probable result, in case they should make an aggressive fight against disciplined forces when only half prepared.
Daybreak, on the 10th of August, found the command still at
Wilson's Creek, cheerlessly waiting, many of the troops remaining in position, in line of march, on the road, and others returning to camp to prepare the morning meal.
Perhaps it was 6 o'clock when the long-roll sounded and the camp was called to arms.
A few minutes before this,
Sergeant Hite, of my body-guard, dashed up to my headquarters, breathless with excitement, hatless, and his horse covered with foam, exclaiming hurriedly, “General, the enemy is coming!”
“Where?”
said I, and he pointed in the direction of a spring, up a ravine, where he had been for water.
He had been fired at, he said, by a
[
300]
picket of some troops advancing on the right flank.
I ordered the sergeant to ride in haste to
General McCulloch with this information, and proceeded to place my command in position.
I was the better enabled to do this without delay, because I had on the day before, with
Colonel R. H. Weightman, made a careful reconnoissance of the ground in the direction from which the enemy was said to be approaching.
The colonels commanding were immediately notified, and the regiments were formed and posted so as to meet his advance.
Captain Woodruff's
Little Rock (Ark.) battery was ordered to occupy a hill commanding the road to
Springfield, and the 3d Arkansas Infantry (
Colonel John R. Gratiot) was ordered to support him. I placed
Captain Reid's
Fort Smith (Ark.) battery on an eminence to command the approaches to our right and rear, and gave him the 5th Arkansas Infantry (
Colonel T. P. Dockery) as a support.
I then advanced the 4th Arkansas Infantry (
Colonel J. D. Walker) north of this battery to watch the approach down the ravine, through which
Sergeant Hite had reported that the enemy was coming.
Thus, the
Arkansas troops under my command had all been
placed in favorable position, ready for action, within a very short time after the first alarm.
While these events were taking place under my immediate notice,
General McCulloch had been actively making disposition of the troops more nearly opposed to the first advance of the enemy, under
General Lyon.
He had posted the 3d Louisiana Infantry (
Colonel Hebert) and
McIntosh's 2d Arkansas Rifles (dismounted) to meet the earliest demonstration from the direction of
Springfield.
General Price had also been industriously engaged in placing his troops to intercept the advancing foe.
General Rains's (
Missouri) command had the honor of giving the first reception to the main column under
General Lyon.
He was ably supported by the gallant
Missouri generals,
Slack,
McBride,
Parsons, and
Clark, with their respective brigades.
The fighting at this juncture — perhaps about 7 o'clock--was confined to the corn-field north of
Wilson's Creek, where the
Louisiana infantry, with
Lieutenant-Colonel Embry's 2d Arkansas Mounted Rifles (dismounted), all under the immediate command of
Colonel McIntosh, effectually charged and drove back the enemy.
Simultaneously the battle opened farther west and south of
Wilson's Creek, where the
Missouri troops were attacked by the main column or right wing of the enemy.
Totten's (Federal) battery was pushed
[
301]
forward, and took its first position on the side of
Oak Hill, north of where the main fight afterward took place.
I had directed
Captain Woodruff, who was posted within easy range, to give attention to
Totten, and the two batteries were soon engaged in a lively artillery duel, being well matched in skill and mettle.
Lieutenant Weaver, of
Woodruff's battery, was killed, and 4 of
Totten's men were killed and 7 wounded in this engagement.
General Lyon's right, although it had gained a temporary advantage in the early morning by surprising the Missourians, was roughly handled when they had recovered themselves.
They were reinforced by
Churchill's regiment, which had moved up from the extreme right, and the battle raged several hours while they held their ground.
At this juncture a gallant charge was made by Greers and
Carroll's mounted regiments on
Totten's battery, but it was not a complete success, as the gunners turned about and recovered their guns.
In the early morning, perhaps simultaneously with the advance of
Lyon,
General Sigel, commanding the left column of the advance from
Springfield, came upon our right and rear, first attacking
Colonel Churchill's camp, as the men were preparing for breakfast, obliging them to retreat to an adjacent wood, where they were formed in good order.
The surprise resulted from the movement of the night before, when pickets had been withdrawn that were not re-posted in the morning.
Sigel did not wait for a fight, however, but advanced to, and had his battery unlimbered near, the
Fayetteville road, west of
Wilson's Creek, opposite and within range of
Reid's battery as it was then in position as originally placed.
Before he had discovered us, and perhaps in ignorance of our position,
Reid attacked him, under my personal orders and supervision.
Sigel's movement was a bold one, and we really could not tell, on his first appearance (there having been no fight with
Churchill), whether he was friend or foe. An accidental gust of wind having unfurled his flag, we were no longer in doubt.
Reid succeeded in getting his range accurately, so that his shot proved very effective.
At this juncture,
General McCulloch in person led two companies of the
Louisiana infantry in a charge and captured five of the guns.
1 General Sigel was himself in command, and made vain attempts to hold his men, who were soon in full retreat, back over the road they came, pursued by the
Texas and
Missouri cavalry.
This was the last of
Sigel for the day, as his retreat was continued to
Springfield.
As a precaution, however, not knowing how badly we had defeated
Sigel, I immediately posted the 4th Arkansas Infantry (
Colonel Walker) along the brow of the hill, commanding the road over which he had fled, which regiment remained on duty until the battle was over.
There seemed now to be a lull in the active fighting; the bloody contest in the corn-field had taken place; the fight “mit
Sigel” had resulted satisfactorily to us, but the troops more immediately opposed to
General Lyon had not done so well.
General Price and his
Missouri troops had borne the brunt of this hard contest, but had gained no ground.
They had suffered heavy
[
302]
losses, and were running short of ammunition.
I had watched anxiously for signs of victory to come from the north side of the creek, but
Totten's battery seemed to belch forth with renewed vigor, and was advanced once or twice in its position.
The line of battle on our left was shortening, and the fortunes of war appeared to be sending many of our gallant officers and soldiers to their death.
There was no demoralization — no signs of wavering or retreat, but it was an hour of great anxiety and suspense.
No one then knew what the day would bring forth.
As the sun poured down upon our devoted comrades, poised and resting, as it were, between the chapters of a mighty struggle not yet completed, the stoutest of us almost weakened in our anxiety to know the outcome.
Just at this time,
General Lyon appeared to be massing his men for a final and decisive movement.
I had been relieved of
Sigel, and
Reid's battery was inactive because it could not reach
Totten.
This was fortunate, for my command, in a measure fresh and enthusiastic, was about to embrace an opportunity-such a
One as will often win or lose a battle-by throwing its strength to the weakened line at a critical moment and winning the day.
Colonel McIntosh came to me from
General McCulloch, and
Captain Greene from
General Price, urging me to move at once to their assistance.
General Lyon was in possession of
Oak Hill; his lines were forward, his batteries aggressive, and his charges impetuous.
The fortunes of the day were balanced in the scale, and something must be done or the battle was lost.
My men were eager to go forward, and when I led the 3d Arkansas Infantry (
Colonel Gratiot) and the right wing of the 5th Arkansas Infantry (
Lieutenant-Colonel Neal) across the creek, and pushed rapidly up the hill in the face of the enemy, loud cheers went up from our expectant friends that betokened an enthusiasm which, no doubt, helped to win the fight.
Colonel McIntosh, with two pieces of
Reid's battery, and with a part of
Dockery's 5th Arkansas Infantry, supported my right; the
Federal forces occupied two lines of battle, reaching across the crest of
Oak Hill; and at this juncture our troops in front were composed of the
Missouri forces, under
General Price (occupying the center);
Texas and
Louisiana troops, under
General McCulloch (on the right), and my forces thrown forward (on the left), when a combined advance was ordered by
General McCulloch.
This proved to be the decisive engagement, and as volley after volley was poured against our lines, and our gallant boys were
[
303]
cut down like grass, those who survived seemed to be nerved to greater effort and a determination to win or die. At about this time (11:30 A. M.) the first line of battle before us gave way. Our boys charged the second line with a yell, and were soon in possession of the field, the enemy slowly withdrawing toward
Springfield.
This hour decided the contest and won for us the day. It was in our front here, as was afterward made known, that the brave commander of the
Federal forces,
General Lyon, was killed, gallantly leading his men to what he and they supposed was victory, but which proved (it may be because they were deprived of his enthusiastic leadership) disastrous defeat.
In the light of the present day, even, it is difficult to measure the vast results had
Lyon lived and the battle gone against us.
General McCulloch, myself, and our staff-officers now grouped ourselves together upon the center of the hill.
Woodruff's battery was again placed in position, and
Totten, who was covering the retreat of
Sturgis (who had assumed command of the
Federal forces after the death of
General Lyon), received the benefit of his parting shots.
We watched the retreating enemy through our field-glasses,
and were glad to see him go. Our ammunition was exhausted, our men undisciplined, and we feared to risk pursuit.
It was also rumored that reinforcements were coming to the
Federal army by forced marches, but it was found the next day that the disaster to the retreating army was greater than we had supposed, and a few fresh cavalry troops could doubtless have followed and captured many more stragglers and army stores.
Next day the enemy evacuated
Springfield, and
Price, with his
Missouri troops, occupied it, and had his supplies and wounded moved to that point.
The
Arkansans in this battle were as brave, as chivalrous, and as successful as any of the troops engaged.
They bore out, on many a hard-fought field later on in the struggle, the high hopes built upon their conduct here.
The body of the army remained at
Springfield until the beginning of
General Price's march upon
Lexington, on the 25th of August.
A few days after the battle
Pearce's brigade of
Arkansas militia was disbanded on the expiration of their term of enlistment.
General McCulloch moved westward with his own brigade, and then to
Maysville, Arkansas, being influenced in his return by the general tenor of his instructions from the Confederate Government to avoid, if possible, operating in the
State of Missouri, which had not seceded.
General Price, upon being informed of his decision, issued an order re-assuming command, and the operations in the
State which followed, including the capture of
Lexington, were conducted with
Missouri troops alone.
At this time the
Federal troops held the
Missouri river by a cordon of military posts.
The object of this line was to prevent the crossing of the river by the secessionists of
north Missouri, who, to the number of 5000 or 6000, were armed and organized and desirous of joining the army of
General Price in
south-west Missouri.
To break this blockade became the object of
General Price.
Of the four Federal posts,
Jefferson City,
Boonville,
Lexington, and
Kansas City,
Lexington was the easiest and most important one to take.
General Price left
Springfield on the 25th of August, dispersed
Lane's forces at
Drywood, September 2d, and reached
Warrensburg in pursuit of
Colonel Peabody at daybreak, September 1Oth;
Peabody getting into
Lexington first,
Price, after a little skirmishing with
Mulligan's outpost, bivouacked within 212 miles of
Lexington.
In the morning (12th)
Mulligan sent out a small force which burnt a bridge in
Price's path.
Price then crossed to the
Independence Road, and waited for his infantry and artillery.
These came up in the afternoon, and
Price then advanced toward
Lexington, and drove
Mulligan behind his defenses.
There was a little skirmishing in a corn-field and in a cemetery through which
Price advanced, and in the streets of
Lexington, where he opened upon
Mulligan with 7 pieces of artillery.
Price's movement into
Lexington in the afternoon of September 12th was only a reconnoissance in force.
Toward dark he retired to the
Fair Ground, and waited for his trains to come up, and for reinforcements that were hurrying to him from all directions, including
Harris's and
Green's commands from north of the
Missouri.
The investment of
Mulligan's position was made as shown on the map, page 309.-editors.
