Resignation-private life-life at Galena-the coming crisis
My family, all this while, was at the
East.
It consisted now of a wife and two children [
Frederick Dent and Ulysses, Jr.]. I saw no chance of supporting them on the
Pacific coast out of my pay as an army officer.
I concluded, therefore, to resign, and in March applied for a leave of absence until the end of the July following, tendering my
[
106]
resignation to take effect at the end of that time.
I left the
Pacific coast very much attached to it, and with the full expectation of making it my future home.
That expectation and that hope remained uppermost in my mind until the
Lieutenant-Generalcy bill was introduced into Congress in the winter of 1863-4.
The passage of that bill, and my promotion, blasted my last hope of ever becoming a citizen of the further
West.
In the late summer of 1854 I rejoined my family, to find in it a son whom I had never seen, born while I was on the
Isthmus of Panama.
I was now to commence, at the age of thirty-two, a new struggle for our support.
My wife had a farm near
St. Louis, to which we went, but I had no means to stock it. A house had to be built also.
I worked very hard, never losing a day because of bad weather, and accomplished the object in a moderate way. If nothing else could be done I would load a cord of wood on a wagon and take it to the city for sale.
I managed to keep along very well until 1858, when I was attacked by fever and ague.
I had suffered very severely and for a long time from this disease, while a boy in
Ohio.
It lasted now over a year, and, while it did not keep me in the house, it did interfere greatly with the amount of work I was able to perform.
In the fall of 1858 I sold out my stock, crops and farming utensils at auction, and gave up farming.
In the winter I established a partnership with
Harry Boggs, a cousin of
Mrs. Grant, in the
real estate agency business.
I spent that winter at
St. Louis myself, but did not take my family into town until the spring.
Our business might have become prosperous if I had been able to wait for it to grow.
As it was, there was no more than one person could attend to, and not enough to support two families.
While a citizen of
St. Louis and engaged in the
real estate agency business, I was a candidate for the office of county engineer, an office of respectability and emolument which would have been very acceptable to me at that time.
The incumbent was appointed by the county court, which consisted of five members.
My opponent had the advantage of birth over me (he was a citizen by adoption) and carried off the prize.
I now withdrew from the copartnership with
Boggs, and, in May,
[
107]
1860, removed to
Galena, Illinois, and took a clerkship in my father's store.
While a citizen of
Missouri, my first opportunity for casting a vote at a Presidential election occurred.
I had been in the army from before attaining my majority and had thought but little about politics, although I was a Whig by education and a great admirer of
Mr. Clay.
But the Whig party had ceased to exist before I had an opportunity of exercising the privilege of casting a ballot; the Know-Nothing party had taken its place, but was on the wane; and the Republican party was in a chaotic state and had not yet received a name.
It had no existence in the
Slave States except at points on the borders next to Free States.
In
St. Louis City and County, what afterwards became the Republican party was known as the
Free-Soil Democracy, led by the
Honorable Frank P. Blair.
Most of my neighbors had known me as an officer of the army with Whig proclivities.
They had been on the same side, and, on the death of their party, many had become Know-Nothings, or members of the
American party.
There was a lodge near my new home, and I was invited to join it. I accepted the invitation; was initiated; attended a meeting just one week later, and never went to another afterwards.
I have no apologies to make for having been one week a member of the
American party; for I still think native-born citizens of the
United States should have as much protection, as many privileges in their native country, as those who voluntarily select it for a home.
But all secret, oath-bound political parties are dangerous to any nation, no matter how pure or how patriotic the motives and principles which first bring them together.
No political party can or ought to exist when one of its cornerstones is opposition to freedom of thought and to the right to worship God “according to the dictate of one's own conscience,” or according to the creed of any religious denomination whatever.
Nevertheless, if a sect sets up its laws as binding above the
State laws, wherever the two come in conflict this claim must be resisted and suppressed at whatever cost.
Up to the
Mexican war there were a few out and out abolitionists, men who carried their hostility to slavery into all elections, from those for a justice of the peace up to the Presidency of the
United States.
They were noisy but not numerous.
But the great majority of people at the
North, where slavery did not exist, were opposed to the institution, and looked upon its existence in any part of the country as unfortunate.
They did not hold the States where slavery existed
[
108]
responsible for it; and believed that protection should be given to the right of property in slaves until some satisfactory way could be reached to be rid of the institution.
Opposition to slavery was not a creed of either political party.
In some sections more anti-slavery men belonged to the Democratic party, and in others to the
Whigs.
But with the inauguration of the
Mexican war, in fact with the annexation of
Texas, “the inevitable conflict” commenced.
As the time for the Presidential election of 1856-the first at which I had the opportunity of voting-approached, party feeling began to run high.
The Republican party was regarded in the
South and the border States not only as opposed to the extension of slavery, but as favoring the compulsory abolition of the institution without compensation to the owners.
The most horrible visions seemed to present themselves to the minds of people who, one would suppose, ought to have known better.
Many educated and, otherwise, sensible persons appeared to believe that emancipation meant social equality.
Treason to the
Government was openly advocated and was not rebuked.
It was evident to my mind that the election of a Republican
President in 1856 meant the secession of all the
Slave States, and rebellion.
Under these circumstances I preferred the success of a candidate whose election would prevent or postpone secession, to seeing the country plunged into a war the end of which no man could foretell.
With a Democrat elected by the unanimous vote of the
Slave States, there could be no pretext for secession for four years. I very much hoped that the passions of the people would subside in that time, and the catastrophe be averted altogether; if it was not, I believed the country would be better prepared to receive the shock and to resist it. I therefore voted for
James Buchanan for
President.
Four years later the Republican party was successful in electing its candidate to the Presidency.
The civilized world has learned the consequence.
Four millions of human beings held as chattels have been liberated; the ballot has been given to them; the free schools of the country have been opened to their children.
The nation still lives, and the people are just as free to avoid social intimacy with the blacks as ever they were, or as they are with white people.
While living in
Galena I was nominally only a clerk supporting myself and family on a stipulated salary.
In reality my position was different.
My father had never lived in
Galena himself, but had established my two brothers there [Simpson and Orvil], the one next younger than myself in charge of the business, assisted by the youngest.
When I went there it was my father's intention to give up all
[
109]
connection with the business himself, and to establish his three sons in it: but the brother who had really built up the business was sinking with consumption [Simpson], and it was not thought best to make any change while he was in this condition.
He lived until September, 1861, when he succumbed to that insidious disease which always flatters its victims into the belief that they are growing better up to the close of life.
A more honorable man never transacted business.
In September, 1861, I was engaged in an employment which required all my attention elsewhere.
During the eleven months that I lived in
Galena prior to the first call for volunteers, I had been strictly attentive to my business, and had made but few acquaintances other than customers and people engaged in the same line with myself.
When the election took place in November, 1860, I had not been a resident of
Illinois long enough to gain citizenship and could not, therefore, vote.
I was really glad of this at the time, for my pledges would have compelled me to vote for
Stephen A. Douglas, who had no possible chance of election.
The contest was really between
Mr. [John C.]
Breckinridge and
Mr. Lincoln; between minority rule and rule by the majority.
I wanted, as between these candidates, to see
Mr. Lincoln elected.
Excitement ran high during the canvas, and torch-light processions enlivened the scene in the generally quiet streets of
Galena many nights during the campaign.
I did not parade with either party, but occasionally met with the “wide awakes” --Republicans — in their rooms, and superintended their drill.
It was evident, from the time of the
Chicago nomination to the close of the canvass, that the election of the
Republican candidate would be the signal for some of the
Southern States to secede.
I still had hopes that the four years which had elapsed since the first nomination of a Presidential candidate by a party distinctly opposed to slavery extension, had given time for the extreme pro-slavery sentiment to cool down; for the Southerners to think well before they took the awful leap which they had so vehemently threatened.
But I was mistaken.
The Republican candidate was elected, and solid substantial people of the North-west, and I presume the same order of people throughout the entire
North, felt very serious, but determined, after this event.
It was very much discussed whether the
South would carry out its threat to secede and set up a separate government, the corner-stone of which should be, protection to the “Divine” institution of slavery.
For there were people who believed in the “divinity” of human slavery, as there are now people who believe Mormonism and Polygamy to be ordained by the
Most High.
We forgive them for entertaining such
[
110]
notions, but forbid their practice.
It was generally believed that there would be a flurry; that some of the extreme Southern States would go so far as to pass ordinances of secession.
But the common impression was that this step was so plainly suicidal for the
South, that the movement would not spread over much of the territory and would not last long.
Doubtless the founders of our government, the majority of them at least, regarded the confederation of the colonies as an experiment.
Each colony considered itself a separate government; that the confederation was for mutual protection against a foreign foe, and the prevention of strife and war among themselves.
If there had been a desire on the part of any single State to withdraw from the compact at any time while the number of States was limited to the original thirteen, I do not suppose there would have been any to contest the right, no matter how much the determination might have been regretted.
The problem changed on the ratification of the
Constitution by all the colonies; it changed still more when amendments were added; and if the right of any one State to withdraw continued to exist at all after the ratification of the
Constitution, it certainly ceased on the formation of new States, at least so far as the new States themselves were concerned.
It was never possessed at all by
Florida or the States west of the
Mississippi, all of which were purchased by the treasury of the entire nation.
Texas and the territory brought into the
Union in consequence of annexation, were purchased with both blood and treasure; and
Texas, with a domain greater than that of any
European state except
Russia, was permitted to retain as state property all the public lands within its borders.
It would have been ingratitude and injustice of the most flagrant sort for this State to withdraw from the
Union after all that had been spent and done to introduce her; yet, if separation had actually occurred,
Texas must necessarily gave gone with the
South, both on account of her institutions and her geographical position.
Secession was illogical as well as impracticable; it was revolution.
Now, the right of revolution is an inherent one.
When people are oppressed by their government, it is a natural right they enjoy to relieve themselves of the oppression, if they are strong enough, either by withdrawal from it, or by overthrowing it and substituting a government more acceptable.
But any people or part of a people who resort to this remedy, stake their lives, their property, and every claim for protection given by citizenship — on the issue.
Victory, or the conditions imposed by the conqueror-must be the result.
[
111]
In the case of the war between the States it would have been the exact truth if the
South had said,--“We do not want to live with you Northern people any longer; we know our institution of slavery is obnoxious to you, and, as you are growing numerically stronger than we, it may at some time in the future be endangered.
So long as you permitted us to control the government, and with the aid of a few friends at the
North to enact laws constituting your section a guard against the escape of our property, we were willing to live with you. You have been submissive to our rule heretofore; but it looks now as if you did not intend to continue so, and we will remain in the
Union no longer.”
Instead of this the seceding States cried lustily,--“Let us alone; you have no constitutional power to interfere with us.”
Newspapers and people at the
North reiterated the cry. Individuals might ignore the constitution; but the Nation itself must not only obey it, but must enforce the strictest construction of that instrument; the construction put upon it by the Southerners themselves.
The fact is the constitution did not apply to any such contingency as the one existing from 1861 to 1865.
Its framers never dreamed of such a contingency occurring.
If they had foreseen it, the probabilities are they would have sanctioned the right of a State or States to withdraw rather than that there should be war between brothers.
The framers were wise in their generation and wanted to do the very best possible to secure their own liberty and independence, and that also of their descendants to the latest days.
It is preposterous to suppose that the people of one generation can lay down the best and only rules of government for all who are to come after them, and under unforeseen contingencies.
At the time of the framing of our constitution the only physical forces that had been subdued and made to serve man and do his labor, were the currents in the streams and in the air we breathe.
Rude machinery, propelled by water power, had been invented; sails to propel ships upon the waters had been set to catch the passing breeze-but the application of steam to propel vessels against both wind and current, and machinery to do all manner of work had not been thought of. The instantaneous transmission of messages around the world by means of electricity would probably at that day have been attributed to witchcraft or a league with the Devil.
Immaterial circumstances had changed as greatly as material ones.
We could not and ought not to be rigidly bound by the rules laid down under circumstances so different for emergencies so utterly unanticipated.
The fathers themselves would have been the first to declare that their prerogatives were not irrevocable.
They would surely
[
112]
have resisted secession could they have lived to see the shape it assumed.
I travelled through the
Northwest considerably during the winter of 1860-1.
We had customers in all the little towns in
south-west Wisconsin,
south-east Minnesota and
north-east Iowa.
These generally knew I had been a captain in the regular army and had served through the
Mexican war. Consequently wherever I stopped at night, some of the people would come to the public-house where I was, and sit till a late hour discussing the probabilities of the future.
My own views at that time were like those officially expressed by
Mr. [William H.]
Seward at a later day, that “the war would be over in ninety days.”
I continued to entertain these views until after the
battle of Shiloh.
I believe now that there would have been no more battles at the
West after the capture of
Fort Donelson if all the troops in that region had been under a single commander who would have followed up that victory.
There is little doubt in my mind now that the prevailing sentiment of the
South would have been opposed to secession in 1860 and 1861, if there had been a fair and calm expression of opinion, unbiased by threats, and if the ballot of one legal voter had counted for as much as that of any other.
But there was no calm discussion of the question.
Demagogues who were too old to enter the army if there should be a war, others who entertained so high an opinion of their own ability that they did not believe they could be spared from the direction of the affairs of state in such an event, declaimed vehemently and unceasingly against the
North, against its aggressions upon the
South; its interference with Southern rights, etc., etc. They denounced the Northerners as cowards, poltroons, Negro-worshippers; claimed that one Southern man was equal to five Northern men in battle; that if the
South would stand up for its rights the
North would back down.
Mr. Jefferson Davis said in a speech, delivered at
La Grange, Mississippi, before the secession of that State, that he would agree to drink all the blood spilled south of
Mason and
Dixon's line if there should be a war. The young men who would have the fighting to do in case of war, believed all these statements, both in regard to the aggressiveness of the
North and its cowardice.
They, too, cried out for a separation from such people.
The great bulk of the legal voters of the
South were men who owned no slaves; their homes were generally in the
[
113]
hills and poor country; their facilities for educating their children, even up to the point of reading and writing, were very limited; their interest in the contest was very meagre-what there was, if they had been capable of seeing it, was with the
North; they too needed emancipation.
Under the old regime they were looked down upon by those who controlled all the affairs in the interest of slave owners, as poor white trash who were allowed the ballot so long as they cast it according to direction.
I am aware that this last statement may be disputed and individual testimony perhaps adduced to show that in ante-bellum days the ballot was as untrammelled in the
South as in any section of the country; but in the face of any such contradiction I reassert the statement.
The shot-gun was not resorted to. Masked men did not ride over the country at night intimidating voters; but there was a firm feeling that a class existed in every State with a sort of divine right to control public affairs.
If they could not get this control by one means they must by another.
The end justified the means.
The coercion, if mild, was complete.
There were two political parties, it is true, in all the States, both strong in numbers and respectability, but both equally loyal to the institution which stood paramount in Southern eyes to all other institutions in state or nation.
The slave-owners were the minority, but governed both parties.
Had politics ever divided the slave-holders and the nonslave-holders, the majority would have been obliged to yield, or internecine war would have been the consequence.
I do not know that the
Southern people were to blame for this condition of affairs.
There was a time when slavery was not profitable, and the discussion of the merits of the institution was confined almost exclusively to the territory where it existed.
The States of
Virginia and
Kentucky came near abolishing slavery by their own acts, one State defeating the measure by a tie vote and the other only lacking one.
But when the institution became profitable, all talk of its abolition ceased where it existed; and naturally, as human nature is constituted, arguments were adduced in its support.
The cotton-gin probably had much to do with the justification of slavery.
[
114]
The winter of 1860-1 will be remembered by middle-aged people of to-day as one of great excitement.
South Carolina promptly seceded after the result of the Presidential election was known.
Other Southern States proposed to follow.
In some of them the
Union sentiment was so strong that it had to be suppressed by force.
Maryland,
Delaware,
Kentucky and
Missouri, all Slave States, failed to pass ordinances of secession; but they were all represented in the so-called congress of the so-called
Confederate States.
The Governor and
Lieutenant-Governor of
Missouri, in 1861, [Claiborne F.]
Jackson and [Thomas C.]
Reynolds, were both supporters of the rebellion and took refuge with the enemy.
The governor soon died, and the lieutenant-governor assumed his office; issued proclamations as governor of the
State; was recognized as such by the Confederate Government, and continued his pretensions until the collapse of the rebellion.
The South claimed the sovereignty of States, but claimed the right to coerce into their confederation such States as they wanted, that is, all the States where slavery existed.
They did not seem to think this course inconsistent.
The fact is, the
Southern slave-owners believed that, in some way, the ownership of slaves conferred a sort of patent of nobility-a right to govern independent of the interest or wishes of those who did not hold such property.
They convinced themselves, first, of the divine origin of the institution and, next, that that particular institution was not safe in the hands of any body of legislators but themselves.
Meanwhile the Administration of
President Buchanan looked helplessly on and proclaimed that the general government had no power to interfere; that the Nation had no power to save its own life.
Mr. Buchanan had in his cabinet two members at least, who were as earnest — to use a mild term — in the cause of secession as
Mr. Davis or any Southern statesman.
One of them, [John B.]
Floyd, the
Secretary of War, scattered the army so that much of it could be captured when hostilities should commence, and distributed the cannon and small arms from Northern arsenals throughout the
South so as to be on hand when treason wanted them.
The navy was scattered in like manner.
The President did not prevent his cabinet preparing for war upon their government, either by destroying its resources or storing them in the
South until a
de facto government was established with
Jefferson Davis as its
President, and
Montgomery, Alabama, as the
Capital.
The secessionists had then to leave the cabinet.
In their own estimation they were aliens in the country which had given them birth.
Loyal men were put into their places.
Treason in the executive
[
115]
branch of the government was estopped.
But the harm had already been done.
The stable door was locked after the horse had been stolen.
During all of the trying winter of 1860-1, when the Southerners were so defiant that they would not allow within their borders the expression of a sentiment hostile to their views, it was a brave man indeed who could stand up and proclaim his loyalty to the
Union.
On the other hand men at the North-prominent men-proclaimed that the government had no power to coerce the
South into submission to the laws of the land; that if the
North undertook to raise armies to go south, these armies would have to march over the dead bodies of the speakers.
A portion of the press of the
North was constantly proclaiming similar views.
When the time arrived for the
President-elect to go to the capital of the Nation to be sworn into office, it was deemed unsafe for him to travel, not only as a President-elect, but as any private citizen should be allowed to do. Instead of going in a special car, receiving the good wishes of his constituents at all the stations along the road, he was obliged to stop on the way and to be smuggled into the capital.
He disappeared from public view on his journey, and the next the country knew, his arrival was announced at the capital.
There is little doubt that he would have been assassinated if he had attempted to travel openly throughout his journey.