Preparations for battle-thomas Carries the first line of the enemy-sherman Carries Missionary Ridge--battle of Lookout Mountain--General Hooker's fight
On the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage-rains falling so heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at Brown's Ferry and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge; news
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coming of a battle raging at
Knoxville; of
Willcox being threatened by a force from the east — a letter was received from
Bragg which contained these words: “As there may still be some non-combatants in
Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal.”
Of course, I understood that this was a device intended to deceive; but I did not know what the intended deception was. On the 22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that
Bragg was leaving our front, and on that day
Buckner's division was sent to reinforce
Longstreet at
Knoxville, and another division [
Patrick Cleburne's] started to follow but was recalled.
The object of
Bragg's letter, no doubt, was in some way to detain me until
Knoxville could be captured, and his troops there be returned to
Chattanooga.
During the night of the 21st the rest of the pontoon boats, completed, one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in North Chickamauga.
The material for the roadway over these was deposited out of view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of the
Tennessee, where the north end of the bridge was to rest.
Hearing nothing from
Burnside, and hearing much of the distress in
Washington on his account, I could no longer defer operations for his relief.
I determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with the Army of the Cumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th.
The position occupied by the Army of the Cumberland had been made very strong for defence during the months it had been besieged.
The line was about a mile from the town, and extended from
Citico Creek, a small stream running near the base of
Missionary Ridge and emptying into the
Tennessee about two miles below the mouth of the
South Chickamauga, on the left, to
Chattanooga Creek on the right.
All commanding points on the line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery.
The important elevations within the line had all been carefully fortified and supplied with a proper armament.
Among the elevations so fortified was one to the east of the town, named
Fort Wood.
It owed its importance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town and
Missionary Ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was.
Fort Wood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, most of which would reach the nearer points of the enemy's line.
On the morning of the 23d
Thomas, according to instructions, moved [Gordon]
Granger's corps of two divisions,
Sheridan and
T. J. Wood commanding, to the foot of
Fort Wood, and formed them into line
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as if going on parade,
Sheridan on the right,
Wood to the left, extending to or near
Citico Creek.
Palmer, commanding the 14th corps, held that part of our line facing south and south-west.
He supported
Sheridan with one division ([Absalom]
Baird's), while his other division under [Richard W.]
Johnson remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to be moved to any point.
Howard's corps was moved in rear of the centre.
The picket lines were within a few hundred yards of each other.
At two o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance.
By this time the clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated position all that was going on. The signal for advance was given by a booming of cannon from
Fort Wood and other points on the line.
The rebel pickets were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor and detached heights between the main ridge and our lines.
These too were carried before halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their advance guards.
But it was not without loss on both sides.
This movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied up to this time.
The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other way. During the following night they were made strong.
We lost in this preliminary action about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were captured.
With the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from
Missionary Ridge and
Fort Wood until night closed in, this ended the fighting for the first day.
The advantage was greatly on our side now, and if I could only have been assured that
Burnside could hold out ten days longer I should have rested more easily.
But we were doing the best we could for him and the cause.
By the night of the 23d
Sherman's command was in a position to move, though one division (
Osterhaus's) had not yet crossed the river at Brown's Ferry.
The continuous rise in the
Tennessee had rendered it impossible to keep the bridge at that point in condition for troops to cross; but I was determined to move that night even without this division.
Orders were sent to
Osterhaus accordingly to report to
Hooker, if he could not cross by eight o'clock on the morning of the 24th.
Because of the break in the bridge,
Hooker's orders were again changed, but this time only back to those first given to him.
General W. F. Smith had been assigned to duty as
Chief Engineer of the
Military Division.
To him were given the general direction of moving troops by the boats from North Chickamauga, laying the
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bridge after they reached their position, and generally all the duties pertaining to his office of chief engineer.
During the night
General Morgan L. Smith's division was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and the brigade of
Giles A. Smith was selected for the delicate duty of manning the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south bank of the river.
During this night also
General J. M. Brannan,
chief of artillery, moved forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the Army of the Cumberland, and placed them on the north side of the river so as to command the ground opposite, to aid in protecting the approach to the point where the south end of the bridge was to rest.
He had to use
Sherman's artillery horses for this purpose,
Thomas having none.
At two o'clock in the morning, November 24th,
Giles A. Smith pushed out from the
North Chickamauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, each loaded with thirty brave and well-armed men. The boats with their precious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoid attracting the attention of any one who could convey information to the enemy, until arriving near the mouth of South Chickamauga.
Here a few boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the picket guard known to be at that point.
The guards were surprised, and twenty of their number captured.
The remainder of the troops effected a landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good results.
The work of ferrying over
Sherman's command from the north side of the
Tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for the purpose.
A steamer was also brought up from the town to assist.
The rest of
M. L. Smith's division came first, then the division of
John E. Smith.
The troops as they landed were put to work intrenching their position.
By daylight the two entire divisions were over, and well covered by the works they had built.
The work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery and cavalry, was now begun.
The ferrying over the infantry was continued with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, however, as fast as they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge.
By a little past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the
South Chickamauga connecting the troops left on that side with their comrades below, and all the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of the
Tennessee.
Sherman as once formed his troops for assault on
Missionary Ridge.
By one o'clock he started with
M. L. Smith on his left, keeping nearly the course of Chickamauga River;
J. E. Smith next to the right and a
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little to the rear; and [Hugh]
Ewing still farther to the right and also a little to the rear of
J. E. Smith's command, in column, ready to deploy to the right if an enemy should come from that direction.
A good skirmish line preceded each of these columns.
Soon the foot of the hill was reached; the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports.
By half-past 3
Sherman was in possession of the height without having sustained much loss.
A brigade from each division was now brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand.
The enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the hill was gained.
There had been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were so low that
Lookout Mountain and the top of
Missionary Ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley.
But now the enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail.
Later in the day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, and
Sherman was left to fortify what he had gained.
Sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge was completed, and by half-past 3 the whole of it was over both bridges and on its way to strike the enemy's communications at
Chickamauga Station.
All of
Sherman's command was now south of the
Tennessee.
During the afternoon
General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded and carried from the field.
Thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the 24th, there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his position.
Howard, however, effected a crossing of
Citico Creek and a junction with
Sherman, and was directed to report to him. With two or three regiments of his command he moved in the morning along the banks of the
Tennessee, and reached the point where the bridge was being laid.
He went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end, and saw
Sherman superintending the work from the north side and moving himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadway put upon it.
Howard reported to his new chief across the chasm between them, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed.
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While these operations were going on to the east of
Chattanooga,
Hooker was engaged on the west.
He had three division:
Osterhaus's, of the 15th corps, Army of the Tennessee;
Geary's, 12th corps, Army of the Potomac; and [Charles]
Cruft's, 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland.
Geary was on the right at Wauhatchie,
Cruft at the centre, and
Osterhaus near Brown's Ferry.
These troops were all west of
Lookout Creek.
The enemy had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and three brigades of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked.
These brigades occupied the summit of the mountain.
General Carter L. Stevenson was in command of the whole.
Why any troops, except artillery with a small infantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top, I do not see. A hundred men could have held the summit — which is a palisade for more than thirty feet down --against the assault of any number of men from the position
Hooker occupied.
The side of
Lookout Mountain confronting
Hooker's command was rugged, heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advance with troops, even in the absence of an opposing force.
Farther up, the ground becomes more even and level, and was in cultivation.
On the east side the slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzagging up it, connects the town of
Chattanooga with the summit.
Early on the morning of the 24th
Hooker moved
Geary's division, supported by a brigade of
Cruft's, up
Lookout Creek, to effect a crossing.
The remainder of
Cruft's division was to seize the bridge over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad.
Osterhaus was to move up to the bridge and cross it. The bridge was seized by [Ferdinand H.]
Gross's brigade after a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it. This attracted the enemy so that
Geary's movement farther up was not observed.
A heavy mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the mountain.
He crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the picket of over forty men on guard near by. He then commenced ascending the mountain directly in his front.
By this time the enemy was seen coming down from their camps on the mountain slope, and filing into their rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge.
By eleven o'clock the bridge was complete.
Osterhaus was up, and after some sharp skirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss in killed and captured.
While the operations at the bridge were progressing,
Geary was pushing up the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his front, and in face of the guns on top of the mountain.
The
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enemy, seeing their left flank and rear menaced, gave way, and were followed by
Cruft and
Osterhaus.
Soon these were up abreast of
Geary, and the whole command pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance.
By noon
Geary had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong fortifications in his front.
The rest of the command coming up, a line was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of
Chattanooga Creek.
Thomas and I were on the top of
Orchard Knob.
Hooker's advance now made our line a continuous one.
It was in full view, extending from the
Tennessee River, where
Sherman had crossed, up Chickamauga River to the base of
Mission Ridge, over the top of the north end of the ridge to
Chattanooga Valley, then along parallel to the ridge a mile or more, across the valley to the mouth of
Chattanooga Creek, thence up the slope of
Lookout Mountain to the foot of the upper palisade.
The day was hazy, so that
Hooker's operations were not visible to us except at moments when the clouds would rise.
But the sound of his artillery and musketry was heard incessantly.
The enemy on his front was partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his works.
During the afternoon the clouds, which had so obscured the top of Lookout all day as to hide whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and made it so dark where
Hooker was as to stop operations for the time.
At four o'clock
Hooker reported his position as impregnable.
By a little after five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops was sent from
Chattanooga to reinforce him. These troops had to cross
Chattanooga Creek and met with some opposition, but soon overcame it, and by night the commander, General [William P.]
Carlin, reported to
Hooker and was assigned to his left.
I now telegraphed to
Washington: “The fight to-day progressed favorably.
Sherman carried the end of
Missionary Ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at
Chickamauga Creek.
Troops from
Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain, and now hold the eastern slope and a point high up.3
Hooker reports two thousand prisoners taken, besides which a small number have
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fallen into our hands from
Missionary Ridge.”
The next day the
President replied: “Your dispatches as to fighting on Monday and Tuesday are here.
Well done.
Many thanks to all. Remember
Burnside.”
And
Halleck also telegraphed: “I congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans.
I fear that
Burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may prove fatal.
I know you will do all in your power to relieve him.”
The division of
Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the Cumberland, had been sent to the
North Chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they were deposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress of citizens.
On the night of the 24th his division, having crossed with
Sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper bridge over the plain to the north base of
Missionary Ridge.
Firing continued to a late hour in the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point.
