Commencement of the Grand campaign-general Butler's position-sheridan's first raid
The armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a single object.
They were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possible over such a vast field.
Lee, with the capital of the
Confederacy, was the main end to which all were working.
Johnston, with
Atlanta, was an important obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at, and was therefore almost an independent objective.
It was of less importance only because the capture of
Johnston and his army would not produce so immediate and decisive a result in closing the rebellion as would the possession of
Richmond,
Lee and his army.
All other troops were employed exclusively in support of these two movements.
This was the plan; and I will now endeavor to give, as concisely as I can, the method of its execution, outlining first the operations of minor detached but co-operative columns.
As stated before,
Banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent
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to do on the
Red River, and eliminated the use of forty thousand veterans whose co-operation in the grand campaign had been expected--ten thousand with
Sherman and thirty thousand against
Mobile.
Sigel's record is almost equally brief.
He moved out, it is true, according to programme; but just when I was hoping to hear of good work being done in the valley I received instead the following announcement from
Halleck: “
Sigel is in full retreat on
Strasburg.
He will do nothing but run; never did anything else.”
The enemy had intercepted him about
New Market and handled him roughly, leaving him short six guns, and some nine hundred men out of his six thousand.
The plan had been for an advance of
Sigel's forces in two columns.
Though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously the other proved more fortunate.
Under
Crook and [William W.]
Averell his western column advanced from the
Gauley in
West Virginia at the appointed time, and with more happy results.
They reached the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad at
Dublin and destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing up several miles of road and burning the bridge over
New River.
Having accomplished this they recrossed
the Alleghenies to Meadow Bluffs and there awaited further orders.
Butler embarked at
Fort Monroe with all his command, except the cavalry and some artillery which moved up the south bank of the
James River.
His steamers moved first up
Chesapeake Bay and
York River as if threatening the rear of
Lee's army.
At midnight they turned back, and
Butler by daylight was far up the
James River.
He seized
City Point and
Bermuda Hundred early in the day [May 5], without loss and, no doubt, very much to the surprise of the enemy.
This was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated in my instructions to
Butler.
He was to act from here, looking to
Richmond as his objective point.
I had given him to understand that I should aim to fight
Lee between the
Rapidan and
Richmond if he would stand; but should
Lee fall back into
Richmond I would follow up and make a junction of the armies of the
Potomac and the
James on the
James River.
He was directed to secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could at as early a date as possible.
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Butler was in position by the 6th of May and had begun intrenching, and on the 7th he sent out his cavalry from
Suffolk to cut the Weldon Railroad.
He also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad between
Petersburg and
Richmond, but no great success attended these latter efforts.
He made no great effort to establish himself on that road and neglected to attack
Petersburg, which was almost defenceless.
About the 11th [May 12] he advanced slowly until he reached the works at Drury's Bluff, about half way between
Bermuda Hundred and
Richmond.
In the mean time
Beauregard had been gathering reinforcements.
On the 16th he attacked
Butler with great vigor, and with such success as to limit very materially the further usefulness of the Army of the James as a distinct factor in the campaign.
I afterward ordered a portion of it to join the Army of the Potomac, leaving a sufficient force with
Butler to man his works, hold securely the footing he had already gained and maintain a threatening front toward the rear of the
Confederate capital.
The position which
General Butler had chosen between the two rivers, the
James and
Appomattox, was one of great natural strength, one where a large area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by means of a single intrenched line, and that a very short one in comparison with the extent of territory which it thoroughly protected.
His right was protected by the
James River, his left by the
Appomattox, and his rear by their junction — the two streams uniting near by. The bends of the two streams shortened the line that had been chosen for intrenchments, while it increased the area which the line inclosed.
Previous to ordering any troops from
Butler I sent my chief engineer, General [John G.]
Barnard, from the Army of the Potomac to that of the
James to inspect
Butler's position and ascertain whether I could again safely make an order for
General Butler's movement in co-operation with mine, now that I was getting so near
Richmond; or, if I could not, whether his position was strong enough to justify me in withdrawing some of his troops and having them brought round by water to
White House to join me and reinforce the Army of the Potomac.
General Barnard reported the position very strong for defensive purposes, and that I could do the latter with great security; but that
General Butler could not move from where he was, in cooperation, to produce any effect.
He said that the general occupied a place between the
James and
Appomattox rivers which was of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold it for an indefinite length of time against a superior; but that he could do nothing offensively.
I then asked him why
Butler could not move out
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from his lines and push across the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad to the rear and on the south side of
Richmond.
He replied that it was impracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line across the neck of land that
General Butler had. He then took out his pencil and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like a bottle and that
Butler's line of intrenchments across the neck represented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong line immediately in front of him across the neck; and it was therefore as if
Butler was in a bottle.
He was perfectly safe against an attack; but, as
Barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a small force could hold the cork in its place.
This struck me as being very expressive of his position, particularly when I saw the hasty sketch which
General Barnard had drawn; and in making my subsequent report I used that expression without adding quotation marks, never thinking that anything had been said that would attract attention — as this did, very much to the annoyance, no doubt, of
General Butler and, I know, very much to my own. I found afterwards that this was mentioned in the notes of
General Badeau's book, which, when they were shown to me, I asked to have stricken out; yet it was retained there, though against my wishes.
I make this statement here because, although I have often made it before, it has never been in my power until now to place it where it will correct history; and I desire to rectify all injustice that I may have done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantly serving their country during the trying period of the war for the preservation of the
Union.
General Butler certainly gave his very earnest support to the war; and he gave his own best efforts personally to the suppression of the rebellion.
The further operations of the Army of the James can best be treated of in connection with those of the Army of the Potomac, the two being so intimately associated and connected as to be substantially one body in which the individuality of the supporting wing is merged.
Before giving the reader a summary of
Sherman's great
Atlanta campaign, which must conclude my description of the various cooperative movements preparatory to proceeding with that of the operations of the centre, I will briefly mention
Sheridan's first raid upon
Lee's communications which, though an incident of the operations on the main line and not specifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant execution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign.
By thus anticipating, in point of time, I will be able to more perfectly observe the continuity of events
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occurring in my immediate front when I shall have undertaken to describe our advance from the
Rapidan.
On the 8th of May, just after the
battle of the Wilderness and when we were moving on
Spottsylvania I directed
Sheridan verbally to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac, pass around the left of
Lee's army and attack his cavalry: to cut the two roads-one running west through
Gordonsville,
Charlottesville and
Lynchburg, the other to
Richmond, and, when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on to the
James River and draw these from
Butler's supplies.
This move took him past the entire rear of
Lee's army.
These orders were also given in writing through
Meade.
The object of this move was three-fold.
First, if successfully executed, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his line of supplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his own use supplies in store in the rear and coming up. Second, he would draw the enemy's cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rear and trains than by remaining with the army.
Third, his absence would save the trains drawing his forage and other supplies from
Fredericksburg, which had now become our base.
He started at daylight the next morning, and accomplished more than was expected.
It was sixteen days before he got back to the Army of the Potomac.
The course
Sheridan took was directly to
Richmond.
Before night [J. E. B. “
Jeb” ]
Stuart, commanding the Confederate cavalry, came on to the rear of his command.
But the advance kept on, crossed the
North Anna, and at
Beaver Dam, a station on the Virginia Central Railroad, recaptured four hundred Union prisoners on their way to
Richmond, destroyed the road and used and destroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores.
Stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing towards
Richmond, abandoned the pursuit on the morning of the 10th and, by a detour and an exhausting march, interposed between
Sheridan and
Richmond at
Yellow Tavern, only about six miles north of the city.
Sheridan destroyed the railroad and more supplies at
Ashland, and on the 11th arrived in
Stuart's front.
A severe engagement ensued in which the losses were heavy on both sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader [Stuart] mortally wounded, and some guns and many prisoners were captured.
Sheridan passed through the outer defences of
Richmond, and could, no doubt, have passed through the inner ones.
But having no supports near he could not have remained.
After caring for his wounded he
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struck for the
James River below the city, to communicate with
Butler and to rest his men and horses as well as to get food and forage for them.
He moved first between the
Chickahominy and the
James, but in the morning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at
Mechanicsville.
He then turned to cross to the north side of the
Chickahominy by
Meadow Bridge.
He found this barred, and the defeated Confederate cavalry, reorganized, occupying the opposite side.
The panic created by his first entrance within the outer works of
Richmond having subsided troops were sent out to attack his rear.
He was now in a perilous position, one from which but few generals could have extricated themselves.
The defences of
Richmond, manned, were to the right, the
Chickahominy was to the left with no bridge remaining and the opposite bank guarded, to the rear was a force from
Richmond.
This force was attacked and beaten by
Wilson's and
Gregg's divisions, while
Sheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastily built a bridge over the
Chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced a crossing and soon dispersed the
Confederates he found there.
The enemy was held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in bridge building.
On the 13th
Sheridan was at Bottom's Bridge, over the
Chickahominy.
On the 14th he crossed this stream and on that day went into camp on the
James River at Haxall's Landing.
He at once put himself into communication with
General Butler, who directed all the supplies he wanted to be furnished.
Sheridan had left the Army of the Potomac at
Spottsylvania, but did not know where either this or
Lee's army now was. Great caution therefore had to be exercised in getting back.
On the 17th, after resting his command for three days, he started on his return.
He moved by the way of
White House.
The bridge over the
Pamunkey had been burned by the enemy, but a new one was speedily improvised and the cavalry crossed over it. On the 22d he was at
Aylett's on the
Matapony, where he learned the position of the two armies.
On the 24th he joined us on the march from
North Anna to Cold Harbor, in the vicinity of
Chesterfield.
Sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around
Lee's army: encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them in all; recaptured four hundred Union prisoners and killed and captured many of the enemy; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war; destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks.
