When I left
Appomattox I ordered
General Meade to proceed leisurely back to Burkesville Station with the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James, and to go into camp there until further orders from me.
General Johnston, as has been stated before, was in
North Carolina confronting
General Sherman.
It could not be known positively, of course, whether
Johnston would surrender on the news of
Lee's surrender, though I supposed he would; and if he did not, Burkesville Station was the natural point from which to move to attack him. The army which I could have sent against him was superior to his, and that with which
Sherman confronted him was also superior; and between the two he would necessarily have been crushed, or driven away.
With the loss of their capital and the Army of Northern Virginia it was doubtful whether
Johnston's men would have had the spirit to stand.
My belief was that he would make no such attempt; but I adopted this course as a precaution against what might happen, however improbable.
Simultaneously with my starting from
City Point, I sent a messenger to
North Carolina by boat with dispatches to
General Sherman, informing him of the surrender of
Lee and his army; also of the terms which I had given him; and I authorized
Sherman to give the
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same terms to
Johnston if the latter chose to accept them.
The country is familiar with the terms that
Sherman agreed to
conditionally, because they embraced a political question as well as a military one and he would therefore have to confer with the government before agreeing to them definitely.
General Sherman had met
Mr. Lincoln at
City Point while visiting there to confer with me about our final movement, and knew what
Mr. Lincoln had said to the peace commissioners when he met them at
Hampton Roads, viz.: that before he could enter into negotiations with them they would have to agree to two points: one being that the
Union should be preserved, and the other that slavery should be abolished; and if they were ready to concede these two points he was almost ready to sign his name to a blank piece of paper and permit them to fill out the balance of the terms upon which we would live together.
He had also seen notices in the newspapers of
Mr. Lincoln's visit to
Richmond, and had read in the same papers that while there he had authorized the convening of the Legislature of Virginia.
Sherman thought, no doubt, in adding to the terms that I had made with
General Lee, that he was but carrying out the wishes of the
President of the
United States.
But seeing that he was going beyond his authority, he made it a point that the terms were only conditional.
They signed them with this understanding, and agreed to a truce until the terms could be sent to
Washington for approval; if approved by the proper authorities there, they would then be final; if not approved, then he would give due notice, before resuming hostilities.
As the world knows,
Sherman, from being one of the most popular generals of the land (Congress having even gone so far as to propose a bill providing for a second lieutenant-general for the purpose of advancing him to that grade), was denounced by the
President and
Secretary of War in very bitter terms.
Some people went so far as to denounce him as a traitor — a most preposterous term to apply to a man who had rendered so much service as he had, even supposing he had made a mistake in granting such terms as he did to
Johnston and his army.
If
Sherman had taken authority to send
Johnston with his army home, with their arms to be put in the arsenals of their own States, without submitting the question to the authorities at
Washington, the suspicions against him might have some foundation.
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But the feeling against
Sherman died out very rapidly, and it was not many weeks before he was restored to the fullest confidence of the
American people.
When, some days after my return to
Washington,
President Johnson and the
Secretary of War received the terms which
General Sherman had forwarded for approval, a cabinet meeting was immediately called and I was sent for. There seemed to be the greatest consternation, lest
Sherman would commit the government to terms which they were not willing to accede to and which he had no right to grant.
A message went out directing the troops in the
South not to obey
General Sherman.
I was ordered to proceed at once to
North Carolina and take charge of matters there myself.
Of course I started without delay, and reached there as soon as possible.
I repaired to
Raleigh, where
Sherman was, as quietly as possible, hoping to see him without even his army learning of my presence.
When I arrived I went to
Sherman's headquarters, and we were at once closeted together.
I showed him the instructions and orders under which I visited him. I told him that I wanted him to notify
General Johnston that the terms which they had conditionally agreed upon had not been approved in
Washington, and that he was authorized to offer the same terms I had given
General Lee.
I sent
Sherman to do this himself.
I did not wish the knowledge of my presence to be known to the army generally; so I left it to
Sherman to negotiate the terms of the surrender solely by himself, and without the enemy knowing that I was anywhere near the field.
As soon as possible I started to get away, to leave
Sherman quite free and untrammelled.
At
Goldsboro‘, on my way back, I met a mail, containing the last newspapers, and I found in them indications of great excitement in the
North over the terms
Sherman had given
Johnston; and harsh orders that had been promulgated by the
President and
Secretary of War.
I knew that
Sherman must see these papers, and I fully realized what great indignation they would cause him, though I do not think his feelings could have been more excited than were my own. But like the true and loyal soldier that he was, he carried out the instructions I had given him, obtained the surrender of
Johnston's army [April 26], and settled down in his camp about
Raleigh, to await final orders.
There were still a few expeditions out in the
South that could not be communicated with, and had to be left to act according to the judgment of their respective commanders.
With these it was
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impossible to tell how the news of the surrender of
Lee and
Johnston, of which they must have heard, might affect their judgment as to what was best to do.
The three expeditions which I had tried so hard to get off from the commands of
Thomas and
Canby did finally get off: one under
Canby himself, against
Mobile, late in March; that under
Stoneman from
East Tennessee on the 20th; and the one under
Wilson, starting from
Eastport, Mississippi, on the 22d of March.
They were all eminently successful, but without any good result.
Indeed much valuable property was destroyed and many lives lost at a time when we would have liked to spare them.
The war was practically over before their victories were gained.
They were so late in commencing operations, that they did not hold any troops away that otherwise would have been operating against the armies which were gradually forcing the Confederate armies to a surrender.
The only possible good that we may have experienced from these raids was by
Stoneman's getting near
Lynchburg about the time the armies of the
Potomac and the
James were closing in on
Lee at
Appomattox.
Stoneman entered
North Carolina and then pushed north to strike the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.
He got upon that road, destroyed its bridges at different places and rendered the road useless to the enemy up to within a few miles of
Lynchburg.
His approach caused the evacuation of that city about the time we were at
Appomattox, and was the cause of a commotion we heard of there.
He then pushed south, and was operating in the rear of
Johnston's army about the time the negotiations were going on between
Sherman and
Johnston for the latter's surrender.
In this raid
Stoneman captured and destroyed a large amount of stores, while fourteen guns and nearly two thousand prisoners were the trophies of his success.
Canby appeared before
Mobile on the 27th of March.
The city of
Mobile was protected by two forts, besides other intrenchments-Spanish Fort, on the east side of the bay, and
Fort Blakely, north of the city.
These forts were invested.
On the night of the 8th of April, the
National troops having carried the enemy's works at one point,
Spanish Fort was evacuated; and on the 9th, the very day of
Lee's surrender,
Blakely was carried by assault, with a considerable loss to us [about 725]. On the 11th the city was evacuated.
I had tried for more than two years to have an expedition sent against
Mobile when its possession by us would have been of great advantage.
It finally cost lives to take it when its possession was of
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no importance, and when, if left alone, it would within a few days have fallen into our hands without any bloodshed whatever.
Wilson moved out with full 12,000 men, well equipped and well armed.
He was an energetic officer and accomplished his work rapidly.
Forrest was in his front, but with neither his old-time army nor his old-time prestige.
He now had principally conscripts.
His conscripts were generally old men and boys.
He had a few thousand regular cavalry left, but not enough to even retard materially the progress of
Wilson's cavalry.
Selma [Alabama] fell on the 2d of April, with a large number of prisoners [2,700] and a large quantity of war material, machine shops, etc., to be disposed of by the victors.
Tuscaloosa,
Montgomery and
West Point fell in quick succession.
These were all important points to the enemy by reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies, and because of their manufactories of war material.
They were fortified or intrenched, and there was considerable fighting before they were captured.
Macon [Georgia, April 20] surrendered on the 21st of April.
Here news was received of the negotiations for the surrender of
Johnston's army.
Wilson belonged to the military division commanded by
Sherman, and of course was bound by his terms.
This stopped all fighting.
General Richard Taylor had now become the senior Confederate officer still at liberty east of the
Mississippi River, and on the 4th of May he surrendered everything within the limits of this extensive command [at
Citronelle, Alabama].
General E. Kirby Smith surrendered the trans-Mississippi department on the 26th of May, leaving no other Confederate army at liberty to continue the war.
Wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugitive president of the defunct confederacy before he got out of the country.
This occurred at Irwinsville, Georgia, on the 11th of May [10th]. For myself, and I believe
Mr. Lincoln shared the feeling, I would have been very glad to have seen
Mr. Davis succeed in escaping, but for one reason: I feared that if not captured, he might get into the trans-Mississippi region and there set up a more contracted confederacy.
The young men now out of homes and out of employment might have rallied under his standard and protracted the war yet another year.
The Northern people were tired of the war, they were tired of piling up a debt which would be a further mortgage upon their homes.
Mr. Lincoln, I believe, wanted
Mr. Davis to escape, because he did not wish to deal with the matter of his punishment.
He knew there would be people clamoring for the punishment of the ex-Confederate
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president, for high treason.
He thought blood enough had already been spilled to atone for our wickedness as a nation.
At all events he did not wish to be the judge to decide whether more should be shed or not. But his own life was sacrificed at the hands of an assassin before the
ex-president of the
Confederacy was a prisoner in the hands of the government which he had lent all his talent and all his energies to destroy.
All things are said to be wisely directed, and for the best interest of all concerned.
This reflection does not, however, abate in the slightest our sense of bereavement in the untimely loss of so good and great a man as
Abraham Lincoln.
He would have proven the best friend the
South could have had, and saved much of the wrangling and bitterness of feeling brought out by reconstruction under a President who at first wished to revenge himself upon Southern men of better social standing than himself, but who still sought their recognition, and in a short time conceived the idea and advanced the proposition to become their
Moses to lead them triumphantly out of all their difficulties.
The story of the legislation enacted during the reconstruction period to stay the hands of the
President is too fresh in the minds of the people to be told now. Much of it, no doubt, was unconstitutional; but it was hoped that the laws enacted would serve their purpose before the question of constitutionality could be submitted to the judiciary and a decision obtained.
These laws did serve their purpose, and now remain “a dead letter” upon the statute books of the
United States, no one taking interest enough in them to give them a passing thought.
Much was said at the time about the garb
Mr. Davis was wearing when he was captured.
I cannot settle this question from personal knowledge of the facts; but I have been under the belief, from information given to me by
General Wilson shortly after the event, that when
Mr. Davis learned that he was surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressed in a gentleman's dressing gown.
Naturally enough,
Mr. Davis wanted to escape, and would not reflect much how this should be accomplished provided it might be done successfully.
If captured, he would be no ordinary prisoner.
He represented all there was of that hostility to the government which had caused four years of the bloodiest war-and the most costly in other respects of which history makes any record.
Every one supposed he would be tried for treason if captured, and that he would be executed.
Had he
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succeeded in making his escape in any disguise it would have been adjudged a good thing afterwards by his admirers.
As my official letters on file in the War Department, as well as my remarks in this book, reflect upon
General Thomas by dwelling somewhat upon his tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to him, that I give my estimate of him as a soldier.
The same remark will apply also in the case of
General Canby.
I had been at
West Point with
Thomas one year, and had known him later in the old army.
He was a man of commanding appearance, slow and deliberate in speech and action; sensible, honest and brave.
He possessed valuable soldierly qualities in an eminent degree.
He gained the confidence of all who served under him, and almost their love.
This implies a very valuable quality.
It is a quality which calls out the most efficient services of the troops serving under the commander possessing it.
Thomas's dispositions were deliberately made, and always good.
He could not be driven from a point he was given to hold.
He was not as good, however, in pursuit as he was in action.
I do not believe that he could ever have conducted
Sherman's army from
Chattanooga to
Atlanta against the defences and the commander guarding that line in 1864.
On the other hand, if it had been given him to hold the line which
Johnston tried to hold, neither that general nor
Sherman, nor any other officer could have done it better.
Thomas was a valuable officer, who richly deserved, as he has received, the plaudits of his countrymen for the part he played in the great tragedy of 1861-5.
General Canby was an officer of great merit.
He was naturally studious, and inclined to the law. There have been in the army but very few, if any, officers who took as much interest in reading and digesting every act of Congress and every regulation for the government of the army as he. His knowledge gained in this way made him a most valuable staff officer, a capacity in which almost all his army services were rendered up to the time of his being assigned to the Military Division of the Gulf.
He was an exceedingly modest officer, though of great talent and learning.
I presume his feelings when first called upon to command a large army against a fortified city, were somewhat like my own when marching a regiment against
General Thomas Harris in
Missouri in 1861.
Neither of us would have felt
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the slightest trepidation in going into battle with some one else commanding.
Had
Canby been in other engagements afterwards, he would, I have no doubt, have advanced without any fear arising from a sense of the responsibility.
He was afterwards killed in the lava beds of
Southern Oregon, while in pursuit of the hostile
Modoc Indians [April 11, 1873]. His character was as pure as his talent and learning were great.
His services were valuable during the war, but principally as a bureau officer.
I have no idea that it was from choice that his services were rendered in an office, but because of his superior efficiency there.