The end of the war-the March to Washington- one of Lincoln's anecdotes-grand review at Washington-characteristics of Lincoln and Stanton-estimate of the different corps commanders
Things began to quiet down, and as the certainty that there would be no more armed resistance became clearer, the troops in
North Carolina and
Virginia were ordered to march immediately to the capital, and go into camp there until mustered out. Suitable garrisons were left at the prominent places throughout the
South to insure obedience to the laws that might be enacted for the government of the several States, and to insure security to the lives and property of all classes.
I do not know how far this was necessary, but I deemed it necessary, at that time, that such a course should be pursued.
I think now that these garrisons were continued after they ceased to be absolutely required; but it is not to be expected that such a rebellion as was fought between the sections from 1861 to 1865 could terminate without leaving many serious apprehensions in the mind of the people as to what should be done.
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Sherman marched his troops from
Goldsboro, up to
Manchester, on the south side of the
James River, opposite
Richmond, and there put them in camp, while he went back to
Savannah to see what the situation was there.
It was during this trip that the last outrage was committed upon him.
Halleck had been sent to
Richmond to command
Virginia, and had issued orders prohibiting even
Sherman's own troops from obeying his,
Sherman's, orders.
Sherman met the papers on his return, containing this order of
Halleck, and very justly felt indignant at the outrage.
On his arrival at
Fortress Monroe returning from
Savannah,
Sherman received an invitation from
Halleck to come to
Richmond and be his guest.
This he indignantly refused, and informed
Halleck, furthermore, that he had seen his order.
He also stated that he was coming up to take command of his troops, and as he marched through it would probably be as well for
Halleck not to show himself, because he (
Sherman) would not be responsible for what some rash person might do through indignation for the treatment he had received.
Very soon after that,
Sherman received orders from me to proceed to
Washington City, and to go into camp on the south side of the city pending the mustering-out of the troops.
There was no incident worth noting in the march northward from
Goldsboro, to
Richmond, or in that from
Richmond to
Washington City.
The army, however, commanded by
Sherman, which had been engaged in all the battles of the
West and had marched from the
Mississippi through the
Southern States to the sea, from there to
Goldsboro, and thence to
Washington City, had passed over many of the battle-fields of the Army of the Potomac, thus having seen, to a greater extent than any other body of troops, the entire theatre of the four years war for the preservation of the
Union.
The march of
Sherman's army from
Atlanta to the sea and north to
Goldsboro, while it was not accompanied with the danger that was anticipated, yet was magnificent in its results, and equally magnificent in the way it was conducted.
It had an important bearing, in various ways, upon the great object we had in view, that of closing the war. All the States east of the
Mississippi River up to the
State of Georgia, had felt the hardships of the war.
Georgia, and
South Carolina, and almost all of
North Carolina, up to this time, had been exempt from invasion by the
Northern armies, except upon their immediate sea coasts.
Their newspapers had given such an account of Confederate success, that the people who remained at home had been convinced that the
Yankees had been whipped from first to last, and
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driven from pillar to post, and that now they could hardly be holding out for any other purpose than to find a way out of the war with honor to themselves.
Even during this march of
Sherman's the newspapers in his front were proclaiming daily that his army was nothing better than a mob of men who were frightened out of their wits and hastening, panic-stricken, to try to get under the cover of our navy for protection against the
Southern people.
As the army was seen marching on triumphantly, however, the minds of the people became disabused and they saw the true state of affairs.
In turn they became disheartened, and would have been glad to submit without compromise.
Another great advantage resulting from this march, and which was calculated to hasten the end, was the fact that the great storehouse of
Georgia was entirely cut off from the Confederate armies.
As the troops advanced north from
Savannah, the destruction of the railroads in
South Carolina and the southern part of
North Carolina, further cut off their resources and left the armies still in
Virginia and
North Carolina dependent for supplies upon a very small area of country, already very much exhausted of food and forage.
In due time the two armies, one from Burkesville Junction and the other from the neighborhood of
Raleigh, North Carolina, arrived and went into camp near the
Capital, as directed.
The troops were hardy, being inured to fatigue, and they appeared in their respective camps as ready and fit for duty as they had ever been in their lives.
I doubt whether an equal body of men of any nation, take them man for man, officer for officer, was ever gotten together that would have proved their equal in a great battle.
The armies of
Europe are machines: the men are brave and the officers capable; but the majority of the soldiers in most of the nations of
Europe are taken from a class of people who are not very intelligent and who have very little interest in the contest in which they are called upon to take part.
Our armies were composed of men who were able to read, men who knew what they were fighting for, and could not be induced to serve as soldiers, except in an emergency when the safety of the nation was involved, and so necessarily must have been more than equal to men who fought merely because they were brave and because they were thoroughly drilled and inured to hardships.
There was nothing of particular importance occurred during the time these troops were in camp before starting North.
I remember one little incident which I will relate as an anecdote
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characteristic of
Mr. Lincoln.
It occurred a day after I reached
Washington, and about the time
General Meade reached
Burkesville with the army.
Governor [William]
Smith of
Virginia had left
Richmond with the
Confederate States government, and had gone to
Danville.
Supposing I was necessarily with the army at
Burkesville, he addressed a letter to me there informing me that, as governor of the
Commonwealth of the
State of Virginia, he had temporarily removed the
State capital from
Richmond to
Danville, and asking if he would be permitted to perform the functions of his office there without molestation by the
Federal authorities.
I give this letter only in substance.
He also inquired of me whether in case he was not allowed to perform the duties of his office, he with a few others might not be permitted to leave the country and go abroad without interference.
General Meade being informed that a flag of truce was outside his pickets with a letter to me, at once sent out and had the letter brought in without informing the officer who brought it that I was not present.
He read the letter and telegraphed me its contents.
Meeting
Mr. Lincoln shortly after receiving this dispatch, I repeated its contents to him.
Mr. Lincoln, supposing I was asking for instructions, said, in reply to that part of
Governor Smith's letter which inquired whether he with a few friends would be permitted to leave the country unmolested, that his position was like that of a certain Irishman (giving the name) he knew in
Springfield who was very popular with the people, a man of considerable promise, and very much liked.
Unfortunately he had acquired the habit of drinking, and his friends could see that the habit was growing on him. These friends determined to make an effort to save him, and to do this they drew up a pledge to abstain from all alcoholic drinks.
They asked
Pat to join them in signing the pledge, and he consented.
He had been so long out of the habit of using plain water as a beverage that he resorted to soda-water as a substitute.
After a few days this began to grow distasteful to him. So holding the glass behind him, he said: “
Doctor, couldn't you drop a bit of brandy in that unbeknownst to myself.”
I do not remember what the instructions were the
President gave me, but I know that
Governor Smith was not permitted to perform the duties of his office.
I also know that if
Mr. Lincoln had been spared, there would have been no efforts made to prevent any one from leaving the country who desired to do so. He would have been equally willing to permit the return of the same expatriated citizens after they had time to repent of their choice.
On the 18th of May orders were issued by the
adjutant-general
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for a grand review by the
President and his cabinet of
Sherman's and
Meade's armies.
The review commenced on the 23d and lasted two days.
Meade's army occupied over six hours of the first day in passing the grand stand which had been erected in front of the
President's house.
Sherman witnessed this review from the grand stand which was occupied by the
President and his cabinet.
Here he showed his resentment for the cruel and harsh treatment that had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him by the
Secretary of War, by refusing to take his extended hand.1
Sherman's troops had been in camp on the south side of the
Potomac.
During the night of the 23d he crossed over and bivouacked not far from the
Capitol.
Promptly at ten o'clock on the morning of the 24th, his troops commenced to pass in review.
Sherman's army made a different appearance from that of the Army of the Potomac.
The latter had been operating where they received directly from the
North full supplies of food and clothing regularly: the review of this army therefore was the review of a body of 65,000 well-drilled, well-disciplined and orderly soldiers inured to hardship and fit for any duty, but without the experience of gathering their own food and supplies in an enemy's country, and of being ever on the watch.
Sherman's army was not so well-dressed as the Army of the Potomac, but their marching could not be excelled; they gave the appearance of men who had been thoroughly drilled to endure hardships, either by long and continuous marches or through exposure to any climate, without the ordinary shelter of a camp.
They exhibited also some of the order of march through
Georgia where the “sweet potatoes sprung up from the ground” as
Sherman's army went marching through.
In the rear of a company there would be a captured horse or mule loaded with small cooking utensils, captured chickens and other food picked up for the use of the men. Negro families who had followed the army would sometimes come along in the rear of a company, with three or four children packed upon a single mule, and the mother leading it.
The sight was varied and grand: nearly all day for two successive days, from the
Capitol to the
Treasury Building, could be seen a mass of orderly soldiers marching in columns of companies.
The National flag was flying from almost every house and store; the windows were filled with spectators; the door-steps and side-walks were The incident of not shaking hands with
Stanton occurred during the review of
Sherman's army on the 23rd rather than on the first day, according to most historians.
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crowded with colored people and poor whites who did not succeed in securing better quarters from which to get a view of the grand armies.
The city was about as full of strangers who had come to see the sights as it usually is on inauguration day when a new
President takes his seat.
It may not be out of place to again allude to
President Lincoln and the
Secretary of War,
Mr. Stanton, who were the great conspicuous figures in the executive branch of the government.
There is no great difference of opinion now, in the public mind, as to the characteristics of the
President.
With
Mr. Stanton the case is different.
They were the very opposite of each other in almost every particular, except that each possessed great ability.
Mr. Lincoln gained influence over men by making them feel that it was a pleasure to serve him. He preferred yielding his own wish to gratify others, rather than to insist upon having his own way. It distressed him to disappoint others.
In matters of public duty, however, he had what he wished, but in the least offensive way.
Mr. Stanton never questioned his own authority to command, unless resisted.
He cared nothing for the feeling of others.
In fact it seemed to be pleasanter to him to disappoint than to gratify.
He felt no hesitation in assuming the functions of the executive, or in acting without advising with him. If his act was not sustained, he would change it — if he saw the matter would be followed up until he did so.
It was generally supposed that these two officials formed the complement of each other.
The
Secretary was required to prevent the
President's being imposed upon.
The President was required in the more responsible place of seeing that injustice was not done to others.
I do not know that this view of these two men is still entertained by the majority of the people.
It is not a correct view, however, in my estimation.
Mr. Lincoln did not require a guardian to aid him in the fulfilment of a public trust.
Mr. Lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his generals in making and executing their plans.
The
Secretary was very timid, and it was impossible for him to avoid interfering with the armies covering the capital when it was sought to defend it by an offensive movement against the army guarding the
Confederate capital.
He could see our weakness, but he could not see that the enemy was in danger.
The enemy would not have been in danger if
Mr. Stanton had been in the field.
These characteristics of the two officials were clearly shown shortly after
Early came so near getting into the capital.
Among the army and corps commanders who served with me
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during the war between the States, and who attracted much public attention, but of whose ability as soldiers I have not yet given any estimate, are
Meade,
Hancock,
Sedgwick,
Burnside,
Terry and
Hooker.
There were others of great merit, such as
Griffin,
Humphreys,
Wright and
Mackenzie.
Of those first named,
Burnside at one time had command of the Army of the Potomac, and later of the Army of the Ohio.
Hooker also commanded the Army of the Potomac for a short time.
General Meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to his usefulness that were beyond his control.
He had been an officer of the engineer corps before the war, and consequently had never served with troops until he was over forty-six years of age. He never had, I believe, a command of less than a brigade.
He saw clearly and distinctly the position of the enemy, and the topography of the country in front of his own position.
His first idea was to take advantage of the lay of the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we wanted to move afterwards.
He was subordinate to his superiors in rank to the extent that he could execute an order which changed his own plans with the same zeal he would have displayed if the plan had been his own. He was brave and conscientious, and commanded the respect of all who knew him. He was unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond his control, at times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in the most offensive manner.
No one saw this fault more plainly than he himself, and no one regretted it more.
This made it unpleasant at times, even in battle, for those around him to approach him even with information.
In spite of this defect he was a most valuable officer and deserves a high place in the annals of his country.
General Burnside was an officer who was generally liked and respected.
He was not, however, fitted to command an army.
No one knew this better than himself.
He always admitted his blunders, and extenuated those of officers under him beyond what they were entitled to. It was hardly his fault that he was ever assigned to a separate command.
Of
Hooker I saw but little during the war. I had known him very well before, however.
Where I did see him, at
Chattanooga, his achievement in bringing his command around the
point of Lookout Mountain and into
Chattanooga Valley was brilliant.
I nevertheless regarded him as a dangerous man. He was not subordinate to his
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superiors.
He was ambitious to the extent of caring nothing for the rights of others.
His disposition was, when engaged in battle, to get detached from the main body of the army and exercise a separate command, gathering to his standard all he could of his juniors.
Hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all the
general officers who did not exercise a separate command.
He commanded a corps longer than any other one, and his name was never mentioned as having committed in battle a blunder for which he was responsible.
He was a man of very conspicuous personal appearance.
Tall, well-formed and, at the time of which I now write, young and fresh-looking, he presented an appearance that would attract the attention of an army as he passed.
His genial disposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his presence with his command in the thickest of the fight won for him the confidence of troops serving under him. No matter how hard the fight, the 2d corps always felt that their commander was looking after them.
Sedgwick was killed at
Spottsylvania before I had an opportunity of forming an estimate of his qualifications as a soldier from personal observation.
I had known him in
Mexico when both of us were lieutenants, and when our service gave no indication that either of us would ever be equal to the command of a brigade.
He stood very high in the army, however, as an officer and a man. He was brave and conscientious.
His ambition was not great, and he seemed to dread responsibility.
He was willing to do any amount of battling, but always wanted some one else to direct.
He [reportedly] declined the command of the Army of the Potomac once, if not oftener.
General Alfred H. Terry came into the army as a volunteer without a military education.
His way was won without political influence up to an important separate command — the expedition against
Fort Fisher, in January, 1865.
His success there was most brilliant, and won for him the rank of brigadier-general in the regular army and of major-general of volunteers.
He is a man who makes friends of those under him by his consideration of their wants and their dues.
As a commander, he won their confidence by his coolness in action and by his clearness of perception in taking in the situation under which he was placed at any given time.
Griffin,
Humphreys, and
Mackenzie were good corps commanders, but came into that position so near to the close of the war as not to
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attract public attention.
All three served as such, in the last campaign of the armies of the
Potomac and the
James, which culminated at Appomattox Court House, on the 9th of April, 1865.
The sudden collapse of the rebellion monopolized attention to the exclusion of almost everything else.
I regarded
Mackenzie as the most promising young officer in the army.
Graduating at
West Point, as he did, during the second year of the war, he had won his way up to the command of a corps before its close.
This he did upon his own merit and without influence.