[308]
appeal to the country for this new force were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so hard it is to have a thing understood as it really is.
Meanwhile, by the news of the victory of
Malvern Hill and the secure position to which
McClellan had retired at
Harrison's Landing, the
President learned that the condition of the Army of the Potomac was not as desperate as at first had seemed.
The result of
Seward's visit to New York is shown in the
President's letter of July 2, answering
McClellan's urgent call for heavy reinforcements:
The idea of sending you fifty thousand, or any other considerable force, promptly, is simply absurd.
If, in your frequent mention of responsibility, you have the impression that I blame you for not doing more than you can, please be relieved of such impression.
I only beg that in like manner you will not ask impossibilities of me. If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now. Save the army, material and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of three hundred thousand, which I accept.
And in another letter, two days later:
To reinforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. . Under these circumstances, the defensive for the present must be your only care.
Save the army-first, where you are, if you can; secondly, by removal, if you must.
To satisfy himself more fully about the actual situation, the
President made a visit to
Harrison's Landing on July 8 and 9, and held personal interviews with
McClellan and his leading generals.
While the question