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On the 23d of May, 1861, according to the conspirators' programme,
Virginia was put through the dumb show of indorsing the
Secession Ordinance by a nominal popular vote; and almost immediately thereafter, about June 1st, the
Confederate seat of government was transferred from
Montgomery to
Richmond.
The reasons for this course were palpable; it gratified the local pride of the Old Dominion secessionists; it gave the reins of local military domination definitely into
Jefferson Davis' personal grasp; it placed him on the most advantageous frontier to meet the expected Union advance from
Washington.
This, as previously related, had already seized upon
Alexandria and
Arlington Heights, which were now being extensively fortified.
Making a short speech to a serenade on the evening of June 1st, the rebel chief announced that
Virginia was “to become the theatre of a great central camp, from which will pour forth thousands of brave hearts to roll back the tide of this despotism.”
The local campaign had already taken shape before his arrival.
Since
Lee was placed in command he had followed a policy which looked less to the capture of
Baltimore than to the obstruction of the
Potomac.
His first and principal task had been to organize the volunteers which Governor
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Letcher called into service; and the earliest levies of
Northern Virginia were posted at
Manassas Junction, where railroads from
Richmond, from
Alexandria, and from the Shenandoah Valley met. On examination, its strategical value was found to be much greater than was suspected at the beginning;
Colonel Cocke, the local commander, first pointed out to
Lee its important relation to the Shenandoah Valley. “These two columns,” he writes, under date of May 15th, “one at
Manassas and one at
Winchester, could readily co-operate and concentrate upon the one point or the other, either to make head against the enemy's columns advancing down the valley, should he force
Harper's Ferry; or, in ease we repulse him at
Harper's Ferry, the
Winchester supporting column could throw itself on this side of the mountains, to co-operate with the column at
Manassas.”
With the great increase of Federal troops at
Washington, and their seizure of
Alexandria and
Arlington Heights, the post at
Manassas Junction became of such prominence and importance, that
Beauregard was sent to take command of it about June 1st.
Beauregard was an officer of curiously unequal merit: thoroughly educated, and highly skilful in the science and art of military engineering, he had little capacity for administration, or sound judgment in the conception of large field-operations.
Giddy to intoxication with laudation for his cheap victory at
Sumter, he now invited upon his own head the contempt of the world, and of history, by publishing a proclamation in which, without provocation, he charged the
Union armies to have abandoned “all rules of civilized warfare,” and to have made “Beauty and Booty” their war-cry.
His next exploit was to excite the distrust of the
Richmond authorities upon his military ability, by proposing a series of aggressive movements intended to annihilate the
Union armies and capture
Washington; liable, however,
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to the objection, noted thereon by
Jefferson Davis, that “the plan was based on the improbable and inadmissible supposition that the enemy was to await everywhere, isolated and motionless, until our forces could effect junctions to attack them in detail.”
Meanwhile he rendered his superiors a real service in pointing out that the defence of his position should be made, not with earthworks at
Manassas, but with troops on the line of
Bull Run, and for this he was urgent in demanding large reinforcements.
As has been already mentioned, it was
General Scott's opinion that the
Government ought not to engage in any military undertakings with the three months volunteers, beyond those to which these forces had been already assigned and distributed, namely: to protect
Washington and fortify
Arlington Heights; to garrison
Fort Monroe and, if chance should offer, recapture the
Gosport Navy Yard at
Norfolk; to hold
Baltimore and
Maryland; to prosecute
Patterson's campaign against
Harper's Ferry; to recover
West Virginia through
McClellan's campaign; to guard the
Ohio line, and control
Kentucky and
Missouri.
Larger and more distant operations, he believed, ought to be undertaken only with new armies formed of the three years volunteers, giving the summer to drill and preparation, and entering on combined movements in the favorable autumn weather.
Important reasons, partly military, partly political, conflicted with so deliberate a programme.
As events had shaped themselves, it seemed necessary to aid
Patterson.
The possibility that
Beauregard and
Johnston might unite their armies was clearly enough perceived; hence, a column to threaten
Manassas was proposed.
Indications were also manifesting themselves that rebel batteries at narrow places might soon seriously embarrass the navigation of the
Potomac.
Chiefly, however, the highly excited patriotism of the
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North, eager to wipe out national insult and vindicate national authority, was impatient of what seemed tedious delay.
The echoes of the
Sumter bombardment were yet in the air; the blood on the
Baltimore paving-stones was crying loudly to heaven.
For half a century the nation had felt no close experience of war. The conquests of peace had grown almost miraculous in speed and certainty.
Rivers and mountains, distance and time, had become the obedient ministers of creative ingenuity and bold enterprise.
Forgetting that the achievements of peace encountered the opposing obstacles, not of man, but of nature alone, the
North demanded speedy as well as signal redress.
It saw rebellion enthroned in the capital of
Virginia; it saw a numerous Union army gathered at
Washington; the newspapers raised the cry of “On to
Richmond;” and the popular heart beat in quick and well-nigh unanimous response to the slogan.
Latterly a detachment sent out by
General Butler from
Fortress Monroe had met a repulse at Great Bethel, and near
Washington a railroad-train under
General Schenck had run into an ambush at
Vienna station; both were trifling losses, but at the moment supremely irritating to the pride of the
North, and the fires of patriotic resentment once more blazed up with fresh intensity.
General Scott's first project of an expedition against
Manassas was made about the beginning of June, the object then being not to fight a battle, but merely make a threatening diversion to aid
Patterson.
There were at that time only some six thousand rebels at
Manassas, according to
Beauregard's report.
Before the design could take final shape,
Johnston had evacuated
Harper's Ferry, and
Patterson's first movement was thereby terminated.
This occurred about the middle of June.
From that time on, the plan grew into the idea of a larger
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and more decisive movement.
Beauregard was receiving large reinforcements; nevertheless, the strength of the
Union army at
Washington was such that it seemed entirely possible to provide every chance of success.
McDowell, raised in rank from the grade of major to that of brigadiergeneral, and placed in command at
Arlington Heights, submitted a formal plan, at the request of the
General-in-Chief, about June 24th.
His plan assumed that the secession forces at
Manassas and its dependencies would number twenty-five thousand; that they would unavoidably become apprised of the movement, and every effort would be made to increase
Beauregard's strength; but that “if
General J. E. Johnston's force is kept engaged by
Major-General Patterson, and
Major-General Butler occupies the force now in his vicinity (
Fortress Monroe), I think they will not be able to bring up more than ten thousand men.”
Against such an array he proposed to move with a force of thirty thousand of all arms, and a reserve of ten thousand.
The project was elaborately discussed, and finally agreed upon, at a council of war at the
Executive Mansion, on June 29th, in which
President Lincoln, his Cabinet, and the principal military officers took part.
As already mentioned,
General Scott was opposed to the undertaking; but, after it was once resolved upon, he joined with hearty good — will in every effort to make it a success.
McDowell was emphatic in his protest that he could not hope to beat the combined armies of
Johnston and
Beauregard; uponwhich
Scott gave him the distinct assurance: “If
Johnston joins
Beauregard, he shall have
Patterson on his heels.”
With this understanding, the movement was ordered to begin a week from that day.
The enterprise did not escape the usual fate of unforeseen delay; it marks great energy in
McDowell that his expedition
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was only deferred a little over a week beyond the appointed time.
On the 16th of July he issued his orders to march that afternoon.
His army was organized as follows:
First Division, commanded by
Tyler: an aggregate of 9,936 men, divided into four brigades, respectively under
Keyes,
Schenck,
Sherman, and
Richardson.
Second Division, commanded by
Hunter: an aggregate of 2,648 men, divided into two brigades, under
Porter and
Burnside.
Third Division, commanded by
Heintzelman: an aggregate of 9,777 men, divided into three brigades, under
Franklin,
Willcox, and
Howard.
Fourth Division, commanded by
Runyon: an aggregate of 5,752 men; no brigade commanders.
Fifth Division, commanded by miles: an aggregate of 6,207 men, divided into two brigades, under
Blenker and
Davies.
Thus, the total of his command, not including four regiments left in the
Alexandria and
Arlington forts, was 34,320 men. From this number, however,
Runyon's division may at once be deducted; it was left behind to guard his communications, its most advanced regiment being seven miles in rear of
Centreville.
McDowell's actual moving column may therefore be said to have consisted of 28,568
1 men, including artillery, a total of forty-nine guns, and a single battalion of cavalry.
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Of all machines, an army develops, perhaps, the greatest inefficiency from mere friction, or the greatest usefulness from action and thoroughness of organization.
The value of a veteran consists as much of his habitual expertness in the routine of camp and march, as of coolness and confidence under fire.
Two principal causes rendered the advance very slow.
The first was the want of practice in marching.
“They stopped every moment to pick blackberries or get water,” says
McDowell; “they would not keep in the ranks, order as much as you pleased; when they came where water was fresh, they would pour the old water out of their canteens, and fill them with fresh water; they were not used to denying themselves much; they were not used to journeys on foot.”
The second cause was, perhaps, yet more potent.
“The affair of Big Bethel and
Vienna had created a great outcry against rushing into places that people did not know anything about.
I think the idea of every one was that we were to go into no such things as that — that we were to feel our way,” again says
McDowell.
Precaution on this point was particularly emphasized in his instructions.
“The three following things,” says his marching order, “will not be pardonable in any commander: 1st, to come upon a battery or breastwork without a knowledge of its position; 2d, to be surprised; 3d, to fall back.”
Moving forward with such painful wariness, a surprise of the enemy was, of course, equally out of the question.
In obedience to
Beauregard's orders, his outposts everywhere retired, though, in several instances, with such precipitation as to leave their tents, knapsacks, and even their freshly cooked rations behind.
Manassas Junction lies thirty-five miles southwest of
Washington, on a high, open plateau; there the rebels had some slight field-works, armed with fourteen or fifteen heavy guns, and garrisoned by about two thousand men-
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Bull Run flows in a southeasterly direction, some three miles east of
Manassas, with wooded heights coming generally close up to its west bank.
The stream is winding and sluggish, and, though here and there it has steep, sometimes precipitous and rocky banks, it is fordable in many places.
Beauregard's main army, increased now to over twenty thousand, was posted at the various fords of
Bull Run, in a line some eight miles long, and extending from the Manassas Railroad to the
Stone Bridge on the
Warrenton turnpike.
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It was
McDowell's intention to turn this position on the
South.
To conceal his purpose, and create the impression of a contemplated attack in front, he directed his march upon
Centreville on the
Warrenton turnpike.
On Thursday morn-
ing, July 18th,
Tyler moved upon
Centreville, but, arriving there at nine o'clock, he found that it, too, had been evacuated, and that
Beauregard's entire army was behind
Bull Run.
Centreville being situated on a hill,
Tyler could see the whole valley spread out before him, with
Manassas on
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the high plateau beyond.
The main body of the enemy, he learned, had retired down the road running directly toward that point, crossing the stream at Mitchell's and Blackburn's fords.
Tyler's unopposed advance had perhaps inspired him and his officers with an over-confidence or undue elation; perhaps it suggested the belief that the enemy did not feel strong enough to make a stand.
Under instructions to “observe well the roads,” but to bring on no engagement, it occurred to him to make a reconnoissance in the direction of the retreat.
As often happens under such circumstances, the spirit of combat overcame discretion.
Accompanied by
Richardson, one of his brigade commanders,
Tyler first went out with a squadron of cavalry and two companies of light infantry.
Finding a favorable situation to try artillery, they sent back for a battery, and
Richardson's brigade to support it. About noon of the 18th they were within a mile of Blackburn's ford.
Then followed the ever-recurring experience of such affairs.
First, an experimental cannonade from a couple of fieldpieces, before which the enemy's guns retired; next the advance of a skirmish-line, before which the enemy's skirmishers retired; then an advance of some of the field-pieces and the planting of a stronger battery; the posting of a regiment to support the skirmishers, and, soon after, the posting of the entire brigade to support the regiment, followed by calling up a reserve brigade to support the first.
Thus the afternoon's work drifted quickly from a reconnoissance to a skirmish, and from a skirmish to a preliminary battle.
It was not until some sixty men had fallen, until the two exposed field-pieces were with difficulty extricated, until one regiment had retreated in confusion and the other
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three were deployed in line of battle to make a new charge, that
Tyler heeded his instructions, and withdrew his reluctant officers and men from the fight, partly demoralized and generally exasperated, and returned to
Centreville.
In point of fact, the loss, the damage, the demoralization, had been equal on both sides.
The rebel reports show that three regiments of
Longstreet's brigade, which bore the first assault, were so much shaken that
Early's reserve brigade of three fresh regiments was called up and relieved them, that one of these regiments was thrown into confusion, and that the rebel loss was sixty-three killed and wounded. Undecisive as it was, the battle of Blackburn's Ford had an important effect.
It confirmed
Beauregard in his previous impression that the principal Union attack would be made at that point on the centre of his long line.
On the other hand,
McDowell, receiving from his officers reports of rifle-pits and breastworks, became convinced that a direct assault was unwise.
The affair of Blackburn's Ford thus proved something more than a preliminary defeat; it augmented the causes of a great disaster.
Upon hearing the cannonade,
McDowell had immediately ordered all the divisions forward to
Centreville.
He had already in his own mind given up the plan of turning the enemy's right, because of the unfavorable nature of the ground and roads.
The necessity of finding an unfortified crossing seemed now also demonstrated.
Meeting his division commanders at
Centreville, that same night of Thursday, July 18th,
McDowell informed them confidentially that he had abandoned his original plan, and had resolved to make the attack by marching northward and turning
Beauregard's left flank instead of his right.
As an incident of this resolve, however, it was even more essential than before to continue to threaten the enemy's
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centre; and thus
Richardson's brigade was once more posted in the direction of Blackburn's Ford.
Meanwhile the engineers were busy all of Friday and Saturday in efforts to find an unfortified ford over
Bull Run.
They were not successful till a late hour on Saturday; and this delay deferred the main battle till Sunday, July 21st.
Could a similar attack have been made a day earlier, the result would probably have been altogether different.
