The Atlanta (Georgia) Campaign: May 1 - September 8, 1864., Part I: General Report.
Maj. George B. Davis, Mr. Leslie J. Perry, Mr. Joseph W. Kirkley, Ed.

[735] with that of Brigadier-General Johnson, his right being taken as the pivot, and to push on until the enemy was encountered, I put my troops in motion at daybreak. Colonel Van Derveer was on my right, formed in two lines, and Brigadier-General Turchin on the left, formed in the same manner. My right had moved some threefourths of a mile, and the direction of our line was about due north and south, facing east, when I received another order from the same source, informing me that Major-General Schofield, whose corps was then in line half, a mile to my rear, with his right overlapping nearly the whole of my left brigade, was about to advance and charge the enemy's works, and directing me to move forward with him and assault at the same time. I had not previously known that the enemy had works in our vicinity, nor was I then informed as to their position, their character, or the manner in which the attack was to be made. There was, of course, no time for a reconnaissance by me without neglecting to advance along with Major-General Schofield, as ordered. I had barely time to give the proper instructions to Brigadier-General Turchin on my left, and was communicating the same to the right brigade, when the troops of Brigadier-General Judah, on General Schofield's right, came up with my left. His front line passed through my rear line before mine began to advance, and, thus interlaced, both went forward together. It was subsequently ascertained that the rebel line of works ran along the western slope of a ridge, which extended from near Resaca northward, on the west side of the railroad. A narrow valley, intersected along its length by a boggy creek, separated this from another ridge which lay parallel with and in front of our line. This our troops had to pass. It was covered for a space of nearly half a mile in width by so dense a growth of wood that an individual alone could make his way through it only with difficulty. It was utterly impossible in this thicket for a regiment, much less for a brigade commander, to see and control the two extremities of his command. Yet our lines of battle worked through it and reached the crest overlooking the valley in as much order as could have been expected. From this position the rebel works could be distinctly seen, and could our men have been allowed to halt here, to reform and to readjust their lines, while an examination of the position should be made, better results might have ensued. It would appear that Major-General Schofield's left, in open ground, did not encounter the same difficulties as his right, and, pressing forward, the impulsion was communicated along the line to his right, and carried my left brigade along with it. It was the affair of a moment, and before I could learn (at 300 yards' distance upon the right) of the condition of affairs, it was too late to stop the movement. Descending about 100 feet the almost vertical slope of the ridge, our men emerged into the open valley, and into direct view, at short range, of the rebel works, and immediately received a fire of artillery and musketry. The tried veterans of this division, who had never failed to accomplish anything that was possible, did not falter, but pushed forward until they had reached the creek. Few got beyond this. Many stuck under the miry banks of the stream, and the few isolated groups that got beyond, not being in sufficient force to sustain themselves, were soon driven back. It was at once apparent that this effort had failed and was at an end, and most of the men were withdrawn to the summit of the ridge to be reformed. A few, unable on account of the sharp fire from the rebel works to leave the banks