This text is part of:
Table of Contents:
Advance sheets of
Reminiscences of secession, war, and reconstruction,
by
Lieutenant-General
Richard
Taylor
.
A review of the
First
two days
operations at
Gettysburg
and a reply to
General
Longstreet
by
General
Fitz.
Lee
.
These letters unquestionably show that had we known it at the time, the position on the heights fought for on the 2nd could have been gained on the afternoon of the 1st by continuing without delay the pursuit of the Federals. It will be observed that they also affirm that the success of an attack made by us after an hour's delay would have been involved in doubt. General Hancock says that an attempt had been made “to reform some of the Eleventh corps as they passed over Cemetery Hill, but it had not been successful;” and that when he arrived there, about 3 P. M., there were only some 1,000 or 1,200 troops on the hill, with Buford's cavalry in front; and that up to 6 P. M. the troops that had been collected from the First and Eleventh corps had only been reinforced by Williams' and Geary's divisions of the Twelfth corps, under Slocum-numbering together by return of June 30th, 8,056. The number collected in the First corps amounted to 2,450-(Bates, page 82, and also Doubleday's, its com mander's, testimony). Of the Eleventh, (see Hancock,) 1,200. Estimating Buford's cavalry at about 2,500, we would have a Federal force, up to 6 P. M.., of 14,206,1 opposed to our 26,000. Birney's division of the Third
1 This includes all troops except those afterwards collected in Eleventh corps in addition to the 1,200 mentioned by General Hancock.
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