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but General Lee having since written a detailed and somewhat critical account of the battle-and the account from which General Longstreet's critics get all their points against him-Longstreet feels justified in discussing the battle on its merits.
It seems, then, that
General Longstreet's appreciation of
General Lee's exalted character did not prevent him from making the false charge, that
General Lee had, when time enough had elapsed for the generous feelings, which prompted him on the field to assume all the responsibility, to subside, written a report differing from his first report, and from the facts of the case, after
General Longstreet and other officers had been entrapped into making the reports which they sent in. For that is the real purport of the charge against
General Lee, as the editor of the
Times gives it, and it is very probable that the letter itself, which is withheld, made it in more emphatic language.
If there was any doubt before of a fact well known to the whole army, that
General Longstreet was very slow in his movements on all occasions, he has now furnished very conclusive evidence of its truth, in his narrative of incidents connected with the
second battle of Manassas.
He says:
When the head of my column reached that field it was about 12 o'clock on the 29th.
As we approached the field we heard sounds of a heavy battle, which proved to be General Jackson very heavily engaged with the enemy.
As soon as his troops were deployed into line,
General Lee wanted him to open the attack, but
Longstreet insisted on taking time to make a reconnoissance, which was delayed for a time by a report of an advance on his right, and the reconnoissance was not made until about nightfall.
This is according to his own showing, and in the meantime
General Jackson's command had sustained and repulsed seven different attacks in heavy force during the afternoon.
So little evidence had
General Longstreet given to the enemy of the presence of his command on the field, that
General Fitz John Porter, of the
Federal army, was afterwards court-martialed and cashiered for failing to carry out an order sent to him by
Pope, at half-past 4 o'clock of that very afternoon, to attack
Jackson's right flank — the very one on which
Longstreet was. It was not until after sunset that any part of
Longstreet's command became engaged, when there was a conflict between
Hood's. division and
King's division of
McDowell's corps, which was moving along the
Warrenton Pike to cut off
Jackson's troops, erroneously supposed to be retreating.
On the next day, though there was skirmishing and fighting in
Jackson's front all day,
General Longstreet was not ready to go into action until after 3 P. M. What caused this delay he does not pretend to explain, but gives his operations on that day as follows:
The next day the Federals advanced against General Jackson in very heavy force.
They soon made the battle so severe for him that he was obliged to call for reinforcements.
At about 3 P. Mi., while the battle was raging fiercely, I was riding to my front when I received a note from Generals Hood and Evans, asking me to ride to a part of the field where they were standing.
I changed my course and hurried to the point indicated.
I found them standing upon a