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The battle of Malvern Hill.
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An orderly at headquarters. |
Before the
battle of Gaines's Mill (already described by me in these pages), a change of base from the
York to the
James River had been anticipated and prepared for by
General McClellan.
After the battle this change became a necessity, in presence of a strong and aggressive foe, who had already turned our right, cut our connection with the
York River, and was also in large force behind the intrenchments between us and
Richmond.
The transfer was begun the moment our position became perilous.
It now involved a series of battles by day and marches by night which brought into relief the able talents, active foresight, and tenacity of purpose of our commander, the unity of action on the part of his subordinates, and the great bravery, firmness, and confidence in their superiors on the part of the rank and file.
These conflicts from the beginning of the Seven Days fighting were the engagement at
Oak Grove, the battles of
Beaver Dam Creek and
Gaines's Mill, the engagements at Golding's and Garnett's farms, and at
Allen's farm or
Peach Orchard; the
battle of Savage's Station; the artillery duel at
White Oak Swamp; the
battle of Glendale (or Charles City cross-roads); the action of
Turkey Creek, and the
battle of Malvern Hill.
Each was a success to our army, the engagement of
Malvern Hill being the most decisive.
The result of the movement was that on the 2d of July our army was safely established at
Harrison's Landing, on the
James, in accordance with
General McClellan's design.
The present narrative will be confined to events coming under my own observation, and connected with my command, the Fifth Army Corps.
Saturday, June 28th, 1862, the day after the
battle of Gaines's Mill, my corps spent in bivouac at the
Trent farm on the south bank of the Chiekahominy.
Artillery and infantry detachments guarded the crossings at the sites of the destroyed bridges.
Our antagonists of the 27th were still north of the river, but did not molest us. We rested and recuperated as best we could, amid the noise of battle close by, at Garnett's and Golding's farms, in which part of
Franklin's corps was engaged, refilling the empty cartridge-boxes and haversacks, so as to be in readiness for immediate duty.
Our antagonists on the north bank of the river were apparently almost inactive.
They seemed puzzled as to our intentions, or paralyzed by the effect of their own labors and losses, and, like ourselves, were recuperating for a renewal of the contest in the early future; though to them, as well as to us, it was difficult to conjecture where that renewal would be made.
The only evidence of activity on their part was the dust rising on the road down
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the river, which we attributed, with the utmost unconcern, to the movements of troops seeking to interrupt our already abandoned communications with
York River.
The absence of any indication of our intention to maintain those communications, together with the rumble of our artillery, which that night was moving southward, opened the eyes of our opponents to the fact that we had accomplished the desired and perhaps necessary object of withdrawing to the south bank of the
Chickahominy, and for the first time had aroused their suspicion that we were either intending to attack
Richmond or temporarily abandon the siege, during a change of base to the
James River.
But the active spurts on the 27th and 28th of June made by the defenders of that city against our left created the false impression that they designed to attack the Second, Third, and Fourth Corps, and thereby succeeded in preventing an attack upon them.
So, in order to thwart our plans, whatever they might be, promptly on the 29th our opponents renewed their activity by advancing from
Richmond, and by recrossing to the south bank of the river all their forces lately employed at
Gaines's Mill.
But at that time the main body of our army was beyond their immediate reach, taking positions to cover the passage of our trains to the new base and to be ready again to welcome our eager and earnest antagonists.
Between 2 and 9 P. M. on the 28th, my corps was in motion and marched by the way of Savage Station to the south side of
White Oak Swamp; and at the junction of the roads from
Richmond (
Glendale) to be prepared to repel attacks from the direction of that city.
General Morell, leading the advance, aided
General Woodbury, of the engineer corps, to build the cause-ways and bridges necessary for the easy passage of the trains and troops over the swamps and streams.
Sykes and
McCall followed at 5 and 9 o'clock, respectively,
McCall being accompanied by
Hunt's Artillery Reserve.
We expected to reach our destination, which was only ten miles distant, early on the 29th; but, in consequence of the dark night and of the narrow and muddy roads, cut up and blocked by numerous trains and herds of cattle, the head of the column did not arrive till 10 A. M., the rear not until midnight.
McCall arrived latest, and all were greatly fatigued.
The enemy not having appeared at
Glendale on the afternoon of the 29th, and other troops arriving to take the place of mine,
General McClellan ordered me to move that night by the direct road to the elevated and cleared lands (
Malvern Hill) on the north bank of
Turkey Creek, there to select and hold a position behind which the army and all its trains could be withdrawn with safety.
General Keyes was to move by a different road and form to my right and rear.
Again the dangers and difficulties of night marches attended us, followed by the consequent delay, which, though fortunately it was counterbalanced by the slowness of our opponents in moving to the same point, endangered the safety of our whole army.
Although we started before dark, and were led by an intelligent cavalry officer who had passed over the route and professed to know it, my command did not reach
Turkey Creek, which was only five miles distant, until 9 A. M. on the 30th.
In fact, we were misled up the
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The Parsonage, near Malvern Hill.
This house was in the rear of the Confederate line, which was formed in the woods shown in the back-ground.
It was used as a Confederate hospital after the fight.
The road is the Church road (known also as the Quaker road), and the view is from near C. W. Smith's, which was for a short time the headquarters of General Lee.
The trees of this neighborhood were riddled with bullets and torn with shell, and in 1885, when this view was photographed, the corn was growing out of many a soldier's grave.--Editors. |
Long Bridge road toward
Richmond until we came in contact with the enemy's pickets.
Then we returned and started anew.
Fortunately I was at the head of the column to give the necessary orders, so that no delay occurred in retracing our steps.
Our new field of battle embraced
Malvern Hill, just north of
Turkey Creek and
Crew's Hill, about one mile farther north.
Both hills have given name to the interesting and eventful battle which took place on July 1st, and which I shall now attempt to describe.
The forces which on this occasion came under my control, and were engaged in or held ready to enter the contest, were my own corps, consisting of
Morell's,
Sykes's and
McCall's divisions,
Colonel H. J. Hunt's Artillery Reserve of one hundred pieces, including
Colonel R. 0.
Tyler's Connecticut siege artillery,
Couch's division of
Keyes's corps, the brigades of
John C. Caldwell and
Thomas F. Meagher of
Sumner's corps, and the brigade of
D. E. Sickles of
Heintzelman's corps.
Though
Couch was placed under my command, he was left uncontrolled by me, as will be seen hereafter.
The other brigades were sent to me by their respective division commanders, in anticipation of my needs or at my request.
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This new position, with its elements of great strength, was better adapted for a defensive battle than any with which we had been favored.
It was elevated, and was more or less protected on each flank by small streams or by swamps, while the woods in front through which the enemy had to pass to attack us were in places marshy, and the timber so thick that artillery could not be brought up, and even troops were moved in it with difficulty.
Slightly in rear of our line of battle on
Crew's Hill the reserve artillery and infantry were held for immediate service.
The hill concealed them from the view of the enemy and sheltered them to some extent from his fire.
These hills, both to the east and west, were connected with the adjacent valleys by gradually sloping plains except at the
Crew house, where for a little distance the slope was quite abrupt, and was easily protected by a small force.
With the exception of the
River road, all the roads from.
Richmond, along which the enemy would be obliged to approach, meet in front of
Crew's Hill.
This hill was flanked with ravines, enfiladed by our fire.
The ground in front was sloping, and over it our artillery and infantry, themselves protected by the crest and ridges, had clear sweep for their fire.
In all directions, for several hundred yards, the land over which an attacking force must advance was almost entirely cleared of forest and was generally cultivated.
I reached.
Malvern Hill some two hours before my command on Monday, June 30th; each division, as it came upon the field, was assigned to a position covering the approaches from
Richmond along the
River road and the debouches from the
New Market,
Charles City, and Williamsburg roads.
Warren, with his brigade of about six hundred men, took position on the low-lands to the left, to guard against the approach of the enemy along the
River road, or over the low, extensive, and cultivated plateau beyond and extending north along
Crew's Hill.
Warren's men were greatly in need of rest.
The brigade had suffered greatly at
Gaines's Mill, and was not expected to perform much more than picket duty, and it was large enough for the purpose designed, as it was not probable that any large force would be so reckless as to advance on that road.
Warren was supported by the 11th U. S. Infantry, under
Major Floyd-
Jones, and late in the afternoon was strengthened by
Martin's battery of 12-pounders and a detachment of the 3d Pennsylvania cavalry under
Lieutenant Frank W. Hess.
On the west side of
Malvern Hill, overlooking
Warren, were some thirty-six guns, some of long range, having full sweep up the valley and over the
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cleared lands north of the
River road.
These batteries comprised Cap-tain
S. H. Weed's Battery I, 5th U. . Artillery,
Captain John Edwards's Batteries L and M, 3d U. S. Artillery,
J. H. Carlisle's Battery E, 2d U. S. Artillery,
John R. Smead's Battery K, 5th U. S. Artillery, and
Adolph Voegelee's, Battery B, 1st N. Y. Artillery Battalion, with others in reserve.
To these, later in the day, were added the siege-guns of the 1st Connecticut Artillery, under
Colonel Robert 0.
Tyler, which were placed on elevated
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The Crew House.
The Upper picture shows the old House, and is from a color-sketch taken soon after the War; the New House shown in the lower picture is from a photograph taken early in 1885.
The old building, sometimes called Dr. Mellert's, was the headquarters of General Morell; during the battle members of the Signal Corps were at work on the roof.
It was burned after the war and rebuilt on the old foundations.
The view in each case is from the east.
The lane, in the lower picture, leads to the Quaker road and was the line of Griffin's guns.
McQuade's repulse of the attack on the hill took place behind the cabin on the left of the picture.
The Crew farm is said to be one of the most fertile on the Peninsula.--Editors. |
ground immediately to the left of the
Malvern house, so as to fire over our front line at any attacking force, and to sweep the low meadow on the left.
To General (then
Colonel)
Hunt, the accomplished and energetic chief of artillery, was due the excellent posting of these batteries on June 30th, and the rearrangement of all the artillery along the whole line on Tuesday (July 1st), together with the management of the reserve artillery on that day.
Major Charles S. Lovell,
commanding Colonel William Chapman's brigade of
Sykes's division, supported some of these batteries, and, with the brigade of
Buchanan on his right, in a clump of pines, extended the line northward, near the Crew (sometimes called the Mellert) house.
Morell, prolonging
Sykes's line on
Crew's Hill, with headquarters at Crew's house, occupied the right of the line extending to the
Quaker road.
To his left front, facing west, was the 14th New York Volunteers, under
Colonel
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McQuade, with a section of
Captain W. B. Weeden's Battery C, 1st Rhode Island Artillery, both watching the
Richmond road and the valley and protecting our left.
On their right, under cover of a narrow strip of woods, skirting the
Quaker road, were the brigades of
Martindale and
Butterfield, while in front of these, facing north, was
Griffin's brigade.
All were supporting batteries of
Morell's division, commanded by
Captain Weeden and others, under the general supervision of
Griffin, a brave and skilled artillery officer.
1
About 3 o'clock on Monday the enemy was seen approaching along the
River road, and
Warren and
Hunt made all necessary dispositions to receive them.
About 4 o'clock the enemy advanced and opened fire from their artillery upon
Warren and
Sykes and on the extreme left of
Morell, causing a few casualties in
Morell's division.
In return for this intrusion the concentrated rapid fire of the artillery was opened upon them, soon smashing one battery to pieces, silencing another, and driving back their infantry and cavalry in rapid retreat, much to the satisfaction of thousands of men watching the result.
The enemy left behind in possession of
Warren a few prisoners, two guns and six caissons, the horses of which had been killed.
The battery which had disturbed
Morell was also silenced by this fire of our artillery.
On this occasion the gun-boats in the
James [see p. 268] made apparent their welcome presence and gave good support by bringing their heavy guns to bear upon the enemy.
Though their fire caused a few casualties among our men, and inflicted but little, if any, injury upon the enemy, their large shells, bursting amid the enemy's troops far beyond the attacking force, carried great moral influence with them, and naturally tended, in addition to the effect of our artillery, to prevent any renewed attempt to cross the open valley on our left.
This attacking force formed a small part of
Wise's brigade of
Holmes's division.
They were all raw troops, which accounts for their apparently demoralized retreat.
This affair is known as the action of Turkey Bridge or Malvern Cliff.
2
Our forces lay on their arms during the night, in substantially the positions I have described, patiently awaiting the attack expected on the following day.
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Map of the battle of Malvern Hill, showing, approximately, positions of brigades and batteries.
The road passing Willis Church and uniting, north of the West house, with the road to Richmond (via Darbytown road) was known locally as the Quaker road.
Union generals and, with few exceptions, Confederate generals, mean that highway whenever they mention the Quaker road.
An unused road nearly two miles farther west, communicating between the Long Bridge road and Charles City (River) road, was sometimes called the Quaker road.
General Magruder supposed he was to take the latter road when ordered to move by the “Quaker road,” and ascribed to that mistake his delay in getting into position on the right of Jackson at Malvern Hill.--Editors.
The Union batteries, as indicated on the map, were: 1, Martin's; 2, Tyler's; 3, 4, 5, 6, batteries in reserve; 7, Hunt's reserve artillery; 8 and 11, first and second positions of Waterman's (Weeden's); 9--9, Edwards's, Livingston's, Ames's, Kingsbury's, and Hyde's; 10, Snow's, Frank's, and Hyde's; 11, Kingsbury's and Seeley's.
On the Union side the chief variations from these positions were the advance of a part of Butterfield's brigade, between Griffin and Couch, and the transfer of batteries from Morell to Couch.
During the afternoon Sickles's brigade took the place of Caldwell's, which had come up to Couch's aid and had suffered severely.
Meagher advanced about 5 o'clock, accompanied by 32-pounders under Colonel H. J. Hunt, which did terrible execution.
The Confederate brigades are placed in the order of their attack; those marked with an arrow were in the charges or in the front line after dark.
It is difficult to fix the positions of the Confederate artillery.
In general, 12 indicates Moorman's, Grimes's, and Pegram's; and 13 denotes the position of Balthis's, Poague's, and Carpenter's. In other positions, the batteries of Wooding (one section under Lieutenant Jones), Carrington, Hardaway, Bondurant, Hart, McCarthy, and the Baltimore Light Artillery were engaged to some extent.--Editors. |
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McCall's division of Pennsylvania Reserves, now under
General Truman Seymour, arrived during the night and was posted just in front of the
Malvern house, and was held in reserve, to be called upon for service only in case of absolute necessity.
3
Early on Tuesday our lines were re-formed and slightly advanced to take full advantage of the formation of the ground, the artillery of the front line being reposted in commanding positions, and placed under
General Griffin's command, but under
Captain Weeden's care, just behind the crest of the hill.
The infantry was arranged between the artillery to protect and be protected by its neighbors, and prepared to be thrown forward, if at any time advisable, so as not to interfere with the artillery fire.
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Berdan's sharp-shooters (of Morell's division) skirmishing in the Meadow wheat-field. |
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The West House, looking toward the Crew House.
From a photograph taken early in 1885.
This house was the dividing point between Couch's division and Morell's line, the artillery fronting the fence and being nearly on the line indicated by it. The West house was occupied as headquarters by General Couch.--Editors. |
The corps of
Heintzelman and
Sumner had arrived during the night and taken position in the order named to the right and rear of
Couch's division, protecting that flank effectively toward
Western Run.
4 They did not expect to be seriously engaged, but were ready to resist attack and to give assistance to the center and left, if circumstances should require it. At an early hour in the day
Sumner kindly sent me
Caldwell's brigade, as he thought I might need help.
This brigade I placed near
Butterfield, who was directed to send it forward wherever it should be needed or called for. He sent it to
Couch at an opportune moment early in the day.
General McClellan, accompanied by his staff, visited our lines at an early hour, and approved my measures and those of
General Couch, or changed them where it was deemed advisable.
Though he left me in charge of that part of the field occupied by
Couch, I at no time undertook to control that general, or even indicated a desire to do so, but with full confidence in his ability, which was justified by the result of his action, left him free to act in accordance with his own judgment.
I cooperated with him fully, however, having
Morell's batteries, under
Weeden, posted so as to protect his front, and sending him help when I saw he needed it. The division of
Couch, though
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it suffered severely in the
battle of Fair Oaks, had seen less service and met with fewer losses in these “Seven days battles” than any one of my three, and was prepared with full ranks to receive an attack, seeming impatient and eager for the fight.
Its conduct soon confirmed this impression.
Batteries of
Hunt's Artillery Reserve were sent to him when needed — and also
Caldwell's brigade, voluntarily sent to me early in the day by
Sumner, and
Sickles's brigade, borrowed of
Heintzelman for the purpose.
About 10 A. M. the enery's skirmishers and artillery began feeling for us along our line; they kept up a desultory fire until about 12 o'clock, with no severe injury to our infantry, who were well masked, and who revealed but little of our strength or position by retaliatory firing or exposure.
Up to this time and until nearly 1 o'clock our infantry were resting upon their arms and waiting the moment, certain to come, when the column of the enemy rashly advancing would render it necessary to expose themselves.
Our desire was to hold the enemy where our artillery would be most destructive, and to reserve our infantry ammunition for close quarters to repel the more determined assaults of our obstinate and untiring foe. Attacks by brigade were made upon
Morell, both on his left front and on his right, and also upon
Couch; but our artillery, admirably handled, without exception, was generally sufficient to repel all such efforts and to drive back the assailants in confusion, and with great loss.
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View from the Meadow West of the Crew House.
From a photograph taken early in 1885.
The Crew house is in the extreme right of the picture.
The hill to the left is the high ground shown on p. 419. The ravine between the two is the ravine shown in the right of the picture on p. 418. At the time of the battle the low ground was in wheat, partly shocked, affording protection for the. Union sharp-shooters under Berdan.
Farther to the left, up this valley, and in the rear of the hill, was the right of the Confederate line, which late in the evening made several assaults upon the Crew Hill, by way of the ravine and meadow.--Editors. |
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Scene of the Confederate attack on the West side of Crew's Hill, looking from the Crew House South-West toward the James River.
From a photograph taken early in 1885.
The Confederates came down the valley or meadow from the right, and advanced up this slope toward the two guns of Weeden, which were supported by the Fourteenth New York Volunteers.
The road across the meadow leads to Holmes's position on the River road.--Editors. |
While the enemy's artillery was firing upon us
General Sumner withdrew part of his corps to the slope of
Malvern Hill, to the right of the
Malvern house, which descended into the valley of
Western Run.
Then, deeming it advisable to withdraw all our troops to that line, he ordered me to fall back to the
Malvern house; but I protested that such a movement would be disastrous, and declined to obey the order until I could confer with
General McClellan, who had approved of the disposition of our troops.
Fortunately
Sumner did not insist upon my complying with the order, and, as we were soon vigorously attacked, he advanced his troops to a point where he was but little disturbed by the enemy, but from which he could quickly render aid in response to calls for help or where need for help was apparent.
5
The spasmodic, though sometimes formidable attacks of our antagonists, at different points along our whole front, up to about 4 o'clock, were presumably demonstrations or feelers, to ascertain our strength, preparatory to their engaging in more serious work.
An ominous silence, similar to that which had preceded the attack in force along our whole line at
Gaines's Mill, now intervened, until, at about 5:30 o'clock, the enemy opened upon both
Morell
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and
Couch with artillery from nearly the whole of his front, and soon after-ward pressed forward his columns of infantry, first on one and then on the other, or on both.
As if moved by a reckless disregard of life, equal to that displayed at
Gaines's Mill, with a determination to capture our army, or destroy it by driving us into the river, regiment after regiment, and brigade after brigade, rushed at our batteries; but the artillery of both
Morell and
Couch mowed them down with shrapnel, grape, and canister; while our infantry, withholding their fire until the enemy were with — in short range, scattered the remnants of their columns, sometimes following them up and capturing prisoners and colors.
6
As column after column advanced, only to meet the same disastrous repulse, the sight became one of the most interesting imaginable.
The havoc made by the rapidly bursting shells from guns arranged so as to sweep any position
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Repulse of the Confederates on the slope of Crew's Hill [see P. 416]. |
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The main battle-field — view of the Union position from the wooded knoll shown in the following page.
From a photograph taken in 1885.
Morell's line extended from the Crew house on the right to the West house in the extreme left of the picture.
Couch extended the line a third of a mile to the left of the West house.
The ravine, to the right of the barn and buildings in the middle-ground, descends to the meadow: it was by this ravine and the shelter of the out-buildings that the Confederates effected a lodgment on the hill, at dusk, compelling Griffin to shift his guns to avoid capture.
General A. R. Wright, who commanded a brigade in Huger's division, in his official report describes as follows the aspect of the Federal position, as seen from the wooded knoll shown on the following page: “I suggested to General Armistead that we go forward to the edge of the field, and, under protection of a strong force of skirmishers, ascend a high knoll or hill which abruptly sprang from the meadow below and on our right, from the summit of which we would be able to observe the enemy's movements.
Having reached this position, we were enabled to get a very complete view of McClellan's army.
Immediately in our front, and extending one mile, stretched a field, at the farther extremity of which was situated the dwelling and farm-buildings of Mr. Crew (formerly Dr. Mellert). In front and to our left the land rose gently from the edge of the woods up to the farm-yard, when it became high and rolling.
Upon the right the field was broken by a series of ridges and valleys, which ran out at right angles to a line drawn from our position to that of the enemy, and all of which terminated upon our extreme right in a precipitous bluff, which dropped suddenly down upon a low, flat meadow, covered with wheat and intersected with a number of ditches, which ran from the bluff across the meadow to a swamp or dense woods about five hundred yards farther to our right.
This low, flat meadow stretched up to, and swinging around, Crew's house, extended as far as Turkey Bend, on James River.
The enemy had drawn up his artillery (as well as could be ascertained about fifty pieces) in a crescent-shaped line, the convex line being next to our position, with its right (on our left) resting upon a road which passed three hundred yards to the left of Crew's house on to Malvern Hill, the left of their advanced line of batteries resting upon the high bluff which overlooked the meadow to the right (our right) and rear of Crew's house.
Their infantry, a little in the rear of the artillery, an d protected by he crest of the ridge upon which the batteries were placed, extended from the woods on our left along the crest of the hill and through a lane in the meadow on our right to the dense woods there.
In rear of this and beyond a narrow ravine, the sides of which were covered with timber, and which ran parallel to their line of battle and but a few rods in the rear of Crew's house, was another line of infantry, its right resting upon a heavy, dense woods, which covered the Malvern Hill farm on the east.
The left of this line rested upon the precipitous bluff which overhung the low meadow on the west of the farm.
At this point the high bluff stretched out to the west for two hundred yards in a long ridge or ledge (nearly separating the meadow from the lowlands of the river), upon the extreme western terminus of which was planted a battery of heavy guns.
This latter battery commanded the whole meadow in front of it, and by a direct fire was able to dispute the manoeuvring of troops over any portion of the meadow.
Just behind the ravine which ran in rear of Crew's house, and under cover of the timber, was planted a heavy battery in a small redoubt, whose fire swept across the meadow.
These two batteries completely controlled the meadow from one extremity of it to the other, and effectually prevented the movement of troops in large masses upon it. The whole number of guns in these several batteries could not have fallen far short of one hundred.
The infantry force of the enemy I estimated at least 25,000 or 30,000 from what I saw. Large numbers, as I ascertained afterward, were posted in the woods on our extreme right and left, and the line of ditches across the meadow were lined with sharp-shooters.”--Editors. |
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The main battle-field — view of the Confederate position from the Union line near the West House.
Based upon a photograph taken in 1885.
The confederate advance was from the woods in the right and center of the background and from the meadow (not visible) on the left.
The wooded knoll is supposed to be the point from which Generals Wright and Armistead reconnoitered the Federal position, as described by General Wright in his report.
[See p. 418.]--Editors. |
far and near, and in any direction, was fearful to behold.
Pressed to the extreme as they were, the courage of our men was fully tried.
The safety of our army — the life of the
Union--was felt to be at stake.
In one case the brigades of
Howe,
Abercrombie, and
Palmer, of
Couch's division, under impulse, gallantly pushed after the retreating foe, captured colors, and advantageously advanced the right of the line, but at considerable loss and great risk.
The brigades of
Morell, cool, well-disciplined, and easily controlled, let the enemy return after each repulse, but permitted few to escape their fire.
Colonel McQuade, on
Morell's left, with the 14th New York, against orders and at the risk of defeat and disaster, yielding to impulse, gallantly (lashed forward and repulsed an attacking party.
Assisted by
Buchanan of
Sykes's division,
Colonel Rice, with the 44th New York Volunteers, like-wise drove a portion of the enemy from the field, taking a flag bearing the inscription “
Seven Pines.”
Colonel Hunt, directing the artillery, was twice dismounted by having his horse shot under him, but though constantly exposed continued his labors until after dark.
General Couch, who was also dismounted in like manner, took advantage of every opportunity to make his opponents feel his blows.
It is not to be supposed that our men, though concealed by the irregularities of the ground, were not sufferers from the enemy's fire.
T[he fact is that before they exposed themselves by pursuing the enemy, the ground was literally covered with the killed and wounded from dropping bullets and bursting shells and their contents; but they bravely bore the severe trial of having to remain inactive under a damaging fire.
As
Morell's front ranks became thinned out and the ammunition was exhausted, other regiments eagerly advanced; all were stimulated by the hope of a brilliant and permanent success, and nerved by the approving shouts of their comrades and the cry of “Revenge, boys!”
“Remember
McLane!”
“Remember black!”
“Remember
Gove!”
or “Remember
Cass!”
Black and Mc-Lane and
Gove had been killed at
Gaines's Mill;
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Malvern Hill, from the direction of Turkey Island Bridge.
From a sketch made soon after the War: view from Malvern Hill, looking toward the James.
From a photograph taken in 1885.
This view is taken from near the position of Tyler's siege-guns (see map). The engagement of Malvern Cliff, or Turkey Island bridge, on the 30th of June, between Generals Warren and Holmes, took place on the road at the foot of the hill which passes near the house in the middle-ground.
The bridge is to the left on this road.
The winding stream is Turkey Creek.
In the middle distance is the position of the three gun-boats which shelled the woods at the right both on the 30th of June and the 1st of July.--Editors. |
Woodbury and
Cass were then lying before them.
7 Colonel McQuade was the only
regimental commander of
Griffin's brigade who escaped death during the Seven Days, and he was constantly exposed.
During that ominous silence of which I have spoken, I determined that our opponents should reap no advantage, even if our lines yielded to attack, and therefore posted batteries, as at
Gaines's Mill, to secure against the disaster of a break in our lines, should such a misfortune be ours.
For this purpose I sent
Weed,
Carlisle, and
Smead, with their batteries, to the gorge of the roads on
Crew's Hill, from which the enemy must emerge in pursuit if he should break our lines; instructing them to join in the fight if necessary, but not to permit the advance of the foe, even if it must be arrested at the risk of firing upon friends.
To these
Colonel Hunt added three batteries of horse artillery.
Though they were all thus posted and their guns loaded with double canister, “they were,” as
Captain Smead reported, “very happy to find their services not needed on that occasion.”
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It was at this time, in answer to my call for aid, that
Sumner sent me
Meagher, and
Heintzelman sent
Sickles, both of whom reached me in the height of battle, when, if ever, fresh troops would renew our confidence and insure our success.
While riding rapidly forward to meet
Meagher, who was approaching at a “double-quick” step, my horse fell, throwing me over his head, much to my discomfort both of body and mind.
On rising and remounting I was greeted with hearty cheers, which alleviated my chagrin.
This incident gave rise to the report, spread through the country, that I was wounded.
Fearing that I might fall into the hands of the enemy, and if so that my diary and dispatch-book of the campaign, then on my person, would meet with the same fate and reveal information to the injury of our cause, I tore it up, scattering the pieces to the winds, as I rode rapidly forward, leading
Meagher into action.
I have always regretted my act as destroying interesting and valuable memoranda of our campaign.
Advancing with
Meagher's brigade, accompanied by my staff, I soon found that our forces had successfully driven back their assailants.
Determined, if possible, satisfactorily to finish the contest, regardless of the risk of being fired upon by our artillery in case of defeat, I pushed on beyond our lines into the woods held by the enemy.
About fifty yards in front of us, a large force of the enemy suddenly rose and opened with fearful volleys upon our advancing line.
I turned to the brigade, which thus far had kept pace with my horse, and found it standing “like a stone-wall,” and returning a fire more destructive than it received and from which the enemy fled.
The brigade was planted.
My presence was no longer needed, and I[ sought
General Sickles, whom I found giving aid to
Couch.
I had the satisfaction of learning that night that a Confederate detachment, undertaking to turn
Meagher's left, was met by a portion of the 69th New York Regiment, which, advancing, repelled the attack and captured many prisoners.
After seeing that
General Sickles was in a proper position, I returned to my own corps, where I was joined by
Colonel Hunt with some 32-pounder howitzers.
Taking those howitzers, we rode forward beyond our lines, and, in parting salutation to our opponents,
Colonel Hunt sent a few shells, as a warning of what would be ready to welcome them on the morrow if they undertook to disturb us.
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The Malvern House.
From a photograph taken in 1885.
During the engagement at Turkey bridge and the battle of Malvern Hill, this house was the headquarters of General Porter, and was a signal-station in communication with the gun-boats in the James River, toward which it fronts.
It was built of imported English brick, of a dark but vivid red. The main battle-field is in the direction of the trees on the right, and Tyler's siege-guns were near the small trees in the left distance.--Editors. |
Almost at the crisis of the battle — just before the advance of
Meagher and
Sickles — the gun-boats on the
James River opened their fire with the good intent of aiding us, but either mistook our batteries at the
Malvern house for those of the enemy, or were unable to throw their projectiles beyond us. If the former was the case, their range was well estimated, for all their shot landed in or close by
Tyler's battery, killing and wounding a few of his men. Fortunately members of our excellent signal-service corps were present as usual on such occasions, and the message signaled to the boats, “For God's sake, stop firing,” promptly relieved us from further damage and the demoralization of a “fire in the rear.”
Reference is occasionally seen in Confederate accounts of this battle to the fearful sounds of the projectiles from those gunboats.
But that afternoon not one of their projectiles passed beyond my headquarters; and I have always believed and said, as has
General Hunt, that the enemy mistook the explosions of shells from
Tyler's siege-guns and
Kusserow's 32-pounder howitzers, which
Hunt had carried forward, for shells from the gun-boats.
While
Colonel Hunt and I were returning from the front, about 9 o'clock, we were joined by
Colonel A. V. Colburn, of
McClellan's staff.
We all rejoiced
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over the day's success.
By these officers I sent messages to the
commanding general, expressing the hope that our withdrawal had ended and that we should hold the ground we now occupied, even if we did not assume the offensive.
From my standpoint I[ thought we could maintain our position, and perhaps in a few days could improve it by advancing.
But I knew only the circumstances before me, and these were limited by controlling influences.
It was now after 9 o'clock at night.
Within an hour of the time that
Colonels Hunt and
Colburn left me, and before they could have reached the
commanding general, I received orders from him to withdraw, and to direct
Generals Sumner and
Heintzelman to move at specified hours to
Harrison's Landing and
General Couch to rejoin his corps, which was then under way to the same point.
8
These orders were immediately sent to the proper officers, and by day-break, July 2d, our troops, preceded by their trains, were well on their way to their destination, which they reached that day, greatly wearied after a hard march over muddy roads, in the midst of a heavy rain.
That night, freed from care and oblivious of danger, all slept a long sleep; and they awoke the next morning with the clear sun, a happier, brighter, and stronger body of men than that which all the day before, depressed and fatigued, had shivered in the rain.
The conduct of the rear-guard was intrusted to
Colonel Averell, commander of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, sustained by
Colonel Buchanan, with his brigade of regulars, and the 67th New York Regiment.
No trying trust was ever better bestowed or more satisfactorily fulfilled.
At daybreak
Colonel Averell found himself accidentally without artillery to protect his command in its difficult task of preventing an attack before our rear was well out of range.
He at once arranged his cavalry in bodies to represent horse-batteries, and, manoeuvring them to create the impression that they were artillery ready for action, he secured himself from attack until the rest of the army and trains had passed sufficiently to the rear to permit him to retire rapidly without molestation.
His stratagem was successful, and without loss he rejoined the main body of the army that night.
Thus ended the memorable “Seven days battles,” which, for severity and for stubborn resistance and endurance of hardships by the contestants, were not surpassed during the war. Each antagonist accomplished the result for which he aimed: one insuring the temporary relief of
Richmond; the other gaining security on the north bank of the
James, where the
Union army, if our civil and military authorities were disposed, could be promptly reinforced, and from whence only, as subsequent events proved, it could renew the contest successfully.
Preparations were commenced and dispositions were at once made under
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every prospect, if not direct promise, of large reinforcements for a renewal of the struggle on the south side of the
James, and in the same manner as subsequently brought a successful termination of the war.
In the Fifth Corps, however, mourning was mingled with rejoicing.
Greatly injured by the mishap of a cavalry blunder at
Gaines's Mill, it had at
Malvern, with the brave and gallant help of
Couch and the generous and chivalric assistance of
Heintzelman and
Sumner, successfully repulsed the foe in every quarter, and was ready to renew the contest at an opportune moment.
Our killed and wounded were numbered by thousands; the loss of the
Confederates may be imagined.
9
While taking
Meagher's brigade to the front, I crossed a portion of the ground over which a large column had advanced to attack us, and had a fair opportunity of judging of the effect of our fire upon the ranks of the enemy.
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It was something fearful and sad to contemplate; few steps could be taken without trampling upon the body of a dead or wounded soldier, or without hearing a piteous cry, begging our party to be careful.
In some places the bodies were in continuous lines and in heaps.
In
Mexico I had seen fields of battle on which our armies had been victorious, and had listened to pitiful appeals; but the pleaders were not of my countrymen then, and did not, as now, cause me to deplore the effects of a fratricidal war.
Sadder still were the trying scenes I met in and around the
Malvern house, which at an early hour that day had been given up to the wounded, and was soon filled with our unfortunate men, suffering from all kinds of wounds.
At night, after issuing orders for the withdrawal of our troops, I passed through the building and the adjoining hospitals with my senior medical officer,
Colonel George H. Lyman.
Our object was to inspect the actual condition of the men, to arrange for their care and comfort, and to cheer them as best we could.
Here, as usual, were found men mortally wounded, by necessity left unattended by the surgeons, so that prompt and proper care might be given to those in whom there was hope of recovery.
While passing through this improvised hospital I heard of many sad cases.
One was that of the major of the 12th New York Volunteers, a brave and gallant officer, highly esteemed, who was believed to be mortally wounded.
While breathing his last, as was supposed a friend asked him if he had any message to leave.
He replied, “Tell my wife that in my last thoughts were blended herself, my boy, and my flag.”
Then he asked how the battle had gone, and when told that we had been successful he said, “God bless the old fla----” and fell back apparently dead.
For a long time he was mourned as dead, and it was believed that he had expired with the prayer left unfinished
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on his closing lips.
Though still an invalid, suffering from the wound then received, that officer recovered to renew his career in the war.
10
On the occasion of this visit we frequently witnessed scenes which would melt the stoutest heart: bearded men piteously begging to be sent home; others requesting that a widowed mother or orphan sisters might be cared for; more sending messages to wife or children, or to others near and dear to them.
We saw the amputated limbs and the bodies of the dead hurried out of the room for burial.
On every side we heard the appeals of the unattended, the moans of the dying, and the shrieks of those under the knife of the surgeon.
We gave what cheer we could, and left with heavy hearts.
At noon on the 4th of July the usual national salute was fired, and the different corps were reviewed.
General McClellan, as opportunity offered, made a few remarks full of hope and encouragement, thanking the men in most feeling terms for their uniform bravery, fortitude, and good conduct, but intimating that this was not the last of the campaign.
Contrary, however, to his expectations, the
Peninsular campaign of the Army of the Potomac for 1862 virtually ended on the 4th of July.
From that date to August 14th, when the army at sundown took up its march for
Fort Monroe, its commander was engaged in the struggle to retain it on the
James, as against the determination of the
Secretary of War to withdraw it to the line of the
Rappahannock, there to act in conjunction with the Army of Virginia.
Although
General McClellan was assured, in writing, that he was to have command of both armies after their junction, he preferred, as a speedy and the only practicable mode of taking
Richmond, to remain on the
James, and
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renew the contest from the south bank, for which he had commenced operations.
11 During this period he omitted nothing which would insure the removal of the army without loss of men and material.
The withdrawal of the army changed the issue from the capture of
Richmond to the security of
Washington, transferred to the
Federals the anxiety of the
Confederates for their capital, and sounded an alarm throughout the
Northern States.
