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Morgan's cavalry during the Bragg invasion.
by Basil W. Duke, Brigadier-General, C. S. A.
While
Bragg was concentrating at
Chattanooga, in August, 1862, preparatory to his march into
Kentucky,
Colonel John H. Morgan, with his cavalry command, numbering some nine hundred effectives, was actively engaged in
middle Tennessee, operating chiefly against the
Federal garrisons in the vicinity of
Nashville, and the detachments employed immediately north and to the east of that city.
All of these were successively captured or dispersed, and on the 21st of August
Morgan defeated and completely routed a select body of cavalry, twelve hundred strong, sent under command of
General R. W. Johnson to drive him out of
Tennessee.
Of this force 164 were killed and wounded, and a much larger number, including
Johnson and his staff, were made prisoners.
Morgan had been notified of the intended invasion of
Kentucky, and part of his duty was the destruction of the railroad track and bridges between
Nashville and
Bowling Green, for the purpose of retarding
Buell's movements when the latter should begin his retreat to
Louisville.
On the 28th of August
Bragg crossed the
Tennessee River at
Chattanooga, and pushed northward.
General Kirby Smith had previously entered
Kentucky, and had ordered
Morgan to report to him at
Lexington, in the blue-grass region.
Morgan marched from
Hartsville, Tenn., on the 29th of August, and on the 4th of September reached
Lexington, already occupied by
General Smith.
His command consisted of the 2d Kentucky Cavalry C. S. A., about 700 strong, and
Gano's squadron, of 2 companies of Texan cavalry, about 150 strong.
It was very largely recruited, however, during the occupation of
Kentucky.
A small detachment of the 2d Kentucky, leaving
Lexington on the same day, made a rapid march of some 90 miles, and captured the garrison, 150 strong, of the stockade fort erected for the protection of the railroad bridge over
Salt River, 17 miles south of
Louisville.
The bridge was burned in pursuance of the programme to destroy rail communication between
Bowling Green and-Louisville.
By order of
General Smith, the command was then divided for separate service.
I was ordered to proceed with 600 men of the 2d Kentucky to the vicinity of
Covington, whence
General Heth, who had threatened
Cincinnati, was then retiring.
Colonel Morgan was ordered, with the remainder of the regiment,
Gano's squadron, and all the cavalry recruits then organized, to march to the assistance of
General Marshall in the mountains of
eastern Kentucky.
The Federal general,
George W. Morgan, had evacuated
Cumberland Gap, and followed by
Stevenson, who had been instructed to observe and pursue him if he moved, was making his way to the
Ohio.
It was intended that
Marshall and
Morgan should intercept and arrest his march until
Stevenson could overtake him and attack him in rear.
The detachment under my command became immediately very actively engaged with the enemy, who, in considerable numbers, had crossed the river and advanced to
Walton, twenty-five miles south of
Covington.
For several days, skirmishing went on constantly, and I was steadily driven back, until I became convinced that it was an advance in force.
Discovering, however, by careful reconnoissance that the entire Federal strength consisted of only 7000 or 8000 infantry, about 1000 cavalry, and 8 pieces of artillery, and that troops were being transported in large numbers by the river from
Cincinnati, I became satisfied that the movement was intended to cover and divert attention from the real concentration at
Louisville, and was not meant as a serious movement on
Lexington, and I so reported to
General Smith.
Reports from my scouts and from citizens, to the effect that these troops were quite raw and inexperienced, and that, on account of the omission to scout or reconnoiter, the encampment at
Walton, where the enemy had halted, could be easily approached, induced me to attack the camp.
By a quick dash upon it, just after daybreak, I secured 90 or 100 prisoners, with very little loss on my part; but found that no effort by a force numerically so inferior could compel the enemy to retire.
It was important, however, that his column should be forced to fall back and not remain as a menace to
Lexington, whence it was distant only two or three days march.
I learned that a regiment was organized for the
Federal army out of some home guard companies at
Augusta, a small town on the
Ohio, about forty miles above
Covington.
I was also informed that at that season of year, when the river was at a very low stage of water, it was fordable immediately below this place.
Leaving the greater part of my command in front of the enemy at
Walton to observe and follow him if he retreated, I marched rapidly with 250 men to
Augusta, believing that the recruits there could be captured or dispersed with ease, and without loss on my part, and that I could cross the river into
Ohio, enter the suburbs of
Cincinnati, and induce such consternation that the troops at
Walton would be recalled.
On the 27th of September I attacked, meeting, however, with fierce resistance.
Two small river steamers were there, bulwarked with bales of hay, and each carrying a 12-pounder howitzer.
On these boats were about one hundred infantry.
The “Home guards,” 400 or 500 strong, were ensconced in the houses of the little town.
I planted two small howitzers attached to my command on a hill overlooking the village, and within a half-mile range of the river.
After the exchange of a few shots on each side, the boats, with the troops upon them, steamed off in disgraceful panic.
I thought then that the affair was over, but when I entered the town I found nearly every house a fortress, and was met with severe volleys which did much damage.
Before I could overcome the resistance of the inmates, I was forced to burn some of
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the houses, storm many others, and even double-shot the small field-pieces and fire them point-blank from the street into some whose defenders were unusually stubborn.
The hand-to-hand fighting in this little skirmish was the fiercest I ever saw. In many instances when the firing from the windows was stopped by the volleys poured into them from the streets, the inmates still refused to surrender, and the details of my men who broke down the doors and entered were compelled to kill all they found inside.
Captain S. D. Morgan killed seven men with his own hand, and was himself killed before the house he entered was taken.
In some houses I saw blood dripping down the stairways.
My loss was 21 men killed and 18 wounded. A very much larger number of the Home guards was killed, and I carried off between 300 and 400 prisoners. The combat lasted not more than fifteen minutes after I entered the town; but my loss, the number of prisoners, and especially the fact that I had nearly exhausted my ammunition, decided me not to cross the
Ohio and carry out the movement on
Cincinnati I had contemplated.
I knew, also, that 500 or 600 Federal troops at
Maysville, not far distant, would be ordered immediately to
Augusta, and that my return by that point would be intercepted.
On the next morning I was at-tacked at
Brookville by these troops, under
Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Wilson, nine miles from
Augusta; but the affair was trifling, the loss on either side slight, and I carried off my prisoners.
Four or five days afterward I was ordered to return to
Lexington.
Col. John H. Morgan had been sent to
eastern Kentucky, as I have said, to intercept the retreat of the
Federal general,
George W. Morgan.
He did not find
Marshall in the vicinity where he was instructed to seek him, nor, indeed, at all. Learning that the
Federal column was moving from
Manchester via
Booneville to
Mount Sterling, doubtless to reach the
Ohio at
Maysville,
Colonel Morgan expected to strike the enemy between
Booneville and
Mount Sterling.
But
General Morgan concentrated at
Irvine on the 21 st, and moved toward
Proctor.
The Confederate cavalry then moved as rapidly as the mountainous country permitted, and receiving further information that the enemy had turned to the right and was at
Campton, in Wolfe County, succeeded in getting directly in his front near
Hazel Green.
From the 25th of September until the 1st of October every effort was made to arrest or delay the
Federal retreat.
The roads were barricaded, the column was attacked in front and flank, and the skirmishing was continuous.
During that time the enemy progressed only thirty miles; nevertheless,
John Morgan received no aid as promised him, nor did
Stevenson overtake the
Federal commander and force him to battle.
At noon, October the 1st,
Colonel Morgan received orders to withdraw from the enemy's front, and rejoin
General Smith “at
Lexington,
or wherever he might be.” He reached
Lexington on the 4th of October.
I reported to him there the next day. The town was about to be evacuated, and
General Smith's entire army,
Stevenson having arrived, was marching to effect a junction with
Bragg.
We left
Lexington on the 6th, and until the 10th were employed in preventing the debouchment of
Sill's and
Dumont's divisions (Federal) from the rough country west of
Frankfort, where they were demonstrating to induce
Bragg to believe that
Buell's at-tack would be delivered from that direction when the latter had in reality marched to
Perryville.
After
General Bragg had moved from
Munfordville to
Bardstown, the entire Confederate strategic line, including the disposition of the forces under
General Smith, may be described as extending from
Bardstown on the left flank, via
Lexington, to
Mount Sterling on the extreme right.
It was one admirably adapted for defense.
However threatened, the troops could be marched to the point menaced by excellent interior roads, and favorable ground for battle was available wherever attack was probable.
The base at
Bryantsville was secure, and was an exceedingly strong natural position.
The aggregate strength of the Confederate armies was little, if any, less than 61,000 men.
On October 1st
Buell moved out of
Louisville with 58,000 effective men, of whom 22,000 were raw troops.
Under the impression that
Buell was about to throw his entire army upon
Smith at
Frankfort,
Bragg, on the 2d, ordered
Polk to march with the Army of the Mississippi from
Bardstown via
Bloomfield toward
Frankfort in order that he might strike the enemy in rear, while
Kirby Smith should assail him in front.
Until the 7th he remained apparently under the impression that
Buell was advancing to attack
Smith.
But on the evening of the 7th,
Gilbert, in command of
Buell's center, came in contact with
Hardee near
Perryville, and compelled him to prepare for action.
Hardee called for reinforcements, and
Cheatham's division was sent him, while the remainder of
Polk's corps continued its march toward
Versailles with the view of joining the forces under
General Smith.
It thus happened that
General Bragg, completely misled by the mere demonstration upon
Frankfort, kept more than two-thirds of the entire force under his control idly manoeuvring in a quarter where nothing could possibly be accomplished, and permitted less than 20,000 men to become engaged upon afield where more than 45,000 of the enemy could have been hurled upon them.
Buell's whole army (with the exception of the divisions of
Sill and
Dumont — together 10,000 or 12,000 strong) was concentrated at
Perryville on the 8th, and but for the unaccountable circumstance that
McCook had been fighting several hours before
Buell was informed that a battle was in progress, the
Confederate line would have been overwhelmed by an attack in force.
If such had been the result at
Perryville on the 8th, and
Buell had then gotten between the scattered remnants of the troops that opposed him there, as he would almost surely have done, he would have been master of the situation, and nothing but disaster could have befallen the
Confederates.
For on the 9th
Sill and
Dumont were marching to rejoin the main body, and in another day
Buell could have had his entire 58,000--minus the loss sustained in the battle — well in hand.
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After
Perryville,
Morgan was ordered to rejoin the army, when everything was concentrated at
Harrodsburg, as if for a battle which
General Bragg could have won but never meant to fight.
When the army, leaving
Harrodsburg, without battle, began its retreat to
Tennessee,
Morgan, assisted by
Col. Henry Ashby with a small brigade of cavalry, was employed in covering its rear.
This rear-guard was engaged very arduously, and almost constantly, in contact with
Buell's advance regiments until the 17th.
At that date
Morgan received permission to retrace his march, capture
Lexington, which was, of course, in the hands of the enemy, and then move southward, directly across
Buell's rear, doing the latter all possible damage.
Marching rapidly for twenty-four hours, he reached
Lexington at dawn of the following morning, and immediately attacked the 4th Ohio Cavalry, which was encamped at
Ashland — once the residence of
Henry Clay — about two miles from the city.
The enemy was defeated after a short combat, and nearly six hundred were made prisoners.
The loss in killed and wounded on either side was slight.
Resuming his march at noon that day,
Morgan encamped on the following night at
Shryock's ferry on the
Kentucky River.
At midnight he was attacked by
Dumont, and fearing that he would be surrounded and entrapped in the rugged hills of that region, he marched with all speed for
Lawrenceburg, four miles distant, reaching and passing through that little town just as a heavy Federal column, sent to intercept him there, was entering it upon the
Frankfort turnpike.
Passing around
Bardstown on the next day, we encamped between that place and
Elizabethtown.
We were now directly in
Buell's rear, and during the next twenty-fourhours captured many laggards, and several wagon trains--one quite large and richly laden.
From the 20th to the 25th of October
Morgan continued to march in a south-western direction, reaching
Hopkinsville on the 25th.
Here he had entirely passed beyond the zone of Federal garrisons in
middle Kentucky, but still had arduous work before him in
Tennessee and in front of
Nashville, whither
Buell, having turned aside from pursuit of
Bragg through the mountains of
south-eastern Kentucky, was now directing his course.
After a short sojourn at
Hopkinsville for much-needed rest,
Colonel Morgan moved directly to
Gallatin, Tennessee, with a view of completing the destruction of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad in that vicinity, and to that extent impeding the transportation of troops and supplies to
Nashville.
While engaged in this work he received orders from
General John C. Breekinridge, who was stationed with a small infantry force at
Murfreesboro‘, to cooperate with
Forrest in a movement intended to effect the destruction of the rolling-stock of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company collected at
Edgefield, on the bank of the
Cumberland River, opposite
Nashville.
It was planned that
Forrest should make such a demonstration south of
Nashville that the attention of the garrison would be attracted, while
Morgan should dash into
Edgefield and burn the cars, several hundred in number.
Leaving
Gallatin on the night of November the 4th,
Morgan entered
Edgefield at daybreak the next morning, and immediately attacked the 16th Illinois and part of another regiment stationed there.
After a sharp fight he drove this force back and obtained possession of the cars it was intended he should destroy.
We heard
Forrest's artillery at the same moment on the other side of the river.
But
Nashville was so strongly fortified on that side, and perhaps, also, the inadequacy of the small force under
Forrest to make any serious attempt upon the place was so apparent, that although he advanced resolutely upon the works, the movement failed: a large portion of the garrison was dispatched to reinforce the detachment we had at tacked; and before the work of demolition was fairly commenced, a column of infantry streamed at the double-quick over the pontoon-bridge, and reinforced the troops with which we were already engaged.
The fight grew too hot to be maintained so near to yet stronger hostile forces, and under the heavy batteries which commanded the ground on which we stood.
Morgan accordingly withdrew, followed a short distance by the enemy.
Our loss in killed and wounded was not so heavy as the enemy's, and we carried off a few prisoners.
Only a small number of the railroad cars were burned, and the expedition was a failure.
Rosecrans's army
1 was now close at hand, marching upon three or four roads leading into
Nashville, and we were immediately in its path.
Crittenden's corps was in advance, the major part of it marching on the
Louisville and Nashville turnpike.
Morgan sent strong detachments to harass these troops, and, if possible, delay their m arch.
The leading division was ambuscaded near
Tyree Springs, and a volley delivered at seventy-five yards' range inflicted some loss.
Similar attacks were kept up all day on the 8th, but of course the efforts of so small a body against more than twenty thousand men were merely annoying.
Early on the morning of the 9th
Wood's and
Van Cleve's divisions moved into and on either flank of
Gallatin, nearly surrounding our people, who incautiously resisted the advance of the central column too long, thus necessitating brisk movement as well as sharp fighting to effect an escape.
That afternoon
Morgan crossed the
Cumberland and encamped in a safe position between
Lebanon and
Murfreesboro‘.
Morgan's loss during the entire campaign, in killed and wounded, was not more than one hundred.
He had inflicted a much greater loss on the enemy, and had captured nearly twelve hundred prisoners. He had entered
Kentucky with less than 900 effectives; his command when he returned to
Tennessee was nearly 2000 strong.
It was admirably mounted, and well armed, and the recruits were fully the equals of the original “
Morgan men,” in spirit, intelligence, and capacity to endure.
