From our encampment on the
Stafford Heights, the bright camp-fires of the enemy and the scenes of the terrible encounters under
Burnside were daily presented to our sight from December, 1862, until the following April.
During this period, with the exception of a futile movement on the right known as the “Mud march,” the army remained quiet.
The pickets stationed on either bank of the
Rappahannock were within hailing distance of each other, and dress and faces could be easily distinguished.
By the comity that prevailed, there was no firing from either side.
One could ride or walk down to the banks of the river with perfect security.
Sometimes “
Johnny Reb,” as he was called, would rig up a little raft, and, loading it with tobacco, start it with sails and rudder set for the other shore.
When the precious freight was unloaded, the craft, generously burdened with coffee and salt, would be headed by “
Yank” in an opposite direction, where it would be received with loud expressions of thanks.
In this and other ways the asperities of the war were mollified.
As time rolled on and the weather improved, arrangements were made for an advance.
The men were well clothed, rested, and eager to move again to test the fortunes of war.
Of the several plans of attack,
Hooker determined to march around the enemy's left flank to
Chancellorsville, leaving a portion of the army at
Fredericksburg to conceal the real movement.
The army struck camp on the 27th of April, and on the 30th
Hooker established his headquarters at
Chancellorsville.
The same evening, in general orders, he said, “It is with heartfelt satisfaction the commanding general announces to the army that the operations of the last three days have determined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defenses and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him.”
Hooker
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forgot the injunction of
Ahab to Benhadad: “Tell him,” he said, “Let not him that girdeth on his harness boast himself as he that putteth it off.”
While the right wing was concentrating at
Chancellorsville, the corps of
Sedgwick and
Reynolds, after considerable opposition, crossed the
Rappahannock on pontoon-bridges below
Fredericksburg, and by the evening of the 30th were deployed on the wide plain where
Franklin's Left Grand Division had fought in the previous battle.
Sickles's corps was in supporting distance.
The position of
Lee's army remained unchanged until the 29th, when
Lee was informed that large bodies of Federals were moving toward
Chancellorsville.
It was the first information he had received of
Hooker's movement on his left, and it is said he was incensed at the delay of the communication.
[See p. 233.] At midnight
Anderson's division of
Lee's army hurriedly moved from
Fredericksburg and intrenched about four or five miles from
Hooker's headquarters.
In an address of
Fitzhugh Lee delivered to the Association of the Army of Northern Virginia he stated: “
General Robert E. Lee said that
Jackson had first preferred to attack
Sedgwick's corps in the plain at
Fredericksburg;
Lee told him he felt it was as impracticable as at the first
battle of Fredericksburg; it was hard to get at the enemy and harder to get away, on account of the artillery on the north bank, if we drove them into the river; but, said he to
Jackson, ‘If your think it can be done, I will give you orders for it.’
Jackson then asked to be allowed to examine the grounds, and did so during the afternoon, and at night came to
Lee and said he thought he (
Lee) was right; it would be inexpedient to attack them.
‘Move then,’ said
Lee, ‘at dawn to-morrow, up to
Anderson.’
”
Sickles's and
Reynolds's corps having subsequently been ordered to
Chancellorsville by
Hooker,
Sedgwick was left alone below
Fredericksburg with about 24,000 men, the Sixth Corps being by several thousand the largest in the army.
During the evening of the 2d of May
Hooker sent word to
Sedgwick “to take up his line on the
Chancellorsville road and attack and destroy any forces he might meet.”
He also added that “he (
Sedgwick) would probably fall upon the rear of
Lee's forces, and between them they would use
Lee up.”
If
Hooker thought an insignificant force was in
Sedgwick's front, the engagement soon to take place showed how mistaken he was.
Sedgwick received the order about 11 o'clock at night.
He at once advanced his command to the
Bowling Green road and then marched by the right flank toward
Fredericksburg.
Newton's division was in the advance.
The night was dark and the road made darker by the foliage of the trees on either side.
The progress was necessarily slow.
Frequent short halts were made while the skirmishers were feeling their way. Once, when the, halt was prolonged and nothing broke the deep silence of the night except an occasional shot followed by the never-to-be-forgotten
ping of the minie-ball,
General Newton, who was riding with the third or fourth regiment from the advance, called out: “Is any one of my staff here?”
Those present promptly responded, and I was directed to “; ride ahead and tell
Colonel Shaler to brush away the enemy's
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pickets.”
The road was filled with soldiers, some lying down, others resting on their guns, but a passage was quickly cleared.
At
Hazel Run Colonel Shaler and
Colonel Hamblin were found standing together.
Here the enemy made a determined resistance.
Their pickets were but a few yards distant.
On the other side of the creek the road made a sharp ascent and curved to the right.
In a subdued tone
Colonel Shaler said: “
Colonel Hamblin, you have heard the order from
General Newton?”
At once
Colonel Hamblin left.
In a moment there was the noise of hurrying feet, the troops quickly disappeared in the dark; a shout, a bright, sudden flash, a roll of musketry followed, and the road was open.
It was the gray of morning when the advance reached the rear and left of
Fredericksburg.
A negro who came into the lines reported the heights occupied and that the enemy were cutting the canal to flood the roads.
To ascertain whether this was true, another delay was caused.
No one in the command was acquainted with the topography of the country, and the advance was compelled to move with great caution through the streets and in the outskirts of the town.
As the morning dawned,
Marye's Heights, the scene of the fierce attacks under
Burnside in the previous December, were presented to our view.
Several regiments were speedily moved along the open ground in the rear of the town toward the heights, and this movement discovered the enemy in force behind the famous stone wall at the base of the hill.
Lee had left
Early with his division and
Barksdale's brigade, a force of about ten thousand men, to hold Fredericksburg Heights.
They were protected by strong works and supported by well-served artillery.
It was at once felt that a desperate encounter was to follow, and the recollections of the previous disaster were by no means inspiriting.
It was Sunday morning, the 3d of May, and the weather was beautiful.
The town was perfectly quiet, many of the inhabitants had fled, not a person was to be seen on the streets, and the windows and blinds of the houses were closed.
The marks of the fierce cannonade to which the place had previously been exposed were everywhere visible.
As soon as practicable and as secretly as possible,
Sedgwick prepared to attack the heights.
Gibbon, of the Second Corps, who had been left on the north bank, crossed shortly after
Sedgwick had captured the town and moved to the right, but his advance was stopped by the canal in front, over which it was impossible to lay bridges in face of the fire from the artillery and infantry on the hill.
Sedgwick says, “Nothing remained but to carry the works by direct assault.”
The attack on
Marye's Heights was made under direction of
Newton.
Two columns, each marching by fours, were formed on the
Plank and Telegraph roads, and were supported by a line of infantry from the Light Brigade on the left, commanded by
Colonel Burnham.
The right column, under
Colonel George C. Spear, was composed of the 61st Pennsylvania and the 43d New York.
These two regiments belonged to the Light Brigade.
This column was supported by the 67th New York and 82d Pennsylvania, under
Colonel Alexander Shaler.
The left column consisted of the 7th Massachusetts and the 36th New York, under
Colonel Thomas D. Johns.
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The line of battle, commanded by
Colonel Hiram Burnham, was composed of the 5th Wisconsin (acting as skirmishers), the 6th Maine, 31st New York (these three regiments also belonging to the Light Brigade), and the 23d Pennsylvania.
Howe's division was posted south of
Hazel Run, and cooperated handsomely, capturing five guns.
1
The order to advance was given at 11 o'clock.
Sedgwick and
Newton with the deepest interest watched the attack from.
the garden of a
brick residence situated on the outskirts of the town and to the left
of the
Telegraph road, which commanded a full view of the assault.
The movements of the enemy showed that they were actively preparing to receive the attack, but the men behind the stone wall were concealed from view.
As the left column emerged from the town and was passing near
Sedgwick and
Newton, the enemy's battery opened, and a portion of a bursting shell struck and killed
Major Elihu J. Faxon, of the 36th New York, while mounted and riding with his command, and wounded several others.
There was an exclamation of horror and a momentary scattering of the rear of the column, but the men quickly closed up and pressed on.
Colonel Spear, commanding the right column, was killed at about the same time.
Both columns and line, in light marching order, advanced at double-quick without firing a shot.
The enemy kept up an incessant artillery fire, and the noise was deafening.
Their musketry fire was reserved until our men were within easy range.
Then a murderous storm of shot from the stone wall, and grape and canister from the hill, burst upon the columns and line.
For a moment the head of the left column was checked and broken.
The column on the right was also broken.
Colonel Burnham's line of blue on the green field paused as if to recover breath, and
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slightly wavered.
Sedgwick and
Newton looked on with unconcealed anxiety, and turned to each other, but remained silent.
The suspense was intense.
Was it to be a victory or a defeat?
Was the place a second time to be a “slaughter-pen?”
Was the Sixth Corps to be driven into the river?
Staff-officers, waving their swords and hurrahing to the men, dashed down the
Telegraph road.
A blinding rain of shot pierced the air. It was more than human nature could face.
The head of the column as it reached the lowest part of the decline near a fork in the road seemed to melt away.
Many fell; others bending low to the earth hurriedly sought shelter from the undulations of ground and the fences and the two or three wooden st ructures along the road.
Out of 400 comprising the 7th Massachusetts, 150 were killed and wounded.
Colonel Johns, commanding, was severely wounded.
Then, as if moved by a sudden impulse and nerved for a supreme effort, both columns and the line in the field simultaneously sprang forward.
The stone wall was gained and the men were quickly over it.
2 Just as my horse was jumping through a break in the wall one of the enemy, standing slightly to the left and about a horse's length from me, raised his gun and fired.
The excitement of the hour must have unnerved his hand, for the ball
zipped harmlessly by to my right.
In a second a bayonet was thrust into his breast by one of our men on my left.
Along the wall a hand-to-hand fight took place, and the bayonet and the butt of the musket were freely used.
The brilliant and successful charge occupied perhaps ten or fifteen minutes, and immediately after the wall was carried the enemy became panic-stricken.
In the flight they threw away guns, knapsacks, pistols, swords, and everything that might retard their speed.
One thousand prisoners were taken, besides several battle-flags and pieces of artillery.
The commander of a Louisiana battery handed his saber to
Colonel Thomas S. Alien, of the 5th Wisconsin.
This regiment out of 500 men lost 123, and the 6th Maine out of about the same number lost 167 in killed and wounded.
Over 600 were killed and wounded in the direct assault upon the heights, and the loss to the corps on the entire front was about 1000.
General G. K. Warren, who had arrived that morning with instructions from headquarters, said in his telegram to
Hooker: “The heights were carried splendidly at 11 A. M. by
Newton.”
Upon reaching the summit of the sharp hill, after passing through the extensive and well-wooded grounds of
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the
Marye House, an exciting scene met the eye. A single glance exhibited to view the broad plateau alive with fleeing soldiers, riderless horses, and artillery and wagon trains on a gallop.
The writer hurried back to
Sedgwick, who was giving directions for
Brooks and
Howe to come up, and suggested that it was a rare opportunity for the use of cavalry.
With evident regret
Sedgwick replied that he did not have a cavalryman.
The carrying of the heights had completely divided the enemy's
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Salem Church.
From a recent photograph.
The view is from the Plank road.
On the left is what remains of the Confederate trenches.
The bricks on the four sides of the church are spotted with bullet-marks, and especially on the line of the upper windows toward the road, showing that many Union soldiers aimed high.
This church was a refuge for many Fredericksburg families during Burnside's battle.--editors. |
forces, throwing either flank with much confusion on opposite roads, and it seemed as though a regiment of cavalry might not only have captured many prisoners, guns, ammunition, and wagons, but also have cleared the way for the corps almost as far as the immediate rear of
Lee's army at
Chancellorsville.
Newton's division, exhausted by the night march, the weight of several days' rations and sixty rounds of ammunition, and by the heat, fatigue, and excitement of battle, were allowed to halt for a short time.
Many were soon asleep, while others made coffee and partook of their first meal that day.
Brooks's division soon came up from below
Hazel Run, and took the advance.
Newton and
Howe followed.
The enemy in the meantime had united their forces, and delayed the rapid advance by frequent stands, retiring successively from hill to hill, and opening with artillery.
Ravines running at right angles to the main road and the rolling character of the country were favorable for impeding the pursuit, which was continued for three or four miles until we reached Salem Church, an unpretentious red-brick structure situated on a ridge covered with dense woods and undergrowth.
To-day it bears many scars of the contest waged around it.
At this point the enemy were in position with four fresh brigades withdrawn from
Hooker's front, and prepared to contest any farther advance.
Lee had met with such complete success in his attack upon
Hooker that he felt he could well spare these troops and not suffer.
Brooks on the left of the road and
Newton on the right quickly formed their commands and made several gallant assaults.
The fight was very severe in the thick woods, and for a time was waged with varying success.
The crest of the woods and a little school-house near the church were gained, and once it was thought they could
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be held, but the enemy, in superior numbers, pressed on, and the ground and the church were left in their possession.
The contest did not last long, but nearly 1500 were killed and wounded.
Bartlett's brigade, numbering less than 1500, lost 580 officers and men. That night the soldiers slept on their arms.
It was understood throughout the Sixth Corps that as soon as it should become engaged with the enemy
Hooker would immediately attack in his front, and prevent any reenforcements from being sent against
Sedgwick.
All during that Sabbath day and the next the sound of
Hooker's guns were eagerly listened for. No sound would have been more welcome.
But after 10 o'clock Sunday morning axes and spades were used at
Chancellorsville more than the guns.
The feeling became widely prevalent that the Sixth Corps would be compelled to take care of itself.
At first it was cautiously whispered that
Hooker had failed, and soon the worst was surmised, and it was concluded that no help could be expected from him. His dash, promptness, and confidence as a division and corps commander were gone.
Lee that night withdrew his troops, flushed with their brilliant success, from the front of
Hooker, with the exception of
Jackson's corps, and marched against
Sedgwick.
Still
Hooker remained inactive; with a force greatly in excess of the enemy in his front, he made no effort to relieve
Sedgwick from his perilous position.
Works were thrown up by the enemy along the Salem Church ridge, and they extended their right until on Monday morning
Marye's Heights and
Fredericksburg, won at so great a sacrifice, were again theirs.
Sedgwick's position, as finally established, was in the shape of a horseshoe, both flanks resting on the river, the line covering Banks's Ford.
His line of battle was between five and six miles in length.
Frequent attempts had been made, during Sunday morning, to communicate with Banks's Ford and to direct the laying of pontoon-bridges, but for some time roving bodies of cavalry frustrated this.
The late
Colonel Henry W. Farrar, then on the staff of
Sedgwick, while carrying a message for this purpose, was captured and taken to
Richmond.
The 4th of May dragged wearily, skirmishing continued all day, the weather was hot,
Sedgwick's position was most critical, and the keenest anxiety was felt.
Lee was in our front with a force much larger than
Sedgwick's then available command of about eighteen thousand men, and an attack was momentarily expected, but fortunately
Lee consumed the whole day in establishing his lines.
The greatest vigilance and activity were exercised by our men in throwing up rifle-pits.
Hooker sent word to
Sedgwick to look well to the safety of his corps, and either to fall back upon
Fredericksburg or recross at Banks's Ford; he also added that he could do nothing to relieve him.
3 Sedgwick accordingly intrusted
Newton with the arrangements
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The attack on Sedgwick at Banks's Ford, Monday evening, May 4, as seen from the Sand-bag Battery near Falmouth.
From a War-time sketch. |
for the withdrawal.
Newton quickly made himself acquainted with the roads leading to Banks's Ford and succeeded in establishing communication with
General Henry W. Benham, who was in charge of the pontoons at that place.
At 6 o'clock in the evening the enemy attacked
Brooks and
Howe on the center and left, with the design of cutting off the corps from Banks's Ford.
Howe not only maintained his position until night-fall, but also made several counter-charges, capturing several hundred prisoners.
Brooks also held on until dark, but in retiring was closely pursued by the enemy.
The whole corps then successfully fell back to Banks's Ford, and the long and painful suspense of the day was over.
The picket line in front and on the left of
Salem ridge was withdrawn by
General David A. Russell in person.
I had been directed to assist him. That sterling soldier dismounted, moved along the line saying, “Quietly, men, quietly; don't make any noise” ; but the jingle of the canteens and other unavoidable sounds on the evening air revealed the movement to the vigilant enemy, and they followed closely, yelling and firing until the double-quick step brought us to our main column on the march, about a mile distant.
Several of the enemy's scouts penetrated almost to the ford and threw up rockets to mark our position.
The enemy's artillery responded to the signal, shelling both troops and bridges, but with little injury.
During the night we recrossed the river and took position to meet the enemy should they, as expected at the time, cross to the north side to renew their attack, or attempt to destroy our depots for supplies near
Fredericksburg.
We captured 5 battle-flags and 15 pieces of artillery, 9 of which were brought off. Fourteen hundred prisoners were taken, including many officers of rank.
