by Henry J. Hunt, Brevet Major-General, U. S. A., chief of artillery of the army of the Potomac.
The battles of
Fredericksburg and
Chancellorsville raised the confidence of the Confederate Army of
Northern Virginia to such a height as to cause its subordinate officers and soldiers to believe that, as opposed to the Army of the Potomac, they were equal to any demand that could be made upon them.
Their belief in the superiority of the
Southerner to the
Northerner as a fighter was no longer, as at the beginning of the war, a mere provincial conceit, for it was now supported by signal successes in the field.
On each of these two occasions the Army of the Potomac had been recently reorganized under a new general, presumably abler than his predecessor and possessing the confidence of the War Department, and the results were crowning victories for the
Confederates.
Yet at
Fredericksburg defeat was not owing to any lack of fighting qualities on the part of the
Federal soldiers, but rather to defective leadership.
At
Chancellorsville both qualities were called in question.
In none of the previous battles between these armies had the disparity of numbers been so great.
The Federal general had taken the initiative, his plan of operations was excellent, and his troops were eager for battle.
The Confederates could at first oppose but a portion of their inferior force to the attack of greatly superior numbers, and the boast of the
Federal commander, that “the Army of Northern Virginia was the legitimate property of the Army of the Potomac,” seemed in a fair way to be justified, when at first contact the advantages already gained were thrown away by the assumption of a timid, defensive attitude.
Lee's bold offensive, which followed immediately on this exhibition of weakness, the consequent rout of a Federal army-corps, and the subsequent retreat of the whole army, a large portion of which had not been engaged, confirmed the exultant Confederates in their conviction — which now became an article of faith — that both in combat and in generalship the superiority of the
Southerner was fully established.
The Federal soldiers
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returned from
Chancellorsville to their camps on the northern bank of the
Rappahannock, mortified and incensed at finding themselves, through no fault of their own, in the condition of having in an offensive campaign lost the battle without fighting, except when the enemy forced it upon them.
Yet in this battle the
Northern soldier fought well.
Under the circumstances no men could have withstood such a sudden attack as that made by “
Stonewall” Jackson on the flank and rear of the Eleventh Corps; but as soon as
Jackson encountered troops in condition for action, his pursuit was checked and he was brought to a stand.
The panic did not extend beyond the routed corps, nor to all of that, for its artillery and so much of its infantry as could form a proper line did their duty, and the army, far from being “demoralized” by this mishap, simply ridiculed the corps which, from its supposed want of vigilance, had allowed itself to be surprised in a position in which it could not fight.
The surprise itself was not the fault of the troops, and in subsequent battles the corps redeemed its reputation.
Both armies were composed in the main of
Americans, and there was little more difference between their men than might be found between those of either army at different periods, or under varying circumstances; for although high bounties had already brought into the
Federal ranks an inferior element which swelled the muster-rolls and the number of stragglers, “bounty jumping”
1 had not as yet become a regular business.
The morale of the Confederate army was, however, much higher at this time than that of its adversary.
It was composed of men not less patriotic, many of whom had gone into the war with reluctance, but who now felt that they were defending their homes.
They were by this time nearly all veterans, led by officers having the confidence of their Government, which took pains to inspire its soldiers with the same feeling.
Their successes were extolled and magnified, their reverses palliated or ignored.
Exaggerations as to the relative numbers of the troops had been common enough on both sides, but those indulged in at the
South had been echoed, sometimes suggested, in the
North by a portion of the press and people, so that friends and enemies united in inspiring in the
Confederate soldier a belief in himself and a contempt for his enemy.
In the Army of the Potomac it was different; the proportion of veterans was much smaller; a cessation of recruiting at the very beginning of active operations, when men were easily obtainable to supply losses in existing regiments, had been followed, as emergencies arose, by new levies, for short periods of service, and in new organizations which could not readily be assimilated by older troops.
Moreover, there were special difficulties.
The Army of the Potomac was not in favor at the War Department.
Rarely, if ever, had it heard a word of official commendation after a success, or of sympathy or encouragement after a defeat.
From the very beginning its camps had been filled with imputations and charges against its leaders, who were accused on the streets, by the press, in Congress, and even in the War Department itself, and after victories as well as after defeats, not only of incapacity or misconduct,
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but sometimes of “disloyalty” to their superiors, civil and military, and even to the cause for which they fought.
These accusations were followed or accompanied by frequent changes of commanders of the army, of army-corps, and even of divisions.
Under such circumstances, but little confidence could be felt by the troops, either in the wisdom of a war office which seemed to change its favorites with the caprice of a coquette, or in the capacity of new generals who followed each other in such rapid succession.
But it is due to that patient and sorely tried army, to say that the spirit of both officers and men was of the best, and their devotion to duty unconquerable.
The army itself had originally been so admirably disciplined and tempered, that there always remained to it a firm self-reliance and a stern sense of duty and of honor that was proof against its many discouragements.
In battle it always acquitted itself well and displayed the highest soldierly qualities, no matter who commanded it or whence he came.
Chancellorsville furnishes no exception to this assertion, nor evidence of inferiority of the
Northern to the
Southern soldier, but it does furnish striking illustrations of
Napoleon's well-known saying, “In war
men are nothing,
a man is everything.”
General Lee, who felt great confidence in his own troops, and overrated the effects of successive reverses on the
Federal soldiers, now resolved to assume the offensive, for he knew that to remain on the defensive would in the end force him. back on
Richmond.
He determined, therefore, in case the Army of the Potomac could not be brought to action under favorable circumstances in
Virginia, to transfer, if permitted, the field of operations to Northern soil, where a victory promptly followed up might give him possession of
Baltimore or
Washington, and perhaps lead to the recognition of the
Confederacy by foreign powers.
The
valley of the Shenandoah offered a safe line of operations; the
Federal troops occupying it were rather a bait than an obstacle, and to capture or destroy them seemed quite practicable to one who controlled absolutely all Confederate troops within the sphere of his operations.
The
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sharp lesson he had administered the previous year had not been heeded by the
Federal War Office; an opportunity now offered to repeat it, and he took his measures accordingly.
In case his Government would not consent to a bolder offensive, he could at least clear the valley of
Virginia of the enemy,--a distinct operation, yet a necessary preliminary to an invasion of the
North.
This work was assigned to
Lieutenant-General Ewell, an able officer, in every way qualified for such an enterprise.
In anticipation of the new campaign,
Lee's army was strengthened and reorganized into three army-corps of three divisions each.
Each division consisted of four brigades, except
Rodes's and
Anderson's, which had five each, and
Pickett's, which had three at
Gettysburg,--in all, thirty-seven infantry brigades.
The cavalry were the select troops of the
Confederacy.
Officers and men had been accustomed all their lives to the use of horses and arms, “and to the very end the best blood in the land rode after
Stuart,
Hampton, and the Lees.”
They were now organized as a division, under
Major-General J. E. B. Stuart, consisting of the six brigades of
Hampton,
Robertson,
Fitzhugh Lee,
Jenkins,
W. E. Jones, and
W. H. F. Lee, and six batteries of horseartillery under
Major R. F. Beckham.
To these should be added
Imboden's command, a strong brigade of over 2000 effective horsemen and a battery of horse-artillery, which had been operating in the mountain country and was now near
Staunton, awaiting orders.
The artillery had recently received an excellent organization under its commandant-in-chief,
General Pendleton.
It consisted, besides the horse-artillery, of fifteen so-called “battalions,” each of four batteries, with one
lieutenant-colonel and a major.
To each army-corps were attached five battalions, one for each division and two as a reserve, the whole under a colonel as chief of artillery.
The total number of batteries was 69, of guns 287, of which 30 were with the cavalry.
With few exceptions the batteries were of four guns each.
The army was commanded by a full general, each army-corps, except the artillery, by a lieutenant-general, each division by a major-general, each brigade, except two, by brigadier-generals.
Nearly all these officers were veterans of proved ability and many had served in the
Mexican war.
In the Army of the Potomac the discharge of 58 regiments had reduced its strength since
Chancellorsville by 25,000 effectives, partly replaced by 5 brigades numbering less than 12,000 men. At the
battle of Gettysburg the 7 army-corps consisted of 19 infantry divisions, 7 of which had 2 brigades, 11 had 3, and 1 had 4; in all 51 brigades.
[See lists of organizations and commanders in “The opposing forces in the
Gettysburg campaign,” to follow.] The army and army-corps were commanded by major-generals, the divisions by 3
major-generals and 16
brigadier-generals, the infantry brigades by 22
brigadier-generals and 29 colonels.
The average strength of army-corps and divisions was about half that of the
Confederates, a fact that should be kept in mind, or the terms will be misleading.
The cavalry had been raised under disadvantages.
Men accustomed to the use of both horses and arms were comparatively few in the
North and required training in everything that was necessary to make a trooper.
The theater of war was not considered favorable for cavalry, and it was distributed to the various headquarters for
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escort duty, guards, and orderlies.
It was not until 1863 that it was united under
General Pleasonton in a corps consisting of three weak divisions,
Buford's,
D. McM. Gregg's, and
Duffie's, afterward consolidated into two,
Stahel's cavalry, which joined at
Frederick, June 28th, becoming the third division.
The corps was then organized as follows: First Division,
Buford: brigades,
Gamble,
Devin,
Merritt; Second Division,
Gregg: brigades,
McIntosh,
Huey,
J. Irvin Gregg; Third Division,
Kilpatrick: brigades, Farns-worth,
Custer.
The divisions and three of the brigades were commanded by brigadier-generals, the other five brigades by colonels.
To the cavalry were attached
Robertson's and
Tidball's brigades of horse-artillery.
Under excellent chiefs and the spirit created by its new organization, the
Federal cavalry soon rivaled that of the
Confederates.
The field-artillery was in an unsatisfactory condition.
The high reputation it had gained in
Mexico was followed by the active and persistent hostility of the War Department, which almost immediately dismounted three-fourths of its authorized batteries.
Congress in 1853 made special provision for remounting them as schools of instruction for the whole arn, a duty which the War Department on shallow pretexts evaded.
Again in 1861 Congress amply provided for the proper organization and command of the artillery in the field, but as there was no chief nor special administration for the arm, and no regulations for its government, its organization, control, and direction were left to the fancies of the various army commanders.
General officers were practically denied it, and in 1862 the War Department announced in orders that field-officers of artillery were an unnecessary expense and their muster into service forbidden.
Promotion necessarily ceased, and such able artillerists as
Hays, DeRussy,
Getty,
Gibbon,
Griffin, and
Ayres could only receive promotion by transfer to the infantry or cavalry.
No adequate measures were taken for the supply of recruits, and the batteries were frequently dependent on the troops to which they were attached for men enough to work their guns in battle.
For battery-draft they were often glad to get the refuse horses after the ambulance and quartermasters' trains were supplied.
Still, many of the batteries attained a high degree of excellence, due mainly to the self-sacrifice, courage, and intelligence of their own officers and men.
On taking command of the army,
General Hooker had transferred the military command of the artillery to his own headquarters, to be resumed by the
chief of artillery only under specific orders and for special occasions, which resulted.in such mismanagement and confusion at
Chancellorsville that he consented to organize the artillery into brigades.
This was a decided improvement, which would have been greater if the brigade commanders had held adequate rank.
As it was, there was no artillery commandant-in-chief for months before the
battle of Gettysburg, and of the 14 brigades 4 were commanded by field-officers, 9 by captains, and 1 by a lieutenant, taken from their batteries for the purpose.
The number of field-batteries at
Gettysburg was 65, of guns 370, of which 212 were with the infantry, 50 with the cavalry, 108 in the reserve.
The disadvantages under which the artillery labored all through the war, from want of proper regulations, supervision, and command
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Major-General John F. Reynolds.
The uniform is that of a field-officer in the regular infantry.
Early in the war General Reynolds was Lieutenant-Colonel of the 14th United States Infantry, and was made Birigadier-General of Volunteers in September, 1861.--editors. |
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were simply disgraceful to our army administration from the close of the
Mexican to that of the Civil war, and caused an unnecessary expenditure of both blood and treasure.
It will be perceived by comparison that the organization of the Army of the Potomac was at this period in every way inferior to that of its adversary.
The army-corps and divisions were too numerous and too weak.
They required too many commanders and staffs, and this imposed unnecessary burdens on the
general-in-chief, who was often compelled to place several army-corps under the commander of one of them, thus reproducing the muchabused “grand divisions” of
Burnside, under every possible disadvantage.
Had the number of infantry corps been reduced to four at most, and the divisions to twelve, the army would have been more manageable and better commanded, and the artillery, without any loss, but rather a gain of efficiency, would have been reduced by a dozen or fifteen batteries.
Early in June
Lee's army began to move, and by the 8th
Longstreet's and
Ewell's corps had joined
Stuart's cavalry at
Culpeper.
A. P. Hill's corps was left in observation at
Fredericksburg; and so skillfully were the changes concealed that
Hooker, believing that all the enemy's infantry were still near that town, ordered
Pleasonton to beat up
Stuart's camps at
Culpeper, and get information as to the enemy's position and proposed movements.
For these purposes he gave
Pleasonton two small brigades of infantry, 3000 men under
Generals Ames and
Russell, which carried his total force to 10,981.
They were echeloned along the railroad, which crosses the river at Rappahannock Station, and runs thence ten miles to
Culpeper.
[See map, p. 55.] About midway is
Brandy Station a few hundred yards north of which is
Fleetwood Hill.
Dividing his force equally,
Pleasonton ordered
Buford and
Ames to cross at Beverly Ford, and
Gregg,
Duffie, and
Russell at
Kelly's Ford.
All were to march to
Brandy Station,
Duffie being thrown out to
Stevensburg, seven miles east of
Culpeper, to watch the
Fredericksburg road.
Then the whole force was to move on
Culpeper.
On the 8th,
General Lee, having sent
Jenkins's brigade as
Ewell's advance into the valley, reviewed the other 5 brigades of
Stuart, 10,292 combatants, on the plains near
Brandy Station.
After the review they were distributed in the neighborhood with a view to crossing the
Rappahannock on the 9th,
Stuart establishing his headquarters at
Fleetwood.
Accident had thus disposed his forces in the most favorable manner to meet
Pleasonton's converging movements.
At daybreak
Buford crossed and drove the enemy's pickets from the ford back to the main body, near St. James's church.
Stuart, on the first report of the crossing, sent
Robertson's brigade toward
Kelly's to watch that ford, and
Colonel M. C. Butler's 2d South Carolina to
Brandy Station.
He himself took the command at the church, where he was attacked by
Buford.
At
Brandy Station W. H. F. Lee was wounded, and
Colonel Chambliss took command of his brigade.
Meantime
Gregg had crossed at
Kelly's Ford, and
Duffie, leading, took a southerly road, by which he missed
Robertson's brigade.
Learning that
Duffie's advance had reached
Stevensburg and that
Buford
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These maps and the others relating to the campaign and battle of Gettysburg are compilations by Abner Doubleday, Brevet Major-General, U. S. A., from the official reports of the commanders on both sides, and from the maps of Colonel John B. Bachelder, which were purchased by Congress for the War Department.--editors. |
was heavily engaged,
Gregg pushed direct for
Brandy Station, sending orders to
Duffie to follow his movement.
Stuart, notified of his approach, had sent in haste some artillery and two of
Jones's regiments to
Fleetwood, and
Colonel Butler started at once for
Stevensburg, followed soon after by
Wickham's 4th Virginia.
On their approach two squadrons of the 6th Ohio, in
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occupation of the place, fell back skirmishing.
Duffie sent two regiments to their aid, and after a severe action, mainly with the 2d South Carolina, reoccupied the village.
In this action
Colonel Butler lost a leg, and his lieutenant-colonel,
Hampton, was killed.
On
Gregg's arrival near
Brandy Station the enemy appeared to be in large force, with artillery, on and about
Fleetwood Hill.
He promptly ordered an attack; the hill was carried, and the two regiments sent by
Stuart were driven back.
Buford now attacked vigorously and gained ground steadily, for
Stuart had to reenforce his troops at
Fleetwood from the church.
In the struggles that followed, the hill several times changed masters; but as
Duffie did not make his appearance,
Gregg was finally overmatched and withdrew, leaving three of his guns, two of them disabled, in the enemy's hands, nearly all of their horses being killed and most of their cannoneers
hors de combat. There were some demonstrations of pursuit, but the approach of
Buford's reserve brigade stopped them.
Duffie finally came up and
Gregg reported to
Pleasonton, informing him of the approach of Confederate infantry from
Culpeper.
Pleasonton, who had captured some important dispatches and orders, now considered his mission accomplished, and ordered a withdrawal of his whole command.
This was effected leisurely and without molestation.
Gregg recrossed at Rappahannock Station,
Buford at Beverly Ford, and at sunset the river again flowed between the opposing forces.
Stuart reports his losses at 485, of whom 301 were killed or wounded.
Pleasonton reports an aggregate loss (exclusive of
Duffie's, which would not exceed 25) of 907, of whom 421 were killed or wounded.
In nearly all the previous so-called “cavalry” actions, the troops had fought as dismounted dragoons.
This was in the main a true cavalry battle, and enabled the
Federals to dispute the superiority hitherto claimed by, and conceded to, the Confederate cavalry.
In this respect the affair was an important one.
It did not, however, delay
Lee's designs on the valley; he had already sent
Imboden toward
Cumberland to destroy the railroad and canal from that place to
Martinsburg.
Milroy's Federal division, about 9000 strong, occupied
Winchester, with
McReynolds's brigade in observation at
Berryville.
Kelley's division of about 10,000 men was at
Harper's Ferry, with a detachment of 1200 infantry and a battery under
Colonel B. F. Smith at
Martinsburg.
On the night of June 11th,
Milroy received instructions to join
Kelley, but, reporting that he could hold
Winchester, was authorized to remain there.
Ewell, leaving
Brandy Station June 10th, reached
Cedarville via Chester Gap on the evening of the 12th, whence he detached
Jenkins and
Rodes to capture
McReynolds, who, discovering their approach, withdrew to
Winchester.
They then pushed on to
Martinsburg, and on the 14th drove out the garrison.
Smith's infantry crossed the
Potomac at
Shepherdstown, and made its way to
Maryland Heights; his artillery retreated by the
Williamsport road, was pursued, and lost five guns.
Meanwhile
Ewell, with
Early's and
Edward Johnson's divisions, marched direct on
Winchester.
Arriving in the neighborhood on the evening of the 13th, he ordered
Early on the 14th to leave a brigade in observation on the south of the town, move his main force under cover of the hills to the north-western
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Map 6: positions June 17th. |
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Map 7: positions June 24th. |
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Map 8: positions June 28th. |
side, and seize the out-works which commanded the main fort.
He also ordered
Johnson to deploy his division on the east of the town, so as to divert attention from
Early.
This was so successfully done that the latter placed, unperceived, twenty guns and an assaulting column in position, and at 6 P. M., by a sudden attack, carried the outworks, driving the garrisons into the body of the place.
This capture was a complete surprise, and
Milroy called a council of war, which decided on an immediate retreat, abandoning the artillery and wagons.
Ewell had anticipated this, and or-dered
Johnson to occupy with a brigade a position on the
Martinsburg pike, north of
Winchester.
The retreat commenced at
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2 A. M. of the 15th, and after proceeding three or four miles, the advance encountered
Johnson's troops, attacked vigorously, and at first successfully, but, the enemy receiving reinforcements, a hard fight ensued in which the
Federals lost heavily.
The retreat was then continued; the troops separated in the darkness, one portion reaching
Harper's Ferry, another crossing the
Potomac at
Hancock.
On the 15th
Ewell crossed the river, occupied
Hagerstown and
Sharpsburg, and sent
Jenkins's cavalry to
Chambersburg to collect supplies.
On the 17th the garrison of
Harper's Ferry was removed to
Maryland Heights, and the
valley of the Shenandoah was cleared of Federal troops.
In these brilliant operations
General Lee claims for
Ewell the capture of 4000 prisoners and small-arms, 28 pieces of artillery, 11 colors, 300 loaded wagons, as many horses, and a considerable quantity of stores of all descriptions, the entire Confederate loss, killed, wounded, and missing, being 269.
These operations indicate on the part of
General Lee either contempt for his opponent, or a belief that the chronic terror of the War Department for the safety of
Washington could be safely relied upon to paralyze his movements,--or both.
On no other reasonable hypothesis can we account for his stretching his army from
Fredericksburg to
Williamsport, with his enemy concentrated on one flank, and on the shortest road to
Richmond.
General Hooker's instructions were to keep always in view the safety of
Washington and
Harper's Ferry, and this necessarily subordinated his operations to those of the enemy.
On June 5th he reported that in case
Lee moved via
Culpeper toward the
Potomac with his main body, leaving a corps at
Fredericksburg, he should consider it his duty to attack the latter, and asked if that would be within the spirit of his instructions.
In reply he was warned against such a course, and its dangers to
Washington and
Harper's Ferry were pointed out. On June 10th, learning that
Lee was in motion, and that there were but few troops in
Richmond, he proposed an immediate march on that place, from which, after capturing it, he could send the disposable part of his force to any threatened point north of the
Potomac, and was informed that
Lee's army, and not
Richmond, was his true objective.
Had he taken
Richmond,
Peck's large force at
Suffolk and
Keyes's 10,000 men
2 in, the
Peninsula might have been utilized, and
Hooker's whole army set free for operations against
Lee.
As yet an invasion of the
North had not been definitely fixed upon.
On June 8th, the day before the engagement at
Brandy Station,
Lee, in a confidential letter to
Mr. Seddon, Confederate
Secretary of War, stated that he was aware of the hazard of taking the aggressive, yet nothing was to be gained by remaining on the defensive; still, if the department thought it better to do so, he would adopt that course.
Mr. Seddon replied, June 10th, the date of
Hooker's proposal to march on
Richmond, concurring in
General Lee's views.
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He considered aggressive action indispensable, that “all attendant risks and sacrifices must be incurred,” and adds, “I have not hesitated, in cooperating with your plans, to leave this city almost defenseless.”
General Lee now had full liberty of action, with the assured support of his Government,--an immense advantage over an opponent who had neither.
As soon as
Hooker learned from
Pleasonton that a large infantry force was at
Culpeper, he extended his right up the
Rappahannock, and when informed of
Ewell's move toward the valley, being forbidden to attack
A. P. Hill at
Fredericksburg or to spoil
Lee's plans by marching to
Richmond, he moved his army, on the night of June 13th, toward the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and occupied Thoroughfare Gap in advance of it. On the 15th
Longstreet left
Culpeper, keeping east of the
Blue Ridge and so covering its gaps.
Hill left
Fredericksburg on the 14th, and reached
Shepherdstown via
Chester Gap on the 23d.
Stuart's cavalry had been thrown out on
Longstreet's right to occupy the passes of the
Bull Run mountains and watch
Hooker's army.
On the 17th he encountered, near
Aldie, a portion of
Pleasonton's command; a fierce fight ensued, which left the
Federals in possession of the field.
During the four following days there was a succession of cavalry combats; those of the 19th near
Middleburg, and of the 21st near
Upperville, were especially well contested, and resulted in the retreat of
Stuart through Ashby's Gap.
Longstreet had already withdrawn through the gaps and followed
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Pennsylvania College, Gettysburg.
From a photograph.
The cupola was first used by Union officers, and then by Confederate, as a station for observation and signals.
During the withdrawal of the First and Eleventh corps through the town to Cemetery Hill, there was hard fighting in the college grounds.--editors. |
to the
Potomac.
Imboden, his work of destruction completed, had taken post at
Hancock.
Longstreet and
Hill crossed the
Potomac on the 24th and 25th and directed their march on
Chambersburg and
Fayetteville, arriving on the 27th.
Stuart had been directed to guard the mountain passes until the
Federal army crossed the river, and, according to
General Lee's report, “to lose no time in placing his command on the right of our [Confederate] column as soon as he should perceive the enemy moving northward,” in order to watch and report his movements.
According to
Stuart's report, he was authorized to cross between the
Federal army and
Washington, and directed after crossing to proceed with all dispatch to join
Early in
Pennsylvania.
General Lee so far had been completely successful; his army was exultant, and he lost no time in availing himself of his advantages.
On the 21st he ordered
Ewell to take possession of
Harrisburg; and on the 22d
Ewell's whole
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corps was on the march,
Rodes's and
Johnson's divisions via
Chambersburg to
Carlisle, which they reached on the 27th, and
Early via
Greenwood and
Gettysburg to
York, with orders from
Ewell to break up the Northern Central Railroad, destroy the bridge across the
Susquehanna at
Wrightsville, and then rejoin the main body at
Carlisle.
Early entered
York on the 28th, and sent
Gordon's brigade, not to destroy but to secure possession of the bridge, which would enable him to operate upon
Harrisburg from the rear; but a small militia force under
Colonel Frick, retreating from
Wrightsville across the bridge, after an unsuccessful attempt to destroy one of its spans, set fire to and entirely destroyed that fine structure,
Gordon's troops giving their aid to the citizens to save the town from the flames.
On the 29th
Ewell received orders from
General Lee to rejoin the army at
Cashtown; the next evening, 30th, his reserve artillery and trains, with
Johnson's division as an escort, were near
Chambersburg, and
Ewell with
Early's and
Rodes's, near
Heidlersburg.
Thus suddenly ended
Ewell's Harrisburg
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The Lutheran Seminary.
The upper picture from a War-time photograph.
Both pictures show the face of the seminary toward the town, and in the right-hand view is seen the Chambersburg Pike.
On the first day, Buford and Reynolds used the cupola for observations; thereafter it was the chief signal-station and observatory for the Confederates--editors. |
expedition.
One object was to collect supplies, and contributions were accordingly levied.
Much damage was done to roads and bridges, but the prompt advance of the Army of the Potomac made this useless to the
Confederates.
Before committing his army to an invasion of the
North,
General Lee recommended the proper steps to cover and support it. In a letter of June 23d, addressed to
President Davis, he states that the season was so far advanced as to stop further Federal operations on the
Southern coast, and that Confederate troops in that country and elsewhere were now disposable.
He proposed, therefore, that an army should as soon as possible be organized at
Culpeper, as “the well-known anxiety of the
Northern Government for the safety of its capital would induce it to retain a large force for its defense, and thus relieve the opposition to our advance” ; and suggested that
General Beauregard be placed in command, “as his presence would give magnitude
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Gettysburg from Oak Hill.
From a photograph.
Oak Hill is a mile north-west of Gettysburg, and the view here is south-east, showing Stevens Hall (named after Thaddeus Stevens), the preparatory department of the Pennsylvania College on the left; then Culp's Hill; then Pennsylvania College, and, to the right of its cupola, the observatory on Cemetery Hill. |
even to a small demonstration.”
On the 25th he wrote twice to
Mr. Davis urging the same views.
The proposition embarrassed
Mr. Davis, who could not see how, with the few troops under his hand, it could be carried out. In fact, although
General Lee had pointed out the means, the proposition came too late, as the decisive battle took place much earlier than was expected.
This correspondence, however, with that between
Lee and
Mr. Seddon, shows that
Hooker's project to capture
Richmond by a
coup-de-main was feasible.
It was not now a question of “swapping queens.”
Washington was safe, being well fortified and sufficiently garrisoned, or with available troops within reach, without drawing on
Hooker; and to take
Richmond and scatter the Confederate Government was the surest way to ruin
Lee's army--“his true objective.”
On the first appearance of danger of invasion,
Pennsylvania's vigilant governor,
Curtin, warned the people of the
State and called out the militia.
General Couch was sent to
Harrisburg to organize and command them, but disbelief in the danger — due to previous false alarms — caused delays until the fugitives from
Milroy's command, followed by
Jenkins's cavalry, roused the country.
Defensive works were then thrown up at
Harrisburg and else-where, and local forces were raised and moved toward the enemy.
Early in June
Hooker represented in strong terms the necessity of having one commander for all the troops whose operations would have an influence on those of
Lee's army, and in reply was informed by
Halleck that any movements he might suggest for other commands than his own would be ordered
if practicable. Misunderstandings and confusion naturally resulted, and authority was given
Hooker from time to time to exercise control over the troops of
Heintzelman, commanding the Department of Washington, and of
Schenck, commanding the Middle Department, followed, June 24th, by orders specifically placing the troops in
Harper's Ferry and its vicinity at his disposal.
Disregarding
Ewell's movements,
Hooker conformed his own to those of the enemy's main body, and crossed the
Potomac at Edwards's Ferry on the 25th and 26th of June.
On the 27th three army-corps under
Reynolds occupied
Middletown and the
South Mountain passes.
The Twelfth Corps was near
Harper's Ferry, and the three other corps at or near
Frederick.
Hooker now ordered the Twelfth Corps to march early on the 28th to
Harper's Ferry,
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there to be joined by its garrison from
Maryland Heights, in order to cut
Lee's communications with
Virginia, and in conjunction with
Reynolds to operate on his rear.
General Halleck, however, objected to the abandonment of the
Heights, notwithstanding
Hooker's representations that the position was utterly useless for any purpose; whereupon
Hooker abandoned his project, and finding now that he was
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General Lee's headquarters on the Chambersburg pike.
From a War-time photograph. |
“ not allowed to manoeuvre his own army in the presence of the enemy,” asked to be relieved from his command.
He had encountered some of the difficulties which had beset a predecessor whom he had himself mercilessly criticised, and promptly succumbed to them.
His request was complied with, and
Major-General George G. Meade was appointed his successor, this being the fifth change of commanders of the army in front of
Washington in ten months.
Meade was an excellent officer of long service, who had always proved equal to his position, whether as a specialist or a commander of troops.
Many welcomed his advent — some regretted
Hooker's departure.
All thought the time for the change unfortunate, but accepted loyally, as that army ever did, the leader designated by the
President, and gave
Meade their hearty support.
He was succeeded in the command of the Fifth Corps by
Major-General George Sykes, a veteran of the
Mexican war and a distinguished soldier.
When
General Meade assumed command, June 28th, the best information placed
Longstreet at
Chambersburg,
A. P. Hill between that place and
Cashtown, and
Ewell in occupation of
Carlisle,
York, and the country between them, threatening
Harrisburg.
Unacquainted with
Hooker's plans and views [see p. 243], he determined at once to move on the main line from
Frederick to
Harrisburg, extending his wings as far as compatible with a ready concentration, in order to force
Lee to battle before he could cross the
Susquehanna.
With this view he spent the day in ascertaining the position of his army, and brought up his cavalry,
Buford to his left,
Gregg to his right, and
Kilpatrick to the front.
Directing French to occupy
Frederick with seven thousand men of the garrison of
Harper's Ferry, he put his army in motion early on the morning of the 29th.
Kilpatrick reached
Littlestown that night; and on the morning of the 30th the rear of his division, while passing through
Hanover, was attacked by a portion of
Stuart's cavalry.
Stuart, availing himself of the discretion allowed him, had left
Robertson's and
Joneses brigades to guard the passes of the
Blue Ridge, and on the night of the 24th, with those of
Hampton,
Fitzhugh Lee, and
Chambliss, had started to move
[
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round the Army of the Potomac, pass between it and
Centreville into
Maryland, and so rejoin
Lee; but the movements of that army forced him so far east that he was compelled to ford the
Potomac near
Seneca [20 miles above
Washington], on the night of the 27th.
Next morning, learning that
Hooker had already crossed the river, he marched north by
Rockville, where he captured a wagon train.
Paroling his prisoners and taking the train with him, he pushed on — through
Westminster, where he had a sharp action with a squadron of
Delaware horse — to
Union Mills, and encamped there on the 29th.
During the night, he learned that the
Federal army was still between him and
Lee on its march north, and his scouts reported its cavalry in strong force at
Littlestown, barring his direct road to
Gettysburg; wherefore, on the morning of the 30th he moved across country to
Hanover,
Chambliss in front and
Hampton in rear of his long train of two hundred wagons, with
Fitzhugh Lee well out on his left flank.
About 10 A. M.
Chambliss, reaching
Hanover, found
Kilpatrick passing through the town and attacked him, but was driven out before
Hampton or
Lee could come to his support.
Stuart's men and horses were now nearly worn out; he was encumbered with a large captured train; a junction with some part of
Lee's army was a necessity, and he made a night march for
York, only to learn that
Early  |
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North-east corner of the McPherson woods, where General Reynolds was killed.
From a photograph. |
had left the day before.
Pushing on to
Carlisle, he found that
Ewell was gone, and the place occupied by a militia force under
General W. F. Smith.
3 His demand of a surrender was refused; he threw a few shells into the town and burned the
Government barracks.
That night he learned that
Lee's army was concentrating at
Gettysburg, and left for that place next day. Thus ended a raid which greatly embarrassed
Lee, and by which the services of three cavalry brigades were, in the critical period of the campaign, exchanged for a few hundred prisoners and a wagon train.
Hearing nothing from
Stuart, and therefore believing that
Hooker was still south of the
Potomac,
Lee, on the afternoon of the 28th, ordered
Longstreet and
A. P. Hill to join
Ewell at
Harrisburg; but late that night one of
Longstreet's scouts came in and reported that the
Federal army had crossed the river, that
Meade had relieved
Hooker and was at
Frederick.
Lee thereupon changed the rendezvous of his army to
Cashtown, which place
Heth reached on the 29th.
Next day
Heth sent
Pettigrew's brigade on to
Gettysburg, nine miles, to procure a supply of shoes.
Nearing this place,
Pettigrew
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272]
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Map 11: positions July 1st: 8 to 10 A. M. |
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Map 12: positions July 1st: 10:10 to 10:30 A. M. |
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Map 13: positions July 1st: 3:30 P. M. |
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Map 14: positions July 1st: about 4 P. M. |
discovered the advance of a large Federal force and returned to
Cashtown.
Hill immediately notified
Generals Lee and
Ewell, informing the latter that he would advance next morning on
Gettysburg.
Buford, sending
Merritt's brigade to
Mechanicstown as guard to his trains, had early on the morning of the 29th crossed into and moved up the
Cumberland valley via
Boonsboro' and
Fairfield with those of
Gamble and
Devin, and on the afternoon of Tuesday, June 30th, under instructions from
Pleasonton, entered
Gettysburg,
Pettigrew's brigade withdrawing on his approach.
From
Gettysburg, near the eastern base of the
Green Ridge, and covering all the upper passes into the
Cumberland valley, good roads lead to all important points between the
Susquehanna and the
Potomac.
It is therefore an important strategic position.
On the west of the town, distant nearly half a mile, there is a somewhat elevated ridge running north and south, on which stands the “Lutheran Seminary.”
This ridge is covered with open woods through its whole length, and is terminated nearly a mile and a half north of the seminary by a commanding knoll, bare on its southern side, called
Oak Hill.
From this ridge the ground slopes gradually to the west, and again rising forms another ridge about 500 yards from the first, upon which, nearly opposite the seminary, stand McPherson's farm buildings.
The second ridge is wider, smoother, and lower than the first, and
Oak Hill, their intersection,
[
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has a clear view of the slopes of both ridges and of the valley between them.
West of McPherson's ridge
Willoughby Run flows south into
Marsh Creek.
South of the farm buildings and directly opposite the seminary, a wood borders the run for about 300 yards, and stretches back to the summit of McPherson's ridge.
From the town two roads run: one south-west to
Hagerstown via
Fairfield, the other north-westerly to
Chambersburg via
Cashtown.
The seminary is midway between them, about 300 yards from each.
Parallel to and 150 yards north of the
Chambersburg pike, is the bed of an unfinished railroad, with deep cuttings through the two ridges.
Directly north of the town the country is comparatively flat and open: on the east of it,
Rock Creek flows south.
On the south, and overlooking it, is a ridge of bold, high ground, terminated on the west by
Cemetery Hill and on the east by
Culp's Hill, which, bending to the south, extends half a mile or more and terminates in low grounds near
Spangler's Spring.
Culp's Hill is steep toward the east, is well wooded, and its eastern base is washed by
Rock Creek.
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Confederate dead on the field of the First day. From a photograph. |
Impressed by the importance of the position,
Buford, expecting the early return of the enemy in force, assigned to
Devin's brigade the country north, and to
Gamble's that west of the town; sent out scouting parties on all the roads to collect information, and reported the condition of affairs to
Reynolds.
His pickets extended from below the
Fairfield road, along the eastern bank of
Willoughby Run, to the railroad cut, then easterly some 1500 yards north of the town, to a wooded hillock near
Rock Creek.
On the night of June 30th
Meade's headquarters and the Artillery Reserve were at
Taneytown; the First Corps at
Marsh Run, the Eleventh at
Emmitsburg, Third at
Bridgeport, Twelfth at
Littlestown, Second at
Uniontown, Fifth at
Union Mills, Sixth and
Gregg's cavalry at
Manchester,
Kilpatrick's at
Hanover.
A glance at the map [p. 266] will show at what disadvantage
Meade's army was now placed.
Lee's whole army was nearing
Gettysburg, while
Meade's was scattered over a wide region to the east and south of that town.
Meade was now convinced that all designs on the
Susquehanna had been abandoned; but as
Lee's corps were reported as occupying the country from
[
274]
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Union dead West of the Seminary.
From a photograph. |
Chambersburg to
Carlisle, he ordered, for the next day's moves, the First and Eleventh corps to
Gettysburg, under
Reynolds, the Third to
Emmitsburg, the Second to
Taneytown, the Fifth to
Hanover, and the Twelfth to
Two Taverns, directing
Slocum to take command of the Fifth in addition to his own. The Sixth Corps was left at
Manchester, thirty-four miles from
Gettysburg, to await orders.
But
Meade, while conforming to the current of
Lee's movement, was not merely drifting.
The same afternoon he directed the chiefs of engineers and artillery to select a field of battle on which his army might be concentrated, whatever
Lee's lines of approach, whether by
Harrisburg or
Gettysburg,--indicating the general line of
Pipe Creek as a suitable locality.
Carefully drawn instructions were sent to the corps commanders as to the occupation of this line, should it be ordered; but it was added that developments might cause the offensive to be assumed from present positions.
These orders were afterward cited as indicating
General Meade's intention not to fight at
Gettysburg.
They were, under any circumstances, wise and proper orders, and it would probably have been better had he concentrated his army behind
Pipe Creek rather than at
Gettysburg; but events finally controlled the actions of both leaders.
At 8 A. M., July 1st,
Buford's scouts reported
Heth's advance on the
Cashtown road,
4 when
Gamble's brigade formed on McPherson's Ridge, from the
[
275]
Fairfield road to the railroad cut; one section of
Calef's battery A, 2d United States, near the left of his line, the other two across the
Chambersburg or Cashtown pike.
Devin formed his disposable squadrons from
Gamble's right toward
Oak Hill, from which he had afterward to transfer them to the north.
of the town to meet
Ewell.
As
Heth advanced, he threw
Archer's brigade to the right,
Davis's to the left of the
Cashtown pike, with
Pettigrew's and
Brockenbrough's brigades in support.
The Confederates advanced skirmishing
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Union dead near McPherson's woods.
From a photograph. |
[
276]
heavily with
Buford's dismounted troopers.
Calef's battery, engaging double the number of its own guns, was served with an efficiency worthy of its former reputation as “
Duncan's battery” in the
Mexican war, and so enabled the cavalry to hold their long line for two hours. When
Buford's report of the enemy's advance reached
Reynolds, the latter, ordering
Doubleday and
Howard to follow, hastened toward
Gettysburg with
Wadsworth's small division (two brigades,
Meredith's and
Cutler's) and
Hall's 2d Maine battery.
As he approached he heard the sound of battle, and directing the troops to cross the fields toward the firing, galloped himself to the seminary, met
Buford there, and both rode to the front, where the cavalry, dismounted, were gallantly holding their ground against heavy odds.
After viewing the field, he sent back to hasten up
Howard, and as the enemy's main line was now advancing to the attack, directed
Doubleday, who had arrived in advance of his division, to look to the
Fairfield road, sent
Cutler with three of his five regiments north of the railroad cut, posted the other two under
Colonel Fowler, of the 14th New York, south of the pike, and replaced
Calef's battery by
Hall's, thus relieving the cavalry.
Cutler's line
[
277]
was hardly formed when it was struck by
Davis's Confederate brigade on its front and right flank, whereupon
Wadsworth, to save it, ordered it to fall back to
Seminary Ridge.
This order not reaching the 147th New York, its gallant major,
Harney, held that regiment to its position until, having lost half its numbers, the order to retire was repeated.
Hall's battery was now imperiled, and it withdrew by sections, fighting at close canister range and suffering severely.
Fowler thereupon changed his front to face
Davis's brigade, which held the cut, and with
Dawes's 6th Wisconsin--sent by
Doubleday to aid the 147th New York--charged and drove
Davis from the field.
The Confederate brigade suffered severely, losing all its field-officers but two, and a large proportion of its men killed and captured, being disabled for further effective service that day. In the meantime
Archer's Confederate brigade had occupied
McPherson's wood, and as the regiments of
Meredith's “Iron Brigade” came up, they were sent forward by
Doubleday, who fully recognized the importance of the position, to dislodge
Archer.
At the entrance of the wood they found
Reynolds in person, and, animated by his presence, rushed to the charge, struck successive heavy blows, outflanked and turned the enemy's right, captured
General Archer and a large portion of his brigade, and pursued the remainder across
Willoughby Run.
Wadsworth's small division had thus won decided successes against superior numbers, but it was at grievous cost
to the army and the country, for
Reynolds, while directing the operations, was killed in the wood by a sharp-shooter.
It was not, however, until by his promptitude and gallantry he had determined the decisive field of the war, and had opened brilliantly a battle which required three days of hard fighting to close with a victory.
To him may be applied in a wider sense than in its original one,
Napier's happy eulogium on Ridge: “No man died on that field with more glory than he, yet many died, and there was much glory.”
After the repulse of
Davis and
Archer,
Heth's division was formed in line mostly south of the
Cashtown pike, with
Pender's in second line,
Pegram's and
McIntosh's artillery (nine batteries) occupying all the commanding positions west of
Willoughby Run.
Doubleday reestablished his former lines,
Meredith holding
McPherson's wood.
Soon after,
Rowley's and
Robinson's divisions (two brigades each) and the four remaining batteries of the corps
[
278]
 |
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Assault of Brockenbrough's Confederate Brigade (Heth's division) upon the Stone barn of the McPherson farm.
The line of the stone barn was held by Stone's brigade, Pennsylvania Bucktails (Doubleday's division), its right resting on the Chambersburg pike (the left of the picture) and its left on the McPherson woods, where a part of Archer's Confederate brigade of Heth's division was captured by Meredith's brigade.--editors. |
arrived.
Rowley's division was thrown forward,
Stone's brigade to the interval between
Meredith and
Cutler, and
Biddle's with
Cooper's battery to occupy the ridge between the wood and the
Fairfield road.
Reynolds's battery replaced
Hall's, and
Calef's rejoined
Gamble's cavalry, now in reserve.
Robinson's division was halted near the base of
Seminary Ridge.
By this time, near noon,
General Howard arrived, assumed command, and directed
General Schurz, commanding the Eleventh Corps, to prolong
Doubleday's line toward
Oak Hill with
Schimmelfennig's and
Barlow's divisions and three batteries, and to post
Steinwehr's division and two batteries on
Cemetery Hill, as a rallying-point.
By 1 o'clock, when this corps was arriving,
Buford had reported
Ewell's approach by the
Heidlersburg road, and
Howard called on
Sickles at
Emmitsburg and
Slocum at
Two Taverns for aid, to which both these officers promptly responded.
It was now no longer a question of prolonging
Doubleday's line, but of protecting it against
Ewell whilst engaged in front with
Hill.
Schurz's two divisions, hardly 6000 effectives, accordingly formed line on the open plain half a mile north of the town.
They were too weak to cover the ground, and a wide interval was left between the two corps, covered only by the fire of
Dilger's and
Wheeler's batteries (ten guns) posted behind it.
That morning, whilst on the march to
Cashtown,
Ewell received
Hill's notice that his corps was advancing to
Gettysburg, upon which he turned
[
279]
the heads of his own columns to that point.
Reporting the change by a staff-officer to
General Lee,
Ewell was instructed that if the
Federals were in force at
Gettysburg a general battle was not to be brought on until the rest of the army was up. Approaching
Gettysburg,
Rodes, guided by the sounds of battle, followed the prolongation of
Seminary Ridge;
Iverson's, Daniel's, and
Ramseur's brigades on the western,
O'Neal's and
Doles's on the eastern slope.
Ewell, recognizing the importance of
Oak Hill, ordered it to be occupied by
Carter's artillery battalion, which immediately opened on both the
Federal corps, enfilading
Doubleday's line.
This caused
Wadsworth again to withdraw
Cutler to
Seminary Ridge, and
Reynolds's battery was posted near McPherson's house, under partial cover.
Stone therefore placed two of his three regiments on the
Cashtown pike, so as to face
Oak Hill.
This left an interval between
Stone and
Cutler, through which
Cooper and
Reynolds could fire with effect, and gave to these lines a cross-fire on troops entering
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Confederate dead gathered for burial near the McPherson woods.
From photographs. |
the angle between them.
Robinson now sent his two brigades to strengthen
Cutler's right.
They took post behind the stone walls of a field,
Paul's brigade facing west,
Baxter's north.
Rodes, regarding this advance as a menace, gave orders at 2:30 P. M. to attack.
Iverson, sweeping round to his left, engaged
Paul, who prolonged
Cutler's line, and
O'Neal attacked
Baxter.
The repulse of
O'Neal soon enabled
Baxter to turn upon
Iverson.
Cutler also attacked him in flank, and after losing 500 men killed and wounded, 3 of
Iverson's regiments surrendered.
General Robinson reports the capture of 1000 prisoners and 3 colors;
General Paul was severely wounded, losing both eyes.
Meanwhile Daniel's brigade advanced directly on
Stone, who maintained his lines against this attack and also
Brockenbrough's, of
Hill's corps,
[
280]
[
281]
but was soon severely wounded.
Colonel Wister, who succeeded him, met the same fate, and
Colonel Dana took command of the brigade.
Ramseur, who followed Daniel, by a conversion to the left, now faced
Robinson and
Cutler with his own brigade, the remnant of
Iverson's, and one regiment of
O'Neal's, his right connecting with Daniel's left, and the fighting became hot. East of the ridge,
Doles's brigade had been held in observation, but about 3:30 P. M., on the advance of
Early, he sent his skirmishers forward and drove those of
Devin — who had gallantly held the enemy's advance in check with his dismounted troopers — from their line and its hillock on
Rock Creek.
Barlow, considering this an eligible position for his own right, advanced his division, supported by
Wilkeson's battery, and seized it. This made it necessary for
Schurz to advance a brigade of
Schimmelfennig's division to connect with
Barlow, thus lengthening his already too extended line.
The arrival of
Early's division had by this time brought an overwhelming force on the flank and rear of the Eleventh Corps.
On the east of
Rock Creek,
Jones's artillery battalion, within easy range, enfiladed its whole line and took it in reverse, while the brigades of
Gordon,
Hays, and
Avery in line, with
Smith's in reserve, advanced about 4 P. M. upon
Barlow's position,
Doles, of
Rodes's division, connecting with
Gordon.
An obstinate and bloody contest ensued, in which
Barlow was desperately wounded,
Wilkeson killed, and the whole corps forced back to its original line, on which, with the aid of
Coster's brigade and
Heckman's battery, drawn from
Cemetery Hill,
Schurz endeavored to rally it and cover the town.
The fighting here was well sustained, but the
Confederate force was overpowering in numbers, and the troops retreated to
Cemetery Hill,
Ewell entering the town about 4:30 P. M. These retrograde movements had uncovered the flank of the First Corps and made its right untenable.
Meanwhile, that corps had been heavily engaged along its whole line; for, on the approach of
Rodes,
Hill attacked with both his divisions.
There were thus opposed to the single disconnected Federal line south of the
Cashtown pike two solid Confederate ones which outflanked their left a quarter of a mile or more.
Biddle's small command, less than a thousand men, after a severe contest, was gradually forced back.
In
McPherson's wood and beyond,
Meredith's and
Dana's brigades repeatedly repulsed their assailants, but as
Biddle's retirement uncovered their left, they too fell back to successive positions from which they inflicted heavy losses, until finally all three reached the
note to cut, P. 280.--The death of
Lieutenant Bayard Wilkeson, who commanded Battery G, Fourth U. S. Artillery, was one of the most heroic episodes of the fight.
He was but nineteen years old and was the son of
Samuel Wilkeson, who, as correspondent of the “New-York times,” was at
Meade's headquarters during the fight.
Young
Wilkeson, by his fearless demeanor, held his battery in an exposed position on the
Union right.
General John B. Gordon, finding it impossible to advance his Confederate division in the face of
Wilkeson's fire, and realizing that if the officer on the horse could be disposed of the battery would not remain, directed two batteries of his command to train every gun upon him.
Wilkeson was brought to the ground, desperately wounded, and his horse was killed.
He was carried by the
Confederates to the
Alms House (or dragged himself there — the accounts differ), where he died that night.
Just before he expired, it is said, he asked for water; a canteen was brought to him; as he took it a wounded soldier lying next to him begged, “For God's sake give me some!”
He passed the canteen untouched to the man, who drank every drop it contained.
Wilkeson smiled on the man, turned slightly, and expired.--editors.
[
282]
 |
|
Note.--Edward Johnson's Confederate division (upper right-hand corner) did not reach the position assigned them on this map until after sunset or about dusk of July 1st.
See p. 284.--editors. |
foot of
Seminary Ridge, where
Colonel Wainwright, commanding the corps artillery, had planted twelve guns south of the
Cashtown pike, with
Stewart's battery, manned in part by men of the
Iron Brigade, north of it.
Buford had already thrown half of
Gamble's dismounted men south of the
Fairfield road.
Heth's division had suffered so severely that
Pender's had passed to its front, thus bringing fresh troops to bear on the exhausted Federal line.
It was about 4 P. M. when the whole Confederate line advanced to the final attack.
On their right
Gamble held
Lane's brigade for some time in check,
Perrin's and
Scales's suffered severely, and
Scales's was broken up, for Stewait, swinging half his guns, under
Lieutenant Davison, upon the
Cashtown pike, raked it. The whole corps being now heavily pressed and its right uncovered,
Doubleday gave the order to fall back to
Cemetery Hill, which was effected in
[
283]
 |
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The line of defense at the Cemetery gate-house.
From a photograph. |
comparatively good order, the rear, covered by the 7th Wisconsin, turning when necessary to check pursuit.
Colonel Wainwright, mistaking the order, had clung with his artillery to
Seminary Hill, until, seeing the infantry retreating to the town, he moved his batteries down the
Cashtown pike until lapped on both sides by the enemy's skirmishers, at close range, when they were compelled to abandon one gun on the road, all its horses being killed.
The Eleventh Corps also left a disabled gun on the field.
Of the troops who passed through the town, many, principally men of the Eleventh Corps, got entangled in the streets, lost their way, and were captured.
On ascending
Cemetery Hill, the retreating troops found
Steinwehr's division in position covered by stone fences on the slopes, and occupying by their skirmishers the houses in front of their line.
As they arrived they were formed, the Eleventh Corps on the right, the First Corps on the left of
Steinwehr.
As the batteries came up, they were well posted by
Colonels Wainwright and
Osborn, and soon a formidable array of artillery was ready to cover with its fire all the approaches.
Buford assembled his command on the plain west of
Cemetery Hill, covering the left flank and presenting a firm front to any attempt at pursuit.
The First Corps found a small reenforcement awaiting it, in the 7th Indiana, part of the train escort, which brought up nearly five hundred fresh men.
Wadsworth met them and led them to
Culp's Hill, where, under direction of
Captain Pattison of that regiment, a defensive line was marked out. Their brigade (
Cutler's) soon joined them; wood and stone were plentiful, and soon the right of the line was solidly established.
Nor was there wanting other assurance to the men who had fought so long that their sacrifices had not been in vain.
As they reached the hill they were received by
General Hancock, who arrived just as they were coming up from the town, under orders from
General Meade to assume the command.
His person was well known; his presence inspired confidence, and it implied also the near approach of his army-corps.
He ordered
Wadsworth at once to
[
284]
Culp's Hill to secure that important position, and aided by
Howard, by
Warren who had also just arrived from headquarters, and by others, a strong line, well flanked, was soon formed.
General Lee, who from
Seminary Hill had witnessed the final attack, sent
Colonel Long, of his staff, a competent officer of sound judgment, to examine the position, and directed
Ewell to carry it if practicable, renewing, however, his previous warning to avoid bringing on a general engagement until the army was all up. Both
Ewell, who was making some preparations with a view to attack, and Long found the position a formidable one, strongly occupied and not accessible to artillery fire.
Ewell's men were indeed in no condition for an immediate assault.
Of
Rodes's eight thousand, nearly three thousand were
hors de combat. Early had lost over five hundred, and had but two brigades disposable, the other two having been sent on the report of the advance of Federal troops, probably the Twelfth Corps, then near by, to watch the
York road.
Hill's two divisions had been very roughly handled, and had lost heavily, and he withdrew them to
Seminary Hill as
Ewell entered the town, leaving the latter with not more than eight thousand men to secure the town and the prisoners.
Ewell's absent division (
Edward Johnson's) was expected soon, but it did not arrive until near sunset, when the Twelfth Corps and
Stannard's Vermont brigade were also up, and the Third Corps was arriving.
In fact an assault by the
Confederates was not practicable before 5:30 P. M., and after that the position was perfectly secure.
For the first time that day the
Federals had the advantage of position, and sufficient troops and artillery to occupy it, and
Ewell would not have been justified in attacking without the positive orders of
Lee, who was present, and wisely abstained from giving them.
[Continuation on page 290.]
