[
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In
Mr. Davis's account of the military operations in
Mississippi in 1863,
2 their disastrous result is attributed to my misconduct.
My object in the following statement is to exhibit the true causes of those disasters.
The combination of Federal military and naval forces which produced that result was made practicable by the military errors of the Confederate Government in 1862, and was made successful by its repetition of the gravest of those errors in 1863.
3
In the first half of July, 1862,
General Halleck was ordered to
Washington as general-in-chief.
Before leaving
Corinth he transferred
General Buell, with his troops, to
middle Tennessee, and left
General Grant in command of those holding in subjection
north-eastern Mississippi and
southern West Tennessee.
For this object they were distributed in
Corinth,
Memphis,
Jackson, and intermediate places.
They numbered about forty-two thousand present for duty by
Mr. Davis's estimate.
Their wide dispersion put them at the mercy of any superior or equal force, such as the
Confederacy could have brought against them readily; but this opportunity, such a one as has. rarely occurred in war, was put aside by the Confederate Government, and the army which, properly used, would have secured to the
South the possession of
Tennessee and
Mississippi was employed in a wild expedition into
Kentucky, which could have had only the results of a raid.
Mr. Davis extols the strategy of that operation, which, he says, “manoeuvred the foe out of a large and to us important territory.”
This advantage, if it could be called so, was of the briefest.
For this “foe” drove us out of
Kentucky in a few weeks, and recovered permanently the “large and to us important territory.”
After
General Bragg was compelled to leave
Kentucky, the
Federal army, which until then had been commanded by
General Buell, was established at
Nashville, under
General Rosecrans.
And
General Bragg, by a very circuitous route through
south-eastern Kentucky and
north-eastern Tennessee, brought his troops to the neighborhood of
Murfreesboro‘.
Mr. Davis says [ “Rise and fall,” p. 384] that “the strength of the
Federal army, as we have ascertained, was 65,000 men.”
Army returns show that it was a little less than 47,000, and
Bragg's, 44,000.
[See also this volume, p. 30.]
[
473]
General Grant was then in
northern Mississippi, with an army formed by uniting the detachments that had been occupying
Corinth and various points in
southern West Tennessee.
He was preparing for the invasion of
Mississippi, with the special object of gaining possession of
Vicksburg by the combined action of his army and
Admiral Porter's squadron, which was in readiness.
To oppose him,
Lieutenant-General Pemberton, who commanded the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, had an active army of 23,000 effective infantry and artillery, and above 6000 cavalry, most of it irregular.
There were also intrenched camps at
Vicksburg and
Port Hudson, each held by about six thousand men, protecting batteries of old smoothbore guns, which, it was hoped, would prevent the
Federal war vessels from occupying the intermediate part of the
Mississippi.
Lieutenant-General Holmes was then encamped near
Little Rock with an army of above fifty thousand men, as
General Cooper,
adjutant-general, reported to the
President in my presence.
There were no Federal forces in
Arkansas at the time, except one or two garrisons.
In all the time to which the preceding relates I had been out of service from the effects of two severe wounds received in the battle of
Seven Pines [May 31st, 1862]. On the 12th of November, 1862, I reported myself fit for duty.
The
Secretary of War replied that I would be assigned to service in
Tennessee and
Mississippi in a few days.
Thinking myself authorized to make suggestions in relation to the warfare in which I was to be engaged, I proposed to the
Secretary, in his office, that, as the
Federal forces about to invade
Mississippi were united in that State, ours available for its defense should be so likewise; therefore
General Holmes should be ordered to unite his forces with
General Pemberton's without delay.
As a reply, he read me a letter of late date from himself to
General Holmes, instructing that officer to make the movement just suggested, and then a note from the
President directing him to countermand his order to
General Holmes.
A few days after this,
General Randolph resigned the office of
Secretary of War--unfortunately for the
Confederacy.
On the 24th of November
Mr. Seddon, who had succeeded
General Randolph as
Secretary of War, assigned me to the command of the departments of
General Bragg and
Lieutenant-Generals E. Kirby Smith and
Pemberton, each to command his department under me. In acknowledging this order, I again suggested the transfer of the army in
Arkansas to
Mississippi.
The suggestion was not adopted or noticed.
The Government placed my headquarters at
Chattanooga, but authorized me to move them as occasion might require.
On the 4th of December, I received there a telegram from the
adjutant-general, informing me that
Lieutenant-General Pemberton was falling back before a very superior force; that “
Lieutenant-General Holmes has been peremptorily ordered to reinforce him, but that, as his troops may be too late, the
President urges on you the importance of sending a sufficient force from
General Bragg's command to the aid of
Lieutenant-General Pemberton.”
I replied that
Lieutenant-General Holmes's troops could join the army in
Mississippi much sooner than
General Bragg's, and that the latter officer could not give adequate aid to the army in
[
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Mississippi without exposing himself to inevitable defeat.
And further, that there was no object in our retaining troops in
Arkansas, where they could find no enemy.
For these reasons I declined to weaken
General Bragg without further orders to do so.
About the 9th of December the
President passed through
Chattanooga on his way to
Murfreesboro‘, to decide, at
General Bragg's headquarters, whether the army of Tennessee or that of
Arkansas should furnish the reenforcements necessary to enable the
Confederacy to hold the
Mississippi and its valley.
He returned in two or three days and directed me to order
General Bragg to send ten thousand of his men under
Major-General C. L. Stevenson to report to
General Pemberton.
The order was given as the
President's. He then set out to
Mississippi, desiring me to accompany him. In
Jackson, which he reached the morning of the 19th of December, he found the Legislature in session.
It had been convened by
Governor Pettus to bring out the remaining military resources of the
State, to aid in its defense.
On the 21st and 22d
Mr. Davis inspected the water-batteries and land defenses of
Vicksburg, which were then very extensive, but slight — the usual defect of Confederate engineering.
He also conferred with the commander,
Major-General Martin L. Smith, and me, in reference to the forces required to hold that place and
Port Hudson, and at the same time to oppose
General Grant in the field.
We agreed (
General Smith and I) that at least twenty thousand more troops were necessary, and I again urged him to transfer the troops in
Arkansas to
Mississippi.
In a friendly note to
General Holmes, which I was permitted to read,
Mr. Davis pointed out to him that he would benefit the service by sending twenty thousand men into
Mississippi, but gave him no order; consequently no troops came.
Thus an army outnumbering that which
General Grant was then commanding was left idle, while preparations were in progress, near it, for the conquest of a portion of the
Confederacy so important as the
valley of the Mississippi.
From
Vicksburg the
President visited
General Pemberton's army in the extensive position it was intrenching near
Grenada,--so extensive that it is fortunate for us, probably, that
General Grant was prevented from trying its strength.
In conversing with the
President concerning the operations impending,
General Pemberton and I advocated opposite modes of warfare.
[
475]
On the 25th the
President returned to
Jackson, and on the 27th information was received from
General W. W. Loring, commanding near
Grenada, that
General Grant's army, which had been advancing, was retiring in consequence of the destruction of the depot of supplies at
Holly Springs by the gallant
Van Dorn's daring and skillfully executed enterprise, surpassed by none of its character achieved during the war. This depot was to have supplied the
Federal army in its march toward
Vicksburg.
Its destruction frustrated that design.
General Van Dorn accomplished it on the 20th of December with a brigade of cavalry, attacking, defeating, and capturing a superior force.
The supplies were destroyed by burning the store-houses — to which the consent of the owners was freely given.
The destruction of the stores compelled
General Grant to fall back and gave the Confederate Government abundant time for thorough preparations to meet his next advance.
The most effective, indeed a decisive one, would have required but 12 or 15 days--the uniting
Lieutenant-General Holmes's troops with
Lieutenant-General Pemberton's, in
Mississippi, which would have formed an effective force of little less than 75,000 men.
Before
Mr. Davis returned to
Richmond I represented to him that my command was a nominal one merely, and useless; because the great distance between the armies of
Tennessee and
Mississippi, and the fact that they had different objects and adversaries, made it impossible to combine their action; so there was no employment for me unless I should take command of one of the armies in an emergency, which, as each had its own general, was not intended or desirable.
He replied that the great distance of these departments from the seat of government made it necessary that there should be an officer near them with authority to transfer troops from one to the other in emergencies.
I suggested that each was too weak for its object; and that neither, therefore, could be drawn upon to strengthen the other; and that the distance between them was so great as to make such temporary transfers impracticable.
These objections were disregarded, however.
The detaching of almost a fourth of
General Bragg's army to
Mississippi, while of no present value to that department, was disastrous to that of
Tennessee, for it caused the battle of
Murfreesboro‘.
General Rosecrans was, of course, soon informed of the great reduction of his antagonist's strength, and marched from
Nashville to attack him. The battle, that of
Murfreesboro' or
Stone's River, occurred on the 31st of December, 1862, and the 2d of January, 1863, and was one of the most obstinately contested and bloody of the war, in proportion to the numbers engaged.
[See articles to follow.] The result of this action compelled the Confederate army to fall back and place itself behind
Duck River, at
Manchester,
Tullahoma, and
Shelbyville.
Early in December
Grant projected an enterprise against
Vicksburg under
Sherman's command.
He directed that officer to embark at
Memphis with about 30,000 men, descend the river with them to the neighborhood of the place, and with the cooperation of
Admiral Porter's squadron proceed to reduce it.
Sherman entered the
Yazoo with his forces on the 26th of December, employed several days in reconnoitering, and on the 29th made a vigorous
[
476]
assault upon the defensive line near
Chickasaw Bayou, manned by
Brigadier-General S. D. Lee's brigade, which repelled the attack.
4 General Pemberton reported that the
Confederate loss was 150, and that of the
Federals 1100.
5
The combined land and naval forces then left the
Yazoo, and, entering the
Arkansas, ascended it to
Arkansas Post, which they captured, with its garrison of five thousand Confederate troops.
In the meantime
General Pemberton brought what had been his active forces into
Vicksburg.
On the 20th of January all the troops destined for the operations against
Vicksburg were ordered by
General Grant to
Milliken's Bend and
Young's Point, where he joined them on the 29th.
These troops were employed until April in cutting a canal through the point of land opposite
Vicksburg, to enable the
Federal vessels to pass it without exposure to the batteries; but the attempt was unsuccessful.
In the meantime
Brigadier-General Bowen was detached with three brigades to
Grand Gulf, to construct batteries there; and
Major-General Loring, with a similar detachment, was sent to select and fortify a position to prevent the enemy from approaching
Vicksburg by the
Yazoo Pass and River.
He constructed a field-work for this object at the head of the
Yazoo.
A flotilla of 9
United States gun-boats and 20 transports, carrying 4500 troops, appeared before it on the 11th of March,
and constructed a land-battery, which, with the gun-boats, cannonaded the fort several days; but the steady fire of the little work [
Fort Pemberton] compelled the assailants to draw off and return to the
Mississippi.
On the 22d of January, while inspecting the works for the defense of
Mobile, then in course of construction, I received orders by telegraph from the
President to go to
General Bragg's headquarters “with the least delay.”
A letter from the
President delivered to me in
Chattanooga told for what service.
It was to ascertain if
General Bragg had so far lost the confidence of the army as to make it expedient to remove him from command.
After making the necessary investigation thoroughly, I came to the conclusion that there was no ground for the general's removal, so reported, and resumed the inspection at
Mobile.
While so employed, I received a telegram from the
Secretary of War, in which he ordered me to direct
General Bragg to report at the
War
[
477]
Department for conference; and to assume, myself, direct charge of the army in
middle Tennessee.
On my return to
Tullahoma under this order, I learned that the general was devoting himself to
Mrs. Bragg, who was supposed to be at the point of death.
So the communication of the order to him was postponed, and the postponement and the cause reported to the
Secretary.
Mrs. Bragg's condition improved, however; but before it became such as to permit
General Bragg to return to military duty, I had become unfit for it, and was compelled to retain him in the command of the Army of Tennessee and put myself under the care of a surgeon.
This sickness continued for weeks, and was
reported repeatedly.
The
United States naval officers had already ascertained that their ironclads could pass the Confederate batteries without great danger.
Moreover, as
General Pemberton had reported, the wooden vessels
Hartford and
Albatross had passed
Port Hudson while most of our guns were engaged with the other vessels of
Admiral Farragut's squadron.
This reduced the value of our water-batteries greatly.
Yet, in the first half of April,
General Pemberton became convinced that
General Grant had abandoned the design against
Vicksburg and was preparing to reembark his forces, perhaps to join
General Rosecrans; and on April 11th he expressed the belief that most of those troops were being withdrawn to
Memphis, and stated that he himself was assembling troops at
Jackson to follow this movement.
This was approved.
On the 17th, however, he reported that the
Federal army had resumed its offensive operations.
He also reported that
General Grant was occupying New Carthage, and that there were nine Federal gun-boats between
Vicksburg and
Port Hudson.
Colonel B. H. Grierson [Federal] set out from
La Grange on the 17th of April on his noted raid through
Mississippi, terminating at
Baton Rouge, May 2d.
The mischief reported was the burning of some bridges, engines, and cars near
Newton, the destruction of ammunition and cars at
Hazelhurst, and the burning of the railroad depot and cars at
Brookhaven.
Several brigades of infantry were detached to protect such property; but fruitlessly, of course.
Admiral Porter's squadron, and three transports towing barges, passed
Vicksburg on the night of April 16th, and ran down to Hard Times, where the army was; and six more transports and barges followed on the night of the 22d.
On the two occasions, one transport was sunk, another burned, and six barges rendered unserviceable by the fire of the batteries.
General Grant's plan seems to have been to take possession of
Grand Gulf, and thence operate against
Vicksburg; for
Admiral Porter's squadron commenced firing upon the
Confederate works early in the morning of the 29th, and the Thirteenth Corps was ready to seize them as soon as their guns should be silenced; but as their fire had slackened but little at 6 o'clock,
Grant changed his plan and sent his troops and transports to the landing-place, six miles from
Bruinsburg, on the east bank of the river.
The four divisions of the Thirteenth Corps were ferried to that point during the day of the 30th.
General Bowen, at
Grand Gulf, observed this, and led parts of his three brigades (five thousand men) to the road from
Bruinsburg to
Port Gibson, four miles in advance of the latter.
By admirable conduct and great advantages
[
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of ground, this handful delayed the advance of the Thirteenth Corps six or eight hours.
Lieutenant-General Pemberton informed me of this engagement by telegraph during the fighting, adding: “I should have large reinforcements.”
I replied immediately: “If
General Grant's army lands on this side of the river, the safety of
Mississippi depends on beating it. For that object you should unite your whole force.”
And I telegraphed again next day: “If
Grant's army crosses, unite all your forces to beat it. Success will give you back what was abandoned to win it.”
In transmitting
General Pemberton's call for reinforcements to the
Secretary of War, I said: “They cannot be sent from here without giving up
Tennessee.”
On the 3d
Bowen's troops abandoned
Grand Gulf and returned to
Vicksburg.
On the same day the Seventeenth Corps joined the Thirteenth at
Willow Springs, where the two waited for the Fifteenth, which came up on the 8th.
The army then marched toward
Raymond, the Seventeenth Corps leaving first, and the Fifteenth second.
In the evening of May 9th I received, by telegraph, orders to proceed at once to
Mississippi and take chief command of the forces there, and to arrange to take with me, for temporary service, or to have follow without delay, three thousand good troops.
I replied instantly: “Your dispatch of this morning received.
I shall go immediately, although unfit for service,” and took the first train, which was on the morning of the 10th.
At
Lake Station, on the 13th, I found a telegram from
General Pemberton, dated the; 12th, informing me that the enemy was apparently moving in heavy force on
Edwards's depot, which, as he said, “will be the battle-field if I can carry forward sufficient force, leaving troops enough to secure the safety of this place [Vicksburg].”
This was the first intelligence of the
Federal army received from
General Pemberton since the first of the month.
I arrived in
Jackson at nightfall, exhausted by an uninterrupted journey of four days, undertaken from a sick-room; in consequence of which
Major Mims,
chief quartermaster of the department, the first officer who reported to me, found me in bed. He informed me, among other military occurrences, that two brigades had marched into the town an hour or two before.
Brigadier-General Gregg, their senior officer, reported to me soon after that he had been ordered from
Port Hudson to
Raymond by
General Pemberton, but had been driven from that place the day before by the
Federal Seventeenth Corps;, and, in obedience to the general's instructions for such an event, had fallen back to
Jackson, accompanied by
Brigadier-General W. H. T. Walker, whom he had met on the way, marching to join him with his brigade.
The latter had just come from
General Beauregard's department [South Carolina,
Georgia,, and
Florida]. There were about six thousand men in the two brigades.
He said further that
Colonel Wirt Adams, of the cavalry, had informed him that
General Pemberton's forces were at
Edwards's depot, 20 miles from
Vicksburg, and his headquarters at
Bovina, 8 miles from that place; that the Seventeenth Corps (
McPherson's) had moved that day from
Raymond to
Clinton, 9 or 10 miles from
Jackson, on the road to
Vicksburg.
He added that
General Maxey's brigade from
Port Hudson was expected in
Jackson next
[
479]
day.
I had passed
General Gist's during that day, on its way from
Charleston.
The arrival of these troops, and, as I hoped, 3000 from
Tennessee, would increase the force in
Jackson to near 15,000 men. The most important measure to be executed then was the junction of these reinforcements with the army.
For that object, an order in writing was sent without delay to
General Pemberton by
Captain Yerger, who volunteered to bear it, to move to
Clinton at once and attack a Federal.
corps there, the troops in
Jackson to cooperate; to beat that detachment and establish communication, that he might be reinforced.
It was delivered at
Bovina early next morning, and
General Pemberton replied promptly that he “moved at once with his whole available force” ; but in the ride of ten or twelve miles to his camp at
Edwards's depot he determined to disobey my order, and on his arrival assembled a council of war, which he informed of that intention, and consulted upon the measure to be substituted for the movement to
Clinton.
It was decided to move southward to a point on the road by which
General Grant's forces had advanced, which would have made it impossible for the troops then in
Jackson and other expected reenforcements to join
Pemberton's army.
Mr. Davis says of this [ “Rise and fall,” II., pp. 404-5]:
When he [Johnston] reached Jackson, learning that the enemy was between that place and the position occupied by General Pemberton's forces, about thirty miles distant, he halted there and opened correspondence with General Pemberton, from which confusion and consequent disasters resulted, which might have been avoided had he, with or without his reenforcements, proceeded to General Pemberton's headquarters in the field.
Mr. Davis knew that I had been sick five or six weeks when ordered to
Mississippi, and therefore he had no right to suppose that I was able to make a night ride of thirty miles, after a journey of four days. He knew, too, that my course, which he now condemns, was the only one offering us a hope of success; for he indorsed on a letter of mine, giving a brief account of these events to the
Secretary of War: “Do not perceive why a junction was not attempted, which would have made our force nearly equal in number to the estimated strength of the enemy; and might have resulted in a total defeat under circumstances which rendered retreat or reenforcement to him scarcely practicable.”
It would be doing injustice to
Mr. Davis's intelligence to think that he really believes that I am chargeable with the consequences of the disobedience of my indispensable order, or that he is ignorant that our only hope of success lay in the execution of that order, and that to disobey it was to ruin us.
After the decision of the council of war,
General Pemberton remained at
Edwards's depot at least 24 hours; and instead of marching in the morning of the 14th, his movement was commenced so late on the 15th that he bivouacked at night but three or four miles from the ground he had left.
Here, soon after nightfall, the camp-fires of a division were pointed out to him, but he took no measures in consequence.
Soon after sunrise on the 16th he received an order from me, the second one, to march toward
Clinton that our forces might be united.
He made preparations to obey it, and, in acknowledging it, described the route he intended to follow; but he remained
[
480]
passive five or six hours, before a single Federal division, until near noon, when
General Grant, having brought up six other divisions, attacked him. Notwithstanding the enemy's great superiority of numbers,
General Pemberton maintained a spirited contest of several hours, but was finally driven from the field.
This was the battle of
Baker's Creek, or Champion's Hill.
The Confederate troops retreated toward
Vicksburg, but bivouacked at night near the
Big Black River, one division in some earth-works in front of the bridge, the other a mile or two in rear of it. Lorina, whose division was in the rear, in quitting the field, instead of crossing
Baker's Creek, turned southward, and by a skillfully conducted march eluded the enemy, and in three days joined the troops from the east, assembling near
Jackson.
On the near approach of the pursuing army next morning, the troops in front of the bridge abandoned the intrenchments and retreated rapidly to
Vicksburg, accompanied by the division that had been posted west of the river.
Information of this was brought to me in the evening of that day, and I immediately wrote to
General Pemberton that, if invested in
Vicksburg, he must ultimately surrender; and that, instead of losing both troops and place, he must save the troops by evacuating
Vicksburg and marching to
 |
|
Vicksburg Court House, a Landmark during the siege.
From a photograph taken in 1880. |
the north-east.
The question of obeying this order was submitted by him to a council of war, which decided that “it was impossible to withdraw the troops from that position with such
morale and material as to be of further service to the
Confederacy.”
This allegation was refuted by the courage, fortitude, and discipline displayed by that army in the long siege.
The investment of the place was completed on the 19th; on the 20th
Gist's brigade from
Charleston, on the 21st
Ector's and
McNair's from
Tennessee, and on the 23d
Maxey's from
Port Hudson joined
Gregg's and
Walker's near
Canton.
This force was further increased on the 3d of June by the arrival of
Breckinridge's division and
Jackson's (two thousand) cavalry from the Army of Tennessee, and
Evans's brigade from
Charleston.
These troops, except the cavalry, having come by railroad, were not equipped for the service before them: that of rescuing the garrison of
Vicksburg.
They required artillery, draught horses and mules, wagons, ammunition, and provisions, all in large numbers and quantity; the more because it was necessary to include the
Vicksburg troops in our estimates.
[
481]
According to
Lieutenant-General Pemberton's report of March 31st, 1863 (the only one I can find), he had then present for duty 2360 officers and 28,221 enlisted men. These were the troops that occupied
Vicksburg and the camp at
Edwards's depot when
General Pemberton received my order dated May 13th.
There were, besides, above two thousand cavalry in the northern and south-western parts of the
State.
I have
General Grant's reports of May 31st and June 30th, 1863.
The first shows a force of 2991 officers and 47.500 enlisted men present for duty: the second, 4412 officers and 70,866 enlisted men present for duty.
The so-called
siege of Vicksburg was little more than a blockade.
But one vigorous assault was made, which was on the third day.
Mr. Davis represents that
General Pemberton's operations were cramped by a want of cavalry, for which I was responsible.
He had cavalry enough; but it was used near the extremities of the
State against raiding parties, instead of being employed against the formidable invasion near the center.
Mr. Davis accepts that officer's idea that a large body of cavalry could have broken
General Grant's communication with the
Mississippi, and so defeated his enterprise.
But
Grant had no communication with the
Mississippi.
His troops supplied themselves from the country around them.
He accuses me of producing “confusion and consequent disasters” by giving a written order to
Lieutenant-General Pemberton, which he terms opening correspondence.
But as that order, dated May 13th, was disobeyed, it certainly produced neither confusion nor disaster.
But “consequent disaster” was undoubtedly due to the disobedience of that order, which caused the battle of Champion's Hill.
When that order was written, obedience to it, which would have united all our forces, might have enabled us to contend with
General Grant on equal terms, and perhaps to win the campaign.
Strange as it may now seem,
Mr. Davis thought so at the time, as the indorsement already quoted proves distinctly.
A proper use of the available resources of the
Confederacy would have averted the disasters referred to by
Mr. Davis.
If, instead of being sent on the wild expedition into
Kentucky,
General Bragg had been instructed to avail himself of the dispersed condition of the
Federal troops in
northern Mississippi and
west Tennessee, he might have totally defeated the forces with which
General Grant invaded
Mississippi three months later.
Those troops were distributed in
Corinth,
Jackson,
Memphis, and intermediate points, while his own were united, so that he could have fought them in detail, with
[
482]
as much certainty of success as can be hoped for in war. And such success would have prevented the military and naval combination which gave the enemy control of the
Mississippi and divided the
Confederacy, and would have given the
Confederacy the ascendency on that frontier.
It is evident, and was so then, that the three bodies of Confederate troops in
Mississippi in July, 1862, should have been united under
General Bragg.
The army of above 65,000 men so formed could not have been seriously resisted by the
Federal forces, not only greatly inferior to it in numbers, but so distributed that the various parts could have been attacked separately, and certainly defeated, probably destroyed.
Even after this failure the
Confederates were stronger to repel invasion than the
Federals to invade.
By uniting their forces in
Arkansas with those in
Mississippi, an army of above 70,000 men would have been formed, to meet
General Grant's of 43,000.
In all human probability such a force would have totally defeated the invading army, and not only preserved
Mississippi but enabled us to recover
Tennessee.
But if there were some necessity known only to the
President to keep the
Confederate troops then in
Arkansas on that side of the
Mississippi, he could have put
General Pemberton on at least equal terms with his antagonist, by giving him the troops in April actually sent to him late in May.
This would have formed an army of above fifty thousand men.
General Grant landed two corps, less than 30,000 men, on the 30th of April and 1st and 2d of May; and it was not until the 8th of May that the arrival of
Sherman's corps increased his force to about 43,000 men. The Confederate reinforcements could have been sent as well early in April as late in May; and then, without bad generalship on our part, the chances of success would have been in our favor, decidedly.
