by S. H. Lockett, C. S. A., chief engineer of the defenses.
The occupation of
Vicksburg was the immediate result of the fall of New Orleans on the 25th of April, 1862.
1 The first military operations were the laying out and construction of some batteries for heavy guns, by
Captain (afterward
Colonel)
D. B. Harris of the
Confederate States Engineers,
2 the work being mostly done by a force of hired negroes.
These batteries were located chiefly below the city; their positions were well chosen; they had fine command of the river against a fleet coming from below.
On the 12th of May, 1862,
Brigadier-General Martin Luther Smith arrived and took command, under orders from
Major-General Mansfield Lovell, the Department commander.
From that day to the end
General Smith was never absent from his post, was always equal to every emergency, and never once, while in control, failed to do the right: thing at the right time.
On the 20th of June, 1862, I was ordered from the Army of Tennessee, then under
General Bragg, to report to
General Smith as his
Chief Engineer.
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Confederate lines in the rear of Vicksburg.
From a War-time photograph. |
I was with him in that capacity until the 1st of November, when I was made, by
General Pemberton,
Chief Engineer of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, of which
General Pemberton had just taken command.
This change extended my field of operations from
Holly Springs to
Port Hudson, but I never relinquished immediate charge of the defenses of
Vicksburg.
Hence I may safely claim to have been identified with the defense almost from the beginning to the end of operations.
The series of irregular hills, bluffs, and narrow, tortuous ridges, apparently without system or order, that constitute the strong defensive position of
Vicksburg, raised some two hundred feet above the level of the river, owe their character, with all their strangely complex arrangement and configuration, to the natural erosive action of water on the fine, homogeneous, calcareous silt peculiar to the lias or bluff formation.
At the time of my arrival no enemy was near, but the work of preparation was going on vigorously.
The garrison was engaged in strengthening the batteries already constructed, in making bomb-proof magazines, and in mounting new guns recently arrived.
Several new batteries were laid out by myself on the most commanding points above the city; these were afterward known as the “Upper batteries.”
The work of making an accurate map of
Vicksburg and vicinity was also begun.
But we had not many days for these preliminaries.
On the 26th of June the advance of
Farragut's fleet arrived in sight.
The next morning found it in position for bombarding.
A flotilla of mortar-boats was moored close to the farther shore of the river just beyond the range of our lower batteries.
A second flotilla had crept along the bank next to us with their masts so covered with the boughs of trees that we did not discover them until they were quite near.
They were completely protected from our guns by the bank.
At a signal-gun from one of the iron-clads the guns were opened.
I measured one of the holes made by the mortar-shells in hard, compact clay, and found it seventeen feet deep.
It was a difficult matter to make bomb-proofs against such destructive engines.
A few shots were fired from our batteries in answer to the challenge of the mortar-boats, but these shots were harmless, and were soon discontinued.
The Federal bombardment was likewise nearly harmless.
But few soldiers and citizens were killed.
Vertical fire is never very destructive of life.
Yet the howling and bursting shells had a very demoralizing effect on those not accustomed to them.
One of my engineer officers, a Frenchman, a gallant officer who had distinguished himself in several severe engagements, was almost unmanned whenever one passed anywhere near him. When joked about it, he was not ashamed to confess: “I no like ze bomb; I cannot fight him back!”
June 28th was a memorable day. At early dawn the mortar-fleet renewed its heavy bombardment.
At the same time the vessels and gun-boats moved up toward the city and opened fire with all their heavy ordnance.
Under cover of this tremendous shelling the
Brooklyn and
Hartford and several of the iron-clads boldly pushed up stream, and went past our batteries under full headway, pouring into the city broadside after broadside with astonishing rapidity.
The Confederate batteries responded with equal energy.
The results of this first encounter with the hitherto redoubtable fleet was highly gratifying to the defenders of
Vicksburg.
It is true the fleet got past the batteries; but the
Brooklyn and
Octorora were temporarily disabled.
All the vessels suffered more or less, and many Federal sailors were killed and wounded, as we learned from people who lived across the river.
On the
Confederate side no gun was disabled, no battery injured, and only thirteen were killed or wounded.
Our batteries mounted 29 guns, of which 2 were 10-inch Columbiads, the rest being old style 42 and 32 pounders.
The
Brooklyn alone carried 24 11-inch
Dahlgren guns.
We expected a land attack at the same time, and were prepared for it by the presence of as many as ten thousand troops, under
Breckinridge,
Bowen, and
Preston, who had just
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arrived and were in near-supporting distance.
They were not called upon, however, and no troops were under fire except the brigade of
General M. L. Smith.
After this, for two weeks, things moved along at
Vicksburg with something akin to monotony.
The mortar-fleets kept up a steady bombardment, but even the citizens of the town became so accustomed to it that they went about their daily occupations.
The women and children left their caves to watch the shells, and would only betake themselves to their shelters when the fire seemed to be concentrated in their particular neighborhoods.
Finally the upper fleet, under
Flag-Officer C. H. Davis, came down the
river, joined the vessels that had run our batteries, put a flotilla of mortar-boats in position, and took part in the grand but nearly harmless sport of pitching big shells into
Vicksburg.
During this period
General Thomas Williams commenced the famous canal across the narrow neck of land in front of
Vicksburg.
But the water fell faster than the ditch was dug, the river refused to make a cut-off, and this effort also proved a failure.
On the 15th of July the monotony of the situation was greatly relieved by one of the most stirring episodes of the war. The little Confederate
ram, Arkansas, under her gallant commander,
I. N. Brown, came out of
Yazoo River, where she had been built in imitation of the famous
Merrimac, and ran the gauntlet of the whole upper fleet.
[See article by
Captain I. N. Brown, to follow.]
For several days after this the regulation bombardment was kept up. Suddenly, however, on the 25th of July, the lower fleet, big ships, gun-boats, and mortar-boats, weighed anchor and dropped down the river to a distance of several miles below their former position.
On the 27th both lower and upper fleets took leave of us, and the 28th of July found
Vicksburg once more freed from the presence of a hostile force.
Working parties were at once put upon the river-batteries to repair damages and increase their strength wherever recent experience had shown it to be necessary.
It was also determined to construct a line of defense in rear of
Vicksburg, to prepare against an army operating upon land.
As
chief engineer, it became my duty to plan, locate, and lay out that line of defense.
A month was spent in reconnoitering, surveying, and studying the complicated and irregular site to be fortified.
No greater topographical puzzle was ever presented to an engineer.
The difficulty of the situation was greatly enhanced by the fact that a large part of the hills and hollows had never been cleared of their virgin forest of magnificent magnolia-trees and dense undergrowth of cane.
At first it seemed impossible to find anything like a general line of commanding ground surrounding the city; but careful study gradually worked out the problem.
The most prominent points I purposed to occupy with a system of redoubts, redans, lunettes, and small field-works, connecting them by rifle-pits so as to give a continuous line of defense.
The work of construction was begun about the 1st of September with a force of negro laborers hired or impressed from the plantations of the adjacent counties.
Haynes's Bluff on the
Yazoo River and
Warrenton, about six miles below
Vicksburg, were fortified as flank protections to the main position.
On the 14th of October, 1862,
Lieutenant-General John C. Pemberton took command of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, establishing his headquarters at
Jackson.
About the same time
General Grant was placed in supreme command of the
Federal forces in
north Mississippi.
Then followed a succession of movements against
Vicksburg, having for their object the turning of that point.
They were all uniformly unsuccessful, and were so remote from the city, with one exception, that the garrison of
Vicksburg was not involved in the operations which defeated them.
I will simply mention them in the order in which they occurred.
First was
General Grant's advance from
Memphis and
Grand Junction, via
Holly Springs, toward
Grenada.
This was defeated by the raids of
Van Dorn and
Forrest upon
Grant's communications [December 20th and December 15th to January 3d]. He was forced to retire or starve.
Next came
General Sherman's attempt to get in rear of
Vicksburg by the
Chickasaw Bayou road, which ran from the
Yazoo River bottom to the
Walnut hills, six miles above the city.
His column of thirty thousand men was defeated and driven back with dreadful slaughter by
General S. D. Lee with one brigade of the Vieksburg garrison [December 20th to January 3d].
After this
General Grant himself appeared in front of
Vicksburg, occupied the river with an immense fleet and the
Louisiana shore with a large army.
He renewed the old style of bombardment and the work on the canal, but high water made him abandon that work and his position.
Then came the expedition, via
Lake Providence and
Bayou Macon, which was defeated by natural difficulties.
Next, the expedition by
Yazoo Pass and Hushpuccanaugh Bayou, which was stopped by
Fort Pemberton,--a cotton-bale fort made by
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Captain P. Robinson, of the
Confederate States Engineers, on the overflowed bottom-lands of the
Tallahatchie and
Yallabusha rivers, near their junction [February 24th to April 8th]. Here
General Loring, with 3 guns and about 1500 men, turned back a large fleet and land force, and won the sobriquet of “Old Blizzards” by standing on the cotton-bale parapet and shouting “Give them blizzards, boys!
Give them blizzards!”
Last of these flanking expeditions was one of
General Sherman and
Admiral Porter, via
Steele's Bayou, to reach the
Sunflower and
Yazoo rivers, above Haynes's Bluff [March 14th-27th]. This came near being as disastrous as that by the
Chickasaw Bayou, owing to obstructions made by the
Confederates and to a sudden fall in the waters.
Though these expeditions all failed, the desperate nature of most of them convinced us that
General Grant was in deep earnest, and not easily discouraged.
He made one more effort, which succeeded perhaps beyond his own most sanguine expectations.
This had been anticipated by
General Pemberton, and, to a certain extent, provided for by sending
General John S. Bowen to occupy and fortify
Grand Gulf.
I accompanied
General Bowen and located the works at
Grand Gulf, leaving them in charge of
Lieutenant Donnellan, of the
Confederate States Engineers.
On the night of the 16th of April, 1863, a large part of the upper fleet (then commanded by
Admiral David D. Porter), consisting of six gun-boats and several transports, ran the batteries at
Vicksburg.
Gun-boats had frequently passed the batteries during the operations of the preceding ten months, but up to that time no one had dreamed that the ordinary river steamboats could do so. They were protected by cotton-bales and by large barges loaded with coal and forage, lashed alongside.
One of the transports was fired by our shells, and burned to the water's edge in front of the city.
Two other boats were partly disabled, and several of the barges were sunk.
Yet eight boats succeeded in getting past both
Vicksburg and
Warrenton in more or less serviceable condition.
The movement of the boats was soon discovered by the
Confederate pickets, who nightly patrolled the river in small boats.
They immediately crossed the river and fired several houses in the village of
DeSoto, so as to illuminate the river.
To appreciate the boldness of this action one must try to put himself in the place of these pickets, who ran great risks of being captured in landing on the opposite shore, which was occupied by the
Federal forces.
In addition, as soon as their work was accomplished, they were exposed to the enemy's sharp-shooters, on the now brightly lighted river, and were in the direct line of fire of the batteries of their friends.
Yet they neither failed nor faltered.
Two nights later, four more boats, towing barges of large capacity, passed down the river, and joined the others at New Carthage, a village in
Louisiana about half-way between
Vicksburg and
Grand Gulf.
Here there was a fleet of formidable gun-boats, and transports and barges enough to ferry a large force across the river.
This gave a serious and threatening aspect to the movement.
At the same time a force under
General Sherman was again menacing Haynes's Bluff;
Grierson's raid
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“Sky parlor Hill,” a Confederate signal-station during the siege, and (pictures above and below) caves of the kind in which residents of Vicksburg sought refuge during the bombardment by the fleet.
From photographs. |
was playing havoc with railroads and depots of supplies in the interior of
Mississippi; rumors of movements of Federal troops in
north Mississippi were rife; and
Port Hudson in
Louisiana was threatened.
General Pemberton, just previous to this time, had sent some troops from his department to
General Bragg, at
Tullahoma, and had others
en route to the same destination.
As soon as he became convinced that
Vicksburg was seriously threatened by
General Grant's last move, he strongly pleaded for the return of his troops, and made rapid dispositions of those still left, to meet the various forces operating against him. Lack of reliable information, however, made his efforts unavailing.
3 Before he could determine which was the real attack, and which were mere diversions,
General Grant had perfected his arrangements, attacked and temporarily silenced the batteries of
Grand Gulf, and passed that point with his fleet.
This was on the 29th of April.
On the next day he crossed the river at
Bruinsburg and obtained a lodgment on the eastern shore.
Then followed in rapid succession the defeat of
Bowen at
Port Gibson on May 1st, the defeat of
General Gregg at
Raymond on the 12th, and the capture of
Jackson on the 14th.
Meantime
General Pemberton had left
Jackson and gone to
Vicksburg.
The writer followed him, after having laid out a line of defenses around
Jackson, leaving them to be constructed by
Captain Thyssens.
General Pemberton first thought that
Grant would turn north from
Port Gibson and try to force a passage across
Big Black River at one of the ferries.
He accordingly sent about a brigade eachtoHankinson's,
Hall's, and
Baldwin's ferr ies, and
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Cave near the machine-shop. |
ordered field-works to be thrown up at these crossings.
After taking measures to establish works for the defense of the important points on our main line of communications at the railroad bridge and
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Edwards's depot, I returned to
Vicksburg with
Captain Wintter's company of sappers and miners and put them to work on the rear line of defenses, with orders to make necessary repairs and put everything in good condition.
At last
General Pemberton became convinced that
General Grant's intention was to march up the east bank of
Big Black River, to strike the railroad at or near
Edwards's depot, and thus cut his communications with
Jackson.
To prevent this, and at the same time to defeat
Grant, if possible, he concentrated all of his forces at
Edwards's depot, excepting
General Forney's division which was left in
Vicksburg, and
General Smith's which was posted at and near the railroad bridge.
On the 12th of May, under the orders of
General Pemberton, I went to
Edwards's depot to put the Confederate forces in position upon the ground selected forthem to occupy, covering all the approaches from the south and east.
The army here assembled consisted of three divisions:
Bowen's on the right,
Loring's in the center, and
C. L. Stevenson's on the left, numbering about 18,000 men. Some slight field-works had been thrown up at favorable points.
The position was naturally a strong one, on high ground, with the cultivated valley of
Baker's Creek in its front.
Here
General Pemberton wished to wait to be attacked by
Grant.
There can be no doubt that if he had been allowed to do so a desperate and bloody battle would have been fought on that ground, the issue of which might have been different from that of the two unfortunate engagements which did actually occur.
The army remained at
Edwards's depot from the 13th to the 15th.
During this time
General Pemberton received numerous dispatches from
President Davis, and from
General J. E. Johnston, who had recently arrived at
Jackson.
I saw, or heard read, most of these dispatches.
They were very conflicting in their tenor, and neither those of
Mr. Davis nor those of
General Johnston exactly comported with
General Pemberton's views.
He then made the capital mistake of trying to harmonize instructions from his superiors diametrically opposed to each other, and at the same time to bring them into accord with his own judgment, which was adverse to the plan s of both.
Mr. Davis's idea was to hold
Vicksburg at all hazard, and not to endanger it by getting too far from it.
Johnston's plan was to cut loose from
Vicksburg altogether, manceuvre so as to avoid a general engagement with
Grant until the Confederate forces could be concentrated, and then beat him.
Pemberton wished to take a strong position on the line of the Big Black and wait for an attack, believing that it would be successfully resisted, and that then the tables could be turned upon
Grant in a very bad position, without any base of supplies, and without a well-protected line of retreat.
As I have said, none of these plans was carried out, but a sort of compromise or compound of all these attempts, resulting in the unfortunate battle of
Baker's Creek, or Champion's Hill, and the disgraceful stampede of Big Black bridge.
Pemberton moved out from
Edwards's depot in obedience to a dispatch from
General Johnston, ordering him to attack in the rear a force which he supposed
General Johnston was going to engage in front.
Instead of this, he encountered
Grant's victorious army returning, exultant and eager for more prizes, from the capture of
Jackson.
Pemberton's army, which was making a retrograde movement at the time, was put into line of battle by being faced to the right with infantry, artillery, baggage, and ordnance wagons just as they were.
In a few minutes after this disposition was made, his extreme left, previously the head of his column, was actively engaged with largely superior numbers.
Under all the circumstances the
Confederates made a gallant fight, but they were driven from the field with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and captured, and a considerable loss of arms and ammunition.
Stevenson's division bore the brunt of this battle and suffered the heaviest losses.
Bowen's division sustained its reputation by making one of its grand old charges, in which it bored a hole through the
Federal army, and finding itself unsupported turned around and bored its way back again.
Loring's division did not cooperate with the other two, through some misunderstanding or misconception, and was scarcely engaged at all during the fight.
Tilghman's brigade of this division covered the road by which the
Confederates retreated late in the afternoon.
While in the discharge of this
duty General Tilghman was killed.
Our beaten forces, except
Loring's division, retreated across
Baker's Creek and took position at nightfall at Big Black bridge; part of the forces,
Bowen's division and
Vaughn's brigade, being put in position in the
tete-de-pont on the east bank of the river, and part on the bluffs on the west.
Loring's division was moved by its commander, by the right; flank, around the
Federal army, and finally, after a loss of most of its cannon and wagons, joined
General Johnston at
Jackson.
The affair of Big Black bridge was one which an ex-Confederate participant naturally dislikes to record.
The Federals engaged us early in the
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morning from a copse of woods on our left.
I was standing on the railroad bridge at the time, and soon saw signs of unsteadiness in our men, and reporting the fact to
General Pemberton, received orders to prepare to destroy the bridges.
Fence-rails and loose cotton saturated with turpentine were piled on the railroad bridge, and a barrel of spirits of turpentine placed on the steamer
Dot, which was swung across the river and used as a bridge.
About 9 o'clock our troops on the left (
Vaughn's brigade) broke from their breastworks and came pell-mell toward the bridges.
Bowen's men, seeing themselves unsupported, followed the example, and soon the whole force was crossing the river by the bridges and by swimming, hotly pursued by the
Federals.
I was on the
Dot at the time.
Waiting until all the
Confederates in sight were across the river I touched a match to the barrel of turpentine, and with the aid of one of my lieutenants tipped it over.
In a moment the boat was in a blaze.
The railroad bridge
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Effect of the gun-boat shells on Vicksburg houses.
From a sketch made the day of the surrender. |
was likewise fired, and all immediate danger of pursuit prevented.
After the stampede at the bridge orders were issued for the army to fall back to
Vicksburg,
Major-General Stevenson being placed in command of the retreating forces.
General Pemberton rode on himself to
Bovina, a small railroad station about two and a half miles from the river.
I was the only staff-officer with him. He was very much depressed by the events of the last two days, and for some time after mounting his horse rode in silence.
He finally said: “Just thirty years ago I began my military career by receiving my appointment to a cadetship at the U. S. Military Academy, and to-day — the same date — that career is ended in disaster and disgrace.”
I strove to encourage him, urging that things were not so bad as they seemed to be; that we still had two excellent divisions (
Smith's and
Forney's) which had not been engaged and were, therefore, fresh and not demoralized; that they could occupy our lines at
Vicksburg, covering especially the approaches from the position now occupied by the
Federal forces, which they would naturally follow; that the rest of the troops could be put, at first, in the less exposed parts of the line, or in reserve, until they had steadied themselves; that
Vicksburg was strong and could not be carried by assault; and that
Mr. Davis had telegraphed to him “to hold
Vicksburg at all hazard,” adding that “if besieged he would be relieved.”
To all of which
General Pemberton replied that my youth and hopes were the parents of my judgment; he himself did not believe our troops would stand the first shock of an attack.
We finally reached
Bovina, where the general halted, and at my earnest instance wrote an order directing me to return to
Vicksburg in all possible haste, to put the place in a good state of defense.
This order directed all officers, of whatsoever rank, to obey all requisitions of the
chief engineer for men, materials, and labor, and to render all possible aid in carrying out his plans.
Generals Forney and
Smith responded heartily, and before nightfall work was under way all along the lines of defense.
The main works on the rear line, already described, had, for the most part, exterior ditches from six to ten feet deep, with rampart, parapet, banquette for infantry, and embrasures and platforms for artillery.
Not having been occupied they were now much washed and weakened by the winter's rains.
The rifle-pits connecting the main works had suffered in the same way, while on many parts of the line these pits had never been finished.
Fatigue parties were set to work making these repairs and connections; at the same time all field-artillery,
Parrott guns, and siege pieces on the river front were moved to the rear line, plat-forms and embrasures were prepared for them, and ammunition was placed in convenient and protected places.
The field-artillery brought in by our retreating army was likewise put in position as it arrived, and the morning of the 18th found us with 102 guns ready for service on the rear line.
Some portions of our front were protected by abatis of fallen trees and entanglements of telegraph wire.
The river-batteries were still strong and intact, having lost none of their sea-coast guns.
The troops were placed in position as I had recommended.
General C. L. Stevenson's division extended from the
Warrenton road on our extreme right to the railroad;
General John H. Forney's division occupied the center, from the railroad to the Graveyard road;
General M. L. Smith's division filling up the space between the Graveyard road and the river on our left.
General John S. Bowen's Missourians and
Waul's Texas Legion were held in reserve.
4
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Early on May 18th the
Federal forces appeared on the
Jackson and Graveyard roads, which were covered by a part of
General M. L. Smith's division posted as skirmishers and pickets outside of our main lines.
The Federals were held in check, so that during the night
General Smith had no difficulty in withdrawing his forces within the main line of defense.
The next day, when the
Federals discovered that the
Confederates were gone from their position of the evening before, they came forward rapidly and took that position, with shout and cheer, and soon after rushed upon the main line of defense, apparently with perfect confidence that there would be another “walk over” such as they had had two days before at Big Black bridge.
But this time they struck a rock in
General Shoup's brigade which met them with so heavy and well-directed a fire that they were compelled to fall back.
A second time they came forward in greater numbers and with more boldness and determination, but
with even more fatal results.
They were repulsed with great loss, leaving five stand of colors close to our lines and tie ground being strewn with their dead and wounded.
These assaults extended from
Shoup's position toward our right so as to include a part of
Forney's division.
Thus they were met by troops which had not been in any of the recent disastrous engagements, and were not in the least demoralized.
These men stood to their arms like true soldiers, and helped to restore the
morale of our army.
The 20th and 21st of May were occupied by the
Federal forces in completing their line, at an average distance of about eight hundred yards from our works.
The Confederates utilized the time in putting up traverses against enfilade fires, and in making covered approaches from the camps in rear to the line of works.
Many a man and officer had already been picked off by the quick-sighted Federal sharp-shooters, while passing along our lines or between them and the cooking-camps.
It took several days for our men to learn the caution necessary to protect themselves.
On the 22d of May the gun-boats moved up within range and opened fire upon the river front.
At the same time several dense columns of troops assaulted our lines in the rear.
These assaults covered the right of
General Smith's position, where
General Shoup's brigade was posted, the whole of
General Forney's front, and that of
Stephen D. Lee's brigade of
Stevenson's division.
The assaults were made with great determination and admirable courage by the
Federal soldiers.
Once, twice, three times they came forward and recoiled from the deadly fire poured upon them by the
Confederates, who were now thoroughly restored to their old-time confidence and aroused to an enthusiastic determination to hold their lines.
Every assault was repulsed with terrible loss to the attacking parties.
At two points on the line — on
General Forney's and
General S. D. Lee's front — the
Federals obtained a lodgment and planted their colors on our parapet; but the brave fellows paid for their success by being either killed or captured and having their colors fall into our hands.
On
General Lee's line they even succeeded in capturing one of our detached works and drove out the men who held it. But it was retaken in a few minutes by a charge of
Waul's Legion, led by
Colonel Pettus of
Alabama.
The losses on both sides were severe; several thousand men, estimated by us
at 3500, were left dead and wounded between the lines.
On the 25th the
Federal dead and some of their wounded in the fight of the 22d were still in our front and close to our lines.
The dead had become offensive and the living were suffering fearful agonies.
General Pemberton, therefore, under a flag of truce, sent a note to
General Grant, proposing a cessation of hostilities for two and a half hours, so that the dead and dying men might receive proper attention.
This was acceded to by
General Grant, and from six o'clock until nearly dark both parties were engaged in performing funeral rites and deeds of mercy to the dead and wounded Federal soldiers.
On this occasion I met
General Sherman for the first time.
Naturally, the officers of both armies took advantage of the truce to use their eyes to the best possible advantage.
I was on the
Jackson road redan, which had been terribly
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pounded and was the object of constant attention from a battery of heavy guns in its immediate front.
The Federals were running toward it in a zigzag approach [see p. 540], and were already in uncomfortable proximity to it. While standing on the parapet of this work a Federal orderly came up to me and said that
General Sherman wished to speak to me. Following the orderly, I reached a group of officers standing some two hundred yards in front of our line.
One of these came forward, introduced himself as
General Sherman, and said: “I saw that you were an officer by your insignia of rank, and have asked you to meet me, to put into your hands some letters intrusted to me by Northern friends of some of your officers and men. I thought this would be a good opportunity to deliver this mail before it got too old.”
To this I replied: “Yes, General, it would have been very old, indeed, if you had kept it until you brought it into
Vicksburg yourself.”
“So you think, then,” said the general, “(I am a very slow mail route.”
“Well, rather,” was the reply, “when you have to travel by regular approaches, parallels, and zigzags.”
“Yes,” he said, “that is a slow way of getting into a place, but it is a very sure way, and I was determined to deliver those letters sooner or later.”
The general then invited me to take a seat with him on an old log near by, and thus the rest of the time of the truce was spent in pleasant conversation.
In the course of it the general remarked: “You have an admirable position for defense here, and you have taken excellent advantage of the ground.”
“Yes, General,” I replied, “but it is equally as well adapted to offensive operations, and your engineers have not been slow to discover it.”
To this
General Sherman assented.
Intentionally or not, his civility certainly prevented me from seeing many other points in our front that I as chief engineer was very anxious to examine.
The truce ended, the sharp-shooters immediately began their work and kept it up until darkness prevented accuracy of aim. Then the pickets of the two armies were posted in front of their respective lines, so near to each other that they whiled away the long hours of the
night-watch with social chat.
Within our lines the pick and shovel were the weapons of defense until the next morning.
On the night of the 26th, while we were trying to place an obstruction across the swamp between our right and the river, our working party and its support had a sharp engagement with a detachment of Federals who came to see what we were doing.
We captured one hundred of our inquisitive friends, and retired without putting in the obstruction.
At other parts of the line the work of making traverses, changing guns to more available points, making covered ways along the line and to the rear, and repairing damages, went on as vigorously as our means would allow.
The events of the 27th of May were varied by an attack on our river batteries by the fleet.
The
Cincinnati was badly crippled, and before reaching her former moorings she sank in water not deep enough to cover her deck.
She was still within range of our guns, so that the efforts made by the
Federals to dismantle her and remove her armament were effectually prevented.
By this time the
Federal commander was evidently convinced that
Vicksburg had to be taken
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by regular siege operations.
By the 4th of June the
Federals had advanced their parallels to within 150 yards of our line.
From them they commenced several double saps against our most salient works — the
Jackson road redan, the Graveyard road redan, the Third Louisiana redan, on the left of the
Jackson road, and the lunette on the right of the Baldwin's Ferry road.
In each of these the engineer in charge was ordered to place thundering barrels and loaded shells with short-time fuses, as preparations for meeting assaults.
The stockade redan and the stockade on its left, which had been constructed across a low place in our line, had by this time been nearly knocked to pieces by the enemy's artillery.
A new line was therefore made to take its place when it should be no longer tenable.
So, too, retrenchments, or inner lines, were ordered at all points where breaches seemed imminent or the enemy more than ordinarily near.
These retrenchments served us excellently before the siege was terminated.
By the 8th of June, in spite of all efforts to prevent them, the enemy's sap-rollers had approached within sixty feet of two of our works.
A private soldier suggested a novel expedient by which we succeeded in destroying the rollers.
He took a piece of port-fire, stuffed it with cotton saturated with turpentine, and fired it from an old-fashioned large-bore musket into the roller, and thus set it on fire.
Thus the enemy's sappers were exposed and forced to leave their sap and begin a new one some distance back.
After this they kept their sap-rollers wet, forcing us to other expedients.
5 Our next effort was counter-mining.
From the ditches of all the threatened works counter-mines were started on the night of the 13th of June.
The Third Louisiana redan was located on a very narrow ridge and had no ditch.
The counter-mines for it were therefore started from within by first sinking a vertical shaft, with the intention of working out by an inclined gallery under the enemy's sap. Before this work was completed the
Federal sappers succeeded in getting under the salient of the redan, and on the 25th they exploded a small mine, but the charge was too small to do much damage.
Nevertheless, it tore off the vortex of the redan, and made what the
Federals thought was a practicable breach.
Into it they poured in strong force as soon as the explosion had expended itself.
But they were met by a deadly volley from our men posted behind the retrenchment prepared for this emergency, and after heavy loss were compelled to retire.
Six of our counter-miners were buried by this explosion.
On the same day we exploded two of our counter-mines and completely destroyed the enemy's sap-rollers, filled up their saps, and forced them to abandon a parallel very close to our line.
Two days later we exploded another mine prematurely, without injury to the enemy, as they had not approached as near our works as we supposed.
It was very difficult to determine distances under ground, where we could hear the enemy's sappers picking, picking, picking, so very distinctly that it hardly seemed possible for them to be more than a few feet distant, when in reality they were many yards away.
On the 29th of June the enemy had succeeded in getting close up to the parapet of the Third Louisiana redan.
We rolled some of their unexploded 13-inch shells down upon them and annoyed them so much as to force them to stop operations.
At night they protected themselves against this method of attack by erecting a screen in front of their sap. This screen was made of heavy timbers, which even the shells could not move.
I finally determined to try the effect of a barrel of powder.
One containing 125 pounds was obtained, a time-fuse set to fifteen seconds was placed in the bung-hole, was touched off by myself with a live coal, and the barrel was rolled over the parapet by two of our sappers.
The barrel went true to its destination and exploded with terrific force.
Timbers, gabions, and fascineswere hurled into the air in all directions and the sappers once more were compelled to retire.
They renewed their operations, however, at night, and in a few days succeeded in establishing their mine under the redan, which they exploded at 1:30 o'clock p. M. on the 1st of July.
The charge was enormous--one and a quarter tons, as I subsequently learned from the
Federal engineer.
The crater made was about twenty feet deep and fifty feet in diameter.
The redan was virtually destroyed, and the explosive effect extended back far enough to make a breach of nearly twenty feet width in the retrenchment across the gorge of the work.
We expected an assault, but previous experience had made the enemy cautious.
Instead, they opened upon the work a most terrific fire from everything that could be brought to bear upon it. Only a few minutes before the explosion I had been down in our counter-mine and had left seven men there, only one of whom was ever seen again; he, a negro, was blown over into the
Federal lines but not seriously hurt [see p. 527]. The next thing for us to do was to stop the breach in our retrenchment.
This we first tried to accomplish by heaving dirt into the breach wit h shovels from the two sides, but the earth was swept away by the storm of missiles faster than it could be placed in position.
We then tried sand-bags, but they, too, were torn to shreds and scattered.
Finally I sent for some tent flies and wagon covers, and with these great rolls of earth were prepared under cover and pushed into place, until at last we had something between us and the deadly hail of shot and shell and minie-balls.
Playing into that narrow breach for nearly six hours were 2 9-inch
Dahlgren guns, a battery of large Parrotts, 1 or more batteries of field-guns, a Coehorn mortar, and the deadliest fire of musketry ever witnessed by any of us there present.
We stopped the breach, but lost in killed and wounded nearly one hundred men by the explosion and the subsequent fusillade.
This was really the last
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stirring incident of the siege.
On the 2d of July we exploded one of our mines somewhat prematurely, and we had ready for explosion 11 others, containing from 100 to 125 pounds of powder, and extending at a depth of 6 to 9 feet for a distance of from 18 to 20 feet in front of our works.
The fuses were set and everything was primed and ready for the approach of the
Federal sappers, but on the 3d of July the flag of truce stopped all operations on both sides, and the efficiency of our preparations was not put to the test.
The Federal engineers had similar preparations made for our destruction at several points.
Their men had gradually closed up to our lines so that at some portions, for a hundred yards or more, the thickness of our parapet was all that separated us. Fighting by hand-grenades was all that was possible at such close quarters.
As the
Federals had the hand-grenades and we had none; we obtained our supply by using such of theirs as failed to explode, or by catching them as they came over the parapet and hurling them back.
The causes that led to the capitulation
6 are well known.
We had been from the beginning short of ammunition, and continued so throughout in spite of the daring exploits of
Lamar Fontaine,
Captain Saunders, and Courier
Walker, who floated down the river on logs and brought us, respectively, 18,000, 20,000, and 200,000 caps.
We were short of provisions, so that our men had been on quarter rations for days before the close of the siege; had eaten mule meat, and rats, and young shoots of cane, with the relish of epicures dining on the finest delicacies of the table.
We were so short-handed that no man within the lines had ever been off duty more than a small part of each day; and in response to inquiries of the
lieutenant-general commanding, every general officer and colonel had reported his men as physically exhausted and unfit for any duty but simply standing in the trenches and firing.
Our lines were badly battered, many of our guns were dismounted, and the
Federal forces were within less than a minute of our defenses, so that a single dash could have precipitated them upon us in overwhelming numbers.
All of these facts were brought out in the council of war on the night of the 2d of July.
After that
General Pemberton said he had lost all hopes of being relieved by
General Johnston; he had considered every possible plan of relieving ourselves, and to his mind there were but two alternatives — either to surrender while we still had ammunition enough left to give us the right to demand terms, or to sell our lives as dearly as possible in what he knew must be a hopeless effort to cut our way through the
Federal lines.
He then asked each officer present to give his vote on the question,
surrender or not? Beginning with the juni or officer present, all voted to surrender but two,--
Brigadier-General S. D. Lee and
Brigadier-General Baldwin,--and these had no reasons to offer.
After all had voted
General Pemberton said: “Well, gentlemen, I have heard your votes and I agree with your almost unanimous decision, though my own preference would be to put myself at the head of my troops and make a desperate effort to cut our way through the enemy.
That is my only hope of saving myself from shame and disgrace.
Far better would it be for me to die at the head of my army, even in a vain effort to force the enemy's lines, than to surrender it and live and meet the obloquy which I know will be heaped upon me. But my duty is to sacrifice myself to save the army which has so nobly done its duty to defend
Vicksburg.
I therefore concur with you and shall offer to surrender this army on the 4th of July.”
Some objection was made to the day, but
General Pemberton said: “I am a Northern man; I know my people; I know their peculiar weaknesses and their national vanity; I know we can get better terms from them on the 4th of July than any other day of the year.
7 We must sacrifice our pride to these considerations.”
And thus the surrender was brought about.
During the negotiations we noticed that
General Grant and
Admiral Porter were communicating with each other by signals from a tall tower on land and a mast-head on
Porter's ship.
Our signal-service men had long before worked out the
Federal code on the principle of
Poe's
Gold Bug, and translated the messages as soon as sent.
We knew that
General Grant was anxious to take us all as prisoners to the
Northern prison-pens.
We also knew that
Porter said that he did not have sufficient transportation to carry us, and that in his judgment it would be far better to parole us and use the fleet in sending the
Federal troops to
Port Hudson and other points where they were needed.
This helped to make
General Pemberton more bold and persistent in his demands, and finally enabled him to obtain virtually the terms of his original proposition.
A few minutes after the
Federal soldiers marched in, the soldiers of the two armies were fraternizing and swapping yarns over the incidents of the long siege.
One Federal soldier seeing me on my little white pony, which I had ridden every day to and from and along the lines, sang out as he passed: “See here,
Mister,--you man on the little white horse!
Danged if you ain't the hardest feller to hit I ever saw; I've shot at you more'n a hundred times!”
General Grant says there was no cheering by the
Federal troops.
My recollection is that on our right a hearty cheer was given by one Federal division “for the gallant defenders of Vieksburg!”
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|
Vicksburg from the North--after the surrender.
From a sketch made at the time. |