[
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by Richard B. Irwin, Lieutenant-Colonel, Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V.
General Banks arrived in New Orleans on the 14th of December, 1862, with the advance of a fleet of transports from New York and
Hampton Roads, bringing reenforcements for the Department of the Gulf.
1 On the 15th he took command of the department,
Butler then formally taking leave of the troops.
His orders were to move up the
Mississippi, in order to open the river, in cooperation with
McClernand's column from
Cairo.
Banks was to take command of the combined forces as soon as they should meet.
On the 16th
General Grover, with 12 regiments and a battery, without disembarking at New Orleans, accompanied by two batteries and two troops of cavalry from the old force, and convoyed by a detachment of
Farragut's fleet under
Captain James Alden, of the
Richmond, was sent to occupy
Baton Rouge.
The next morning the town was evacuated by the small Confederate detachment which had been posted there, and
General Grover quietly took possession.
The town was held without opposition until the war ended.
An attempt followed to occupy
Galveston, apparently under importunity from
Brigadier-General Andrew J. Hamilton, and in furtherance of the policy that had led the
Government to send him with the expedition as military governor of
Texas.
This resulted on the 1st of January in a military and naval disaster in which three companies of the 42d Massachusetts regiment, under
Colonel Isaac S. Burrell, were taken prisoners by the
Confederates under
Magruder.
2
Weitzel, who was occupying the
La Fourche, was strengthened so as to enable him to make the district safe in view of the projected operations on the
Mississippi; a strong work was constructed at
Donaldsonville commanding the head of the bayou; and intrenchments were thrown up at
Brashear City to prevent, with the aid of the navy, any approach of the enemy from the direction of
Berwick Bay.
On the 14th of January, having crossed the bay,
Weitzel ascended the
Teche, accompanied by the gun-boats
Calhoun,
Estrella, and
Kinsman, under
Lieutenant-Commander Buchanan, forced the
Confederates to destroy the gun-boat
Cotton, and took 50 prisoners, with a loss of 6 killed and 27 wounded. Among the dead was
Buchanan, who was succeeded by
Lieutenant-Commander A. P. Cooke.
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After providing for the garrisons and the secure defense of New Orleans,
Banks organized his available forces in four divisions, commanded by
Major-General C. C. Augur and
Brigadier-Generals Thomas W. Sherman,
William H. Emory, and
Cuvier Grover.
Each division was composed of three brigades with three field-batteries, and there were also two battalions and six troops of cavalry, numbering about 700 effectives, and a regiment of heavy artillery, the 1st Indiana (21st Infantry) to man the siege train.
The veteran regiments that had served in the department from the beginning were distributed so as to leaven the mass and to furnish brigade commanders of some experience; of the eight colonels commanding brigades, all but two belonged
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to these regiments.
The whole force available for active operations was about 25,000. Two-thirds were, however, new levies, and of these, again, half were nine-months' men; some were armed with guns that refused to go off, others did not know the simplest evolutions, while in one instance (afterward handsomely redeemed) the colonel was actually unable to disembark his men except by the novel command, “Break ranks, boys, and get ashore the best way you can!”
The cavalry was poor, except the six old companies, and was quite insufficient in numbers.
Of land and water transportation, both indispensable to any possible operation, there was barely enough for the movement of a single division.
In Washington,
Banks had been led to expect that he would find in the depots, or in the country, all material required for moving his army; yet the supplies in the depots barely sufficed for the old force of the department, while the country could furnish very little at best, and nothing at all until it should be occupied.
Banks had finally to send his chief quartermaster back to
Washington before these deficiencies could be supplied.
Again,
Banks had not been informed until he reached New Orleans that the
Confederates held in force any fortified place below
Vicksburg, yet
Port Hudson, 135 miles above New Orleans, was found strongly intrenched, with
 |
|
Sharp-Shooters of the 75th N. Y. Volunteers picking off the gunners of the Confederate gun-boat “cotton,” in the action at Bayou Teche, La., January 14, 1863.
from a sketch made at the time. |
21 heavy guns in position, and a garrison of 12,000 men-in-creased to 16,000 before
Banks could have brought an equal number to the attack.
Banks could not communicate with the commander of the northern column, and knew practically nothing of its movements.
Under these conditions, all concert between the cooperating forces was rendered impossible from the start, and it became inevitable that the expectations of the
Government that
Banks would go against
Vicksburg immediately on landing in
Louisiana should be doomed to disappointment.
The Confederate occupation of
Port Hudson had completely changed the nature of the problem confided to
General Banks for solution, for he had now to choose among three courses, each involving an impossibility:
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 |
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Return of a foraging party of the 24th Connecticut Volunteers to Baton Rouge.
From a sketch made at the time. |
to carry by assault a strong line of works, three miles long, impregnable on either flank and defended by 16,000 good troops; to lay siege to the place, with the certainty that it would be relieved from
Mississippi and the prospect of losing his siege train in the venture; to leave
Port Hudson in his rear and go against
Vicksburg, thus sacrificing his communications, putting New Orleans in peril, and courting irreparable and almost inevitable disaster as the price of the remote chance of achieving a great success.
No word came from
Grant or
McClernand.
Meanwhile
Banks was trying to find a way of turning Port Hudsn on the west by means of the
Atchafalaya, the mouth of
Red River, and tie net-work of bayous, interlacing and intersecting one another, that connect the
Atchafalaya with the
Mississippi, in time of flood overflowing and fertilizing, at other seasons serving as highways for the whole region between the two rivers.
[See map, p. 442.] The Mississippi was unusually high, the narrow and tortuous bayous were swollen and rapid; the levees, nearly everywhere neglected since the outbreak of the war, had in some places been cut by the
Confederates; a large area of the country was under water; while great rafts of drift-logs added to the difficulty of navigation occasioned by the scarcity of suitable steamers and skilled pilots.
Every attempt to penetrate the bayous having failed,
Banks was just turning his attention to the preparations for gaining the same end by a movement from
Berwick Bay by the
Atchafalaya or
Teche, when the news came that two of
Ellet's rams, the
Queen of the West
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and
Indianola, after successfully running the batteries of
Vicksburg, had been captured by the
Confederates.
These gun-boats must therefore be reckoned with in any movement on or beyond the
Atchafalaya, while their presence above
Port Hudson as a hostile force, in place of the reenforcement expected from
Admiral Porter, greatly increased the anxiety
Admiral Farragut had for some time felt to pass the batteries of
Port Hudson with part of his fleet, control the long reach above, and cut off the
Confederate supplies from the
Red River country.
General Banks fell in with the admiral's plans, and, concentrating 17,000 men at
Baton Rouge, moved to the rear of
Port Hudson on the 14th of March, with the divisions of
Augur,
Emory, and
Grover, for the purpose of cooperating with the fleet by dividing the attention of the garrison and gaining a flank fire of artillery on the lower batteries on the bluff.
The field-returns showed 12,000 men in line after providing for detachments and for holding
Baton Rouge.
Admiral Farragut had intended to pass the batteries on the 15th, in the gray of the morning, but at the last moment saw reason to change this plan and moved to the attack before midnight. In a naval affair like this the cooperation of the army could not have been very effective at best; the change of hour left us little more than spectators and auditors of the battle between the ships and the forts.
The
Hartford and
Albatross passed up comparatively uninjured, but in the smoke and darkness the rest of the fleet could not go by, and the
Mississippi, stranding, was set on fire and blown up — the grandest display of fireworks I ever witnessed, and the costliest.
[See p. 566.]
This gave the navy command of the mouth of
Red River, and, accordingly,
Banks at once reverted to the execution of his former plan,--a turning movement by the
Atchafalaya.
That involved disposing of
Taylor's force of about 4000 or 5000 men encamped and intrenched on the
Teche below
Franklin.
Our force was so much stronger than
Taylor's as to suggest the idea of capturing him in his position, by getting in his rear, simultaneously with a front attack; and this was particularly to be desired, as otherwise he might retire indefinitely into the vast open country behind him and return at his leisure at some inopportune moment.
So perfectly was the movement masked that
Taylor was actually preparing to attack the force in his front (
Weitzel) when the main army began crossing
Berwick Bay.
Weitzel crossed on the 9th;
Emory followed; they then bivouacked on the west bank to wait for
Grover's movement.
So few were the facilities that it took
Grover two days to embark.
Six hours more were lost by a dense fog, and four by the stranding of the
Arizona.
When the proposed landing-place at
Madame Porter's plantation was reached after dark, the road was found to be under water and impassable, but a practicable way was discovered six miles farther up the lake, at McWilliams's plantation.
There the landing began early on the 13th, and with great difficulty, owing to the shallowness of the water, was completed by 4 o'clock in the afternoon.
Favored by the woods and undergrowth, which concealed their numbers,
Vincent's 2d Louisiana and
Reily's 4th Texas Cavalry, with a section of
Cornay's battery, delayed the advance until
Dwight's brigade, supported by two regiments of
Birge's and
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March of the Nineteenth army Corps by the Bayou Sara road toward Port Hudson, Saturday, march 14, 1863.
from a sketch made at the time. |
by
Closson's battery, went out and drove them away.
At 6 the division took up the line of march to the
Teche and bivouacked at nightfall on
Madame Porter's plantation, five miles distant.
Meanwhile
Banks had moved
Emory and
Weitzel slowly up the
Teche, seeking to hold
Taylor's forces in position until
Grover could gain their rear.
Taylor fell back behind the intrenched lines below
Centreville known as
Fort Bisland, and there a brisk engagement took place on the 13th,
Banks only seeking to gain a good position on both sides of the bayou, and to occupy the enemy's attention, while he listened in vain for
Grover's guns, which were to have been the signal for a direct and determined attack in front.
At night, knowing that
Grover's movement must certainly have been seen and reported daring his passage up
Grand Lake and surmising some miscarriage,
Banks gave orders to carry the works by assault at daylight.
However, early in the night,
Taylor ordered his whole force to fall back on
Franklin; the sounds of the movement were heard, and toward daylight reconnoitering parties discovered the evacuation.
Banks's whole force at once moved in pursuit.
Early in the morning
Taylor met
Grover advancing against his line of retreat, which here follows the great bow of the
Teche, known as
Irish Bend, struck
Birge's brigade in flank, forced
Grover to develop, and with the
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assistance of the
Diana3 held him just long enough to make good the retreat.
Taylor had made a gallant fight and had extricated himself cleverly.
His reports show his whole force to have been 5000.
Grover had about the same.
We lost at Bisland 40 killed and 184 wounded,--total, 224; at
Irish Bend, 49 killed, 274 wounded, 30 missing,--total, 353.
The losses of the
Confederates are not reported, but they destroyed their two gun-boats and all their transport steamers except one, which we captured, and their troops began to disperse soon after passing
Franklin.
We captured many prisoners on the march.
Their gun-boats came down the
Atchafalaya too late to dispute
Grover's landing, were defeated by our flotilla, under
Lieutenant-Commander A. P. Cooke, and the
Queen of the West was destroyed.
On the 20th
Butte-à--la-Rose, with sixty men and two heavy guns, surrendered to
Cooke, and the same day
Banks occupied
Opelousas.
Here he received his first communication from
General Grant, dated before
Vicksburg, March 23d, and sent through
Admiral Farragut.
This opened a correspondence, the practical effect of which was to cause
General Banks to conform his movements to the expectation that
General Grant would send an army corps to
Bayou Sara to join in reducing
Port Hudson.
Banks moved on to
Alexandria, on the
Red River, to push
Taylor farther out of the way.
Taylor retired toward
Shreveport.
On the 14th of May the
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The baggage train of General Augur's division crossing Bayou Montecino on the march to Port Hudson.
From a sketch made at the time, |
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whole command marched on
Simsport, crossed the
Atchafalaya, and moved to
Bayou Sara, where the advance of the army crossed the
Mississippi on the night of the 23d and moved immediately to the rear of
Port Hudson.
There communication was made with
Augur's two brigades, which had established themselves in position on the 21st, after a brisk engagement, known as the battle of Plains Store,
4 just in time, apparently, to prevent the evacuation, which had been ordered by
General Johnston and afterward countermanded by
President Davis.
With
Augur we found
T. W. Sherman and two brigades from New Orleans.
When the investment was completed on the 26th, we had about 14,000 men of all arms in front of the works, and behind them the
Confederates had about 7000, under
Major-General Frank Gardner.
Part of the garrison (three brigades, as it proved) was known to have gone to succor
Vicksburg, and all reports, apparently confirmed by the comparative feebleness of the attack on
Augur at Plains Store, indicated a reduction even greater than had actually taken place.
Nothing was known, of course, of the phenomenal success of
Grant's operations, nor could it have been surmised, while his precarious position in the event of a defeat or even a serious check was obvious enough; the magnitude of the Confederate forces in
Mississippi and the energy habitual to their commanders everywhere, added an additional reason against delay.
Finally the troops themselves, elated by their success in the
Teche campaign, were in the best of spirits for an immediate attack.
For these reasons
General Banks, with the full concurrence of all his commanders, save one, ordered a general assault to be made on the morning of the 27th of May.
Early in the morning
Weitzel, who commanded the right wing on this day, moved to the attack in two lines,
Dwight at first leading, and steadily drove the
Confederates in his front into their works.
Thus unmasked, the Confederate artillery opened with grape and canister, but our batteries, following the infantry as closely as possible, soon took commanding positions within 200 and 300 yards of the works that enabled them to keep down the enemy's fire.
The whole fight took place in a dense forest of magnolias, mostly amid a thick undergrowth, and among ravines choked with felled or fallen timber, so that it was difficult not only to move but even to see; in short, in the phrase of the day, the affair was “a gigantic bush-whack.”
Soon after
Weitzel's movement began
Grover, on his left, moved to the attack at two points, but only succeeded in gaining and holding commanding positions within about two hundred yards of the works.
This accomplished, and no sound of battle coming from his left,
Grover determined to wait where he was for the attack that had been expected in that quarter, or for further orders, and
Weitzel conformed his action to
Grover's: properly in both cases, although it was afterward made apparent that had
Weitzel continued to press his attack a few minutes longer he would probably have broken through the
Confederate defense and taken their whole line in reverse.
To make a diversion,
Dwight caused the two colored regiments on the extreme
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Opening of the naval attack on Port Hudson, march 13, 1863. |
right to form for the attack; they had hardly done so when the extreme left of the
Confederate line opened on them, in an exposed position, with artillery and musketry and forced them to abandon the attempt with great loss.
In
Augur's front the
Confederate works were in full view, but the intervening plain was obstructed by tangled abatis of huge trees felled with their great branches spread as if to receive us with open arms, and these obstructions were commanded by the fire of nearly a mile of the works.
His movement had therefore been meant for a demonstration, mainly in aid of
Sherman, to be converted into a real attack if circumstances should favor; but as the morning wore away and no sound came from
Sherman,
General Banks rode to the left and gave fresh orders for that assault; then, returning to the center about two o'clock, he ordered
Augur to attack simultaneously.
At the word
Chapin's brigade moved forward with great gallantry, but was soon caught and cruelly punished in the impassable abatis.
Sherman gallantly led his division on horseback, surrounded by his full staff, likewise mounted, but though the ground in his front was less difficult than that which
Augur had to traverse, it was very exposed, and the formation was, moreover, broken by three parallel lines of fence.
No progress was possible, and when night fell the result was that we had gained commanding positions, yet at a fearful cost.
The next day a regular siege was begun.
Grover was assigned to the command of the right wing, embracing his own and
Paine's divisions and
Weitzel's brigade; while
Dwight was given command of
Sherman's division, raised to three brigades by transferring regiments.
From left to right, from this time, the lines were held in the order of
Dwight,
Augur,
Paine,
Grover, and
Weitzel.
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On the 14th of June, time still pressing, the lines being everywhere well advanced, the enemy's artillery effectually controlled by ours, every available man having been brought up, and yet our force growing daily less by casualties and sickness,
Taylor menacing our communications on the west bank of the
Mississippi, and the issue of
Grant's operations before
Vicksburg in suspense,
Banks ordered a second assault to be delivered simultaneously at daybreak on the left and center, preceded by a general cannonade of an hour's duration.
Dwight's attack on the left was misdirected by its guides and soon came to naught.
Paine attacked with great vigor at what proved to be the strongest point of the whole work, the priest-cap near the
Jackson road.
He himself almost instantly fell severely wounded at the head of his division, and this attack also ended in a disastrous repulse, our men being unable to cross the crest just in front of the work, forming a natural glacis so swept by the enemy's fire that in examining the position afterward I found this grass-crowned knoll shaved bald, every blade cut down to the roots as by a hoe.
Our loss in the two assaults was nearly 4000, including many of our best and bravest officers.
The heat, especially in the trenches, became almost insupportable, the stenches quite so, the brooks dried up, the creek lost itself in the pestilential swamp, the springs gave out, and the river fell, exposing to the tropical sun a wide margin of festering ooze.
The illness and mortality were enormous.
The labor of the siege, extending over a front of seven miles, pressed so severely upon our numbers, far too weak for such an undertaking, that the men were almost incessantly on duty; and as the numbers for duty diminished, of course the work fell the more heavily upon those that remained.
From first to last we had nearly 20,000 men of all arms engaged before
Port Hudson, yet the effective strength of infantry and artillery at no time exceeded 13,000, and at the last hardly reached 9000, while even of these every other man might well have gone on the sick-report if pride and duty had not held him to his post.
Meanwhile
Taylor with his forces, reorganized and reenforced until they again numbered four or five thousand, had crossed the
Atchafalaya at Morgan's Ferry and
Berwick Bay, surprised and captured the garrisons at
Brashear City and
Bayou Boeuf almost without resistance, menaced
Donaldsonville, carried havoc and panic through the
La Fourche, and finally planted batteries on the
Mississippi to cut off our communication with New Orleans.
At
Donaldsonville, however, an assault by about 1500 Texans was repulsed by about 200 men, including convalescents, under
Major J. D. Bullen, 28th Maine,
5 and at La Fourche Crossing
Taylor's forces suffered another check at the hands of a detachment under
Lieutenant-Colonel Albert Stickney, 47th Massachusetts.
Otherwise
Taylor, whose operations were conducted with marked skill and vigor, had everything his own way. In New Orleans great was the excitement when it was known that the Confederate forces were on the west bank within a few miles of the city; but fortunately the illness that had deprived
Emory's division of its commander in the field had given New Orleans
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a commander of a courage and firmness that now, as always, rose with the approach of danger, with whom difficulties diminished as they drew near, and whose character had earned the respect of the inhabitants.
Still by the 4th of July things were at such a pass that
General Emory plainly told
General Banks he must choose between
Port Hudson and New Orleans.
However,
Banks was convinced that
Port Hudson must be in his hands within three days.
His confidence was justified.
At last on the 7th of July, when the saphead was within 16 feet of the priest-cap, and a storming party of 1000 volunteers had been organized, led by the intrepid
Birge, and all preparations had been made for springing two heavily charged mines, word came from
Grant that
Vicksburg had surrendered.
Instantly an aide was sent to the “general-of-the-trenches” bearing duplicates in “flimsy” of a note from the adjutant-general announcing the good news.
One of these he was directed to toss into the
Confederate lines.
Some one acknowledged the receipt by calling back, “That's another damned Yankee lie!”
Once more the cheers of our men rang out as the word passed, and again the forest echoed with the strains of the Star-spangled banner from the long-silent bands.
Firing died away, the men began to mingle in spite of everything, and about 2 o'clock next morning came the long, gray envelope that meant
surrender.
Formalities alone remained; these were long, but the articles were signed on the afternoon of the 8th; a moment later a long train of wagons loaded with rations for the famished garrison moved down the
Clinton road, and on the morning of the 9th a picked force of eight regiments, under
Brigadier-General George L. Andrews, marched in with bands playing and colors flying; the
Confederates stacked arms and hauled down their flag, and the
National ensign floated in its stead.
By
General Banks's order,
General Gardner's sword was returned to him in the presence of his men in recognition of the heroic defense — a worthy act, well merited.
But, stout as the defense had been, the besiegers had on their part displayed some of the highest qualities of the soldier; among these valor in attack, patient endurance of privation, suffering, and incredible toil, and perseverance under discouragement.
And to defenders and besiegers it is alike unjust to say, even though it has been said by the highest authority, that
Port Hudson surrendered only because
Vicksburg had fallen.
The simple truth is that
Port Hudson surrendered because its hour had come.
The garrison was literally starving.
With less than 3000 famished men in line, powerful mines beneath the salients, and a last assault about to be delivered at 10 paces, what else was left to do?
With the post there fell into our hands 6340 prisoners, 20 heavy guns, 31 field-pieces, about 7500 muskets, and two river steamers.
6 Many of the guns were ruined, some had been struck over and over again, and the depots and magazines were empty.
The garrison also lost about 500 prisoners or
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deserters before the surrender, and about 700 killed and wounded. Our loss was 707 killed, 3336 wounded, 319 missing,--total, 4362.
The army was greatly assisted by
Admiral Farragut's fleet above and below
Port Hudson, and directly by two fine batteries forming part of the siege-works, manned by seamen under
Lieutenant-Commander Edward Terry.
While the ceremonies of capitulation were going on,
Weitzel led
Augur's division aboard the transports and hastened to
Donaldsonville to drive
Taylor out of the
La Fourche.
Grover followed.
On the 13th, at
Koch's plantation,
Green and
Major suddenly fell upon
Weitzel's advance, composed of
Dudley's brigade and
Dwight's under
Colonel Joseph S. Morgan, and handled them roughly.
We lost 50 killed, 223 wounded, 186 missing,--total, 465,--as well as 2 guns, while
Green's loss was 3 killed and 30 wounded. As the gun-boats could not be got round to
Berwick Bay in time to cut off
Taylor, he crossed
Berwick Bay on the 21st with all his spoils that he could carry away and took post on the lower
Teche, until in September the Nineteenth Corps, reorganized and placed under the command of
Franklin, once more advanced into the
Teche country and drove him back toward
Opelousas.
After the
fall of Vicksburg and
Port Hudson,
Grant sent
Herron's division, and the Thirteenth Corps under
Ord, to report to
Banks.
Banks went to
Vicksburg to consult with
Grant, and
Grant came to New Orleans; together they agreed with
Admiral Farragut in urging an immediate attack on
Mobile.
This was the only true policy; success would have been easy and must have influenced powerfully the later campaigns that centered about
Chattanooga and
Atlanta; but for reasons avowedly political rather than military, the
Government ordered, instead, an attempt to “plant the flag at some point in
Texas.”
The unaccountable failure at
Sabine Pass followed,
7 then the occupation of the
Texan coast by the Thirteenth Corps.
So the favorable moment passed and 1863 wore away.
