The brief campaign which resulted in forcing the Confederate army to evacuate their works at
Tullahoma and
Shelbyville, Tenn., and retire behind the
Tennessee River, began on the 23d of June, was prosecuted in the midst of drenching rains, and terminated July 4th, 1863.
Both armies had occupied the time since the
battle of Stone's River in recruiting their strength and in fortifying their respective positions.
Murfreesboro' was
Rosecrans's secondary base of supplies, while
Tullahoma was
Bragg's barrier against
Rosecrans's farther advance toward
Chattanooga, the strategic importance of which, as controlling Confederate railroad communication between the East and West, had rendered it the objective point of all the campaigns of the armies of the
Ohio and the
Cumberland.
As the contending armies stood facing each other on the 20th of June, 1863,
General Bragg estimated the effective strength of his army at 30,449 infantry, 13,962 cavalry, and 2254 artillery.
Polk and
Hardee commanded his two corps of infantry, and
Wheeler and
Forrest the cavalry.
Deducting the garrisons of
Nashville and points
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Map of the Tullahoma campaign. |
north, and the Reserve Corps, 12,575, to be used in emergency,
Rosecrans had at the same date “present for duty, equipped,” 40,746 infantry, 6806 cavalry, and 3065 artillery, for an offensive campaign.
Having received full and accurate descriptions of the fortifications at
Tullahoma, where a part of
Polk's corps was intrenched behind formidable breastworks, protected by an abatis of fallen trees six hundred yards in width, and at
Shelbyville, where
Hardee had fortified his position with equal engineering skill,
General Rosecrans determined to force the Confederate army out of its works, and if possible engage it in the open field.
A glance at the map will show
Shelbyville directly south of
Murfreesboro‘, and
Tullahoma, on the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, eighteen miles south-east.
The high state of cultivation of the country west of
Shelbyville, and the connection of the towns by broad turnpike roads, would naturally suggest the route of march for the
Union army; moreover, the region to the east of the railroad consisted of sterile uplands through which winding country roads offered continuous obstacles to the rapid advance of an army.
Precisely for this reason
Rosecrans chose the latter route for one of his corps, while the other two corps were directed against the center of the line at
Tullahoma.
Sending his supply trains out on the
Shelbyville road, the cavalry under
Stanley was ordered to
Eagleville, twenty miles west, and a little south of
Murfreesboro‘, with orders to advance on
Shelbyville on the 24th of June in bold array, and at night to fill the country to their rear with camp-fires extending from
Hardee's left to the
Shelbyville road and beyond, indicating the presence of a heavy infantry force in his support.
This ruse had the desired effect, and held
Hardee at
Shelbyville, while the real movement was against his right.
This advance was made by
Hoover's Gap1 in front of
Tullahoma, and to this end
Colonel J. G. Wilder, in command of his splendid brigade of mounted infantry, was ordered to “trot through the gap,” pushing the
Confederate pickets before him, while
Thomas was directed to follow as closely in his rear as possible.
Wilder obeyed his orders literally, paying no attention to the frequent stands made by the retiring pickets, but driving them back upon their reserves, who in turn fell back upon
Stewart's division, posted on the
Garrison Fork of
Elk River, which is about four miles south of
Tullahoma.
General Stewart sent
Bushrod Johnson's brigade forward, and a brisk fight ensued.
The head of
Thomas's column was six miles in the rear, but
Wilder's plucky regiments used their Spencer rifles to such good purpose as to hold their ground until
Reynolds's division secured possession of the bridge, when
Stewart, finding that the movement was really an advance in force, that the
Gap he was posted to guard was lost, and that a heavy column was crossing the bridge, fell back upon the main line.
Thomas was followed closely by
McCook with the Twentieth Corps,
Granger with the Reserve Corps holding the ground in front of
Murfreesboro‘. Meantime,
Crittenden with the Twenty-first Corps, who had seventeen miles to march, over a road that seemingly had no bottom, was toiling through the mud between
Woodbury and
Manchester on his way to his position before
Bragg's right flank and rear.
Colonel John F. Miller with his brigade of
Negley's division attacked Liberty Gap, and fell in a fierce fight there, badly wounded; but the
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Gap was held by the brigade until relieved by the Twentieth Corps, which then passed
Thomas and took the lead on the
Manchester road, both corps camping within two miles of
Tullahoma.
In front of
Stanley, Guy's Gap, held by a battery supported by cavalry, was charged, driving the
Confederates toward
Shelbyville, near which town they made a stand; but
Colonel Minty attacked them on the left with the 4th Regular Cavalry of his brigade, sabering the gunners and pursuing the remainder through the town.
Bragg had ordered
Hardee to the support of
Polk's threatened left flank, leaving
Shelbyville with its elaborately planned fortifications to fall before a cavalry charge after a brief struggle by the rear-guard.
The unforeseen inclemency of the weather retarded
Crittenden's advance to such an extent that, notwithstanding the continued exertions of both officers and men, he was four days in marching seventeen miles. Horses and mules, floundering in the mud, were unhitched, and artillery and ammunition wagons dragged through deep morasses by the infantry.
In some places mules perished in the mud, unable to extricate themselves.
But for the heavy rains
Crittenden would have joined
McCook and
Thomas two days earlier, and the campaign might have had a different ending.
When he came up, line of battle was formed fronting the works at
Tullahoma, to mask a flank movement through the woods to Elk River Bridge, four miles in rear of
Bragg's position.
Between the lines the treacherous soil was filled with quicksand, which only needed the soaking of the week's rain to render it impassable.
To advance against the
Confederate works over this ground, through a dense abatis of tangled tree-tops, in the face of a storm of grape-shot and minie-balls, would have been to doom one-half the army to destruction.
Finding, when too late, that the advance against
Hardee was only a feint to cover the real movement upon his left and rear, and alive to the paramount importance of protecting
Chattanooga,
General Bragg again faced his army southward, and crossed the
Tennessee River at
Bridgeport, the mouth of
Battle Creek, and at Kelley's Ferry.
The advance of the column against Elk River Bridge arrived in time to witness the crossing of the rear of
Bragg's army, and on the afternoon of the 3d of July
Sheridan's division occupied
Tullahoma.
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