Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley.
by Wesley Merritt, Major-General, U. S. V., Brigadier-General, U. S. A.
Up to the summer of 1864 the Shenandoah Valley had not been to the
Union armies a fortunate place either for battle or for strategy.
A glance at the map will go far toward explaining this.
The
Valley has a general direction from south-west to north-east.
The
Blue Ridge Mountains, forming its eastern barrier, are well defined from the
James River above
Lynchburg to
Harper's Ferry on the
Potomac.
Many passes (in
Virginia called “gaps” ) made it easy of access from the
Confederate base of operations; and, bordered by a fruitful country filled with supplies, it offered a tempting highway for an army bent on a flanking march on
Washington or the invasion of
Maryland or
Pennsylvania.
For the
Union armies, while it was an equally practicable highway, it led away from the objective,
Richmond, and was exposed to flank attacks through the gaps from vantage-ground and perfect cover.
It was not long after
General Grant completed his first campaign in
Virginia, and while he was in front of
Petersburg, that his attention was called to this famous seat of side issues between Union and Confederate armies.
With quick military instinct he saw that the
Valley was not useful to the
Government for aggressive operations.
He decided that it must be made untenable for either army.
In doing this he reasoned that the advantage would be with us, who did not want it as a source of supplies, nor as a place of arms, and against the
Confederates, who wanted it for both.
Accordingly, instructions were drawn up for carrying on a plan of devastating the
Valley in a way least injurious to the people.
These instructions, which were intended for
Hunter, were destined to be carried out by another, and how well this was accomplished it is my purpose to recount.
Hunter's failure to capture
Lynchburg in the spring of 1864 [see p. 492] and his retreat by a circuitous line opened the
Valley to
General Early, who had gone to the relief of
Lynchburg.
Marching down the
Valley and taking possession of it without serious opposition,
Early turned
Harper's
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Ferry, which was held by a Union force under
Sigel, and crossed into
Maryland at
Shepherdstown.
The governors of New York,
Pennsylvania, and
Massachusetts were called on for hundred-days men to repel the invasion, and later the Army of the Potomac supplied its quota of veterans as a nucleus around which the new levies could rally.
General Early marched on
Washington, and on the 11th of July was in front of the gates of the capital.
The following day, after a severe engagement in which the guns of
Fort Stevens took part, he withdrew his forces through
Rockville and
Poolesville, and, crossing the
Potomac above
Leesburg, entered the
Valley of Virginia through Snicker's Gap.
Afterward, crossing the
Shenandoah at the ferry of the same name, he moved to
Berryville, and there awaited developments.
After the immediate danger to
Washington had passed it became a question with
General Grant and the authorities in
Washington to select an officer who, commanding in the
Valley, would prevent further danger from invasion.
After various suggestions,
1 Major-General Philip H. Sheridan was selected temporarily for this command.
His permanent
occupation of the position was opposed by
Secretary Stanton on the ground that he was too young for such important responsibility.
On the 7th of August, 1864,
Sheridan assumed command of the Middle Military Division and of the army for the protection of the
Valley, afterward known as the “Army of the Shenadoah.”
Naturally, on assuming command,
Sheridan moved with caution.
He was incited to this by his instructions, and inclined to it by his unfamiliarity with the country, with the command, and with the enemy he had to deal with.
On the other hand,
Early, who had nothing of these to learn, save the mettle of his new adversary, was aggressive, and at once manoeuvred with a bold front, seemingly anxious for a battle.
The movements of the first few days showed, however, that
Early was not disposed to give battle unless he could do so on his own conditions.
On the morning of the 10th of August
Sheridan, who had massed his army at
Halltown, in front of
Harper's Ferry, marched toward the enemy's communications, his object being to occupy
Early's line of retreat and force him to fight before reenforcements could reach him. The march of my cavalry toward the Millwood-Winchester road brought us in contact with the
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enemy's cavalry on that road, and it was driven toward
Kernstown.
At the same time a brigade under
Custer, making a reconnoissance on the Berryville-Winchester road, came on the enemy holding a defile of the highway while “his trains and infantry were marching toward
Strasburg.”
As soon as the retreat of the enemy was known to
General Sheridan the cavalry was ordered to pursue and harass him. Near White Post,
Devin came upon a strongly posted force, which, after a sharp fight, he drove from the field, and the division took position on the
Winchester-Front Royal pike.
The same day my division had a severe affair with infantry near
Newtown, in which the loss to my Second Brigade was considerable.
On the 12th of August, the enemy having retired the night before, the cavalry pursued to
Cedar Creek, when it came up with
Early's rear-guard and continued skirmishing until the arrival of the head of the column.
The day following, the reconnoissance of a brigade of cavalry discovered the enemy strongly posted at
Fisher's Hill.
About this time
Early received his expected reenforcements.
General Sheridan, being duly informed of this, made preparations to retire to a position better suited for defense and adapted to the changed conditions of the strength of the two armies.
On the 13th of August
General Devin's brigade of the First Division was ordered to
Cedarville on the
Front Royal pike, and on the 14th I marched with the rest of my division to the same point,
Gibbs taking position near
Nineveh.
On the arrival of his reenforcemnents
Early had requested
General R. H. Anderson, in command, to take station at
Front Royal, it being a convenient point from which to make a flank movement in case of attack on
Sheridan's command, which
Early undoubtedly contemplated.
At the same time it constituted a guard
About 2 P. M. on the 16th an attack was made by this command on the First Cavalry Division, which resulted in the battle of
Cedarville.
A force of
cavalry under
Fitz Lee, supported by a brigade of
Kershaw's division, made a descent on
Devin's brigade.
General Fitz Lee drove in the cavalry pickets and attacked
Devin with great violence.
This force was scarcely repulsed when a brigade of infantry was discovered moving on the opposite bank of the
Shenandoah River toward the left of the cavalry position.
One regiment of
Custer's brigade, dismounted, was moved up to the crest of a hill near the river-bank to meet this force, while the rest of the brigade, mounted, was stationed to the right of the hill.
At the same time the Reserve Brigade under
General Gibbs was summoned to the field.
The enemy advanced boldly,
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wading the river, and when within short carbine range was met by a murderous volley from the dismounted men, while the remainder of the command charged mounted.
The Confederates were thrown into confusion and retreated, leaving 300 prisoners, together with two stand of colors.
Anderson hurried reenforcements to his beaten brigades, but no further attempt to cross the river was made.
The loss to the
Union cavalry was about 60 in killed and wounded.
The loss to the enemy was not less than 500.
These affairs between the
Union cavalry and the enemy's infantry were of more importance than might appear
at first glance.
They gave the cavalry increased confidence, and made the enemy correspondingly doubtful even of the ability of its infantry, in anything like equal numbers, to contend against our cavalry in the open fields of the
Valley.
On the night of the 16th
Sheridan withdrew toward his base, and on the following day the cavalry marched, driving all the cattle and live stock in the
Valley before it, and burning the grain from
Cedar Creek to
Berryville.
No other private property was injured, nor were families molested.
On the afternoon of the 17th the Third Division of cavalry, under
General James H. Wilson, reported to
General Torbert,
chief-of-cavalry, who with it and
Lowell's brigade and the
Jersey brigade (
Penrose's) of the Sixth Corps was ordered to cover the flank of the army which marched and took position near
Berryville.
General Early, who on the morning of the 17th discovered the withdrawal of
Sheridan's force, pursued rapidly,
Anderson advancing from
Front Royal with his command.
Early struck
Torbert's force with such vigor and with such overwhelming numbers as completely to overthrow it, with considerable loss, and drive it from
Winchester.
In this affair
Penrose's brigade lost about 300 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and
Wilson's cavalry lost
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Map of the battle of Winchester, September 19, 1864. |
in prisoners some 50 men. At this time, information having reached
Sheridan that the reenforcements that had come to
Early under
Anderson were only part of what might be expected,
Sheridan concluded still further to solidify his lines.
On the 21st of August Early moved with his army to attack
Sheridan.
His own command marched through
Smithfield toward
Charlestown, and
Anderson on the direct road through
Summit Point.
Rodes's and
Ramseur's infantry were advanced to the attack, and heavy skirmishing was continued for some time with a loss to the Sixth Corps, principally
Getty's division, of 260 killed and wounded. In the meantime
Anderson was so retarded by the
Union cavalry that he did not reach the field, and night overtaking him at
Summit Point, he there went into camp.
That night
Sheridan drew in the cavalry, and, carrying out the resolution already formed, withdrew his army to
Halltown.
During the three days following the
Confederates demonstrated in front of
Sheridan's lines, but to little purpose except to skirmish with
Crook's and
Emory's pickets.
On the 25th, leaving
Anderson's force in front of
Sheridan,
Early moved with his four divisions and
Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry to
Leetown, from which place he dispatched
Lee toward
Williamsport while he crossed the railroad at
Kearneysville and moved
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Sprout's Spring Mill, Opequon River, Va., hospital of the Sixth Army Corps during the battle of Winchester, September 19, 1864.
from a War-time sketch. |
toward
Shepherdstown.
Between
Kearneysville and
Leetown he was met by
Torbert with the cavalry.
A sharp fight followed, in the first shock of which
Early's advance, consisting of
Wharton's division, was driven back in confusion, but upon discovering the strength of the enemy,
Torbert withdrew in good order, though
Custer's brigade was pressed so closely that he was forced to cross the
Potomac.
A charge on the flank of the pursuing infantry relieved
Custer from danger, and the next morning he returned, as ordered, via
Harper's Ferry to the army at
Halltown.
Early's movement ended with this affair, and during the following two days he returned to the vicinity of
Winchester.
During the absence of
Early,
R. H. Anderson's position was reconnoitered by
Crook with two divisions and
Lowell's cavalry brigade, who carried
Anderson's lines, driving two brigades from their earth-works and capturing a number of officers and men, after which
Anderson withdrew from
Sheridan's front.
In a dispatch to
Halleck Sheridan said: “I have thought it best to be prudent, everything considered.”
Grant commended
Sheridan's conduct of affairs in general terms, and predicted the withdrawal from the
Valley of all of
Early's reenforcements.
This the pressure of
Grant's lines at
Petersburg finally accomplished.
On the 28th of August
Sheridan moved his army forward to
Charlestown.
My division of cavalry marched to
Leetown, and drove the enemy's cavalry to
Smithfield and across the
Opequon.
The next day
Early's infantry, in turn, drove my division from
Smithfield; whereupon
Sheridan, advancing with
Ricketts's division, repulsed the enemy's infantry, which retired to the west bank of the Opequon.
On this day the cavalry had some severe fighting with
Early's infantry, but not until in hand-to-hand fighting the Confederate cavalry had been driven from the field.
On the 3d of September
Rodes's Confederate division proceeded to
Bunker Hill, and in conjunction with
Lomax's cavalry made a demonstration which
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was intended to cover the withdrawal of
Anderson's force from the
Valley.
But on marching toward the gap of the
Blue Ridge, via
Berryville,
Anderson came upon
Crook's infantry just taking station there.
The meeting was a surprise to both commands and resulted in a sharp engagement which continued till nightfall.
On the following morning
Early moved with part of his infantry to
Anderson's assistance, and demonstrating toward the right of
Sheridan's lines, he made show of giving battle, but only long enough to extricate
Anderson and his trains, when the entire command retired to the country near
Winchester.
On the 14th
Anderson withdrew from
Early's army, and this time unmolested pursued his march through the
Blue Ridge to Culpeper Court House.
Fitzhugh
Lee's cavalry remained with
Early.
About this time
General Grant visited the
Valley and found everything to his satisfaction.
Sheridan was master of the situation, and he was not slow in showing it to his chief.
On the 12th of September
Sheridan had telegraphed
Grant to the effect that it was exceedingly difficult to attack
Early in his position behind the
Opequon, which constituted a formidable barrier; that the crossings, though numerous, were deep, and the banks abrupt and difficult for an attacking force; and, in general, that he was waiting for the chances to change in his favor, hoping that
Early would either detach troops or take some less defensible position.
His caution was fortunate at this time, and his fearlessness and hardihood were sufficiently displayed thereafter.
In the light of criticisms, then, it is curious that the world is now inclined to call
Sheridan reckless and foolhardy.
At 2 A. M. of September 19th
Sheridan's army was astir under orders to attack
Early in front of
Winchester.
My cavalry was to proceed to the fords of the
Opequon, near the railroad crossing, and, if opposed only by cavalry, was to cross at daylight and, turning to the left, attack
Early's left flank.
Wilson's division was to precede the infantry and clear the crossing of the
Opequon, on the
Berryville road, leading to
Winchester.
The infantry of the army, following
Wilson, was to cross the
Opequon, first
Wright and then
Emory, while
Crook's command, marching across country, was to take position in reserve, or be used as circumstances might require.
South of
Winchester, running nearly east and emptying into the
Opequon, is
Abraham's Creek, and nearly parallel to it, on the north of
Winchester, is
Red Bud Creek.
These two tributaries flanked the usual line of the
Confederates, when in position, covering
Winchester, and on this line, across the Berryville-Winchester road,
Ramseur was stationed with his infantry, when
Sheridan's forces debouched from the defile and deployed for attack.
Sheridan's plan was to attack and overthrow this part of
Early's force before the rest of the army, which a day or two before was known to be scattered to the north as far as
Martinsburg, could come to its assistance.
At daylight
Wilson
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advanced across the
Opequon, and carried the earth-work which covered the defile and captured part of the force that held it. The infantry followed —
Wright's corps first, with
Getty leading, and
Emory next.
Between two and three miles from the
Opequon,
Wright came up with
Wilson, who was waiting in the earth-work he had captured.
There the country was suitable for the deployment of the column, which commenced forming line at once.
Ramseur, with the bulk of the Confederate artillery, immediately opened on
Wright's troops, and soon the
Union guns were in position to reply.
Wilson took position on the left of the Sixth Corps.
Then followed a delay that thwarted the part of the plan which contemplated the destruction of
Early's army in detail.
Emory's command was crowded off the road in its march, and so delayed by the guns and trains of the Sixth Corps that it was slow getting on the field, and it was hours before the lines were formed.
2 This delay gave the
Confederates time to bring up the infantry of
Gordon and
Rodes.
Gordon, who first arrived, was posted on
Ramseur's left near the
Red Bud, and when
Rodes arrived with three of his four brigades, he was given the center.
This change in the situation, which necessitated fighting
Early's army in his chosen position, did not disconcert the
Union commander.
He had come out to fight, and though chafing at the unexpected delay, fight he would to the bitter end.
In the meantime the cavalry, which had been ordered to the right, had not been idle.
Moving at the same time as did the rest of the army, my division reached the fords of the
Opequon near the railroad crossing at early dawn.
Here I found a force of cavalry supported by
Breckinridge's infantry.
After sharp skirmishing the stream was crossed at three different points, but the enemy contested every foot of the way beyond.
The cavalry, however, hearing
Sheridan's guns, and knowing the battle was in progress, was satisfied with the work it was doing in holding from
Early a considerable force of infantry.
The battle here continued for some hours, the cavalry making charges on foot or mounted according to the nature of the country, and steadily though slowly driving the enemy's force toward
Winchester.
Finally
Breckinridge, leaving one brigade to assist the cavalry in retarding our advance, moved to the help of
Early, arriving on the field about 2 P. M.
It was 11:30 A. M. before
Sheridan's lines were ready to advance.
When they moved forward
Early, who had gathered all his available strength, met them with a front of fire, and the battle raged with the greatest fury.
The advance was pressed in the most resolute manner, and the resistance by the enemy being equally determined and both sides fighting without cover, the
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The battle of Winchester--Ricketts's advance against Rodes's division on the morning of September 19, 1864. |
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casualties were very great.
Wright's infantry forced
Ramseur and
Rodes steadily to the rear, while
Emory on the right broke the left of the enemy's line and threw it into confusion.
At this time the Confederate artillery opened with canister at short range, doing fearful execution.
This, coupled with the weakening of the center at the junction between
Emory and
Wright, and with a charge delivered on this junction of the lines by a part of
Bodes's command, just arrived on the field, drove back the
Union center.
At this critical moment
Russell's division of
Wright's corps moved into the breach on
Emory's left, and, striking the flank of the
Confederate troops who were pursuing
Grover, restored the lines and stayed the
Confederate advance.
3 The loss to both sides had been heavy.
General Russell of the
Union army and
Generals Rodes and
Godwin of the
Confederate were among the killed.
A lull in the battle now followed, which
General Sheridan improved to restore his lines and to bring up
Crook, who had not yet been engaged.
It had been the original purpose to use
Crook on the left to assist
Wilson's cavalry in cutting off
Early's retreat toward
Newtown.
But the stress of battle compelled
Sheridan to bring his reserve in on the line, and accordingly
Crook was ordered up on
Emory's right, one brigade extending to the north of
Red Bud Creek.
At the same time
Early reformed his lines, placing
Breckinridge's command in reserve.
At this time
Merritt, who with his cavalry had followed
Breckinridge closely to the field, approached on the left rear of the
Confederates, driving their flying and broken cavalry through the infantry lines.
The cavalry then charged repeatedly into
Early's infantry, first striking it in the rear, and afterward face to face as it changed front to repel the attack.
4 These attacks were made by the cavalry without any knowledge of the state of the battle except what was apparent to the eye. First
Devin charged with his brigade, returning to rally, with three battle-flags and over three hundred prisoners. Next
Lowell charged with his
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brigade, capturing flags, prisoners, and two guns.
After this the entire division was formed and charged to give the final coup.
5
At the time of this last charge the
Union infantry advanced along the entire line and the enemy fled in disorder from the field, and night alone (for it was now dark) saved
Early's army from capture.
At daylight on the morning of the 20th the army moved rapidly up the main Valley road in pursuit of the enemy.
Early had not stopped on the night of the battle until he reached the shelter of
Fisher's Hill.
This is admirably situated for defense for an army resisting a movement south.
Here the
Valley is obstructed by the
Massanutten Mountains and its width virtually reduced to four or five miles. In this position
Early's right was protected by impassable mountains and by the north fork of the
Shenandoah, and he at once took means to protect his left artificially.
“On the evening of the 20th,” reports
Sheridan, “
Wright and
Emory went into position on the heights of
Strasburg,
Crook north of
Cedar Creek, the cavalry on the right and rear of
Emory, extending to the back road.”
On the 21st
Sheridan occupied the day in examining the enemy's lines and improving his own. Accompanied by
General Wright, he directed changes in the lines of the Sixth Corps, so that it occupied the high lands to the north of
Tumbling Run.
Wright did not secure this vantage-ground without a severe struggle, in which
Warner's brigade was engaged, finally holding the heights after a brilliant charge.
Sheridan decided on turning
Early's impregnable position by a movement on the
Little North Mountain.
On the night of the 21st he concealed
Crook's command in the timber north of
Cedar Creek.
In making his disposition
Sheridan did not attempt to cover the entire front, it being his intention to flank the enemy by
Crook's march, and then, by advancing the right of
Wright's and
Emory's line, to form connection and make his line continuous.
On the morning of the 22d,
Crook, being still concealed, was marched to the timber near
Little North Mountain and massed in it. Before this,
Torbert, with his two divisions of cavalry, except one brigade (
Devin's), was ordered via
Front Royal into Luray Valley, with a view to reentering the
Valley of the Shenandoah at
New Market.
This design was not accomplished.
6
Not long before sundown
Crook's infantry, which had not yet been discovered
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by the enemy, struck
Early's left and rear so suddenly as to cause his army to break in confusion and flee.
The rout was complete, the whole of
Sheridan's troops uniting in the attack.
That night, though the darkness made the marching difficult,
Sheridan followed
Early as far as
Woodstock, some fifteen miles, and the following day up to
Mount Jackson, where he drove the enemy, now to some extent reorganized, from a strong position on the opposite bank of the river.
From this point the enemy retreated in line of battle.
But every effort to make him fight failed.
No doubt
Sheridan in this pursuit regretted the absence of his cavalry, which, with
Torbert, was striving, by a circuitous and obstructed march, to reach the enemy's rear.
A few miles beyond
New Market Early abandoned the main road, which leads on through
Harrisonburg; turning to the east, he pursued the road that leads thence to
Port Republic.
This direction was taken to receive the reenforcements which were to reach him through one of the gaps of the
Blue Ridge.
For it appears that
Kershaw and his command had not proceeded beyond
Culpeper in his march to
Lee's army before he was ordered to return to
Early, the news of whose overthrow at
Winchester, and afterward at
Fisher's Hill, had reached the authorities at
Richmond.
On the 25th of September
Torbert with the cavalry rejoined
General Sheridan, and was at once put to work doing what damage was possible to the
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Central Railway. After proceeding to
Staunton and destroying immense quantities of army stores,
Torbert moved to
Waynesboro‘, destroying the railway track, and after burning the railway bridges toward the
Blue Ridge, and on being threatened by
Early's forces, which had moved thither to attack him, he retired to
Bridgewater.
Naturally a question now arose between
Sheridan, the authorities in
Washington, and
General Grant as to the future theater of the campaign and the line of operations.
Sheridan was opposed to the proposition submitted by the others, which was to operate against
Central Virginia from his base in the
Valley.
The general reasons for his opposition were the distance from the base of supplies, the lines of communication, which in a country infested by guerrillas it would take an army to protect, and the nearness, as the campaign progressed, if successful, to the enemy's base, from which large reenforcements could easily and secretly be hurried and the
Union army be overwhelmed.
But before the plan was finally adopted a new turn was given to affairs, and the plan originally formed was delayed in its execution if not changed altogether.
When the army commenced its return march, the cavalry was deployed across the
Valley, burning, destroying, or taking away everything of value, or likely to become of value, to the enemy.
It was a severe measure, and appears severer now in the lapse of time; but it was necessary as a measure of war. The country was fruitful and was the paradise of bushwhackers and guerrillas.
They had committed numerous murders and wanton acts of
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cruelty on all parties weaker than themselves.
Officers and men had been murdered in cold blood on the roads, while proceeding without a guard through an apparently peaceful country.
The thoughtless had been lured to houses only to find, when too late, that a foe was concealed there, ready to take their lives if they did not surrender.
It is not wonderful, then, that the cavalry sent to work the destruction contemplated did not at that time shrink from the duty.
It is greatly to their credit that no personal violence on any inhabitant was ever reported, even by their enemies.
The
Valley from
Staunton to
Winchester was completely devastated, and the armies thereafter occupying that country had to look elsewhere for their supplies.
There is little doubt, however, that enough was left in the country for the subsistence of the people, for this, besides being contemplated by orders, resulted of necessity from the fact that, while the work was done hurriedly, the citizens had ample time to secrete supplies, and did so.
The movement north was conducted without interruption for two days, except that the enemy's cavalry, made more bold by the accession to its strength of a command under
General T. L. Rosser, followed our cavalry, dispersed across the
Valley as already described.
On the 8th of October the enemy's cavalry harassed
Custer's division on the back road during the day, taking from him some battery-forges and wagons.
The cavalry also showed itself on the main road upon which
Merritt was retiring, but dispersed upon being charged by a brigade which was sent to develop their strength.
That night
Sheridan gave orders to his chief-of-cavalry,
Torbert, to attack and beat the enemy's cavalry the following day “or to get whipped himself,” as it was expressed.
On the morning of the 9th
Torbert's cavalry moved out to fight that of the enemy under
Generals Rosser and
Lomax. Merritt's division moved on the pike and extended across to the back road where
Custer was concentrated.
A stubborn cavalry engagement commenced the day, but it was not long before the Confederate cavalry was broken and routed, and from that time till late in the day it was driven a distance of twenty-six miles, losing everything on wheels, except one gun, and this at one time was in possession of a force too weak to hold it. At one time
General Lomax was a prisoner, but made his escape by personally overthrowing his captor.
In this affair the advantage of pluck, dash, and confidence, as well as of numbers, was on the
Union side.
From the time of the occupation of the
Valley by
Sheridan's force the cavalry had been the active part of his command.
Scarcely a day passed that they were not engaged in some affair, and often with considerable loss, as is shown by the fact that in twenty-six engagements, aside from the battles, the cavalry lost an aggregate of 3205 men and officers.
In reporting the result of the cavalry battle of October 9th,
Early says:
This is very distressing to me, and God knows I have done all in my power to avert the disasters which have befallen this command; but the fact is the enemy's cavalry is so much superior to ours, both in numbers and equipment, and the country is so favorable to the operations of cavalry, that it is impossible for ours to compete with his.
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He further says in this same connection:
Lomax's cavalry is armed entirely with rifles and has no sabers, and the consequence is they cannot fight on horseback, and in this open country they cannot successfully fight on foot against large bodies of cavalry.
This is a statement on which those who think our cavalry never fought mounted and with the saber should ponder.
The cavalry had scant justice done it in reports sent from the battle-field; and current history, which is so much made up of first reports and first impressions, has not to a proper extent been impressed with this record.
On the return of the army after the pursuit of the scattered remnants of
Early's force,
General Sheridan placed it in position on
Cedar Creek north of the
Shenandoah, Crook on the left,
Emory in the center, and
Wright in reserve.
The cavalry was placed on the flanks.
The occupation of
Cedar Creek was not intended to be permanent; there were many serious objections to it as a position for defense.
The approaches from all points of the enemy's stronghold at
Fisher's Hill were through wooded ravines in which the growth and undulations concealed the movement of troops, and for this reason and its proximity to
Fisher's Hill the pickets protecting its front could not be thrown, without danger of capture, sufficiently far to the front to give ample warning of the advance of the enemy.
We have already seen how
Sheridan took advantage of like conditions at
Fisher's Hill.
Early was now contemplating the surprise of his antagonist.
On the 12th of October
Sheridan received a dispatch from
Halleck saying that
Grant wished a position taken far enough south to serve as a base for operations upon
Gordonsville and
Charlottesville.
On the 13th and the 16th he received dispatches from the
Secretary of War and from
General Halleck pressing him to visit
Washington for consultation.
On the 15th
General Sheridan, taking with him
Torbert with part of the cavalry, started for
Washington, the design being to send the cavalry on a raid to
Gordonsville and vicinity.
The first camp was made near
Front Royal, from which point the cavalry was returned to the army, it being considered safer to do so in consequence of a dispatch intercepted by our signal officers from the enemy's station on Three Top Mountain, and forwarded to
General Sheridan by
General Wright.
This dispatch was as follows:
to Lieutenant-General Early: Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush Sheridan.--Longstreet, Lieutenant-General.
In sending back the cavalry
General Sheridan wrote to
General Wright, directing caution on his part, so that he might be duly prepared to resist the attack in case the above dispatch was genuine.
7 Sheridan continued to
Washington, and the cavalry resumed its station in the line of defense at
Cedar Creek.
At this time everything was quiet — suspiciously so.
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The surprise at Cedar Creek.
From a War-time sketch: the right of the picture shows the Confederate flanking column attacking the left of the Nineteenth Corps from the rear.
The Union troops, after a determined resistance, took position on the outer side of their rifle-pits. |
On the 16th
Custer made a reconnoissance in his front on the back road, but found no enemy outside the lines at
Fisher's Hill.
This absence of the enemy's cavalry was accounted for the next morning just before daylight by the appearance of
Rosser in the rear of
Custer's picket line with his cavalry and one brigade of infantry.
Rosser carrying the infantry behind his cavalry troopers had made a march of thirty-two miles to capture an exposed brigade of
Custer's division on the right; but a change in the arrangements of the command (the return of
Torbert) thwarted the scheme, and it resulted only in the capture of a picket guard.
On the 18th reconnoissances on both flanks discovered no sign of a movement by the enemy.
The result of the destruction of supplies in the
Valley was now being felt by
Early's troops.
About this time he writes: “I was now compelled to move back for want of provisions and forage, or attack the enemy in his position with the hope of driving him from it; and I determined to attack.”
From reports made by
General Gordon and a staff-officer who ascended Three Top Mountain to reconnoiter the
Union position, and the result of a
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Hill at Cedar Creek occupied by Sheridan's left, October 19, 1864, as seen from Kershaw's Ford.
From a photograph taken in 1865. |
reconnoissance made at the same time by
General Pegram toward the right flank of the
Union army,
General Early concluded to attack by secretly moving a force to turn
Sheridan's left flank at
Cedar Creek.
The plan of this attack was carefully made; the routes the troops were to pursue, even after the battle had commenced, were carefully designated.
[See
General Early's article, p. 526.] The attack was made at early dawn.
The surprise was complete.
Crook's camp, and afterward
Emory's, were attacked in flank and rear and the men and officers driven from their beds, many of them not having the time to hurry into their clothes, except as they retreated half awake and terror-stricken from the overpowering numbers of the enemy.
Their own artillery, in conjunction with that of the enemy, was turned on them, and long before it was light enough for their eyes, unaccustomed to the dim light, to distinguish friend from foe, they were hurrying to our right and rear intent only on their safety.
Wright's infantry, which was farther removed from the point of attack, fared somewhat better, but did not offer more than a spasmodic resistance.
The cavalry on the right was on the alert.
The rule that in the immediate presence of the enemy the cavalry must be early prepared for attack resulted in the whole First Division being up with breakfast partly finished, at the time the attack commenced.
A brigade sent on reconnoissance to the right had opened with its guns some minutes before the main attack on the left, for it had met the cavalry sent by
Early to make a demonstration on our right.
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Battle of Cedar Creek. Oct. 19, 1864. |
The disintegration of
Crook's command did not occupy many minutes.
With a force of the enemy passing through its camp of sleeping men, and another powerful column well to their rear, it was not wonderful that the men as fast as they were awakened by the noise of battle thought first and only of saving themselves from destruction.
The advance of
Gordon deflected this fleeing throng from the main road to the rear, and they passed over to the right of the army and fled along the back road.
Emory made an
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attempt to form line facing along the main road, but the wave of
Gordon's advance on his left, and the thunders of the attack along the road from
Strasburg, rendered the position untenable, and he was soon obliged to withdraw to save his lines from capture.
8
At this time there were hundreds of stragglers moving off by the right to the rear, and all efforts to stop them proved of no avail.
A line of cavalry was stretched across the fields on the right, which halted and formed a respectable force of men, so far as numbers were concerned, but these fled and disappeared to the rear as soon as the force which held them was withdrawn.
By degrees the strength of the battle died away.
The infantry of the Sixth Corps made itself felt on the advance of the enemy, and a sort of confidence among the troops which had not fled from the field was being restored.
A brigade of cavalry was ordered to the left to intercept the enemy's advance to
Winchester.
Taylor's battery of artillery, belonging to the cavalry, moved to the south, and, taking position with the infantry which was retiring, opened on the enemy.
The artillery with the cavalry was the only artillery left to the army.
The other guns had either been captured or sent to the rear.
This battery remained on the infantry lines and did much toward impeding the enemy's advance until the cavalry changed position to the Winchester-Strasburg road.
This change took place by direction of
General Torbert about 10 o'clock. In making it the cavalry marched through the broken masses of infantry direct to a point on the main road north-east of
Middletown.
The enemy's artillery fire was terrific.
Not a man of the cavalry left the ranks unless he was wounded, and everything was done with the precision and quietness of troops on parade.
General Merritt informed
Colonel Warner of
Getty's division, near which the cavalry passed, and which was at that time following the general retreat of the army, of the point where the cavalry would take position and fight, and
Warner promised to notify
General Getty, and no doubt did so, for that division of the Sixth Corps advanced to the position on the cavalry's right.
Then
Devin and
Lowell charged and drove back the advancing Confederates.
Lowell dismounted his brigade and held some stone walls whose position was suited to defense.
Devin held on to his advance ground.
Here the enemy's advance was checked for the first time, and beyond this it did not go.
The enemy's infantry sheltered themselves from.
our cavalry attacks in the woods to the left, and in the inclosures of the town of
Middletown.
But they opened a devastating fire of artillery.
This was the state of affairs when
Sheridan arrived.
Stopping at
Winchester over night on the 18th, on his way from
Washington,
General Sheridan heard the noise of the battle the following morning,
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and hurried to the field.
His coming restored confidence.
A cheer from the cavalry, which awakened the echoes of the valley, greeted him and spread the good news of his coming over the field.
9
He rapidly made the changes necessary in the lines, and then ordered an advance.
The cavalry on the left charged down on the enemy in their front, scattering them in all directions.
The infantry, not to be outdone by the mounted men, moved forward in quick time and charged impetuously the lines of
Gordon, which broke and fled.
10 It took less time to drive the enemy from the field than it had for them to take it. They seemed to feel the changed conditions in the
Union ranks, for their divisions broke one after another and disappeared toward their rear.
The cavalry
rode after them and over them, until
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night fell and ended the fray at the foot of
Fisher's Hill. Three battle-flags and twenty-two guns were added to the trophies of the cavalry that day. Early lost almost all his artillery and trains, besides everything that was captured from the
Union army in the morning.
11
The victory was dearly bought.
The killed or mortally wounded included
General Bidwell and
Colonels Thoburn and
Kitching, besides many other officers and men. Among the killed: in the final charge by the cavalry at
Cedar Creek was
Colonel Charles Russell Lowell.
He had been wounded earlier in the day, but had declined to leave the field.
The
battle of Cedar Creek has been immortalized by poets and historians.
The transition from defeat, rout, and confusion to order and victory, and all this depending on one man, made the country wild with enthusiasm.
The victory was a fitting sequel to
Winchester, a glorious prelude to
Five Forks and
Appomattox.
In this battle fell mortally wounded on the
Confederate side
Major-General Stephen D. Ramseur, four years before a classmate of the writer at
West Point.
A Union officer — a friend — watched by his side in his last moments and conveyed to his southern home his last words of affection.
There is little more to record of events in the
Valley.
Part of the night after its defeat
Early's army rested in the intrenchments on
Fisher's Hill, but before dawn the next day it retreated to
New Market.
Rosser, with the Confederate cavalry, acted as rear-guard, and was driven by the
Union cavalry beyond
Woodstock.
While
Early remained at
New Market reenforcements were sent him in the way of convalescents and one brigade from south-
western Virginia.
He contented himself, however, with remaining on the defensive.
The winter of 1864-65 was passed by
Sheridan's command at
Kernstown, where better protection could be given the troops and a short line of supplies secured.
He moved to this position in November.
About this time I moved under orders with my division of cavalry into
Loudoun Valley and reduced it to a state of destitution, so far as supplies for the enemy were concerned, as had been done in other parts of the valley.
On December 19th
Torbert with two divisions of cavalry marched through
Chester Gap in another raid on
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the Virginia Central Railway; but this attempt, like the others, was unsuccessful.
The local troops and Valley cavalry succeeded in delaying
Torbert until infantry was hurried by rail from
Richmond, when he was forced to retire.
As a diversion in favor of
Torbert's expedition
Custer's cavalry was moved up the
Valley to engage the cavalry of
Early.
Near
Harrisonburg he was attacked and surprised and was forced to retreat.
In making these expeditions the troops suffered intensely from cold, bad roads, and miserable camps.
This was especially so with
Torbert's column in crossing the mountains.
It is difficult to imagine a more disagreeable duty for a mounted soldier than marching over sleety, slushy, snowy or icy roads in winter, and bivouacking without the means of protection.
It is demoralizing to men and ruinous to horses.
After the failure of these expeditions no further movements were attempted in the
Valley, and most of the infantry of
Sheridan's army was sent either to the Army of the Potomac at
Petersburg, or elsewhere where it was needed.
In February
Sheridan made arrangements to march from the
Valley with the cavalry with a view to interrupting and destroying, as far as possible, the lines of supply through
central Virginia.
After accomplishing this it was intended that he should either move west of
Richmond and join
Sherman's army, or return to the
Valley, or join
Meade's army in front of
Petersburg, as might be most practicable.
February 27th the movement commenced, the command consisting of two superb divisions of cavalry which had been recruited and remounted during the winter, under myself, as chief-of-cavalry.
The march to
Staunton was made without noticeable
opposition.
On the morning of March 2d Early was found posted on a ridge west of
Waynesboro‘. The veteran soldier was full of pluck and made a bold front for a fight, but his troops were overcome, almost without even perfunctory resistance, by the advance regiments of the column, and
Early, with a few general officers, barely escaped capture by flight.
All
Early's supplies, all transportation, all the guns, ammunition and flags, and most of the officers and men of the army were captured and sent to the rear.
From this point
Sheridan moved unmolested to the Virginia Central Railroad, which was destroyed for miles, large bridges being wrecked, the track torn up, and the rails heated and bent.
The command was divided and sent to the
James River Canal, which was destroyed as effectually as the railroad.
This done, the cavalry proceeded to
White House, on the
Pamunkey River, where it arrived on March 19th, 1865.
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View on the Valley turnpike where Sheridan joined the Army at Cedar Creek.
From a photograph taken in 1885. |
