The struggle for Atlanta.
The forces under
General Grant after his appointment as general-in-chief were, the Army of the Potomac, under
Meade; that of the
Ohio, near
Knoxville, under
Schofield;
1 that of the
Cumberland, under
Thomas,
2 near
Chattanooga; that of the
Tennessee, under
McPherson, scattered front
Huntsville, Alabama, to the
Mississippi; that of the
Gulf, under
Banks, in
Louisiana; besides subordinate detachments, under
Steele and others, in
Arkansas and farther west.
Grant took the whole field into his thought.
He made three parts to the long, irregular line of armies, which extended from
Virginia to
Texas.
He gave to
Banks the main work in the south-west; to
Sherman the middle part, covering the hosts of
McPherson,
Thomas,
Schofield, and
Steele; and reserved to himself the remainder.
The numbers were known, at least on paper; the plan, promptly adopted, was simple and comprehensive: To break and keep broken the connecting links of the enemy's opposing armies, beat them one by one, and unite for a final consummation.
Sherman's part was plain.
Grant's plan, flexible enough to embrace his own, afforded
Sherman “infinite satisfaction.”
It looked like “enlightened war.”
He rejoiced at “this verging to a common center.”
“Like yourself,” he writes to
Grant, “you take the biggest load, and from me you shall have thorough and hearty cooperation.”
Sherman made his calculations so as to protect most faithfully our line of supply which ran through
Louisville,
Nashville, and
Chattanooga, guarding it against enemies within and without his boundaries, and against accidents.
He segregated the men of all arms for this protection.
Block-houses and intrenchments were put at bridges and tunnels along the railway.
Locomotives
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and freight cars were gathered in, and a most energetic force of skilled railroad men was put at work or held in reserve under capable chiefs.
Besides an equal number of guards of his large depots and long line of supply,
Sherman had an effective field force of 100,000,—50,000 with
Thomas, 35,000 with
McPherson, 15,000 with
Schofield.
Sherman was gratified at the number of his force; for two years before, he had been held up as worthy of special distrust because he had declared to
Secretary Cameron that before they were done with offensive operations on the line from the Big Sandy to
Paducah, 200,000 men would be required.
A few changes of organization were made.
Slocum's corps, the Twelfth, and mine, the Eleventh, were consolidated, making a new Twentieth, and
Hooker was assigned to its command.
I went at once to
Loudon, east Tennessee, to take the Fourth Corps and relieve
General Gordon Granger, to enable him to have a leave of absence.
Slocum was sent to
Vicksburg, Mississippi, to watch the great river from that quarter; while
Hooker,
Palmer, and myself, under
Thomas, were to control the infantry and artillery of the Army of the Cumberland.
In a few days I moved
Wagner's (afterward
Newton's) division and
T. J. Wood's of my new corps to
Cleveland, east Tennessee.
Rations, clothing, transportation, and ammunition came pouring in with sufficient abundance, so that when orders arrived for the next movement, on the 3d of May, 1864, my division commanders,
Stanley,
Newton, and
Wood, reported everything ready.
This very day
Schofield's column, coming from
Knoxville, made its appearance at
Cleveland.
There was now the thrill of preparation, a new life everywhere.
Soldiers and civilians alike caught the inspiration.
Ringgold and
Catoosa Springs, Georgia, were the points of concentration for
Thomas's three corps.
We of his army were all in that neighborhood by the 4th of May.
It took till the 7th for
McPherson to get into
Villanow, a few miles to the south of us.
Schofield meanwhile worked steadily southward from
Cleveland, east Tennessee, through
Red Clay, toward.
Dalton, Georgia. The three railway lines uniting
Chattanooga,
Cleveland, and
Dalton form an almost equilateral triangle.
Dalton, its south-east vertex, was the center of the Confederate army, under
Joseph E. Johnston.
Pushing out from
Dalton toward us at
Catoosa Springs,
Johnston occupied the famous pass through
Taylor's Ridge, Buzzard-Roost Gap, and part of the ridge itself; and held, for his extreme outpost in our direction,
Tunnel Hill, near which our skirmish-line and his first exchanged shots.
His northern lines ran along the eastern side of the triangle, between
Dalton and
Red Clay.
Johnston, according to his official return for April, had a force of 52,992.
At
Resaca, a few days later, after the corps of
Polk had joined him, it numbered 71,235.
3 Our three field armies aggregated then, in officers and men, 98,797, with 254 pieces of artillery.
The Confederate commander had about the same number of cannon.
McPherson had thus far brought to
Sherman but 24,465 men.
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When the Army of the Cumberland was in line, facing the enemy, its left rested near
Catoosa Springs, its center at
Ringgold, the railway station, and its right at Leet's Tan-yard.
My corps formed the left.
Catoosa Springs was a Georgia watering-place, where there were several large buildings, hotel and boarding-houses, amid undulating hills, backed by magnificent mountain scenery.
Here, on the morning of the 6th, I met
Thomas and
Sherman.
Sherman had a habit of dropping in and explaining in a happy way what he purposed to do. At first he intended that
Thomas and
Schofield should simply breast the enemy and skirmish with him on the west and north, while
McPherson, coming from
Alabama, was to strike the
Atlanta railroad at least ten miles below
Resaca.
McPherson, failing in getting some of his troops back from furlough, was not now deemed strong enough to operate alone; hence he was brought to
Chattanooga instead, and sent thence to
Villanow, soon after to pass through the
Snake Creek Gap of
Taylor's Ridge, all the time being kept near enough the other armies to get help from them in case of emergency.
By this it was ardently hoped by
Sherman that
McPherson might yet succeed in getting upon
Johnston's communications near
Resaca.
Thomas here urged his own views, which were to give
Schofield and
McPherson the skirmishing and demonstrations, while he (
Thomas), with his stronger army, should pass through Snake Creek Gap and seize
Johnston's communications.
He felt sure of victory.
Sherman, however, hesitated to put his main army twenty miles away beyond a mountain range on the enemy's line, lest he should thereby endanger his own. He could not yet afford an exchange of base.
Still, in less than a week, as we shall see, he ran even a greater risk.
Early in the day, May 7th, the Fourth Corps, arranged for battle, was near a small farm-house in sight of
Tunnel Hill. Two divisions,
Stanley's and
Newton's, abreast in long, wavy lines, and the other,
Wood's, in the rear, kept on the
qui vive to prevent surprises, particularly from the sweep of country to the north of us. The front and the left of the moving men were well protected by infantry skirmishers.
It, was a beautiful picture — that army corps, with arms glistening in the morning light, ascending the slope.
By 8 o'clock the few rifle-shots had become a continuous rattle.
First we saw far off, here and there, puffs of smoke, and then the gray horsemen giving back and passing the crest.
Suddenly there was stronger resistance, artillery and musketry rapidly firing upon our advance.
At 9 o'clock the ridge of
Tunnel Hill bristled with Confederates, mounted and dismounted.
A closer observation from Stanley's field-glass showed them to be only horse artillery and cavalry supports.
In a few moments
Stanley's and
Newton's men charged the hill at a run and cleared the ridge, and soon beheld the enemy's artillery and cavalry galloping away.
“The ball is opened,”
Stanley called out, as I took my place by his side to study
Taylor's Ridge and its “Rocky face,” which was now in plain sight.
We beheld it, a craggy elevation of about five hundred feet, extending from a point not far north of us, but as far as the eye could reach southward.
Its perpendicular face presented a formidable wall and afforded us no favorable door of entrance.
[See also article, p. 278.]
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Thomas's three corps,
Palmer occupying the middle and
Hooker the right, were now marched forward till my men received rifle-shots from the heights,
Palmer's a shower of them from the defenders of the gap, and
Hooker's a more worrisome fusillade from spurs of the ridge farther south.
Thomas could not sit down behind this formidable wall and do nothing.
How could he retain before him the
Confederate host?
Only by getting into closer contact.
On the 8th I sent
Newton some two miles northward, where the ascent was not so abrupt.
He succeeded by rushes in getting from cover to cover, though not without loss, till he had wrested at least one-third of the “knife edge” from those resolute men of gray.
Quickly the observers of this sharp contest saw the bright signal flags up there in motion.
Stanley and
Wood gave
Newton all possible support by their marksmen and by their efforts to land shells on the ridge.
The enemy's signals were near
Newton.
He tried hard to capture them, but failed.
In the night two pieces of artillery, after much toil, reached the top, and soon cleared away a few hundred yards more of this territory in bloody dispute.
On May 9th
Thomas put forth a triple effort to get nearer his foe. First,
Stanley's division reconnoitered Buzzard-Roost Gap into the very “jaws of death,” till it drew the fire from newly discovered batteries, and set whole lines of Confederate musketry-supports ablaze.
At this time I had a narrow escape.
Stanley,
Captain G. C. Kniffin of his staff, several other officers, and myself were in a group, watching a reconnoissance.
All supposed there were no Confederate sharp-shooters near enough to do harm, when
whiz came a bullet which passed through the group;
Kniffin's hat was pierced, three holes were made in my coat, and a neighboring tree was struck.
Thomas now made a second effort.
Palmer sent
Morgan's brigade up one of the spurs south of the gap. It encountered the hottest fire, and suffered a considerable loss in killed and wounded.
One regiment drove back the enemy's first line, and, like
Newton's men, came within speaking distance of their opponents.
Here arose the story to the effect that a witty corporal proposed to read to them the
President's
Emancipation Proclamation, and that they kept from firing while he did so. Still farther south, with
Hooker's Twentieth Corps, and almost beyond our hearing,
Thomas made his third push.
In this action fifty were reported killed, and a larger number wounded; among them every regimental commander engaged.
Similarly, but with easier approaches than ours,
Schofield kept
Johnston's attention at the east and north.
Such was the demonstration, while
McPherson was making his long detour through
Villanow,
Snake Creek
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Part of the battle-field of Resaca, from a War-time photograph |
Gap, and out into
Sugar Valley.
He found the gap unoccupied; and so, with
Kilpatrick's small cavalry detachment ahead,
4 followed closely by
Dodge's Sixteenth Corps, with
Logan's Fifteenth well closed up, he emerged from the mountains on the morning of the 9th, at the eastern exit.
Immediately there was excitement — the cavalry advance stumbled upon Confederate cavalry, which had run out from
Resaca to watch this doorway.
Our cavalry followed up the retreating Confederates with dash and persistency, till they found shelter behind the deep-cut works and guns at
Resaca.
In plain view of these works, though on difficult ground,
Logan and
Dodge pressed up their men, under orders from
McPherson “to drive back the enemy and break the railroad.”
And pray, why were not these plain orders carried out?
McPherson answers in a letter that night sent to
Sherman: “They [probably
Polk's men] displayed considerable force and opened on us with artillery.
After skirmishing [among the gulches and thickets] till nearly dark, and finding that I could not succeed in cutting the railroad before dark, or in getting to it, I decided to withdraw the command and take up a position for the night between
Sugar Valley and the entrance to
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the gap.”
At the first news
Sherman was much vexed, and declared concerning
McPherson's failure to break the enemy's main artery: “Such an opportunity does not occur twice in a single life, . . . still he was perfectly justified by his orders.”
Our commander, believing that
Johnston would now speedily fall back to
Resaca, at once changed his purpose.
Leaving me at
Rocky Face with the Fourth Corps and
Stoneman's small division of cavalry to hold our line of supply,
Sherman pressed after
McPherson the armies of
Thomas and
Schofield.
But
Johnston was not in a hurry.
He terrified me for two days by his tentative movements, till our skirmishing amounted at times almost to a battle.
But the night of the 12th of May he made off in one of his clean retreats.
At dawn of the 13th the formidable Buzzard-Roost Gap was open and safe, and our men passed through.
Stoneman rushed into the village of
Dalton from the north, and the Fourth Corps, eager and rapid, kept close to the chasing cavalry.
Not far south of
Dalton we came upon a bothersome Confederate rear-guard, which made our marching all that long day slow and spasmodic, yet before dark my command had skirted the eastern slope of
Taylor's Ridge for eighteen miles and joined skirmishers with
Sherman, who was already, with
McPherson, abreast of
Resaca.
Thus we ended the combats of
Tunnel Hill and
Dalton, and opened up
Resaca.
As soon as
Johnston reached the little town of
Resaca he formed a horseshoe-shaped line, something like ours at
Gettysburg.
He rested
Polk's corps on the Oostenaula River; placed
Hardee's next, running up
Milk Creek; and then curved
Hood's back to strike the
Connasauga River.
After the
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Extreme left (view looking South) of the Confederate lines at Resaca.
From a War-time photograph. |
The cluster of houses includes the railway station, the railway running generally parallel with the earth-works here seen, which in the distance descend to the Oostenaula River.
The railway and wagon bridges mentioned in the notes on p. 266 are near the railway station.
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Confederates had thrown up the usual intrenchments, and put out one or two small advanced forts with cannon, the position was as strong as
Marye's Heights had been against direct attack.
We spent a part of the 14th of May creeping up among the bushes, rocks, and ravines.
Early that morning, while this was going on,
Sherman, who had worked all night, was sitting on a log, with his back against a tree, fast asleep.
Some men marching by saw him, and one fellow ended a slurring remark by: “A pretty way we are commanded!”
Sherman, awakened by the noise, heard the last words.
“Stop, my man,” he cried; “while you were sleeping, last night,
I was planning for you, sir; and now I was taking a nap.”
Thus, familiarly and kindly, the general gave reprimands and won confidence.
McPherson rested his right upon the Oostenaula River, opposite
Polk.
Thomas, with the corps of
Palmer and
Hooker, came next; and then that brave young officer,
Cox, commanding the Twenty-third Corps, against a storm of bullets and shells swung his divisions round to follow the bend in the enemy's line.
I watched the operation, so as to close upon his left.
T. J. Wood's division moved up in a long line, with skirmishers well out, and then
Stanley's carried us to the railway.
Stanley's chief-of-artillery arranged two or three batteries to keep the enemy from walking around our unprotected left.
The air was full of screeching shells and whizzing bullets, coming uncomfortably near, while line after line was adjusting itself for the deadly conflict.
Our fighting at
Resaca did not effect much.
There might possibly have been as much accomplished if we had used skirmish-lines alone.
In
McPherson's front
Logan had a battery well placed, and fired till he had silenced the troublesome foes on a ridge in his front; then his brave men, at a run, passed the ravine and secured the ridge.
Here
Logan intrenched his corps; and
Dodge, abreast of him, did the same.
Afterward,
McPherson seized another piece of ground across
Camp Creek, and held it. During the evening of the 14th a vigorous effort was made by
Polk to regain this outpost, but he was repulsed with loss.
The detailed account gives great credit to
Generals Charles R. Woods,
Giles A. Smith, and
J. A. J. Lightburn. One hundred prisoners and 1300 Confederates
hors de combat were on
Logan's list.
This work forced
Johnston to lay a, new bridge over the
Oostenaula.
The divisions of
Absalom Baird,
R. W. Johnson,
Jefferson C. Davis, and
John Newton plunged into the thickets and worked their way steadily and bravely into the reentrant angles on
Hardee's front.
Schofield's right division, under
Judah, had a fearful
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struggle, losing six hundred men; the others, coming to its help, captured and secured a part of the enemy's intrenchments.
Hood assailed my left after 3 P. M. The front attack was repulsed, but heavy columns came surging around
Stanley's left.
Everybody, battery men and supporting infantry, did wonders; still, but for help promptly rendered,
Sherman's whole line, like the left of
Wellington's at
Waterloo, would soon have been rolled up and displaced.
But
Colonel Morgan of my staff, who had been sent in time, brought up
Williams's division from
Hooker's corps as quickly as men could march.
Stanley's brave artillerymen were thus succored before they were forced to yield their ground, and
Hood, disappointed, returned to his trenches.
The next day, the 15th, came
Hooker's attack.
He advanced in a column of deployed brigades.
Both armies watched with eager excitement this passage-at-arms.
The divisions of
Generals Butterfield,
Williams, and
Geary seized some trenches and cheered, but were stopped before a sort of lunette holding four cannon.
The Confederates were driven from their
trenches; but our men, meeting continuous and deadly volleys, could not get the guns till night.
A color-bearer named
Hess, of
Colonel Benjamin Harrison's brigade, while his comrades were retiring a few steps for better cover, being chagrined at the defiant yell behind him, unfurled his flag and swung it to the breeze.
He was instantly killed.
A witness says: “There were other hands to grasp the flag, and it came back, only to return and wave from the very spot where its former bearer fell.”
While the main battle was in progress,
Dodge had sent a division under the one-armed
Sweeny, to Lay's Ferry, a point below
Resaca.
Under the
chief engineer,
Captain Reese, he laid a bridge and protected it by a small force.
Sweeny, being threatened by some Confederates crossing the river above him, and fearing that he might be cut off from the army, suddenly drew back about a mile beyond danger.
On the 15th, however, he made another attempt and was more successful; formed a bridge-head beyond the river; threw over his whole force; and fought a successful battle against
Martin's Confederate cavalry, before
Walker's infantry, which was hastily sent against him from
Calhoun, could arrive.
Besides
Sweeny's division,
Sherman dispatched a cavalry force over the pontoons, instructing them to make a wider detour.
The operations in this quarter being successful, there was nothing left to the
Confederate commander but to withdraw his whole army from
Resaca.
This was effected during the night of the 15th, while our
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weary men were sound asleep.
At the first peep of dawn
Newton's skirmishers sprang over the enemy's intrenchments to find them abandoned.
In the ensuing pursuit,
Thomas, crossing the river on a floating bridge, hastily constructed, followed directly with the Fourth and the Fourteenth corps.
Stanley had some sharp fighting with
Stewart's Confederate division, which was acting as
Johnston's rear-guard.
It was, in fact, a running skirmish, that lasted till evening, at the close of which we encamped for the night near the enemy's empty works at
Calhoun.
Meanwhile
McPherson had been marching on parallel roads to the right toward
Rome, Georgia,
Jefferson C. Davis's division from
Thomas's army sweeping farther still to the right, and
Schofield, accompanied by
Hooker, to the left toward
Cassville.
Our enemy, between these columns with his entire force, made a brief stand on the 17th of May at
Adairsville, and fortified.
About 4 P. M.
Newton and
Wood, of my corps,
Wood on the right, found the resistance constantly increasing as they advanced, till
Newton's skirmishers, going at double-time through clumps of trees, awakened a heavy opposing fire.
A little after this, while I was watching the developments from a high point,
Sherman with his staff and escort joined me. Our showy group immediately drew upon it the fire of a battery, shells bursting over our heads with indescribable rapidity.
Colonel Morgan's horse was very badly lamed;
Fullerton, the
adjutant-general, was set afoot, and several horses of the escort were killed or crippled.
Captain Bliss, of
Newton's staff, had one shoulder-strap knocked off by a fragment, which bruised him badly.
The skirmishing of
Newton and
Wood kept increasing.
In fact, both parties, though desiring to avoid a general battle, nevertheless reenforced, till the firing amounted to an engagement.
It was not till after 9 o'clock that the rattling of the musketry had diminished to the ordinary skirmish, and the batteries had ceased, except an occasional shot, as if each were trying to have the last gun. The losses in my command in this combat were about two hundred killed and wounded. The morning of the 18th found the works in front of
Adairsville with few reminders that an army had been there the night before.
Hooker and
Schofield had done the work.
Johnston's scouts during the night brought him word that a large Federal force was already far beyond his right near
Cassville, threatening his main crossing of the
Etowah; and also that
McPherson was camping below him at McGuire's Cross-roads, and that our infantry (
Davis's division) was already in sight of the little town of
Rome, where, under a weak guard, were foundries and important mills.
We began now to perceive slight evidences of our opponent's demoralization.
I captured a regiment and quite a large number of detached prisoners.
The whole number taken, including many commissioned officers, was about four thousand.
The rapidity with which the badly broken railroad was repaired seemed miraculous.
We had hardly left
Dalton before trains with ammunition and other supplies arrived.
While our skirmishing was going on at
Calhoun, the locomotive whistle sounded in
Resaca.
The telegraphers were nearly as rapid: the lines were in order to
Adairsville on the morning of the 18th.
While we
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were breaking up the State arsenal at
Adairsville, caring for the wounded and bringing in Confederate prisoners, word was telegraphed from
Resaca that bacon, hard-bread, and coffee were already there at our service.
Johnston, by his speedy night-work, passed on through
Kingston, and formed an admirable line of battle in the vicinity of
Cassville, with his back to the
Etowah River, protecting the selected crossing.
This was his final halt north of that river, so difficult with its mountain banks.
Johnston remained here to obstruct and dispute our way one day only, for
Schofield and
Hooker had penetrated the forests eastward of him so far that
Hood, still on
Johnston's right, insisted that the
Yankees were already beyond him and in force.
Upon this report, about which there has since been much controversy,
Johnston ordered a prompt withdrawal.
The morning of the 21st of May, bright and clear, showed us a country picturesque
in its natural features, with farm and woodland as quiet and peaceful as if there had been no war. So
Sherman, taking up his headquarters at
Kingston, a little hamlet on the railway, gave his armies three days rest.
5
A glance at the map [see p. 251] shows the
Etowah flowing nearly west thirty miles from
Allatoona to
Rome.
Sherman's headquarters at
Kingston were midway.
While the armies were resting, the right (
Davis's division) at
Rome, the left (
Schofield and
Hooker) near
Cartersville, and the remainder at
Kingston, the railroad and telegraph lines were repaired to
Kingston; baggage, temporarily abandoned, came back to officers and men; necessary supplies, at the hands of smiling quartermasters and commissaries, now found us. The dead were buried, the sick and wounded were made more comfortable, and everybody got his mail and wrote letters.
Meanwhile
Sherman and his army commanders were.
endeavoring to find the location of their enemy.
Johnston was holding the region south of the
Etowah, including the pass
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of
Allatoona, and extended his army along the ridge of
Allatoona Creek toward the south-west.
He was picketing a parallel ridge in front of his line, along another creek, the
Pumpkin Vine.
This is substantially where we found this able and careful commander; but he pushed a little to the left and forward as we came on, till
Hardee was at
Dallas and
Hood at New Hope Church.
Our march was resumed on the morning of the 24th of May,
Thomas crossing on his own pontoons south of
Kingston;
Hooker, contrary to the plan, went in advance of
Schofield's column over a bridge at
Milam's, east of
Kingston;
Davis, being at
Rome, went straightforward from that place, and
McPherson did the same from his position, laying his bridges so as to take the road to
Van Wert.
Stoneman's cavalry covered the left;
Garrard's division was near
McPherson and
Davis, while
McCook's cleared the front for the center.
The whole country between the
Etowah and the
Chattahoochee presented a desolate appearance, with few openings and very few farms, and those small and poor; other parts were covered with trees and dense underbrush, which the skirmishers had great difficulty in penetrating.
Off the ordinary “hog-backs” one plunged into deep ravines or ascended abrupt steeps.
There was much loose, shifting soil on the hills, and many lagoons and small streams bordered with treacherous quicksands.
Very soon on May 24th the usual skirmishing with the cavalry began, but there was not much delay.
Hooker, coming into
Thomas's road the next morning, the 25th, led our column, taking the direct road toward
Dallas.
It was showery all day, and the weather and bad roads had a disheartening effect on men and animals.
To relieve the situation as much as possible
Thomas had my corps take advantage of country roads to the right, that would bring us into
Dallas by the
Van Wert route.
McPherson and
Davis had already come together at
Van Wert.
Now, suddenly,
Geary's division found a bridge over Pumpkin Vine Creek on fire, and hostile cavalry behind it. The cavalry soon fled, and the bridge was repaired.
Hooker, thinking there was more force in that quarter, pushed up the road toward New Hope Church.
He had gone but a short distance before he ran upon one of
Hood's brigades.
It was an outpost of
Stewart's division, put there to create delay.
Hooker soon dislodged this outpost and moved on, driving back the brigade through the woods, till he came upon the enemy's main line.
The sound of cannon speedily drew
Sherman to the point of danger.
He immediately ordered the necessary changes.
Williams's division, having passed on, faced about and came back.
Butterfield's hastened up. The two divisions, each forming in parallel lines, promptly assaulted
Hood's position.
Again and again
Hooker's brave men went forward through the forest only to run upon log-barricades thoroughly manned and protected by well-posted artillery.
During these charges occurred a thunder-storm, the heaviest shower of the day. I turned to the left by the first opportune road, and deployed
Newton's division to the right of
Hooker by 6 P. M. The remainder of my command came up over roads deep with mud and obstructed by wagons.
In the morning all the troops were at hand.
On that terrible night the nearest house to the field was filled with the wounded.
Torch-lights and
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Confederate intrenchments near New Hope Church.
From a War-time photograph. |
candles lighted up dimly the incoming stretchers and the surgeons' tables and instruments.
The very woods seemed to moan and groan with the voices of sufferers not yet brought in.
McPherson, with
Davis for his left, took position at
Dallas, having
Logan on his right, and
Garrard's cavalry still beyond.
There must have been a gap of three miles between
McPherson and us.
Schofield was badly injured by the fall of his horse in that black forest while finding his way during the night to
Sherman's bivouac, so that; for a few days
Cox took his command.
Cox, with his Twenty-third Corps, and
Palmer with the Fourteenth, swung in beyond me, as my men were moving up carefully into their usual positions in line of battle.
Now the enemy kept strengthening his trench-barricades, which were so covered by thickets that at first we could scarcely detect them.
As he did, so did we. No regiment was long in front of
Johnston's army without having virtually as good a breastwork as an engineer could plan.
There was a ditch before the embankment and a strong log revetment behind it, and a heavy “top-log” to shelter the heads of the men. I have known a regiment to shelter itself completely against musketry and artillery with axes and shovels, in less than an hour after it reached its position.
It would only weary the reader's patience to follow up the struggle step by step from New Hope Church to the
Chattahoochee.
Still, these were the hardest times which the army experienced.
It rained continuously for seventeen days; the roads, becoming as broad as the fields, were a series of quagmires.
And, indeed, it was difficult to bring enough supplies forward from
Kingston to meet the needs of the army.
Sherman began to pass his
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Union earth-works in front of Big and little Kenesaw.
From a War-time photograph. |
armies to the left.
First, I was sent with two divisions to attempt to strike
Johnston's right.
I marched thither
Wood's division, supported by
R. W. Johnson's, and connected with the army by
Cox on my right.
At
Pickett's Mill, believing I had reached the extreme of the
Confederate line, at 6 P. M. of the 27th I ordered the assault.
Wood encountered just such obstructions as
Hooker had found at New Hope Church, and was similarly repulsed, suffering much loss.
R. W. Johnson's division was hindered by a side-thrust from the hostile cavalry, so that we did not get the full benefit of his forward push.
We believed that otherwise we should have lodged at least a brigade beyond
Hindman's Confederate division.
But we did what was most important: we worked our men all that weary night in fortifying.
The Confederate commander was ready at daylight to take the offensive against us at
Pickett's Mill, but he did not do so, because he found our position and works too strong to warrant the attempt.
With a foot bruised by the fragment of a shell, I sat that night among the wounded in the midst of a forest glade, while
Major Howard of my staff led regiments and brigades into the new position chosen for them.
General R. W. Johnson had been wounded,
Captain Stinson of my staff had been shot through the lungs, and a large number lay there, on a sideling slope by a faint camp-fire, with broken limbs or disfigured faces.
The next day, the 28th,
McPherson made an effort to withdraw from
Dallas, so as to pass beyond my left; but as
Hardee at the first move quickly assailed him with great fury, he prudently advised further delay.
This battle
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was the reverse of mine at
Pickett's Mill.
The enemy attacked mainly in columns of deployed regiments along the front of
Dodge's and
Logan's corps, and was repulsed with a dreadful loss, which
Logan estimated at two thousand.
Now, necessity pressing him in every direction,
Sherman, mixing divisions somewhat along the line, gradually bore his armies to the left.
The 1st of June put
Stoneman into
Allatoona, and on the 3d
Schofield's infantry was across the railroad near
Ackworth, having had a severe and successful combat
en route.
Being now far beyond
Johnston's right, and having seized and secured the
Allatoona Creek from its mouth to
Ackworth,
Sherman was ready, from
Allatoona as a new base, to push forward and strike a new and heavy blow, when, to his chagrin, in the night of the 4th of June
Johnston abandoned his works and fell back to a new line.
This line ran from
Brush Mountain to
Lost Mountain, with “Pine top” 1 standing out in a salient near the middle.
He also held an outpost in front of Gilgal Church abreast of Pine Top. Slowly, with skirmishes and small combats, for the most part in dense woods, we continuously advanced.
On my front we seized the skirmish-holes of the enemy, made epaulements for batteries there, and little by little extended our deep ditches or log-barricades close up to
Johnston's. As we settled down to steady work again,
McPherson was near
Brush Mountain, having pushed down the railroad.
F. P. Blair's corps (the Seventeenth) from
Huntsville, Alabama, had now joined him, making up for our losses, which were already, from all causes, upward of nine thousand.
This accession gave heart to us all.
Thomas was next, advancing and bearing away toward Pine Top, and
Schofield coming up against the salient angle near Gilgal Church.
To tell the work of these two opposing hosts in their new position is a similar story to the last.
There was gallant fighting here and there all along the lines.
Here it was that my batteries, opening fire under the direct instruction of
Sherman, drove back the enemy from the exposed intrenchments on Pine Top. It was at this time that
General Polk was killed.
McPherson, by overlapping
Hood, skirmished heavily, and captured the 40th Alabama regiment entire.
Schofield, brushing away the cavalry, penetrated between
Lost Mountain and Gilgal Church, put his artillery on a prominent knoll, and, with rapid discharges, took
Hardee in reverse.
That night, the 16th of June,
Johnston again went back to a new line, already prepared, just behind
Mud Creek.
Our troops, being on the alert, followed at once with great rapidity.
Just where the old lines joined the new (for
Johnston's right wing was unchanged), I saw a feat the like of which never elsewhere fell under my observation.
Baird's division, in a comparatively open field, put forth a heavy skirmish-line, which continued such a rapid fire of rifles as to keep down a corresponding hostile line behind its well-constructed trenches, while the picks and shovels behind the skirmishers fairly flew, till a good set of works was made four hundred yards distant from the enemy's and parallel to it. One of my brigades (
Harker's), by a rush, did also a brave and unusual thing in capturing an intrenched and well-defended line of the enemy's works and taking their defenders captive.
Again, another (
Kirby's
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Confederate works on the South bank of the Chattahoochee.
From a War-time photograph. |
brigade), having lost
Bald Hill in a skirmish, retook it by a gallant charge in line, under a hot fire of artillery and infantry, and intrenched and kept it.
Hood, who had been massed opposite
McPherson, made a forced night-march, and suddenly appeared on the other flank fronting
Schofield and
Hooker.
With his known method of charging and firing, he delivered there a desperate attack on the 22d of June.
After a hard battle he was repulsed with heavy loss.
This was the “Battle of Culp's Farm.”
Here it was that
Hooker received a reproof from
Sherman for an exaggerated dispatch, which inferentially, but wrongly, blamed
Schofield.
6 Hooker was ever after incensed at
Sherman.
Again, by the gradual pressure against
Johnston's right and left,
Sherman forced him to a new contraction of his lines.
This time it was the famous
Kenesaw position that he assumed.
With his right still at
Brush Mountain, he extended a light force over the crest of the
Kenesaws, and placed a heavier one along the southern slope, reaching far beyond the
Dallas and
Marietta road.
He drew back his left and fortified.
The whole line was stronger in artificial contrivances and natural features than the cemetery at
Gettysburg.
The complete works, the slashings in front, and the difficulties of the slope toward us under a full sweep of cross-fire made the position almost impregnable.
For reasons similar to those which influenced
Lee to strike twice for
Little Round Top,
Sherman ordered an assault here with the hope of carrying the southern slope of
Kenesaw, or of penetrating
Johnston's long front at some
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weak point.
Schofield, well southward, advanced and crossed Olley's Creek, and kept up enough fire and effort to hold a large force in his front.
McPherson, on the left, did the same, a serious engagement being sustained by
Logan's corps advancing straight against the mountain.
Logan lost heavily from the trenches in his front, and from artillery that raked his men as they advanced.
Seven regimental commanders fell, killed or wounded.
But the dreadful battle, hard to describe, was left to
Thomas.
He commanded two attacks, one opposite the
Confederate General Loring's
7 left, the other in front of
Cheatham.
Newton's division led my attack, and
Davis that of
Palmer.
Like
Pickett's charge at
Gettysburg, the movement was preceded by a heavy cannonade.
Then our skirmishers sprang forward and opened; and quickly the enemy's skirmish-line was drawn back to their main work.
Harker, commanding one brigade, led his column rapidly over the open ground.
Wagner did the same on
Harker's left, and
Kimball put his brigade in close support.
The enemy's fire was terrific.
Our men did not stop till they had gained the edge of the felled trees; a few penetrated, to fall close to the enemy's parapet; but most sought shelter behind logs and rocks, in rifle-holes, or depressions.
Harker, moving with them, cheered on his men; when they were forced to stop, he rallied them again and made a second vigorous effort, in which he fell mortally wounded.
Davis's effort was like
Newton's; he met the same withering fire from rifle-balls and shells.
But his men managed to make a shelter, which they kept, close up to the hostile works.
Here they staid and intrenched.
Among those who fell were brigade
commanders Colonel Daniel McCook and
Colonel O. F. Harmon.
Our losses in this assault were heavy indeed, and our gain was nothing.
We realized now, as never before, the futility of direct assaults upon intrenched lines already well prepared and well manned.
Plainly there was now nothing left for
Sherman to do but to send his left army (
McPherson's) to follow up the right (
Schofield's) across Olley's Creek, and force his cavalry to
Sandtown and the
Chattahoochee far below
Johnston's force.
The first sign, namely,
McPherson's starting, and
Schofield's boldness, set the
Confederates again in motion.
On the morning of the 3d of July
Sherman turned his spy-glass to the Kenesaw crest, and saw our pickets “crawling up the hill cautiously.”
The strong works were found vacant.
Johnston had made new breastworks six miles below, at
Smyrna Camp Ground, and another complete set, by the labor of slaves and new levies, where the railway crosses the
Chattahoochee.
Thomas, taking up the pursuit, followed his enemy through
Marietta and beyond.
My command skirmished up to the Smyrna works during the 3d.
The next day
Sherman paid us a Fourth of July visit.
He could not at first believe that
Johnston would make another stand north of the river.
“
Howard,” he said to me, “you are mistaken; there is no force in your front; they are laughing at you!”
We were in a thinnish grove of tall trees, in front of a farm-house.
“Well, General,” I
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replied, “let us see.”
I called
Stanley, whose division held the front.
“General, double your skirmishers and press them.”
At once it was done.
The lines sped forward, capturing the outlying pits of the enemy, and took many prisoners; but a sheet of lead instantly came from the hidden works in the edge of the wood beyond us, and several unseen batteries hurled their shot across our lines, some of them reaching our grove and forcing us to retire.
Sherman, as he rode away, said that I had been correct in my report.
While we kept the
Confederates busy by skirmishing and battery firing, a set of demonstrations to the north and south of us finally resulted in gaining crossings of the river at
Roswell,
Soap Creek, Powers's and Paice's ferries.
Schofield effected the first crossing by pushing out from
Soap Creek boats loaded with men, crossing quickly, and surprising the Confederate cavalry and cannon in his front.
This was done on the 9th of July.
As soon as
Johnston knew of it, he left his excellent works near the
Chattahoochee, burned his bridges, and hastened his retreat to
Atlanta.
The weather had become good, and there was great animation and manifest joy on our side.
It was gratifying to escape from such fastnesses and dismal forests as those which had hampered us for over a month, and we now firmly believed that the end of the campaign was sure.
Our armies made a right wheel--
 |
|
General Sherman's headquarters at the Howard House, in front of Atlanta.
From a sketch made at the time.
In his “Memoirs” General Sherman says that on July 21st (the day before General McPherson was killed), while he (Sherman) was at the head of Schofield's troops, expecting that the enemy would evacuate, McPherson and his staff rode up. “We went back,” he says, “to the Howard House, a double frame-building with a porch, and sat on the steps discussing the chances of battle, and Hood's general character.
McPherson had also been of the same class at West Point with Hood, Schofield, and Sheridan.
We agreed that we ought to be unusually cautious, and prepared at all times for sallies and for hard fighting, because Hood, though not deemed much of a scholar, or of great mental capacity, was undoubtedly a brave, determined, and rash man.”--editors. |
Thomas, on the pivot, taking the shortest line to
Atlanta;
McPherson, on the outer flank, coming by Roswell to
Decatur, with
Schofield between.
As the several columns were crossing the famous
Peach Tree Creek my corps was divided.
I was sent, with
Stanley and
Wood, to connect with
Schofield, causing a gap of two miles.
Newton remained on
Thomas's left; on
Newton's right was
Ward; next,
Geary; then,
Williams; last,
Palmer's corps; all, having crossed over, were stretched out along the creek.
There was at that point but little open ground, mostly woodland, and very uneven with cross-ravines.
Just at this time, much to our comfort and to his surprise,
Johnston was removed, and
Hood placed in command of the Confederate army.
Johnston had planned to attack
Sherman at
Peach Tree Creek, expecting just such a division between our wings as we made.
Hood endeavored to carry out the plan.
A. P. Stewart now had
Polk's corps, and
Cheatham took
Hood's.
Hardee on the right and
Stewart on his
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left, in lines that overlapped
Newton's position, at 3 o'clock of the 20th of July, struck the blow.
They came surging on through the woods, down the gentle slope, with noise and fury like
Stonewall Jackson's men at
Chancellorsville.
As to our men, some of them were protected by piles of rails, but the most had not had time to barricade.
Stewart's masses advanced successively from his right, so
Newton was first assailed.
His rifles and cannon, firing incessantly and with utmost steadiness, soon stopped and repulsed the front attack; but whole battalions went far east of him into the gap before described.
Thomas, behind the creek, was watching; he turned some reserved batteries upon those Confederate battalions, and fired his shells into the thickets that bordered the
deep creek, sweeping the creek's valley as far as the cannon could reach.
This was sufficient; in his own words, “it relieved the hitch.”
The hostile flankers broke back in confusion.
In succession,
Ward,
Geary,
Williams, and
Palmer received the on-coming waves, and though their ranks were shaken in places, they each made a strong resistance, and soon rolled the
Confederates back, shattered and broken.
Hardee would have resumed the assault, but an order from
Hood took away a whole division (
Cleburne's), for
McPherson was too rapidly approaching
Cheatham and the defenses of
Atlanta from the east.
The battle of the 20th did not end till
Gresham's division, on
McPherson's left, had gone diagonally toward
Atlanta, sweeping the hostile cavalry of
Wheeler before it past the Augusta railroad, and skirmishing up against an open knob denominated
Bald Hill.
General Gresham, a fine officer, was severely wounded during his brisk movement.
Wheeler had made a desperate and successful stand here, and soon after, in the evening, the division (
Cleburne's) which was taken from
Newton's sorely handled front was brought hither and put into the trenches, in order to make secure the right of
Hood's line.
The
Bald Hill was an important outpost.
The 21st, a fearfully hot day, was spent by all in readjustment.
Thomas brought his three corps forward, near to the enemy.
The gap in my lines was closed as we neared the city.
Schofield filled the space between the Fourth (mine) and
Logan's corps.
McPherson, to get a better left, ordered
Blair to seize
Bald Hill.
General Force, of
Leggett's division, supported by
Giles A. Smith, who now had
Gresham's place, charged the hill and
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carried it, though with a heavy loss.
No time ran to waste till this point was manned with batteries protected by thick parapets and well secured by infantry supports.
Atlanta appeared to us like a well-fortified citadel with outer and inner works.
After
Thomas had beaten him,
Hood resolved to give up the
Peach Tree line; so, after dark, he drew back two corps into those outer works.
Hardee, however, was destined to a special duty.
About midnight he gathered his four divisions into
Atlanta:
Bate led the way;
Walker came next;
Cleburne, having now left the vicinity of
Bald Hill (for he was soon to go beyond it), followed; then came
Maney in rear.
They pushed out far south and around
Gresham's sleeping soldiers; they kept on eastward till
Hardee's advance was within two miles of
Decatur, and his rear was nearly past
Sherman's extreme left.
There, facing north, he formed his battle front; then he halted on rough ground, mostly covered by forest and thicket.
He had made a blind night-march of fifteen miles; so he rested his men for a sufficient time, when, slowly and confidently, the well-disciplined Confederates in line took up their forward movement.
Success was never more
 |
|
Scene of General McPherson's death, on the battle-field Op July 22.
from War-time photograph's: a 32-pounder cannon, set upon a granite block, now marks the spot of General McPherson's death.
A large pine stands within a few feet of the monument, which faces a partly improved roadway that is called McPherson avenue. |
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assured, for was not
Sherman's cavalry well out of the way, breaking a railroad and burning bridges at and beyond
Decatur?
And thus far no Yankee except a chance prisoner had discovered this Jacksonian march!
The morning showed us empty trenches from
Bald Hill to the right of
Thomas.
We quickly closed again on
Atlanta, skirmishing as we went.
McPherson's left was, however, near enough already, only a single valley lying between
Blair's position and the outer defensive works of the city.
The Sixteenth Corps (
Dodge), having sent a detachment under
General Sprague to hold
Decatur, to support the cavalry and take care of sundry army wagons,--a thing successfully accomplished,--had marched, on the 21st, toward
Atlanta.
Dodge remained for the night with head of column a mile or more in rear of
Blair's general line.
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Fuller's division was nearest
Blair's left, and
Sweeny's not far from the Augusta railroad, farther to the north.
McPherson spent the night with
Sweeny.
His hospitals and main supply trains were between
Sweeny and the front.
About midday
McPherson, having determined to make a stronger left, had set
Dodge's men in motion.
They marched, as usual, by fours, and were in long column pursuing their way nearly parallel to
Hardee's battle front, which was hidden by the thick trees.
Now danger threatened: at the first skirmish shots
Dodge's troops halted and faced to the left and were in good line of battle.
The Confederate divisions were advancing; fortunately for
Dodge, after the firing began
Hardee's approaching lines nearing him had to cross some open fields.
McPherson was then paying a brief visit to
Sherman near the
Howard house.
The attack was sudden, but
Dodge's veterans, not much disturbed, went bravely to their work.
It is easy to imagine the loud roar of artillery and the angry sounds of musketry that came to
Sherman and
McPherson when the sudden assault culminated and extended from
Dodge to
Blair's left.
McPherson mounted, and galloped off toward the firing.
He first met
Logan and
Blair near the railway; then the three separated, each to hasten to his place on the battle-line.
McPherson went at once to
Dodge; saw matters going well there; sent off aides and orderlies with dispatches, till he had but a couple of men left with him. He then rode forward to pass to
Blair's left through the thick forest interval.
Cheatham's division was just approaching.
The call was made, “Surrender!”
But
McPherson, probably without a thought save to escape from such a trap, turned his horse toward his command.
He was instantly slain, and fell from his horse.
One of his orderlies was wounded and captured; the other escaped to tell the sad news.
Our reenforcements were on the way, so that
Cheatham was beaten back.
While the battle raged,
McPherson's body was brought to
Sherman at the
Howard house.
I wrote next day: “We were all made sad yesterday by the death of
General McPherson,--so young, so noble, so promising, already commanding a department!”
I closed my report concerning him thus: “His death occasioned a profound sense of loss, a feeling that his place can never be completely filled.
How valuable, how precious the country to us all, who have paid for its preservation such a price!”
Logan immediately took the Army of the Tennessee, giving his corps to
Morgan L. Smith.
As soon as
Hood, from a prominent point in front of
Atlanta, beheld
Hardee's lines emerging from the thickets of
Bald Hill, and knew by the smoke and sound that the battle was fully joined, he hurried forward
Cheatham's division to attack
Logan all along the east front of
Atlanta.
At the time, I sat beside
Schofield and
Sherman near the
Howard house, and we looked upon such parts of the battle as our glasses could compass.
Before long we saw the line of
Logan broken, with parts of two batteries in the enemy's hands.
Sherman put in a cross-fire of cannon, a dozen or more, and
Logan organized an attacking force that swept away the bold Confederates by a charge in double-time.
Blair's soldiers repulsed the front attack of
Cheatham's and
Maney's divisions, and then, springing over their parapets, fought
Bate's and
Maney's men from the other side.
The battle continued
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Battle of Atlanta, July 22, 1864--the contest on Bald Hill [see pp. 317-328]: Fourth division, Fifteenth Corps, in the Foreground.
From the Panorama of “Atlanta.”
|
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till night, when
Hood again yielded the field to
Sherman and withdrew.
The losses on both sides in this
battle of Atlanta were probably nearly even — about four thousand each.
Our gain was in morale.
Sherman now drew his half-circle closer and closer, and began to manoeuvre with a view to get upon the railways proceeding southward.
The Army of the Tennessee (late
McPherson's) was assigned to me by the
President, and I took command on the 27th of July, while it was marching around by the rear of
Schofield and
Thomas, in order to throw itself forward close to
Atlanta on the south-west side, near Ezra Church.
Skirmishing briskly,
Dodge was first put into line facing the city; next
Blair, beside him; last,
Logan, on the right, making a large angle with
Blair.
He was not at night quite up to the crest of the ridge that he was to occupy.
In the morning of the 28th he was moving slowly and steadily into position.
About 8 o'clock
Sherman was riding with me through the wooded region in rear of
Logan's forces, when the skirmishing began to increase, and an occasional shower of grape cut through the tree-tops and struck the ground beyond us. I said: “General,
Hood will attack me here.”
“I guess not — he will hardly try it again,”
Sherman replied.
I said that I had known
Hood at
West Point, and that he was indomitable.
As the signs increased,
Sherman went back to
Thomas, where he could best help me should I need reenforcement.
Logan halted his line, and the regiments hurriedly and partially covered their front with logs and rails, having only a small protection while kneeling or lying down.
It was too late for intrenching.
With a terrifying yell,
Hood's men charged through the forest.
They were met steadily and repulsed.
But in the impulse a few Confederate regiments passed beyond
Logan's extreme right.
To withstand them four regiments came from
Dodge;
Inspector-General Strong led thither two from
Blair, armed with repeating-rifles; and my chief-of-artillery placed several batteries so as to sweep that exposed flank.
These were brought in at the exact moment, and after a few rapid discharges, the repeating-rifles being remarkable in their execution, all the groups of flankers were either cut down or had sought safety in flight.
This battle was prolonged for hours.
We expected help from
Morgan's division of
Palmer's corps, coming back from Turner's Ferry; but the Confederate cavalry kept it in check.
Our troops here exhibited nerve and persistency;
Logan was cheerful and hearty and full of enthusiasm.
He stopped stragglers and sent them back, and gave every needed order.
Blair was watchful and helpful, and so was
Dodge.
After the last charge had been repelled I went along my lines, and felt proud and happy to be intrusted with such brave and efficient soldiers.
Hood, having again lost three times as many as we, withdrew within his fortified lines.
Our skirmishers cleared the field, and the battle of Ezra Church was won; and with this result I contented myself.
One officer, who was a little panic-stricken, ran with the first stragglers to
Sherman, and cried substantially, as I remember, “You've made a mistake in
McPherson's successor.
Everything is going to pieces!”
Sherman said, “Is
General Howard there?”
“Yes; I suppose he is.”
“Well, I'll wait before taking action till I hear from him!”
So
Sherman sustained and
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trusted me, and I was content.
Of
General Logan, who has so recently gone from us, I wrote, after this battle:
Major-General Logan was spirited and energetic, going at once to the point where he apprehended the slightest danger of the enemy's success.
His decision and resolution animated and encouraged his officers and men to hold on at all hazards.
For a month
Hood kept to a defensive attitude, and, like a long storm, the siege operations set in.
Sherman worked his right, with block after block, eastward and southward.
Schofield and part of
Thomas's command had passed beyond me, digging as they halted.
Every new trench found a fresh one opposite.
The lines were near together.
Many officers and men were
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slain and many were wounded and sent back to the hospitals.
Dodge, while reconnoitering, was badly hurt;
T. E. G. Ransom took his corps, and
J. M. Corse a division in it.
Hooker, already vexed at
Sherman, was incensed at my assignment, resigned, and went home.
Slocum came from
Vicksburg to command the Twentieth Corps.
Palmer, having a controversy concerning his seniority, left the Fourteenth Corps, and
Jeff. C. Davis took his place.
Hazen passed from a brigade in the Fourth (
Stanley's) to
M. L. Smith's division of
Logan's corps.
F. P. Blair, in a report, condensed the work of his corps in these
 |
|
The battle of Ezra Church, July 28, 1864.
from a sketch made at the time. |
words: “The command was occupied for 28 days in making approaches, digging rifle-pits, and erecting batteries, being subjected day and night to a galling fire of artillery and musketry.”
Sherman now having his supplies well up, beginning on the night of the 25th of August, intrenched
Slocum's strong corps across his railroad communication to defend it; then made another grand wheel of his armies.
Schofield this time clung to the pivot.
My command described an are of 25 miles radius aiming at
Jonesboro‘, while
Thomas followed the middle course.
Both southern railways were to be seized, and the stations and road destroyed.
Preceded by
Kilpatrick, we made the march rapidly enough, considering the endless plague of the enemy's horse artillery supported by
Wheeler's cavalry, and the time it took us to break up the West Point railroad.
At Renfro Place we were to encamp on the night of the 30th of August.
Finding no water there, and also hoping to secure the
Flint River Bridge, six miles ahead, I called to
Kilpatrick for a squadron.
He sent me a most energetic young man,
Captain Estes, and the horsemen needed.
I asked
Estes if he could keep the enemy in motion.
He gave a sanguine reply, and galloped off at the head of his men.
Wheeler's rear-guard was surprised, and hurried toward the river.
Hazen's infantry followed, forgetting their fatigue in the excitement of pursuit.
We reached the bridge as it was burning, extinguished the fire, crossed over in the dusk of the evening under an increasing fire from hostile cavalry and infantry, but did not stop till
Logan had reached the wooded ridge beyond, near
Jonesboro‘. The command was soon put into position,
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and worked all night and during the next morning to intrench, and build the required bridges.
Hood had sent
Hardee by rail, with perhaps half of his command, to hold
Jonesboro‘. My Confederate classmate,
S. D. Lee, who had had the immediate assault at Ezra Church, here appeared again, commanding
Cheatham's corps.
At 3 P. M. on the 31st the
Confederates came on with the usual vigor, but were met by
Logan and
Ransom, and thoroughly repulsed.
Hood now abandoned
Atlanta, and united with
Hardee in the vicinity of
Jonesboro‘, near Love-joy's Station.
Thomas, joining my left flank, fought mainly the battle of September 1st.
During the rest that followed,
Blair and
Logan went home
on leave of absence; the field-force of the Army of the Tennessee was consolidated into two corps,
Osterhaus temporarily commanding the Fifteenth, and
Ransom the Seventeenth.
Thomas went to
Chattanooga to defend the communications with
Sherman's army.
Wagner's division was sent to
Chattanooga, and
Corse's division to
Rome.
Colonel John E. Tourtellotte had a detachment garrisoning the works at Allatoona Pass.
Hood had been threatening for some time to break
Sherman's long line of communication and supply.
Sherman could not divine where the blow would fall.
He was already arranging for a campaign southward; but he wanted
Grant's formal sanction, and he wished to make proper provision for
Hood.
At last, on the 2d of October,
Hood had passed on his way back beyond the
Chattahoochee.
Sherman had waited for this till he was sure that the first attempt against his line would be south of the
Etowah.
Now, leaving one corps,
Slocum's, at
Atlanta, he followed
Hood with the remainder of his force.
Hood stopped near
Dallas, and sent
French's division to take the garrison of
Allatoona and the depots there.
From the top of
Kenesaw,
Sherman communicated with
Corse,
8 who had joined
Tourtellotte at
Allatoona, and
[
323]
taken command.
The popular hymn, “Hold the
Fort,” was based upon the messages between these chiefs and the noble defense that the garrison successfully made against a whole Confederate division.
Sherman was coming,
 |
|
Allatoona pass, looking North--Corse's Fort on the left (see P. 344). from a War-time photograph. |
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324]
 |
|
The battle of Allatoona, October 5, 1864.
from “the Mountain campaigns in Georgia, or War scenes on the W. & A.,” published by the Western & Atlantic R. R.
Co. |
[
325]
and
French, several times repulsed with.
great loss, withdrew and joined
Hood at New Hope Church.
Taking up his northward march,
Hood avoided
Rome and aimed for
Resaca.
Schofield was warned, and got ready to defend
Chattanooga, while
Sherman now made forced marches so as to overtake his enemy and force him to battle.
Finding us on his heels,
Hood, picking up two or three small garrisons, but leaving untouched those that showed great pluck, like that of the resolute
Colonel Clark R. Wever at
Resaca,
9 rushed through
Sugar Valley and Snake Creek Gap, choking it behind him with trees.
My command, following rapidly through the pass (October 16th), cut away or threw the gap obstructions to the right and left, and camped close up to
Hood's rear-guard.
He again refused battle, and we pursued him beyond
Gaylesville, Alabama.
Between
Rome and
Gaylesville,
General Ransom, thee gallant and promising young officer before mentioned, died from over-work and exposure due to our
forced marches.
Taking advantage of a rich country,
Sherman recuperated his men and moved slowly back to the
Chattahoochee.
Now, with the full consent of
Grant, he hastened his preparations for his grand march to the sea.
