[
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Soon after my arrival in the Trans-Mississippi Department
2 I became convinced that the valley of the
Red River was the only practicable line of operations by which the enemy could penetrate the country.
This fact was well understood and appreciated by their generals.
I addressed myself to the task of defending this line with the slender means at my disposal.
Fortifications were erected on the lower
Red River;
Shreveport and
Camden were fortified, and works were ordered on the
Sabine and the crossings of the upper
Red River.
Depots were established on the shortest lines of communication between the
Red River valley and the troops serving in
Arkansas and
Texas.
Those commands were directed to be held ready to move with little delay, and every preparation was made in advance for accelerating a concentration, at all times difficult over long distances, and through a country destitute of supplies and with limited means of transportation.
In February, 1864, the enemy were preparing New Orleans,
Vicksburg, and
Little Rock for offensive operations.
Though 25,000 of the enemy were reported on the
Texas coast, my information convinced me that the valley of the
Red River would be the principal theater of operations and
Shreveport the objective point of the columns moving from
Arkansas and
Louisiana.
On the 21st of February
General Magruder, commanding in
Texas, was ordered to hold
Green's division of cavalry in readiness to move at a moment's warning, and on the 5th of March the division was ordered to march at once to
Alexandria and report to
General Taylor, who had command in
Louisiana.
About that time the enemy commenced massing his forces at
Berwick Bay.
On the 12th of March a column of ten thousand men, composed of portions of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Army Corps under
General A. J. Smith, moved down from
Vicksburg to
Simsport, and advanced with such celerity on
Fort De Russy, taking it in reverse, that
General Taylor was not allowed time to concentrate and cover this important work, our only means of arresting the progress of the gun-boats.
The fall of this work and the immediate movement of the enemy, by means of his transports, to
Alexandria, placed
General Taylor in a very embarrassing position.
He extricated himself with his characteristic tact by a march of seventy miles through the pine woods.
Banks now pressed forward from
Berwick Bay, by the line of the
Teche, and by the aid of steamers, on both the
Mississippi and
Red rivers, concentrated at
Alexandria a force of over 30,000 men, supported by the most powerful naval armament ever employed on a river.
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As soon as I received intelligence of the debarkation of the enemy at
Simsport, I ordered
General Price, who commanded in
Arkansas, to dispatch his entire infantry, consisting of
Churchill's and
Parsons's divisions, to
Shreveport, and
General Maxey to move toward
General Price, and, as soon as
Steele advanced, to join
Price with his whole command, Indians included.
The cavalry east of the
Ouachita was directed to fall back toward
Natchitoches, and subsequently to oppose, as far as possible, the advance of the enemy's fleet.
It was under the command of
General St. John R. Liddell.
All disposable infantry in
Texas was directed on
Marshall, and although the enemy still had a force of several thousand on the coast, I reduced the number
of men holding the defenses to an absolute minimum.
General Magruder's field report shows that but 2300 men were left in
Texas.
Except these, every effective soldier in the department was put in front of
Steele or in support of
Taylor.
The enemy was operating with a force, according to my information, of full 50,000 effective men; with the utmost powers of concentration not 25,000 men of all arms could be brought to oppose his movements.
Taylor had at
Mansfield, after the junction of
Green, 11,000 effectives with 5000 infantry from
Price's army in one day's march of him at
Keachie.
Price, with 6000 or 8000 cavalry, was engaged in holding in check the advance of
Steele, whose column, according to our information, did not number less than 15,000 of all arms.
Shreveport was made the point of concentration; with its fortifications covering the depots, arsenals, and shops at
Jefferson,
Marshall, and above, it was a strategic point of vital importance.
All the infantry not with
Taylor, opposed to
Banks, was directed on
Shreveport.
Price with his cavalry command was instructed to delay the march of
Steele's column whilst the concentration was being made.
Occupying a central position at
Shreveport, with the enemy's columns approaching from opposite directions, I proposed drawing them within striking distance, when, by concentrating upon and striking them in detail, both columns might be crippled or destroyed.
Banks pushed on to
Natchitoches.
It was expected he would be detained there several days in accumulating supplies.
Steele on the Little Missouri and
Banks at
Natchitoches were but about one hundred miles from
Shreveport or
Marshall.
The character of the country did not admit of their forming a junction above
Natchitoches, and if they advanced I hoped, by refusing one of them, to fight the other with my whole force.
It seemed probable at this time that
Steele would advance first.
When he reached Prairie d'ane, two routes were open to him: the one to
Marshall,
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crossing the river at
Fulton, the other direct to
Shreveport.
I consequently held
Price's infantry, under
Churchill, a few days at
Shreveport.
Steele's hesitation and the reports of the advance of
Banks's cavalry caused me, on the 4th of April, to move
Churchill to
Keachie, a point twenty miles in rear of
Mansfield, where the road divides to go to
Marshall and
Shreveport.
He was directed to report to
General Taylor.
I now visited and conferred with
General Taylor.
He believed that
Banks could not yet advance his infantry across the barren country lying between
Natchitoches and
Mansfield.
I returned to
Shreveport and wrote
General Taylor not to risk a general engagement, but to select a position in which to give battle should
Banks advance, and by a reconnoissance in force to compel the enemy to display his infantry, and to notify me as soon as he had done so and I would join him in the front.
The reconnoissance was converted into a decisive engagement near
Mansfield, on the 8th of April, with the advance of the enemy (a portion of the Thirteenth Corps and his cavalry), and by the rare intrepidity of
Mouton's division resulted in a complete victory over the forces engaged.
The
battle of Mansfield was not an intentional violation of my instructions on
General Taylor's part.
The Federal cavalry had pushed forward so far in advance of their column as to completely cover its movement, and
General Taylor reported to me by dispatch at 12 meridian of the day on which the battle took place, that there was no advance made from
Grand Ecore except of cavalry.
In fact, however,
General Franklin with his infantry was on the march and at once pushed forward to the support of the cavalry.
When
General Mouton with his division drove in the cavalry, he struck the head of
Franklin's troops, and by a vigorous and able attack, without waiting for orders from
Taylor, repulsed and drove back
Franklin's advance and opened the
battle of Mansfield, which, when
Taylor came to the front, with his accustomed boldness and vigor he pushed to a complete success.
[See p. 353.]
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372]
Churchill, with his infantry under
Tappan and
Parsons joined
Taylor that night.
The next morning
Taylor, advancing in force, found the enemy in position at
Pleasant Hill.
Our troops attacked with vigor and at first with success, but, exposing their right flank, were finally repulsed and thrown into confusion.
The Missouri and
Arkansas troops, with a brigade of
Walker's division, were broken and scattered.
The enemy recovered cannon which we had captured the day before, and two of our pieces with the dead and wounded were left on the field.
Our repulse at
Pleasant Hill was so complete and our command was so disorganized that had
Banks followed up his success vigorously he would have met but feeble opposition to his advance on
Shreveport.
Having ridden forward at 2 A. M. on receipt of
Taylor's report of the
battle of Mansfield, I joined
Taylor after dark on the 8th, a few yards in rear of the battle-field of that day.
Polignac's (previously
Mouton's) division of
Louisiana infantry was all that was intact of
Taylor's force.
Assuming command, I countermanded the order that had been given for the retreat of
Polignac's division, and was consulting with
General Taylor when some stragglers from the battle-field, where our wounded were still lying, brought the intelligence that
Banks had precipitately retreated after the battle, converting a victory which he might have claimed into a defeat.
Our troops in rear rallied, and the field was next day occupied by us.
Banks continued his retreat to
Grand Ecore, where he intrenched himself and remained until the return of his fleet and its safe passage over the bars, made especially difficult this season by the unusual fall of the river.
Our troops were completely paralyzed and disorganized by the repulse at
Pleasant Hill, and the cavalry, worn by its long march from
Texas, had been constantly engaged for three days, almost without food or forage.
Before we could reorganize at
Mansfield and get into condition to advance over the fifty-five miles of wilderness that separated our armies, the enemy had been reenforced and intrenched at
Grand Ecore.
The enemy held possession of the river until he evacuated
Grand Ecore.
Steele was still slowly advancing from the Little Missouri to the
Prairie d'ane.
I deemed it imprudent to follow
Banks below
Grand Ecore with my whole force, and leave
Steele so near
Shreveport.
Even had I been able to throw
Banks across the
Atchafalaya, the high water of that stream would have arrested my farther progress.
An intercepted dispatch from
General Sherman to
General A. J. Smith, directing the immediate return of his force to
Vicksburg, removed the last doubt in my mind that
Banks would withdraw to
Alexandria as rapidly as possible, and it was hoped the falls would detain his fleet there until we could dispose of
Steele, when the entire force of the department would be free to operate against him. I confidently hoped, if I could reach
Steele with my infantry, to beat him at a distance from his depot, in a poor country, and with my large cavalry force to destroy his army.
The prize would have been the
Arkansas Valley and the powerful fortifications of
Little Rock.
Steele's defeat or retreat would leave me in position promptly to support
Taylor's operations against
Banks.
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Leaving
Taylor with his cavalry, now under
Wharton, and the
Louisiana division of infantry under
Polignac, to follow up
Banks's retreat, and taking the
Texas, Arkansas, and
Missouri divisions of infantry, I moved against
Steele's column in
Arkansas.
Steele entered
Camden, where he was too strong for assault, but the capture of his train at the
battle of Marks's Mill on the 25th of April forced him to evacuate
Camden on the 28th, and the battle of Jenkins's Ferry on the
Saline, April 30th, completed his discomfiture.
[See p. 375.] He retreated to
Little Rock.
Churchill,
Parsons, and
Walker were
at once marched across country to the support of
Taylor, but before the junction could be effected
Banks had gone.
To return to
Taylor, after the enemy left
Grand Ecore General Taylor attacked his rear at
Cloutierville, whilst a detachment under
Bee held the
Federal advance in check at Monette's Ferry.
General Taylor's force was, however, too weak to warrant the hope that he could seriously impede the march of
Banks's column.
After the latter reached
Alexandria,
General Taylor transferred a part of his command to the river below
Alexandria, and with unparalleled audacity and great ability and success operated on the enemy's gun-boats and transports.
The construction of the dam, aided by a temporary rise in
Red River, enabled
Admiral Porter to get his fleet over the falls.
Had he delayed but one week longer, our whole infantry force would have been united against him.
Banks evacuated
Alexandria on the 12th and 13th of May, the fleet quitted the
Red River, and the campaign ended with the occupation of all the country we had held at its beginning, as well as of the lower
Teche.
The operations of
Taylor on
Red River and
Marmaduke on the
Mississippi prevented
A. J. Smith from obeying
Sherman's order to return to
Vicksburg in time for the
Atlanta campaign.
3
Through the courtesy of the editors of this work, I have carefully read a statement in which are grouped in detail the covert insinuations, the gossip of camps and capitals, and the misstatements of well-known facts that go to make up the old story of many versions of “an arrangement at
Washington whereby
Kirby Smith's army was to recede before the army of
General Banks, falling back through the
State of Texas, and finally to disband.
In anticipation of this,” the story continues, “Confederate cotton to an amount
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named, believed to be 25,000 bales, was to be gathered at points convenient for transportation and taken by three commissioners, residents of New Orleans, who would accompany the expedition under
Banks, and sold by them; the proceeds to be divided like naval prize money, and to go to make a fund for the benefit of such Confederate officers and men as might expatriate themselves in
Brazil or some other country.
General Banks was instructed to carry out this arrangement.
General Dick Taylor was assigned to the command of the Army of the West
Mississippi after this arrangement was entered into and before its execution, was not a party to it, and purposely prevented its being carried out by bringing on an engagement at
Mansfield.
After the navy commenced taking the cotton, claiming it as prize of war, a wrangle began over it and its destruction commenced.”
I remark in passing that neither the emphatic statement in regard to
General Taylor, nor the equally explicit one about the destruction of cotton, can stand the test of dates; for
General Taylor had been in command since 1862,--in fact before either
General Banks or myself,--and I ordered the cotton to be burned, in accordance with the settled policy of the
Confederacy, as soon as I heard of
Banks's movement, and before I knew of the approach of the navy.
There is not the least foundation upon which this story could rest.
The circumstances alleged are impossible to have happened without my having been a party to them.
My power in the Trans-Mississippi Department was almost absolute.
I bought cotton through my Cotton Bureau at three and four cents a pound, and sold it at fifty cents a pound in gold.
It passed in constant streams by several crossings of the
Rio Grande, as well as through
Galveston, to the agents abroad.
It would have been absurd in me to have called in the devious and uncertain agency of a Federal army, and of cotton speculators from within the
Union lines, when I could at any time have safely exported and placed to my credit abroad thousands of bales of cotton.