by J. B. Hood, General, C. S. A.
Unless the army could be heavily reenforced, there was but one plan to be adopted [after withdrawing from
Atlanta.
See p. 343]: by manoeuvres, to draw
Sherman back into the mountains, then beat him in battle, and at least regain our lost territory.
Therefore, after anxious reflection and consultation with the corps commanders, I determined to communicate with the
President, and ascertain whether or not reinforcements could be obtained from any quarter.
The reply from His
Excellency conveyed no hope of assistance:
. . . The necessity for reinforcements was realized, and every effort made to bring forward reserves, militia, and detailed men for the purpose. . . . No other resource remains.
It is now requisite that absentees be brought back, the addition required from the surrounding country be promptly made available, and that the means in hand be used with energy proportionate to the country's need.
I thereupon decided to operate at the earliest moment possible in the rear of
Sherman, as I became more and more convinced of our inability successfully to resist an advance of the
Federal army.
I recalled
General Wheeler from
Tennessee to join immediately the left of the army, whilst
Colonel Presstman, of the engineer corps, made ready to move with the pontoon-train and a sufficient number of boats to meet any emergency.
Upon the morning of the 18th the army began to move in the direction of the West Point Railroad, which the advance reached on the 19th.
Upon the 20th, line of battle was formed, with the right east of the railroad, and the left resting near the river, with army headquarters at
Palmetto.
On the 28th I issued instructions to commence the movement across the
Chattahoochee at Pumpkin Town and Phillips's Ferry, and on the following morning I directed that our supplies from
Newnan cross the river at
Moore's Ferry.
At noon I rode over the pontoon-bridge in advance of the infantry, and that night established my headquarters at Pray's Church, along with
General W. H. Jackson, commanding the cavalry.
The morning of the 1st of October
Brigadier-General Jackson advanced with the cavalry, sending a detachment at the same time to operate against the railroad between the
Chattahoochee and
Marietta.
That night the army went into bivouac eight miles north of Pray's Church, after having effected an undisturbed and safe passage of the
Chattahoochee.
Information was here received that
Kilpatrick's cavalry was north of the river, and that
Garrard's cavalry had moved in the direction of
Rome.
The night of the 2d the army rested near Flint Hill Church.
On the morning of the
3d Lieutenant-General Stewart was instructed to move with his corps and take possession of Big Shanty; to send, if practicable, a detachment for the same purpose to
Ackworth, and to destroy as great a portion of the railroad in the vicinity as possible; also to send a division to
Allatoona to capture that place, if, in the judgment of the
commanding officer, the achievement was feasible.
The main body of the army in the meantime moved forward and bivouacked near Carley's house, within four miles of
Lost Mountain.
On the 4th
General Stewart captured, after a slight resistance, about 170 prisoners at Big Shanty, and at 9:30 A. M. the garrison at
Ackworth, numbering 250 men, surrendered to
General Loring.
The forces under these officers joined the main body near
Lost Mountain on the morning of the 5th, having, in addition, destroyed about ten or fifteen miles of the railroad.
I had received information that the enemy had in store at
Allatoona large supplies which were guarded by two or three regiments.
As one of the objects of the campaign was to deprive the enemy of provisions,
Major-General French was ordered to move with his division, capture the garrison, if practicable, and gain possession of the supplies.
Accordingly, on the 5th, at 10 A. M., after a refusal to surrender, he attacked the
Federal forces at
Allatoona, and succeeded in capturing a portion of the works; at that juncture he received intelligence that large reinforcements were advancing in support of the enemy, and fearing he would be cut off from the main body of the army, he retired and abandoned the attempt.
Our soldiers fought with great courage; during the engagement
Brigadier-General Young, a brave and efficient officer, was wounded and captured by the enemy.
General Corse won my admiration by his gallant resistance, and not without reason the
Federal commander complimented this officer, through a
general order, for his handsome conduct in the defense of
Allatoona.
[See pp. 322, 323, and 324.]
Our presence upon his communications compelled
Sherman to leave
Atlanta in haste and cross the
Chattahoochee on the 3d and 4th of October with, according to our estimate at that time, about 65,000 infantry and artillery and two divisions of cavalry.
He left one corps to guard the city and the railway bridge across the river, and telegraphed to
Grant he would attack me if I struck his road south of the
Etowah.
On the 6th my army reached
Dallas; our right rested at New Hope Church, where intelligence was received that the enemy was advancing from
Lost Mountain.
From
Dallas we marched to Coosaville, ten miles south-west of
Rome, via
Van Wert,
Cedartown, and
Cave Spring.
At the latter place
Major-General Wheeler, with a portion of his command, joined me from
Tennessee.
We arrived at Coosaville on the 10th.
In a dispatch to General [Richard]
Taylor, October 7th, I requested that
Forrest be ordered to operate at once in
Tennessee:
Your dispatch of the 6th received.
This army being in motion, it is of vital importance that Forrest should
[426]
move without delay, and operate on the enemy's railroad.
If he cannot break the Chattanooga and Nashville Railroad he can occupy their forces there and prevent damage being repaired on the other road.
He should lose no time in moving.
On the 11th the army crossed the
Coosa River, marched in the direction of
Resaca and
Dalton, and bivouacked that night fourteen miles above Coosaville and ten miles north-west of
Rome.
That same day
Major-General Arnold Elzey,
chief-of-artillery, was directed to move to
Jacksonville with the reserve artillery and all surplus wagons, and
General Jackson was instructed to retard the enemy as much as possible, in the event of his advance from
Rome.
Having thus relieved the army of all incumbance, and made ready for battle, we marched rapidly to
Resaca, and thence to
Dalton, via
Sugar Valley Post-Office.
Lieutenant-General Lee moved upon
Resaca, with instructions to display his forces and demand the surrender of the garrison, but not to attack unless, in his judgment, the capture could be effected with small loss of life.
He decided not to assault the
Federal works, and commenced at once the destruction of the railroad.
On the 13th I demanded the surrender of
Dalton, which, in the first instance, was refused, but was finally acceded to at 4 P. M. The garrison consisted of about one thousand men. As the road between
Resaca and
Tunnel Hill had been effectually destroyed, the army was put in motion the next morning in the direction of
Gadsden, and camped that night near
Villanow.
From
Villanow the army passed through the gaps in the mountains, and halted on the 15th at Cross Roads, in a beautiful valley about nine miles south of
Lafayette.
At this time I received intelligence that on the 13th
Sherman had reached Snake Creek Gap, where the right of his line had rested in the early spring of this year; also that he was marching in our pursuit, whilst
General Wheeler was endeavoring to retard his advance as much as possible.
I here determined to advance no farther toward the
Tennessee River, but to select a position and deliver battle, since
Sherman, at an earlier date than anticipated, had moved as far north as I had hoped to allure him; moreover, I was again in the vicinity of the
Alabama line, with the Blue Mountain Railroad in my rear, and I thought I had discovered that improvement in the morale of the troops which would justify me in delivering battle.
In accordance with information received from our cavalry,
Sherman had, however, made no further division of his forces after leaving
Atlanta.
I therefore estimated his strength to be about 65,000 effectives.
Upon the eve of action I considered it important to ascertain by personal inquiry and through the aid of officers of my staff,--not alone from corps commanders, but from officers of less rank,--whether or not my impressions after the capture of
Dalton were correct, and I could rely upon the troops entering into battle at least hopeful of victory.
I took measures to obtain likewise the views of
Lieutenant-General S. D. Lee, who at this juncture was with his corps in rear, at or near Ship's Gap.
He agreed with all the officers consulted; the opinion was unanimous that although the army had much improved in spirit, it was not in condition to risk battle against the numbers reported by
General Wheeler.
The renouncement of the object for which I had so earnestly striven brought with it genuine disappointment; I had expected that a forward movement of one hundred miles would re-inspirit the officers and men in a degree to impart to them confidence, enthusiasm, and hope of victory, if not strong faith in its achievement.
I remained two days at Cross Roads in serious thought and perplexity.
I could not offer battle while the officers were
unanimous in their opposition.
Neither could I take an intrenched position with likelihood of advantageous results, since
Sherman could do the same, repair the railroad, amass a large army, place
Thomas in my front in command of the forces he afterward assembled at
Nashville, and then, himself, move southward; or, as previously suggested, he could send
Thomas into
Alabama, whilst he marched through
Georgia, and left me to follow in his rear.
This last movement upon our part would be construed by the troops into a retreat, and could but result in disaster.
In this dilemma I conceived the plan of marching into
Tennessee with the hope to establish our line eventually in
Kentucky, and determined to make the campaign which followed, unless withheld by
General Beauregard2 or the authorities at
Richmond.
I decided to make provision for twenty days supply of rations in the haversacks and wagons; to order a heavy reserve of artillery to accompany the army, in order to overcome any serious opposition by the
Federal gun-boats; to cross the
Tennessee at or near
Guntersville, and again destroy
Sherman's communications at
Stevenson and
Bridgeport; to move upon
Thomas and
Schofield, and to attempt to rout and capture their army before it could reach
Nashville.
I intended then to march upon that city, where I would supply the army and reenforce it, if possible, by accessions from
Tennessee.
I was imbued with the belief that I could accomplish this feat, afterward march north-east, pass the
Cumberland River at some crossing where the gun-boats, if too formidable at other points, were unable to interfere, then move into
Kentucky, and take position with our left at or near
Richmond, and our right extending toward
Hazel Green, with
Pound and Stony gaps in the
Cumberland Mountains at our rear.
In this position I could threaten
Cincinnati, and recruit the army from
Kentucky and
Tennessee; the former State was reported, at this juncture, to be more aroused and embittered against the
Federals than at any other period of the war. While
[
427]
Sherman was debating between the alternatives of following our army or marching through
Georgia, I hoped, by rapid movements, to achieve these results.
If
Sherman should cut loose and move south — as I then believed he would do after I left his front
without previously worsting him in battle--I would occupy at
Richmond, Kentucky, a position of superior advantage, as
Sherman, upon his arrival at the sea-coast, would be forced to go on board ship, and, after a long detour by water and land, repair to the defense of
Kentucky and
Ohio or march direct to the support of
Grant.
If he should return to confront my forces, or follow me directly from
Georgia into
Tennessee and
Kentucky, I hoped then to be in condition to offer battle; and, if blessed with victory, to send reinforcements to
General Lee, in
Virginia, or to march through the gaps in the
Cumberland Mountains and attack
Grant in rear.
This latter course I would pursue in the event of defeat or of inability to offer battle to
Sherman.
If, on the other hand, he should march to join
Grant, I could pass through the
Cumberland gaps to
Petersburg, and attack
Grant in rear at least two weeks before he,
Sherman, could render him assistance.
This move, I believed, would defeat
Grant, and allow
General Lee, in command of our combined armies, to march upon
Washington or turn upon and annihilate
Sherman.
Such is the plan which during the 15th and 16th, as we lay in bivouac near
Lafayette, I maturely considered, and determined to carry out.
On the 17th the army resumed its line of march, and that night camped three miles from the forks of the Alpine,
Gaylesville, and Summerville roads; thence it proceeded towards
Gadsden.
I proposed to move directly on to
Guntersville and to take into
Tennessee about one-half of
Wheeler's cavalry (leaving the remainder to look after
Sherman) and to have a depot of supplies at
Tuscumbia in the event that I should meet with defeat in
Tennessee.
Shortly after my arrival at
Gadsden,
General Beauregard reached the same point; I at once unfolded to him my plan, and requested that he confer apart with the corps commanders,
Lieutenant-Generals Lee and
Stewart and
Major-General Cheatham.
If after calm deliberation he deemed it expedient we should remain upon the
Alabama line and attack
Sherman, or take position, intrench, and finally follow on his rear when he should move south, I would of course acquiesce, albeit with reluctance.
If, contrariwise, he should agree to my proposed plan to cross into
Tennessee, I would move immediately to
Guntersville, thence to
Stevenson,
Bridgeport, and
Nashville.
This important question at issue was discussed during the greater part of one night, with maps before us.
General Beauregard at length took the ground that, if I should engage in the projected campaign, it would be necessary to leave in
Georgia all the cavalry at present with the army, in order to watch and harass
Sherman in case he should move south, and to instruct
Forrest to join me as soon as I should cross the
Tennessee River.
To this proposition I acceded.
After he had held a separate conference with the corps commanders, we again debated several hours over the course of action to be pursued; and, during the interview, I discovered that he had gone to work in earnest to ascertain, in person, the true condition of the army; that he had sought information not only from the corps commanders, but from a number of officers, and had reached the same conclusion I had formed at
Lafayette: that we were not competent to offer pitched battle to
Sherman, nor could we follow him south without causing our retrograde movement to be construed by the troops into
a recurrence of retreat, which would entail desertions and render the army of little or no use in its opposition to the enemy's march through
Georgia.
After two days deliberation
General Beauregard authorized me, on the evening of the 21st of October, to proceed to the execution of my plan of operations into
Tennessee.
General Beauregard's approval of a forward movement into
Tennessee was soon made known to the army.
The prospect of again entering that State created great en-thusiasm, and from the different encampments arose at intervals that genuine Confederate shout so familiar to every Southern soldier, and which then betokened an improved state of feeling among the troops.
With twenty days rations in the haversacks and wagons, we marched, on the 22d of October, upon all the roads leading from
Gadsden in the direction of
Guntersville, on the
Tennessee River, and bivouacked that night in the vicinity of
Bennettsville.
I here received information that
General Forrest was near
Jackson, Tennessee, and could not reach the middle portion of this State, as the river was too high.
It would, therefore, be impossible for him to join me if I crossed at
Guntersville; as it was regarded as essential that the whole of
Wheeler's cavalry should remain in
Georgia, I decided to deflect westward, effect a junction with
Forrest, and then cross the river at
Florence.
General Beauregard sent orders to him to join me without delay, and also dispatched a messenger to hasten forward supplies to
Tuscumbia.
The succeeding day the movement was continued toward
Florence, in lieu of
Guntersville as I had expected.
Lieutenant-General Lee's corps reached the
Tennessee, near
Florence, on the 30th; [Edward]
Johnson's division crossed the river and took possession of that town.
My headquarters were during the 27th and 28th at the house of
General Garth, near
Decatur, where
General Beauregard also stopped.
While the army turned
Decatur, I ordered a slight demonstration to be made against the town till our forces passed safely beyond, when I moved toward
Tuscumbia, at which place I arrived on the 31st of October.
Johnson's division, which held possession of
Florence, was reenforced the same day by
Clayton's division.
Thus the Confederate army rested upon the banks of the
Tennessee one month after its departure from
Palmetto.
It had been almost continuously in motion during the interim; by rapid moves and manoevres, and with only a small loss, it had drawn
Sherman as far north as he stood in the
[
428]
early spring.
The killed and wounded at
Allatoona had been replaced by absentees who returned to ranks, and, as usual in such operations, the number of desertions became of no consequence.
Notwithstanding my request as early as the 9th of October that the railroad to
Decatur be repaired, nothing had been done on the 1st of November toward the accomplishment of this important object.
I had expected upon my arrival at
Tuscumbia to find additional supplies, and to cross the river at once.
Unfortunately, I was constrained to
await repairs upon the railroad before a sufficient amount of supplies could be received to sustain the army till it was able to reach
middle Tennessee.
General Beauregard remained two weeks at
Tuscumbia and in its vicinity, during which interval the inaugurated campaign was discussed anew at great length.
General Sherman was still in the neighborhood of
Rome, and the question arose as to whether we should take trains and return to
Georgia to oppose his movements south, or endeavor to execute the projected operations into
Tennessee and
Kentucky.
I adhered to the conviction I had held at
Lafayette and
Gadsden, and a second time desired
General Beauregard to consult the corps commanders, together with other officers, in regard to the effect a return to
Georgia would produce upon the army.
I also urged the consideration that
Thomas would immediately overrun
Alabama, if we marched to confront
Sherman.
I had fixedly determined, unless withheld by
Beauregard or the authorities at
Richmond, to proceed, as soon as supplies were received, to the execution of the plan submitted at
Gadsden.
At this juncture I was advised of the
President's opposition to the campaign into
Tennessee previous to a defeat of
Sherman in battle.
3 The President was evidently under the impression that the army should have been equal to battle by the time it had reached the
Alabama line, and was averse to my going into
Tennessee.
He was not, as were
General Beauregard and myself, acquainted with its true condition.
Therefore, a high regard for his views notwithstanding, I continued firm in the belief that the only means to checkmate
Sherman, and cooperate with
General Lee to save the
Confederacy, lay in speedy success in
Tennessee and
Kentucky, and in my ability finally to attack
Grant in rear with my entire force.
Although every possible effort was made to expedite the repairs upon the railroad, the work progressed slowly.
Heavy rains in that section also interfered with the completion of the road.
On the 13th I established my headquarters in
Florence, upon the north branch of the
Tennessee, and the following day
General Forrest, with his command, reported for duty.
On the 15th the remainder of
Lee's corps crossed the river and bivouacked in advance also of
Florence.
Stewart's and
Cheatham's corps were instructed to cross.
About the time all necessary preparations verged to a completion, and I anticipated to move forward once more, heavy rains again delayed our supplies.
Working parties were at once detailed and sent to different points on the railroad; wagons were also dispatched to aid in the transportation of supplies.
The officer in charge was instructed to require the men to labor unceasingly for the accomplishment of this important object.
In the meantime information had reached me that
Sherman was advancing south, from
Atlanta.
He marched out of that fated city on the 16th.
Thus were two opposing armies destined to move in opposite directions, each hoping to achieve glorious results.
I well knew the delay at
Tuscumbia would accrue to the advantage of
Sherman, as he would thereby be allowed time to repair his railroad, and at least start to the rear all surplus material.
I believed, however, that I could still get between
Thomas's forces and
Nashville, and rout them; furthermore, effect such manoeuvres as to insure to our troops an easy victory.
These convictions counterbalanced my regret that
Sherman was permitted to traverse
Georgia unopposed.
General Beauregard had moved in the direction of
Georgia to assemble all available forces to oppose
Sherman's advance.
[
429]
On the 19th the cavalry was ordered to move forward.
The succeeding day
Lee's corps marched to the front about ten miles on the
Chisholm road, between the
Lawrenceburg and Waynesboro' roads. On the 20th of November,
Stewart's corps having crossed the
Tennessee and bivouacked several miles beyond on the
Lawrenceburg road, orders were issued that the entire army move at an early hour the next morning.
Lee's and
Stewart's corps marched upon the Chisholm and the
Lawrenceburg roads, and
Cheatham's upon the Waynesboro' road.
Early dawn of the 21st found the army in motion.
I hoped by a rapid march to get in rear of
Schofield's forces, then at
Pulaski, before they were able to reach
Duck River.
That night headquarters were established at
Rawhide, twelve miles north of
Florence, on the Waynesboro' road.
The march was resumed on the 22d and continued till the 27th, upon which date the troops, having taken advantage of every available road, reached
Columbia, via
Mount Pleasant.
Forrest operated in our front against the enemy's cavalry, which he easily drove from one position to another.
The Federals at
Pulaski became alarmed, and, by forced marches, reached
Columbia, upon
Duck River, in time to prevent our troops from cutting them off.
Colonel Presstman and his assistants laid the pontoons [over
Duck River] during the night of the 28th, about three miles above
Columbia; orders to move at dawn the following day having been issued to the two corps and the division above mentioned, I rode with my staff to
Cheatham's right, passed over the bridge soon after daybreak, and moved forward at the head of
Granbury's Texas brigade, of
Cleburne's division, with instructions that the remaining corps and divisions follow, and at the same time keep well closed up during the march.
General Forrest had crossed, the evening previous, and moved to the front and right.
I threw forward a few skirmishers who advanced at as rapid a pace as troops could possibly proceed.
During the march the
Federal cavalry appeared on the hills to our left; not a moment, however, was lost on that account, as the army was marching by the right flank and was prepared to face at any instant in their direction.
No attention, therefore, was paid to the enemy, save to throw out a few sharp-shooters in his front.
4
Thus I led the main body of the army to within about two miles and in full view of the pike from
Columbia to
Spring Hill and
Franklin.
I here halted about 3 P. M., and requested
General Cheatham, commanding the leading corps, and
Major-General Cleburne to advance to the spot where, sitting upon my horse, I had in sight the enemy's wagons and men passing at double-quick along the
Franklin pike.
As these officers approached, I spoke to
Cheatham in the following words, which I quote almost verbatim, as they have remained indelibly engraved upon my memory ever since that fatal day: “General, do you see the enemy there, retreating rapidly to escape us?”
He answered in the affirmative.
“Go,” I continued, “with your corps, take possession of and hold that pike at or near
Spring Hill.
Accept whatever comes, and turn all those wagons over to our side of the house.”
Then, addressing
Cleburne, I said, “General, you have heard the
 |
|
A Southern private.
From an Ambrotype. |
orders just given.
You have one of my best divisions.
Go with
General Cheatham, assist him in every way you can, and do as he directs.”
Again, as a parting injunction to them, I added, “Go and do this at once.
Stewart is near at hand, and I will have him double-quick his men to the front.”
5
They immediately sent staff-officers to hurry the men forward, and moved off with their troops at a quick pace in the direction of the enemy.
I sent several of my staff with orders to
Stewart and
Johnson to make all possible haste.
Meantime I rode to one side and looked on at
Cleburne's division, followed by the remainder of
Cheatham's corps, as it marched by, seemingly ready for battle.
Within about one-half hour from the time
Cheatham left me skirmishing began with the enemy, when I rode forward to a point nearer the pike, and again sent a staff-officer to
Stewart and
Johnson to push forward.
At the same time I dispatched a
[
430]
[
431]
messenger to
General Cheatham to lose no time in gaining possession of the pike at
Spring Hill.
It was reported back that he was about to do so.
6
Listening attentively to the fire of the skirmishers in that direction I discovered there was no continued roar of musketry, and being aware of the quick approach of darkness, about 4 o'clock at that season of the year, I became somewhat uneasy, and again ordered an officer to go to
General Cheatham, inform him that his supports were very near at hand; that he must attack at once, if he had not already so done, and take and hold possession of the pike.
Shortly afterward I intrusted another officer with the same message, and, if my memory is not treacherous, finally requested the governor of
Tennessee,
Isham G. Harris, to hasten forward and impress upon
Cheatham the importance of action without delay.
I knew no large force of the enemy could be at
Spring Hill, as couriers reported
Schofield's main body still in front of
Lee, at
Columbia, up to a late hour in the day. I thought it probable that
Cheatham had taken possession of
Spring Hill without encountering material opposition, or had formed line across the pike, north of the town, and intrenched without coming in serious contact with the enemy, which would account for the little musketry heard in his direction.
However, to ascertain the truth, I sent an officer to ask
Cheatham if he held the pike, and to inform him of the arrival of
Stewart, whose corps I intended to throw on his left, in order to assail the
Federals in flank that evening or the next morning, as they approached and formed to attack
Cheatham.
At this juncture the last messenger returned with the report that the road had not been taken possession of.
General Stewart was then ordered to proceed to the right of
Cheatham and place his corps across the pike north of
Spring Hill.
By this hour, however, twilight was upon us, when
General Cheatham rode up in person.
I at once directed
Stewart to halt, and, turning to
Cheatham, I exclaimed with deep emotion, as I felt the golden opportunity fast slipping from me, “General, why in the name of God have you not attacked the enemy and taken possession of that pike?”
He replied that the line looked a little too long for him, and that
Stewart should first form on his right.
7 I could hardly believe it possible that this brave old soldier, who had given proof of such courage and ability upon so many hard-fought fields, would even make such a report.
After leading him within full view of the enemy, and pointing out to him the
Federals retreating in great haste and confusion along the pike, and then giving explicit orders to attack, I would as soon have expected midday to turn into darkness as for him to have disobeyed my orders.
I then asked
General Cheatham whether or not
Stewart's corps, if formed on the right, would extend across the pike.
He answered in the affirmative.
Guides were at once furnished to point out
Cheatham's right to
General Stewart, who was ordered to form thereon, with his right extending across the pike.
Darkness, however, which was increased by large shade-trees in that vicinity, soon closed upon us, and
Stewart's corps, after much annoyance, went into bivouac for the night, near, but not across, the pike, at about 11 or 12 o'clock.
It was reported to me about this hour that the enemy was marching along the road, almost under the light of the camp-fires of the main body of the army.
I sent anew to
General Cheatham to know if at least a line of skirmishers could not be advanced, in order to throw the
Federals in confusion, to delay their march, and allow us a chance to attack in the morning.
Nothing was done.
The Federals, with immense wagon-trains, were permitted to march by us the remainder of the night, within gunshot of our lines.
I could not succeed in arousing the troops to action, when one good division would have sufficed to do the work.
One good division, I reassert, could have routed that portion of the enemy which was at
Spring Hill; could have taken possession of and formed line across the road; and thus could have made it an easy matter to
Stewart's corps,
Johnson's division, and
Lee's two divisions, from
Columbia, to have enveloped, routed, and captured
Schofield's army that afternoon and the ensuing day.
General Forrest gallantly opposed the enemy farther down to our right to the full extent of his power; beyond this effort nothing whatever was cone, although never was a grander opportunity offered to utterly rout and destroy the
Federal army.
Had I dreamed for one moment that
Cheatham would have failed to give battle, or at least to take position across the pike and force the enemy to assault him, I would myself have ridden.
to the front and led the troops into action.
8
In connection with this grave misfortune, I must here record an act of candor and nobility upon the part of
General Cheatham, which proves him to be equally generous-hearted and brave.
I was, necessarily, much pained by the disappointment suffered, and, a few days later, telegraphed to
Richmond,
[
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to withdraw my previous recommendation for his promotion, and to request that another be assigned to the command of his corps.
Before the receipt of a reply, this officer called at my headquarters — then at the residence of
Mr. Overton, six miles from
Nashville — and, standing in my presence, spoke an honest avowal of his error, in the acknowledgment that he felt we had lost a brilliant opportunity at
Spring Hill to deal the enemy a crushing blow, and that he was greatly to blame.
I telegraphed and wrote to the War Department to withdraw my application for his removal, in the belief that, inspired with an ambition to retrieve his shortcoming, he would prove in the future doubly zealous in the service of his country.
The following are the dispatches above referred to:
headquarters, six miles from
Nashville, on Franklin Pike, December 7, 1864.
: I withdraw my recommendation in favor of the promotion of
Major-General Cheatham, for reasons which I will write more fully.
headquarters, six miles from
Nashville, on Franklin Pike, December 8, 1864.
,
Secretary of War;
General G. T. Beauregard,
Macon, Ga.: A good lieutenant-general should be sent here at once to command the corps now commanded by
Major-General Cheatham.
I have no one to recommend for the position.
headquarters, six miles from
Nashville, on Franklin Pike, December 8, 1864.
:
Major-General Cheatham made a failure on the 30th of November which will be a lesson to him. I think it best he should remain in his position for the present.
I withdraw my telegrams of yesterday and to-day on this subject.
On the 11th of December I wrote the Hon.
Mr. Seddon:
“. . .
Major-General Cheatham has frankly confessed the great error of which he was guilty, and attaches much blame to himself.
While his error lost so much to the country, it has been a severe lesson to him, by which he will profit in the future.
In consideration of this, and of his previous conduct, I think that it is best that he should retain for the present the command he now holds.”
9
The best move in my career as a soldier I was thus destined to behold come to naught.
The discovery that the army, after a forward march of one hundred and eighty miles, was still, seemingly, unwilling to accept battle unless under the protection of breastworks, caused me to experience grave concern.
In my inmost heart I questioned whether or not I would ever succeed in eradicating this evil.
It seemed to me I had exhausted every means in the power of one man to remove this stumbling-block to the Army of Tennessee.
On the morning of the 30th of November,
Lee was on the march up the
Franklin pike, when the main body of the army, at
Spring Hill, awoke to find the
Federals had disappeared.
I hereupon decided, before the enemy would be able to reach his stronghold at
Nashville, to make that same afternoon another and final effort to overtake and rout him, and drive him into the
Big Harpeth River at
Franklin, since I could no longer hope to get between him and
Nashville, by reason of the short distance from
Franklin to that city, and the advantage which the
Federals enjoyed in the possession of the direct road.
At early dawn the troops were put in motion in the direction of
Franklin, marching as rapidly as possible to overtake the enemy before he crossed the Big Harpeth, eighteen miles from
Spring Hill.
Lieutenant-General Lee had crossed
Duck River after dark the night previous, and, in order to reach
Franklin, was obliged to march a distance of thirty miles. The head of his column arrived at
Spring Hill at 9 A. M. on the 30th, and, after a short rest, followed in the wake of the main body.
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Stewart's corps was first in order of march;
Cheatham followed immediately, and
Lieutenant-General Lee in rear.
Within about three miles of
Franklin, the enemy was discovered on the ridge over which passes the turnpike.
As soon as the
Confederate troops began to deploy, and skirmishers were thrown forward, the
Federals withdrew slowly to the environs of the town.
It was about 3 P. M. when
Lieutenant--General Stewart moved to the right of the pike and began to establish his position in front of the enemy.
Major-General Cheatham's corps, as it arrived in turn, filed off to the left of the road, and was also disposed in line of battle.
The artillery was instructed to take no part in the engagement, on account of the danger to which women and children in the village would be exposed.
10 General Forrest was ordered to post cavalry on both flanks, and, if the assault proved successful, to complete the ruin of the enemy by capturing those who attempted to escape in the direction of
Nashville.
Lee's corps, as it arrived, was held in reserve, owing to the lateness
of the hour and my inability, conseqently, to post it on the extreme left.
Schofield's position was rendered favorable for defense by open ground in front, and temporary intrenchments which the
Federals had had time to throw up, notwithstanding the Confederate forces had marched in pursuit with all possible speed.
At one or two points, along a short space, a slight abatis had been hastily constructed, by felling some small locust saplings in the vicinity.
Soon after
Cheatham's corps was massed on the left,
Major-General Cleburne came to me where I was seated on my horse in rear of the line, and asked permission to form his division in two, or, if I remember correctly, three lines for the assault.
I at once granted his request, stating that I desired the
Federals to be driven into the river in their immediate rear, and directing him to advise me as soon as he had completed the new disposition of his troops.
Shortly afterward
Cheatham and
Stewart reported all in readiness for action, and received orders to drive the enemy from his position into the river
at all hazards. About that time
Cleburne returned, and, expressing himself with an enthusiasm which he had never before betrayed in our intercourse, said, “General, I am ready, and have more hope in the final success of our cause than I have had at any time since the first gun was fired.”
I replied, “God grant it!”
He turned and moved at once toward the head of his division; a few moments thereafter he was lost to my sight in the tumult of battle.
These last words, spoken to me by this brave and distinguished soldier, I have often recalled; they can never leave my memory, as within forty minutes after he had uttered them he lay lifeless upon or near the breastworks of the foe.
The two corps advanced in battle array at about 4 P. M., and soon swept away the first line of the
Federals, who were driven back upon the main line.
At this moment resounded a concentrated roar of musketry, which recalled to me some of the deadliest struggles in
Virginia, and which now proclaimed that the possession of
Nashville was once more dependent upon the fortunes of war. The conflict continued to rage with intense fury; our troops succeeded in breaking the main line at one or more points, capturing and turning some of the guns on their opponents.
Just at this critical moment of the battle, a brigade of the enemy, reported to have been
Stanley's,
11 gallantly charged, and restored the
Federal line, capturing at the same time about one thousand of our troops within the intrenchments.
Still
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From the “bivouac” for August, 1885. |
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Overton's House, Hood's head)quarters at Nashville.
From a photograph taken in 1884. |
the ground was obstinately contested, and at several points upon the immediate sides of the breastworks the combatants endeavored to use the musket upon one another, by inverting and raising it perpendicularly, in order to fire; neither antagonist, at this juncture, was able to retreat without almost a certainty of death.
It was reported that soldiers were even dragged from one side of the breastworks to the other by men reaching over hurriedly and seizing their enemy by the hair or the collar.
Just before dark
Edward Johnson's division of
Lee's corps moved gallantly to the support of
Cheatham; although it made a desperate charge and succeeded in capturing three stand of colors, it did not effect a permanent breach in the line of the enemy.
Unfortunately, the two remaining divisions could not become engaged owing to the obscurity of night.
The struggle continued with more or less violence until 9 P. M., when skirmishing and much desultory firing followed until about 3 A. M. the ensuing morning.
The enemy then withdrew, leaving his dead and wounded upon the field.
Thus terminated one of the fiercest conflicts of the war.
Nightfall, which closed in upon us so soon after the beginning of the battle, prevented the formation and participation of
Lee's entire corps on the extreme left.
This, it may safely be asserted, saved
Schofield's army from destruction.
I might, with equal assurance, assert that had
Lieutenant-General Lee been in advance at
Spring Hill the previous afternoon
Schofield's army never would have passed that point.
Major-General Cleburne had been distinguished for his admirable conduct upon many fields, and his loss at this moment was irreparable.
He was a man of equally quick perception and strong character, and was, especially in one respect, in advance of many of our people.
He possessed the boldness and the wisdom earnestly to advocate, at an early period of the war, the freedom of the negro and the enrollment of the young and able-bodied men of that race.
This stroke of policy and additional source of strength to our armies would, in my opinion, have given us our independence.
After the failure of my cherished plan to crush
Schofield's army before it reached its strongly fortified position around
Nashville, I remained with an effective force of only 23,053.
12 I was therefore well aware of our inability to attack the
Federals in their new stronghold with any hope of success, although
Schofield's troops had abandoned the field at
Franklin, leaving their dead and wounded in our possession, and had hastened with considerable alarm into their fortifications — which latter information, in regard to their condition after the battle, I obtained through spies.
I knew equally well that in the absence of the prestige of complete victory I could not venture with my small force to cross the
Cumberland River into
Kentucky, without first receiving reenforcements from the Trans-Mississippi Department.
I felt convinced that the Tennesseans and Kentuckians would not join our forces, since we had failed in the first instance to defeat the
Federal army and capture
Nashville.
The President was still urgent in his instructions relative to the transference of
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troops to the Army of Tennessee from
Texas, and I daily hoped to receive the glad tidings of their safe passage across the
Mississippi River.
Thus, unless strengthened by these long-looked — for reenforcements, the only remaining chance of success in the campaign, at this juncture, was to take position, intrench about
Nashville, and await
Thomas's attack, which, if handsomely repulsed, might afford us an opportunity to follow up our advantage on the spot, and enter the city on the heels of the enemy.
I could not afford to turn southward, unless for the
special purpose of forming a junction with the
expected reenforcements from
Texas, and with the avowed intention to march back again upon
Nashville.
In truth, our army was in that condition which rendered it more judicious the men should face a decisive issue rather than retreat — in other words, rather than renounce the honor of their cause, without having made a last and manful effort to lift up the sinking fortunes of the
Confederacy.
I therefore determined to move upon
Nashville, to intrench, to accept the chances of reeforeements from
Texas, and, even at the risk of an attack in the meantime by overwhelming numbers, to adopt the only feasible means of defeating the enemy with my own reduced numbers, viz., to await his attack, and, if favored by success, to follow him into his works.
I was apprised of each accession to
Thomas's army, but was still unwilling to abandon the ground as long as I saw a shadow of probability of assistance from the Trans-Mississippi Department, or of victory in battle; and, as I have just remarked, the troops would, I believed, return better satisfied even after defeat if, in grasping at the last straw, they felt that a brave and vigorous effort had been made to save the country from disaster.
Such, at the time, was my opinion, which I have since had no reason to alter.
In accordance with these convictions I ordered the army to move forward on the 1st of December in the direction of
Nashville;
Lee's corps marched in advance, followed by
Stewart's and
Cheatham's corps, and the troops bivouacked that night in the vicinity of
Brentwood.
On the morning of the 2d the march was resumed, and line of battle formed in front of
Nashville.
Lee's corps was placed in the center and across the
Franklin pike;
Stewart occupied the left and
Cheatham the right — their flanks extending as near the
Cumberland as possible, whilst
Forrest's cavalry filled the gap between them and the river.
General Rousseau occupied
Murfreesboro' in rear of our right, with about eight thousand men, heavily intrenched.
General Bate's division and
Sears's and
Brown's brigades were ordered, on the 5th, to report at that point to
General Forrest, who was instructed to watch closely that detachment of the enemy.
The same day information was received of the capture of 100 prisoners, two pieces of artillery, 20 wagons and teams by
Forrest's cavalry at
La Vergne; of the capture and destruction of three block houses on the Chattanooga Railroad by
Bate's division; and of the seizure the day previous by
Chalmers of two transports on the
Cumberland River with 300 mules on board.
We had in our possession two engines and several cars, which ran as far south as
Pulaski.
Dispatches were sent to
Generals Beauregard and
Maury to repair the railroad from
Corinth to
Decatur, as our trains would be running in a day or two to the latter point.
This means of transportation was of great service in furnishing supplies to the army.
When we reached
middle Tennessee our troops had an abundance of provisions, although sorely in need of shoes and clothing.
General Bate's division was ordered to return to the army;
Forrest was instructed to direct
Palmer's and
Mercer's infantry brigades to thoroughly intrench on
Stewart's Creek, or at
LaVergne, according as he might deem more judicious, to constitute, with these troops and his cavalry, a force in observation of the enemy at
Murfreesboro‘, and, lastly, to send a brigade of cavalry to picket the river at
Lebanon.
The Federals having been reported to be massing cavalry at
Edgefield,
Forrest was instructed to meet and drive them back, if they attempted to cross the
Cumberland.
The same day, the 10th of December,
Generals Stewart and
Cheatham were directed to construct detached works in rear of their flanks, which rested near the river, in order to protect these flanks against an effort by
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the
Federals to turn them.
Although every possible exertion was made by these officers, the works were not completed when, on the 15th, the
Federal army moved out and attacked both flanks, whilst the main assault was directed against our left.
It was my intention to have made these defenses self-sustaining, but time was not allowed, as the enemy attacked on the morning of the 15th.
Throughout that day they were repulsed at all points of the general line with heavy loss, and only succeeded toward evening in capturing the infantry outposts on our left, and with them the small force together with the artillery posted in these unfinished works.
Finding that the main movement of the
Federals was directed against our left, the
chief engineer was instructed carefully to select a line in prolongation of the left flank;
Cheatham's corps was withdrawn from the right during the night of the 15th and posted on the left of
Stewart —
Cheatham's left resting near the
Brentwood Hills.
The men were ordered to construct breastworks there during that same night.
The morning of the 16th found us with
Lee's right on Overton's Hill.
At an early hour the enemy made a general attack along our front, and were again and again repulsed at all points with heavy loss, especially in
Lee's front.
About 3:30 P. M. the
Federals concentrated a number of guns against a portion of our line, which passed over a mound on the left of our center, and which had been occupied during the night.
This point was favorable for massing troops for an assault under cover of artillery.
Accordingly the enemy availed himself of the advantage presented, massed a body of men — apparently one division — at the base of this mound, and, under the fire of artillery, which prevented our men from raising their heads above the breastworks, made a sudden and gallant charge up to and over our intrenchments.
Our line, thus pierced, gave way; soon thereafter it broke at all points, and I beheld for the first and only time a Confederate army abandon the field in confusion.
I was seated upon my horse not far in rear when the breach was effected, and soon discovered that all hope to rally the troops was vain.
I did not, I might say, anticipate a break at that time, as our forces up to that moment had repulsed the
Federals at every point, and were waving their colors in defiance, crying out to the enemy, “Come on, come on.”
Just previous to this fatal occurrence I had matured the movement for the next morning.
The enemy's right flank, by this hour, stood in air some six miles from
Nashville, and I had determined to withdraw my entire force during the night, and attack this exposed flank in rear.
I could safely have done so, as I still had open a line of retreat.
The day before the rout, the artillery posted in the detached works had been captured; a number of guns in the main line were abandoned for the reason
that the horses could not be brought forward in time to remove them.
Thus the total number of guns captured amounted to fifty-four.
We had fortunately still remaining a sufficient number of pieces of artillery for the equipment of the army, since, it will be remembered.
I had taken with me at the outset of the campaign a large reserve of artillery to use against gun-boats.
Our losses in killed and wounded in this engagement were comparatively small, as the troops were protected by breastworks.
Order among the troops was in a measure restored at
Brentwood, a few miles in rear of the scene of disaster, through the promptness and gallantry of
Clayton's division, which speedily formed and confronted the enemy, with
Gibson's brigade and
McKenzie's battery, of
Fenner's battalion, acting as rear-guard of the rear-guard.
General Clayton displayed admirable coolness and courage that afternoon and the next morning in the discharge of his duties.
Gibson, who evinced conspicuous gallantry and ability in the handling of his troops, succeeded, in concert with
Clayton, in checking and staying the first and most dangerous shock which always follows immediately after a rout.
The result was that even after the army passed the Big Harpeth, at
Franklin, the brigades and divisions were marching in regular order.
General S. D. Lee displayed his usual energy and skill in handling his troops on the 17th, whilst protecting the rear of our army.
Unfortunately, in the afternoon he was wounded and forced to leave the field.
General C. L. Stevenson then assumed command of
Lee's corps, and ably discharged his duties during the continuance of the retreat to and across the
Tennessee River.
General Walthall, one of the most able division commanders in the
South, was here ordered to form a rear-guard with eight picked brigades and
Forrest's cavalry; the march was then resumed in the direction of
Columbia,
Stewart's corps moving in front, followed by those of
Cheatham and
Stevenson.
The army bivouacked in line of battle near
Duck River on the night of the 1 8th.
The following day we crossed the river and proceeded on different roads leading toward
Bainbridge on the
Tennessee.
I entertained but little concern in regard to being further harassed by the enemy.
I therefore continued to march leisurely, and arrived at
Bainbridge on the 25th of December.
The following day the march was continued in the direction of
Tupelo, at which place
Cheatham's corps, the last in the line of march, went into camp on the 10th of.January, 1865.
On the 13th of January I sent the following dispatch to the
Secretary of War: “I request to be relieved from the command of this army.”
Upon
General Beauregard's arrival at
Tupelo, on the 14th of January, I informed him of my application to be relieved from the command of the army.
I again telegraphed the authorities in
Richmond, stating that the campaigns to the
Alabama line and into
Tennessee were my own conception; that I alone was responsible; that I had striven hard to execute them in such manner as to bring victory to our people, and at the same time repeated my desire to be relieved.
The President finally complied with my request, and I bade farewell to the Army of Tennessee on the 23d of January, 1865, after having served with it some-what in excess of eleven months, and having performed my duties to the utmost of my ability.
