by Henry Stone, Brevet Colonel, U. S. V., member of thee staff of General Thomas.
On September 28th, 1864, less than four weeks from the day the
Union forces occupied
Atlanta,
General Sherman, who found his still unconquered enemy,
General Hood, threatening his communications in
Georgia, and that formidable raider,
General Forrest, playing the mischief in
west Tennessee, sent to the latter State two divisions--
General Newton's of the Fourth Corps, and
General J. D. Morgan's of the Fourteenth--to aid in destroying, if possible, that intrepid dragoon.
To make assurance doubly sure, the next day he ordered
General George H. Thomas, his most capable and experienced lieutenant, and the commander of more than three-fifths of his grand army, “back to
Stevenson and
Decherd . . . to look to
Tennessee.”
No order could have been more unwelcome to
General Thomas.
It removed him from the command of his own thoroughly organized and harmonious army of sixty thousand veterans, whom he knew and trusted, and who knew and loved him, and relegated him to the position of supervisor of communications.
It also sent him to the rear just when great preparations were making for an advance.
But, as often happens, what seemed an adverse fate opened the door to great, unforeseen opportunity.
The task of expelling
Forrest and reopening the broken communications was speedily completed, and on the 17th of October
General Thomas wrote to
General Sherman, “I hope to join you very soon.”
Sherman, however, had other views, and the hoped — for junction was never made.
On the 19th he wrote to
General Thomas:
I will send back to Tennessee the Fourth Corps, all dismounted cavalry, all sick and wounded, and all incumbrances whatever except what I can haul in our wagons. . . . I want you to remain in Tennessee and take command of all my [military] division not actually
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present with me. Hood's army may be set down at forty thousand (40,000) of all arms, fit for duty. . . . If you can defend the line of the Tennessee in my absence of three (3) months, it is all I ask.
With such orders, and under such circumstances,
General Thomas was left to play his part in the new campaign.
General Hood, after a series of daring adventures which baffled all
Sherman's calculations ( “he can turn and twist like a fox,” said
Sherman, “and wear out my army in pursuit” ), concentrated his entire force except
Forrest's cavalry, at
Gadsden, Alabama, on the 22d of October, while
General Sherman established his headquarters at
Gaylesville,--a “position,” as he wrote to
General Halleck, “very good to watch the enemy.”
In spite of this “watch,”
Hood suddenly appeared on the 26th at
Decatur, on the
Tennessee River, seventy-five miles north-west of
Gadsden.
This move was a complete surprise, and evidently “meant business.”
The Fourth Corps, numbering about twelve thousand men, commanded by
Major-General D. S. Stanley, was at once ordered from
Gaylesville, to report to
General Thomas.
On the 1st of November its leading division reached
Pulaski, Tennessee, a small town on the railroad, about forty miles north of
Decatur, where it was joined four days later by the other two.
Making a slight though somewhat lengthened demonstration against
Decatur,
General Hood pushed on to
Tuscumbia, forty-five miles west.
Here he expected to find — what he had weeks before ordered — ample supplies, and the railroad in operation to
Corinth.
But he was doomed to disappointment.
Instead of being in condition to make the rapid and triumphant march with which he had inflamed the ardor of his troops, he was detained three weeks, a delay fatal to his far-reaching hopes.
Placing one corps on the north side of the river at
Florence, he waited for supplies and for
Forrest, who had been playing havoc throughout
west Tennessee, from the line of the
Mississippi border, northward to
Kentucky, and was under orders to join him.
Convinced now of
Hood's serious intentions,
General Sherman also ordered the Twenty-third Corps, ten thousand men, under command of
Major-General J. M. Schofield, to report to
General Thomas.
Reaching
Pulaski, with one division, on the 14th of November,
General Schofield, though inferior in rank to
Stanley, assumed command by virtue of being a department commander.
The whole force gathered there was less than 18,000 men; while in front were some 5000 cavalry, consisting of a brigade of about 1500, under
General Croxton, and a division of some 3500, under
General Edward Hatch, the latter being fortunately intercepted while on his way to join
Sherman.
The Confederate army in three corps (
S. D. Lee's,
A. P. Stewart's, and
B. F. Cheatham's) began its northward march from
Florence on the 19th of November, in weather of great severity.
It rained and snowed and hailed and froze, and the roads were almost impassable.
Forrest had come up, with about six thousand cavalry, and led the advance with indomitable energy.
Hatch and
Croxton made such resistance as they could; but on the 22d the head of
Hood's column was at
Lawrenceburg, some 16 miles due west of
Pulaski,
Tennessee and on a road running direct to
Columbia, where the railroad and turnpike
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to
Nashville cross
Duck River, and where there were less than 800 men to guard the bridges.
The situation at
Pulaski, with an enemy nearly three times as large fairly on the flank, was anything but cheering.
Warned by the reports from
General Hatch, and by the orders of
General Thomas, who, on the 20th, had directed
General Schofield to prepare to fall back to
Columbia, the two divisions of
General J. D. Cox and
General George D. Wagner (the latter
Newton's old division) were ordered to march to
Lynnville — about half-way
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to
Columbia — on the 22d.
On the 23d the other two divisions, under
General Stanley, were to follow with the wagon-trains.
It was not a moment too soon.
On the morning of the 24th
General Cox, who had pushed on to within nine miles of
Columbia, was roused by sounds of conflict away to the west.
Taking a cross-road, leading south of
Columbia, he reached the
Mount Pleasant pike just in time to interpose his infantry between
Forrest's cavalry and a hapless brigade, under command of
Colonel Capron, which was being handled most unceremoniously.
1 In another hour
Forrest would have been in possession of the crossings of
Duck River, and the only line of communication with
Nashville would have been in the hands of the enemy.
General Stanley, who had left
Pulaski in the afternoon of the 23d, reached
Lynnville after dark.
Rousing his command at 1 o'clock in the morning, by 9 o'clock the head of his column connected with
Cox in front of
Columbia — having marched thirty miles since 2 o'clock of the preceding afternoon.
These timely movements saved the little army from utter destruction.
When
General Sherman had finally determined on his march to the sea, he requested
General Rosecrans, in
Missouri, to send to
General Thomas two divisions, under
General A. J. Smith, which had been lent to
General Banks for the
Red River expedition, and were now repelling the incursion of
Price into
Missouri.
As they were not immediately forthcoming,
General Grant had ordered
General Rawlins, his chief-of-staff, to
St. Louis, to direct, in person, their speedy embarkation.
Thence, on the 7th of November, two weeks before
Hood began his advance from
Florence,
General Rawlins wrote to
General Thomas that
Smith's command, aggregating nearly 14,000, would begin to leave that place as early as the 10th.
No news was ever more anxiously awaited or more eagerly welcomed than this.
But the promise could not be fulfilled.
Smith had to march entirely across the
State of Missouri; and instead of leaving
St. Louis on the 10th, he did not arrive there until the 24th.
Had he come at the proposed time, it was
General Thomas's intention to place him at
Eastport, on the
Tennessee River, so as to threaten
Hood's flank and rear if the latter advanced.
With such disposition, the battles of
Franklin and
Nashville would have been relegated to the category of “events which never come to pass.”
7 But when
Smith reached
St. Louis,
Hood was threatening
Columbia; and it was an open question whether he would not reach
Nashville before the reenforcements from
Missouri.
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As fast as the
Union troops arrived at
Columbia, in their hurried retreat from
Pulaski, works were thrown up, covering the approaches from the south, and the trains were sent across the river.
But the line was found to be longer than the small force could hold; and the river could easily be crossed, above or below the town.
Orders were given to withdraw to the north side on the night of the 26th, but a heavy storm prevented.
The next night the crossing was made, the railroad bridge was burned, and the pontoon boats were scuttled.
This was an all-night job, the last of the pickets crossing at 5 in the morning. It was now the fifth day since the retreat from
Pulaski began, and the little army had been exposed day and night to all sorts of weather except sunshine, and had been almost continually on the move.
From deserters it was learned that
Hood's infantry numbered 40,000, and his cavalry, under
Forrest, 10,000 or 12,000.
But the
Union army was slowly increasing by concentration and the arrival of recruits.
It now numbered at
Columbia about 23,000 infantry and some 5000 cavalry — of whom only 3500 were mounted.
General James H. Wilson, who had been ordered by
General Grant to report to
General Sherman,--and of whom
General Grant wrote, “I believe he will add fifty per cent. to the effectiveness of your cavalry,”--had taken command personally of all
General Thomas's cavalry, which was trying to hold the fords east and west of
Columbia.
[See article by
General Wilson, to follow.]
In spite of every opposition,
Forrest succeeded in placing one of his divisions on the north side of
Duck River before noon of the 28th, and forced back the
Union cavalry on roads leading toward
Spring Hill and
Franklin.
At 1 o'clock on the morning of the 29th
General Wilson became convinced that the enemy's infantry would begin crossing at daylight, and advised
General Schofield to fall back to
Franklin.
At 3:30 the same morning
General Thomas sent him similar orders.
Daylight revealed the correctness of
Wilson's information.
Before sunrise
Cheatham's corps, headed by
Cleburne's division,--a division unsurpassed for courage, energy, and endurance by any in the Confederate army,--was making its way over
Duck River at Davis's Ford, about five miles east of
Columbia.
The weather had cleared, and it was a bright autumn morning, the air full of invigorating life.
General Hood in person accompanied the advance.
When
General Schofield was informed that the Confederate infantry were crossing, he sent a brigade, under
Colonel P. Sidney Post, on a reconnoissance along the river-bank, to learn if the report was true.
He also ordered
General Stanley to march with two divisions,
Wagner's and
Kimball's, to
Spring Hill, taking the trains and all the reserve artillery.
In less than half an hour after receiving the order,
Stanley was on the way. On reaching the point where
Rutherford Creek crosses the
Franklin Pike,
Kimball's division was halted, by order of
General Schofield, and faced to the east to cover the crossing against a possible attack from that quarter.
In this position
Kimball remained all day.
Stanley, with the other division, pushed on to
Spring Hill.
Just before noon, as the head of his column was approaching that place, he met “a cavalry soldier who seemed to be badly scared,” who reported that
Buford's division of
Forrest's cavalry was approaching from
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the east.
The troops were at once double-quicked into the town, and the leading brigade, deploying as it advanced, drove off the enemy just as they were expecting, unmolested, to occupy the place.
As the other brigades came up, they also were deployed, forming nearly a semicircle,--
Opdycke's brigade stretching in a thin line from the railroad station north of the village to a point some distance east, and
Lane's from
Opdycke's right to the pike below.
Bradley was sent to the front to occupy a knoll some three-fourths of a mile east, commanding all the approaches
 |
|
View of the Winstead hills, Franklin, where Hood formed his line of battle.
From a photograph: the right of Wagner's two brigades, in the advanced position, was posted behind the stone wall in the foreground.
The Columbia Pike is shown passing over the hills on the left of the picture. |
from that direction.
Most of the artillery was placed on a rise south of the town.
The trains were parked within the semicircle.
From Spring Hill roads radiate to all points, the turnpike between
Columbia and
Franklin being there intersected by turnpikes from
Rally Hill and
Mount Carmel, as well as by numerous country roads leading to the neighboring towns.
Possession of that point would not only shut out the
Union army from the road to
Nashville, but it would effectually bar the way in every direction.
Stanley's arrival was not a moment too soon for the safety of the army, and his prompt dispositions and steady courage, as well as his vigorous hold of all the ground he occupied, gave his little command all the moral fruits of a victory.
Hardly had the three brigades, numbering, all told, less than four thousand men, reached the positions assigned them, when
Bradley was assailed by a force which the men declared fought too well to be dismounted cavalry.
At the same time, at
Thompson's Station, three miles north, an attack was made on a small wagon train heading for
Franklin; and a dash was made by a detachment of the Confederate cavalry on the
Spring Hill station, north-west of the town.
It seemed as if the little band, attacked from all points, was threatened with destruction.
Bradley's brigade was twice assaulted, but held its own, though with considerable loss, and only a single regiment could be spared to reenforce him. The third assault was more successful, and he was
[
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driven back to the edge of the village,
Bradley himself receiving a disabling wound in rallying his men. While attempting to follow up this temporary advantage, the enemy, in crossing a wide cornfield, was opened upon with spherical case-shot from eight guns posted on the knoll, and soon scattered in considerable confusion.
These attacks undoubtedly came from
Cleburne's division, and were made under the eye of the corps commander,
General Cheatham, and the army commander,
General.
Hood. That they were not successful, especially as the other two divisions of the same corps,
Brown's and
Bate's, were close at hand, and
Stewart's corps not far off, seems unaccountable.
Except this one small division deployed in a long thin line to cover the wagons, there were no Union troops within striking distance; the cavalry were about
Mount Carmel, five miles east, fully occupied in keeping
Forrest away from Franklin and the
Harpeth River crossings.
The nearest aid was
Kimball's division, seven miles south, at
Rutherford Creek.
The other three divisions of infantry which made up
Schofield's force —
Wood's,
Cox's, and
Ruger's (in part)--were still at
Duck River.
Thus night closed down upon the solitary division, on whose boldness of action devolved the safety of the whole force which
Sherman had spared from his march to the sea to breast the tide of
Hood's invasion.
When night came, the danger increased rather than diminished.
A single Confederate brigade, like
Adams's or
Cockrell's or
Maney's,--veterans since
Shiloh,--planted squarely across the pike, either south or north of
Spring Hill, would have effectually prevented
Schofield's retreat, and day-light would have found his whole force cut off from every avenue of escape by more than twice its numbers, to assault whom would have been madness, and to avoid whom would have been impossible.
Why
Cleburne and
Brown failed to drive away
Stanley's one division before dark; why
Bate failed to possess himself of the pike south of the town; why
Stewart failed to lead his troops to the pike at the north; why
Forrest, with his audacious temper and his enterprising cavalry, did not fully hold
Thompson's Station or the crossing of the
West Harpeth, half-way to
Franklin: these are to this day disputed questions among the
Confederate commanders; and it is not proposed to discuss them here.
The afternoon and night of November 29th, 1864, may well be set down in the calendar of
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[
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lost opportunities.
The heroic valor of the same troops the next day, and their frightful losses as they attempted to retrieve their mistake, show what might have been.
By 8 o'clock at night--two hours only after sunset, on a moonless night — at least two corps of
Hood's army were in line of battle facing the turnpike, and not half a mile away.
The long line of Confederate camp-fires burned
bright, and the men could be seen standing around them or sauntering about in groups.
Now and then a few would come almost to the pike and fire at a passing Union squad, but without provoking a reply.
General Schofield, who had remained at
Duck River all day, reached
Spring Hill about 7 P. M., with
Ruger's division and
Whitaker's brigade.
Leaving the latter to cover a cross-road a mile or two below the town, he started with
Ruger about 9 P. M. to force a passage at
Thompson's Station, supposed to be in the hands of the enemy.
At 11 P. M.
General Cox arrived with his division, and soon after
Schofield returned to
Spring Hill with the welcome news that the way was open.
From
Thompson's Station he sent his engineer officer,
Captain William J. Twining, to
Franklin, to telegraph the situation to
General Thomas, all communication with whom had been cut off since early morning.
Captain Twining's dispatch shows most clearly the critical condition of affairs: “The general says he will not be able to get farther than
Thompson's Station to-night . . . He regards his situation as extremely perilous. . . Thinking the troops under
A. J. Smith's command had reached
Franklin,
General Schofield directed me to have them.
pushed down to
Spring Hill by daylight to-morrow.”
This was Tuesday.
The day before,
General Thomas had telegraphed to
General Schofield that
Smith had not yet arrived, but would be at
Nashville in three days--that is, Thursday.
The expectation of finding him at
Franklin, therefore, was like a drowning man's catching at a straw.
Just before midnight
Cox started from
Spring Hill for
Franklin, and was ordered to pick up
Ruger at
Thompson's Station.
At 1 A. M. he was on the road, and the train, over five miles long, was drawn out. At the very outset it had to cross a bridge in single file.
So difficult was this whole movement, that it was 5 o'clock in the morning before the wagons were fairly under way. As the head of the train passed
Thompson's Station, it was attacked by the Confederate cavalry, and for a while there was great consternation.
Wood's division, which had followed
Cox from
Duck River, was marched along to the east of the pike, to protect the train, and the enemy were speedily driven off. It was near daybreak when the last wagon left
Spring Hill.
Kimball's division
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followed
Wood's, and at 4 o'clock
Wagner drew in his lines, his skirmishers remaining till it was fairly daylight.
The rear-guard was commanded by
Colonel Emerson Opdycke, who was prepared, if necessary, to sacrifice the last man to secure the safety of the main body.
So efficiently did his admirable brigade do its work, that, though surrounded by a cloud of the enemy's cavalry, which made frequent dashes at its lines, not a straggler nor a wagon was left behind.
The ground was strewn with knapsacks cut from the shoulders of a lot of raw recruits weighed down with their unaccustomed burden.
 |
|
1. the Carter House, from the side toward the town.
2. the Carter House, from the Confederate side.
3. front view of the Carter House.
From Photographs taken in 1884. |
The head of the column, under
General Cox, reached the out-skirts of
Franklin about the same hour that the rear-guard was leaving
Spring Hill.
Here the tired, sleepy, hungry men, who had fought and marched, day and night, for nearly a week, threw up a line of earth-works on a slight eminence which guards the southern approach to the town, even before they made their coffee.
Then they gladly dropped anywhere for the much-needed “forty winks.”
Slowly the rest of the weary column, regiment after regiment of worn-out men, filed into the works, and continued the line, till a complete bridge-head, from the river-bank above to the river-bank below, encircled the town.
By noon of the 30th all the troops had come up, and the wagons were crossing the river, which was already fordable, notwithstanding the recent heavy rainfalls.
The rear-guard was still out, having an occasional bout with the enemy.
[See map of the field, p. 430.]
The
Columbia Pike bisected the works, which at that point were built just in front of the
Carter house, a one-story brick dwelling west of the pike, and a large gin-house on the east side.
Between the gin-house and the river the works were partly protected in front by a hedge of
Osage orange, and on the knoll, near the railroad cut close to the bank, were two batteries belonging to the Fourth Corps.
Near the
Carter house was a considerable thicket of locust trees.
Except these obstructions, the whole ground in front was entirely
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unobstructed and fenceless, and, from the works, every part of it was in plain sight.
General Cox's division of three brigades, commanded that day, in order from left to right, by
Colonels Stiles and
Casement and
General Reilly, occupied the ground between the
Columbia Pike and the river above the town.
The front line consisted of eight regiments, three in the works and one in reserve for each of the brigades of
Stiles and
Casement, while
Reilly's brigade nearest the pike had but two regiments in the works, and two in a second line, with still another regiment behind that.
West of the pike, reaching to a ravine through which passes a road branching from the
Carter's Creek Pike, was
Ruger's division of two brigades — the third, under
General Cooper, not having come up from
Johnsonville.
Strickland's brigade, of four regiments, had two in the works and two in reserve.
Two of these regiments, the 72d Illinois and 44th Missouri, belonged to
A. J. Smith's corps, and had reported to
General Schofield only the day before.
A third, which was in reserve, the 183d Ohio, was a large and entirely new regiment, having been mustered into service only three weeks before, and having joined the army for the first time on the 28th.
Moore's brigade, of six regiments, had four in the works and two in reserve.
Beyond
Ruger, reaching from the ravine to the river below, was
Kimball's division of the Fourth Corps,--all veterans,--consisting of three brigades commanded by
Generals William Grose and
Walter C. Whitaker and
Colonel Isaac M. Kirby.
All the troops in the works were ordered to report to
General Cox, to whom was assigned the command of the defenses.
2 General Wood's division of the Fourth Corps had gone over the river with the trains; and two brigades of
Wagner's division, which had so valiantly stood their ground at
Spring Hill and covered the rear since, were halted on a slope about half a mile to the front.
Opdycke had brought his brigade within the works, and held them massed, near the pike, behind the
Carter house.
Besides the guns on the knoll, near the railroad cut, there were six pieces in
Reilly's works; four on
Strickland's left; two on
Moore's left, and four on
Grose's left — in all, twenty-six guns in that part of the works, facing south, and twelve more in reserve, on or near the
Columbia Pike.
As the bright autumn day, hazy with the golden light of an Indian summer atmosphere, wore away, the troops that had worked so hard looked hopefully forward to a prospect of ending it in peace and rest, preparatory either to a night march to
Nashville, or to a reenforcement by
Smith's corps and
General Thomas.
But about 2 o'clock, some suspicious movements on the hills a mile or two away — the waving of signal flags and the deployment of the enemy in line of battle — caused
General Wagner to send his adjutant-general, from the advanced position where his two brigades had halted, to his commanding general, with the information that
Hood seemed to be preparing for attack.
In a very short time the whole Confederate line could be
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seen, stretching in battle array, from the dark fringe of chestnuts along the river-bank, far across the
Columbia Pike, the colors gayly fluttering and the muskets gleaming brightly, and advancing steadily, in perfect order, dressed on the center, straight for the works.
Meantime
General Schofield had retired to the fort, on a high bluff on the other side of the river, some two miles away, by the road, and had taken
General Stanley with him. From the fort the whole field of operations was plainly visible.
Notwithstanding all these demonstrations, the two brigades of
Wagner were left on the knoll where they had been halted, and, with scarcely an apology for works to
 |
|
Front view of the Gin-House.
The line of the Union works ran in front of the Gin-house, and only a few feet from it; in 1886 a faint depression along the edge of the field still indicated the position.
Near the tree seen in the lower picture there is a round, deep hollow which afforded protection to the Union soldiers.
The lower view was taken from the same point on the pike, looking a little to the right, as the view of “The Carter House, from the Confederate side,” on p. 449. |
 |
|
View of the Gin-House, from the Pike. |
protect them, had waited until it was too late to retreat without danger of degenerating into a rout.
On came the enemy, as steady and resistless as a tidal wave.
A couple of guns, in the advance line, gave them a shot and galloped back to the works.
A volley from a thin skirmish-line was sent into their ranks, but without causing any delay to the massive array.
A moment more, and with that wild “rebel yell” which, once heard, is never forgotten, the great human wave swept along, and seemed to ingulf the little force that had so sturdily awaited it.
The first shock came, of course, upon the two misplaced brigades of
Wagner's division, which, through some one's blunder, had remained in their false position until too late to retire without disaster.
They had no tools to throw up works; and when struck by the resistless sweep of
Cleburne's and
Brown's divisions, they had only to make their way, as best they could, back to the works.
In that wild rush, in which friend and foe were intermingled, and the piercing “rebel yell” rose high above the “Yankee cheer,” nearly seven hundred were made prisoners.
But, worst of all for the
Union side, the men of
Reilly's and
Strickland's brigades dared not fire, lest they should shoot down their own comrades, and the guns, loaded with grape and canister, stood silent in the embrasures.
With loud shouts of “Let's go into the
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works with them,” the triumphant Confederates, now more like a wild, howling mob than an organized army, swept on to the very works, with hardly a check from any quarter.
So fierce was the rush that a number of the fleeing soldiers — officers and men — dropped exhausted into the ditch, and lay there while the terrific contest raged over their heads, till, under cover of darkness, they could crawl safely inside the intrenchments.
On
Strickland's left, close to the
Columbia Pike, was posted one of the new infantry regiments.
The tremendous onset, the wild yells, the whole infernal din of the strife, were too much for such an undisciplined body.
As they saw their comrades from the advance line rushing to the rear, they too turned and fled.
The contagion spread, and in a few minutes a disorderly stream was pouring down the pike past the
Carter house toward
 |
|
Bridge at Franklin over the Harpeth River, looking up-stream.
The left of the picture, is the north bank of the stream; Franklin is upon the south bank.
Fort Granger, where General Schofield had his headquarters, occupied the site of the buildings on the north bank. |
the town.
The guns, posted on each side the
Columbia Pike, were abandoned, and the works, for the space of more than a regimental front, both east and west of the pike, were deserted.
Into the gap thus made, without an instant's delay, swarmed the jubilant Confederates, urged on by
Cleburne and
Brown, and took possession of both works and guns.
For a moment it looked as though these two enterprising divisions, backed by the mass of troops converging toward the pike, would sweep down the works in both directions, and, taking
Strickland and
Reilly on the flank, drive them out, or capture them.
Fortunately, there were at hand reserves of brave men who were not demoralized by the momentary panic.
Colonel Emerson Opdycke, of
Wagner's division, as already stated, had brought his brigade inside the works, and they were now massed near the
Carter house, ready for any contingency.
Two regiments of
Reilly's brigade, the 12th and 16th Kentucky, which had reached
Franklin about noon, had taken position a little in rear of the rest of the brigade, and thrown up works.
As soon as the break was made in the lines all these reserves rushed to the front, and, after a terrific struggle, succeeded in regaining the works.
Opdycke's brigade, deploying as it advanced, was involved in as fierce a hand-to-hand encounter as ever soldiers engaged in. The two
Kentucky regiments joined in the fight with equal ardor and bravery.
A large part of
Conrad's and
Lane's men, as they came in, though wholly disorganized, turned about and gave the enemy a hot reception.
Opdycke's horse was shot under him, and he fought on foot at the head of his brigade.
General Cox was everywhere present, encouraging and cheering on his men.
General Stanley, who, from the fort where he had gone with
General Schofield, had seen the opening clash, galloped to the front as soon as possible and did all that a brave man could until he was painfully wounded.
Some of
Opdycke's men manned the abandoned guns in
Reilly's works ; others filled the gap in
Strickland's line.
These timely movements first checked and then
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repulsed the assaulting foe, and soon the entire line of works was reoccupied, the enemy sullenly giving up the prize which was so nearly won.
Stewart's corps, which was on
Cheatham's right, filling the space to the river, kept abreast of its valiant companion, and, meeting no obstacle, reached the works near the
Union left before
Cheatham made the breach at the
Columbia Pike.
Owing to the peculiar formation of the field, the left of
Stewart's line was thrown upon the same ground with the right of
Cheatham's; the two commands there became much intermingled.
This accounts for so many of
General Stewart's officers and men being killed in front of
Reilly's and
Casement's regiments.
Where there was nothing to hinder the
Union fire, the muskets of
Stiles's and
Casement's brigades made fearful havoc; while the batteries at the railroad cut plowed furrows through the ranks of the advancing foe. Time after time they came up to the very works, but they never crossed them except as prisoners.
More than one color-bearer was shot down on the parapet.
It is impossible to exaggerate the fierce energy with which the
Confederate soldiers, that short November afternoon, threw themselves against the works, fighting with what seemed the very madness of despair.
There was not a breath of wind, and the dense smoke settled down upon the field, so that, after the first assault, it was impossible to see at any distance.
Through this blinding medium, assault after assault was made, several of the
Union officers declaring in their reports that their lines received as many as thirteen distinct attacks.
Between the gin-house and the
Columbia Pike the fighting was fiercest, and the
Confederate losses the greatest.
Here fell most of the
Confederate generals, who, that fateful afternoon, madly gave up their lives;
Adams of
Stewart's corps — his horse astride the works, and himself within a few feet of them.
Cockrell and
Quarles, of the same corps, were severely wounded.
In
Cheatham's corps,
Cleburne and
Granbury were killed near the pike.
On the west of the pike
Strahl and
Gist were killed, and
Brown was severely wounded.
General G. W. Gordon was captured by
Opdycke's brigade, inside the works.
The heaviest loss in all the
Union regiments was in the 44th Missouri, the advance guard of
Smith's long-expected reenforcement, which had been sent to
Columbia on the 27th, and was here stationed on the right of the raw regiment that broke and ran at the first onset of the enemy.
Quickly changing front, the 44th held its ground, but with a loss of 34 killed, 37 wounded, and 92 missing, many of the latter being wounded.
In the 72d Illinois, its companion, every field-officer was wounded, and the entire color-guard, of one sergeant and eight corporals, was shot down.
Its losses were 10 killed, 66 wounded, and 75 missing.
While this infantry battle was going on,
Forrest had crossed the river with his cavalry some distance east of the town, with the evident purpose of getting at
Schofield's wagons.
But he reckoned without his host.
Hatch and
Croxton, by
General Wilson's direction, fell upon him with such vigor that he returned to the south side and gave our forces no further trouble.
At nightfall the victory was complete on every part of the
Union lines.
But here and there on the
Confederate side desultory firing was kept up till long after dark, though with little result.
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At 3 o'clock in the afternoon, as the
Confederate lines were forming for their great assault,
General Schofield, in reply to a telegram from
General Thomas, asking him if he could “hold
Hood at
Franklin for three days longer,” replied, “I do not think I can. . . It appears to me I ought to take position at
Brentwood at once.”
Accordingly
General Thomas, at 3:30, directed him to retire to
Brentwood, which he did that night, bringing away all the wagons and other property in safety.
Among the spoils of war were thirty-three Confederate colors, captured by our men from the enemy.
The morning found the entire infantry force safe within the friendly shelter of the works at
Nashville, where they also welcomed the veterans of
A. J. Smith, who were just arriving from
Missouri.
Soon after, a body of about five thousand men came in from
Chattanooga, chiefly of
General Sherman's army, too late for their proper commands.
These were organized into a provisional division under
General J. B. Steedman, and were posted between the
Murfreesboro' Pike and the river.
Cooper's brigade also came in after a narrow escape from capture, as well as several regiments of colored troops from the railroad between
Nashville and
Johnsonville.
Their arrival completed the force on which
General Thomas was to rely for the task he now placed before himself — the destruction of
Hood's army.
It was an ill-assorted and heterogeneous mass, not yet welded into an army, and lacking a great proportion of the outfit with which to undertake an aggressive campaign.
Horses, wagons, mules, pontoons, everything needed to mobilize an army, had to be obtained.
At that time they did not exist at
Nashville.
[See map, p. 434.]
The next day
Hood's columns appeared before the town and took up their positions on a line of hills nearly parallel to those occupied by the
Union army, and speedily threw up works and prepared to defend their ground.
Probably no commander ever underwent two weeks of greater anxiety and distress of mind than
General Thomas during the interval between
Hood's arrival and his precipitate departure from the vicinity of
Nashville.
The story is too painful to dwell upon, even after the lapse of twenty-three years. From the 2d of December until the battle was fought on the 15th, the
general-in-chief did not cease, day or night, to send him from the headquarters at
City Point, Va., most urgent and often most uncalled — for orders in regard to his operations, culminating in an order on the 9th relieving him, and directing him to turn over his command to
General Schofield, who was assigned to his place — an order which, had it not been revoked, the great captain would have obeyed with loyal single-heartedness.
This order, though made out at the Adjutant-Generals office in
Washington, was not sent to
General Thomas, and he did not know of its existence until told of it some years later by
General Halleck, at
San Francisco.
He felt, however, that something of the kind was impending.
General Halleck dispatched to him, on morning of the 9th: “
Lieutenant-General Grant expresses much dissatisfaction at your delay in attacking the enemy.”
His reply shows how entirely he understood the situation: “I feel conscious I have done everything in my power, and that the troops could not have been gotten ready before this.
If General Grant should order me to be relieved, I will submit without a murmur.” As he
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 |
|
Hill near Nashville from which Bate's Confederate division was driven on December 16.
from a photograph taken in 1884. |
was writing this,--2 o'clock in the afternoon of December 9th,--a terrible storm of freezing rain had been pouring down since daylight, and it kept on pouring and freezing all that day and a part of the next.
That night
General Grant notified him that the order relieving him — which he had divined — was suspended.
But he did not know who had been designated as ]his successor.
With this threat hanging over him; with the utter impossibility, in that weather, of making any movement; with the prospect that the labors of his whole life were about to end in disappointment, if not disaster,--he never, for an instant, abated his energy or his work of preparation.
Not an hour, day and night, was he idle.
Nobody — not even his most trusted staff-officers — knew the contents of the telegrams that came to him. But it was very evident that something greatly troubled him. While the rain was falling and the fields and roads were ice-bound, he would sometimes sit by the window for an hour or more, not speaking a word, gazing steadily out upon the forbidding prospect, as if he were trying to will the storm away.
It was curious and interesting to see how, in this gloomy interval, his time was occupied by matters not strictly military.
Now, it was a visit from a delegation of the city government, in regard to some municipal regulation; again, somebody whose one horse had been seized and put into the cavalry; then, a committee of citizens, begging that wood might be furnished, to keep some poor families from freezing; and, of evenings,
Governor Andrew Johnson--then
Vice-President elect--would unfold to him, with much iteration, his fierce views concerning secession, rebels, and reconstruction.
To all he gave a patient and kindly hearing, and he often astonished
Governor Johnson by his knowledge of constitutional and international law. But, underneath all, it — was plain to see that
General Grant's dissatisfaction keenly affected him, and that only by the proof which a successful battle would furnish could he hope to regain the confidence of the
general-in-chief.
So when, at 8 o'clock on the evening of December 14th, after having laid his plans before his corps commanders, and dismissed them, he dictated to
General Halleck the telegram, “The ice having melted away to-day, the enemy will be attacked to-morrow morning,” he drew a deep sigh of relief, and for the first time for a week showed again something of his natural buoyancy and cheerfulness.
He moved about more briskly; he put in order all the little last things that remained to be done; he signed his name where it was needed in the letter-book, and then, giving orders to his staff-officers to be ready at 5 o'clock the next morning, went gladly to bed.
The ice had not melted a day too soon; for, while he was writing the telegram to
General Halleck,
General Logan was speeding his way to
Nashville, with orders from
General Grant that would have placed him in command
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of all the
Union forces there assembled.
General Thomas, fortunately, did not then learn this second proof of
General Grant's lack of confidence; and
General Logan, on reaching
Louisville, found that the work intended for him was already done — and came no farther.
At the very time when these orders were made out at
Washington, in obedience to
General Grant's directions, a large part of the cavalry was unmounted; two divisions were absent securing horses and proper outfit; wagons were unfinished and mules lacking or unbroken; pontoons unmade and pontoniers untrained; the ground was
 |
|
The Capitol, Nashville.
Strong works, set with cannon, inclosed the foundations of the Capitol.
Cisterns within the building held a bountiful supply of water.
Owing to its capacity and the massiveness of the lower stories, the Capitol was regarded as a citadel, in which a few thousand men could maintain themselves against an army. |
covered with a glare of ice which made all the fields and hillsides impassable for horses and scarcely passable for foot-men.
The natives declared that the
Yankees brought their weather as well as their army with them.
Every corps commander in the army protested that a movement under such conditions would be little short of madness, and certain to result in disaster.
A very considerable reorganization of the army also took place during this enforced delay.
General Stanley, still suffering from his wound, went North, and
General T. J. Wood, who had been with it from the beginning, succeeded to the command of the Fourth Corps.
General Ruger, who had commanded a division in the Twenty-third Corps, was also disabled by sickness, and was succeeded by
General D. N. Couch, formerly a corps commander in the Army of the Potomac, and who had recently been assigned to duty in the Department of the Cumberland.
3 General Wagner was retired from command of his division, and was succeeded by
General W. L. Elliott, who had been chief of cavalry on
General Thomas's staff in the
Atlanta campaign.
General Kenner Garrard, who had commanded a cavalry division during the
Atlanta campaign, was assigned to an infantry division in
Smith's corps.
In all these cases, except in that of
General Wood succeeding to the command of the Fourth Corps, the newly assigned officers were entire strangers to the troops over whom they were placed.
On the afternoon of the 14th of December
General Thomas summoned his corps commanders, and, delivering to each a written order containing a
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detailed plan of the battle, went with them carefully and thoroughly over the whole ground, answering all questions and explaining all doubts.
Never had a commander a more loyal corps of subordinates or a more devoted army.
The feeling in the ranks was one of absolute and enthusiastic confidence in their general.
Some had served with him since his opening triumph at
Mill Springs; some had never seen his face till two weeks before.
But there was that in his bearing, as well as in the confidence of his old soldiers, which inspired the new-comers with as absolute a sense of reliance upon him as was felt by the oldest of his veterans.
The plan, in general terms, was for
General Steedman, on the extreme left, to move out early in the morning, threatening the rebel right, while the cavalry, which had been placed on the extreme right, and
A. J. Smith's corps were to make a grand left wheel with the entire right wing, assaulting and, if possible, overlapping the left of
Hood's position.
Wood was to form the pivot for this wheel, and to threaten and perhaps attack
Montgomery Hill; while
General Schofield was to be held in reserve, near the left center, for such use as the exigency might develop.
It was not daylight, on the morning of the 15th of December, when the army began to move.
In most of the camps reveille had been sounded at 4 o'clock, and by 6 everything was ready.
It turned out a warm, sunny, winter morning.
A dense fog at first hung over the valleys and completely hid all movements, but by 9 o'clock this had cleared away.
General Steedman, on the extreme left, was the first to draw out of the defenses, and to assail the enemy at their works between the
Nolensville and Murfreesboro' pikes.
It was not intended as a real attack, though it had that effect.
Two of
Steedman's brigades, chiefly colored troops, kept two divisions of
Cheatham's corps constantly busy, while his third was held in reserve; thus one Confederate corps was disposed of.
S. D. Lee's corps, next on
Cheatham's left, after sending two brigades to the assistance of
Stewart, on the
Confederate left, was held in place by the threatening position of the garrison troops, and did not fire a shot during the day. Indeed, both
Cheatham's and
Lee's corps were held, as in a vise, between
Steedman and
Wood.
Lee's corps was unable to move or to fight.
Steedman maintained the ground he occupied till the next morning, with no very heavy loss.
When, about 9 o'clock, the sun began to burn away the fog, the sight from
General Thomas's position was inspiring.
A little to the left, on
Montgomery Hill, the salient of the
Confederate lines, and not more than six hundred yards distant from
Wood's salient, on Lawrens Hill, could be seen the advance line of works, behind which an unknown force of the enemy lay in wait.
Beyond, and along the
Hillsboro' Pike, were stretches of stone wall, with here and there a detached earth-work, through whose embrasures peeped the threatening artillery.
To the right, along the valley of
Richland Creek, the dark line of
Wilson's advancing cavalry could be seen slowly making its difficult way across the wet, swampy, stumpy ground.
Close in front, and at the foot of the hill, its right joining
Wilson's left, was
A. J. Smith's corps, full of cheer and enterprise, and glad to be once more in the open field.
Then
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 |
|
Views of Fort Negley on the left of the Union intrenchments, Nashville, between the Franklin and Nolensville pikes.
From Photographs: the lower picture shows a casemate protected with railroad iron.
The hills in the distance were the Confederate center and left at the opening of the fight. |
came the Fourth Corps, whose left, bending back toward the north, was hidden behind Lawrens Hill.
Already the skirmishers were engaged, the
Confederates slowly falling back before the determined and steady pressure of
Smith and
Wood.
By the time that
Wilson's and
Smith's lines were fully extended and brought up to within striking distance of the
Confederate works, along the
Hillsboro' Pike, it was noon.
Post's brigade of
Wood's old division (now commanded by
General Sam Beatty), which lay at the foot of
Montgomery Hill, full of dash and spirit, had since morning been regarding the works at the summit with covetous eyes.
At Post's suggestion, it was determined to see which party wanted them most.
Accordingly, a charge was ordered — and in a moment the brigade was swarming up the hillside, straight for the enemy's advanced works.
For almost the first time since the grand assault on
Missionary Ridge, a year before, here was an open field where everything could be seen.
From
General Thomas's headquarters everybody looked on with breathless suspense, as the blue line, broken and irregular, but with steady persistence, made its way up the steep hillside against a fierce storm of musketry and artillery.
Most of the shots, however, passed over the men's heads.
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It was a struggle to keep up with the colors, and, as they neared the top, only the strongest were at the front.
Without a moment's pause, the color-bearers and those who had kept up with them, Post himself at the head, leaped the parapet.
As the colors waved from the summit, the whole line swept forward and was over the works in a twinkling, gathering in prisoners and guns.
Indeed, so large was the mass of the prisoners that a few minutes later was seen heading toward our own lines, that a number of officers at
General Thomas's headquarters feared the assault had failed and the prisoners were Confederate reserves who had rallied and retaken the works.
But the fear was only momentary; for the wild outburst of cheers that rang across the valley told the story of complete success.
Meanwhile, farther to the right, as the opposing lines neared each other, the sound of battle grew louder and louder, and the smoke thicker and thicker, until the whole valley was filled with the haze.
It was now past noon, and, at every point the two armies were so near together that an assault was inevitable.
Hatch's division of
Wilson's cavalry, at the extreme right of the continuous line, was confronted by one of the detached works which
Hood had intended to be “impregnable” ; and the right of
McArthur's division of
A. J. Smith's infantry was also within striking distance of it.
Coon's cavalry brigade was dismounted and ordered to assault the work, while
Hill's infantry brigade received similar orders.
The two commanders moved forward at the same time, and entered the work together,
Colonel Hill falling dead at the head of his command.
In a moment the whole Confederate force in that quarter was routed and fled to the rear, while the captured guns were turned on them.
With the view of extending the operations of
Wilson's cavalry still farther to the right, and if possible gaining the rear of the enemy's left, the two divisions of the Twenty-third Corps that had been in reserve near Lawrens Hill were ordered to
Smith's right, while orders were sent to
Wilson to gain, if possible, a lodgment on the
Granny White ]Pike.
These orders were promptly obeyed, and
Cooper's brigade on reaching its new position got into a handsome fight, in which its losses were more than the losses of the rest of the Twenty-third Corps during the two days battle.
But though the enemy's left was thus rudely driven from its fancied security, the salient at the center, being an angle formed by the line along Hillsboro' Pike and that stretching toward the east, was still firmly held.
Post's successful assault had merely driven out or captured the advance forces; the main line was intact.
As soon as word came of the successful assault on the right,
General Thomas sent orders to
General Wood, commanding the Fourth Corps, to prepare to attack the salient.
The staff-officer by whom this order was sent did not at first find
General Wood; but seeing the two division commanders whose troops would be called upon for the work, gave them the instructions.
As he was riding along the line he met one of the brigade commanders — an officer with a reputation for exceptional courage and gallantry — who, in reply to the direction to prepare for the expected assault, said, “You don't mean that we've got to go in here and
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attack the works on that hill?”
“Those are the orders,” was the answer.
Looking earnestly across the open valley, and at the steep hill beyond, from which the enemy's guns were throwing shot and shell with uncomfortable frequency and nearness, he said, “Why, it would be suicide, sir; perfect suicide.”
“Nevertheless, those are the orders,” said the officer; and he rode on to complete his work.
Before he could rejoin
General Thomas the assault was made, and the enemy were driven out with a loss of guns, colors, and
 |
|
View of a part of the Union lines at Nashville.
From a photograph. |
prisoners, and their whole line was forced to abandon the works along the
Hillsboro' Pike and fall back to the
Granny White Pike.
The retreating line was followed by the entire Fourth Corps (
Wood's), as well as by the cavalry and
Smith's troops; but night soon fell, and the whole army went into bivouac in the open fields wherever they chanced to be.
At dark,
Hood, who at 12 o'clock had held an unbroken, fortified line from the
Murfreesboro' to the
Hillsboro' Pike, with an advanced post on
Montgomery Hill and five strong redoubts along the
Hillsboro' Pike, barely maintained his hold of a line from the
Murfreesboro' Pike to the
Granny White Pike, near which on two large hills the left of his army had taken refuge when driven out of their redoubts by
Smith and
Wilson.
These hills were more than two miles to the rear of his morning position.
It was to that point that
Bate, who had started from
Hood's right when the assault was first delivered on the redoubts, now made his way amidst, as he says, “streams of stragglers, and artillerists, and horses, without guns or caissons — the sure indications of defeat.”
General Hood, not daunted by the reverses which had befallen him, at once set to work to prepare for the next day's struggle.
As soon as it was dusk
Cheatham's whole corps was moved from his right to his left;
Stewart's was retired some two miles and became the center;
Lee's also was withdrawn and became the right.
The new line extended along the base of a range of hills two miles south of that occupied during the day, and was only about half as long as that from which he had been driven.
During the night the
Confederates threw up works along their entire front, and the hills on their flanks were strongly fortified.
The flanks were also further secured by return works, which prevented them from being left “in the air.”
Altogether, the position was naturally far more formidable than that just abandoned.
At early dawn the divisions of the Fourth Corps moved forward, driving out the opposing skirmishers.
The men entered upon the work with such ardor that the advance soon quickened into a run, and the run almost into a
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 |
|
South-West front of the Capitol at Nashville.
From a photograph: the view is toward the battle-field.
Near the base of the first column is seen in the distance the flag of Fort Negley. |
charge.
They took up their positions in front of the enemy's new line, at one point coming within 250 yards of the salient at Overton's Hill.
Here they were halted, and threw up works, while the artillery on both sides kept up a steady and accurate fire.
Steedman also moved forward and about noon joined his right to
Wood's left, thus completing the alignment.
On his way to the front
General Thomas heard the cannonading, and, as was his custom, rode straight for the spot where the action seemed heaviest.
As he was passing a large, old-fashioned house, his attention was attracted by the noise of a window closing with a slam.
Turning to see the cause, he was greeted by a look from a young lady whose expression at the moment was the reverse of angelic.
With an amused smile, the general rode on, and soon forgot the incident in the excitement of battle.
But this trifling event had a sequel.
The young lady, in process of time, became the wife of an officer then serving in
General Thomas's army,--though he did not happen to be a witness of this episode.
The ground between the two armies for the greater part of the way from the
Franklin to the
Granny White Pike is low, open, and crossed by frequent streams running in every direction, and most of the fields were either newly plowed or old corn-fields, and were heavy, wet, and muddy from the recent storms.
Overton's Hill,
Hood's right, is a well-rounded slope, the top of which was amply fortified, while hills held by the left of his line just west of the
Granny White Pike are so steep that it is difficult to climb them, and their summits were crowned with formidable barricades, in front of which
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were abatis and masses of fallen trees.
Between these extremities the works in many places consisted of stone walls covered with earth, with head-logs on the top. To their rear were ample woods, sufficiently open to enable troops to move through them, but thick enough to afford good shelter.
Artillery was also posted at every available spot, and good use was made of it.
The morning was consumed in moving to new positions.
Wilson's cavalry, by a wide detour, had passed beyond the extreme Confederate left, and secured a lodgment on the
Granny White Pike.
But one avenue of escape was now open for
Hood — the
Franklin Pike.
General Thomas hoped that a vigorous assault by
Schofield's corps against
Hood's left would break the line there, and thus enable the cavalry, relieved from the necessity of operating against the rebel flank, to gallop down the
Granny White Pike to its junction with the
Franklin, some six or eight miles below, and plant itself square across the only remaining line of retreat.
If this scheme could be carried out, nothing but capture or surrender awaited
Hood's whole army.
Meantime, on the
National left,
Colonel Post, who had so gallantly carried
Montgomery Hill the morning before, had made a careful reconnoissance of Overton's Hill, the strong position on
Hood's right.
As the result of his observation, he reported to
General Wood, his corps commander, that an assault would cost dear, but he believed it could be made successfully; at any rate he was ready to try it. The order was accordingly given, and everything prepared.
The brigade was to be supported on either side by fresh troops to be held in readiness to rush for the works the moment Post should gain the parapet.
The bugles had not finished sounding the charge, when
Post's brigade, preceded by a strong line of skirmishers, moved forward, in perfect silence, with orders to halt for nothing, but to gain the works at a run. The men dashed on, Post leading, with all speed through a shower of shot and shell.
A few of the skirmishers reached the parapet; the main line came within twenty steps of the works, when, by a concentrated fire of musketry and artillery from every available point of the enemy's line, the advance was momentarily checked, and, in another instant, Post was brought down by a wound, at first reported as mortal.
This slight hesitation and the disabling of Post were fatal to the success of the assault.
The leader and animating spirit gone, the line slowly drifted back to its original position, losing in those few minutes nearly 300 men; while the supporting brigade on its left lost 250.
Steedman had promised to cooperate in this assault, and accordingly
Thompson's brigade of colored troops was ordered to make a demonstration at the moment
Post's advance began.
These troops had never before been in action and were now to test their mettle.
There had been no time for a reconnaissance, when this order was given, else it is likely a way would have been found to turn the enemy's extreme right flank.
The colored brigade moved forward against the works east of the
Franklin Pike and nearly parallel to it. As they advanced, they became excited, and what was intended merely as a demonstration was unintentionally converted into an actual assault.
Thompson, finding his men rushing forward at the double-quick, gallantly led them to the very slope of the intrenchments.
But, in their advance across
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the open field, the continuity of his line was broken by a large fallen tree.
As the men separated to pass it, the enemy opened an enfilading fire on the exposed flanks of the gap thus created, with telling effect.
In consequence, at the very moment when a firm and compact order was most needed, the line came up ragged and broken.
Meantime Post's assault was repulsed, and the fire which had been concentrated on him was turned against
Thompson.
Nothing was left, therefore, but to withdraw as soon as possible to the original position.
This was done without panic or confusion, after a loss of 467 men from the three regiments composing the brigade.
When it was seen that a heavy assault on his right, at Overton's Hill, was threatened,
Hood ordered
Cleburne's old division to be sent over to the exposed point, from the extreme left, in front of
Schofield.
About the same time
General Couch, commanding one of the divisions of the Twenty-third Corps, told
General Schofield that he believed he could carry the hill in his front, but doubted if he could hold it without assistance.
The ground in front of
General Cox, on
Couch's right, also offered grand opportunities for a successful assault.
Meantime the cavalry, on
Cox's right, had made its way beyond the extreme left flank of the enemy, and was moving northward over the wooded hills direct to the rear of the extreme rebel left.
General Thomas, who had been making a reconnoissance, had no sooner reached
Schofield's front than
General McArthur, who commanded one of
Smith's divisions, impatient at the long waiting, and not wanting to spend the second night on the rocky hill he was occupying, told
Smith that he could carry the high hill in front of
Couch,--the same that
Couch himself had told
Schofield he could carry,--and would undertake it unless forbidden.
Smith silently acquiesced, and
McArthur set to work.
Withdrawing
McMillen's (his right) brigade from the trenches, he marched it by the flank in front of
General Couches position, and with orders to the men to fix bayonets, not to fire a shot and neither to halt nor to cheer until they had gained the enemy's works, the charge was sounded.
The gallant brigade, which had served and fought in every part of the South-west, moved swiftly down the slope, across the narrow valley, and began scrambling up the steep hillside, on the top of which was the redoubt, held by
Bate's division, and mounted also with Whitworth guns.
The bravest onlookers held their breath as these gallant men steadily and silently approached the summit amid the crash of musketry and the boom of the artillery.
In almost the time it has taken to tell the story they gained the works, their flags were wildly waving from the parapet, and the unmistakable cheer, “the voice of the
American people,” as
General Thomas called it, rent the air. It was an exultant moment; but this was only a part of the heroic work: of that afternoon.
While
McMillen's brigade was preparing for this wonderful charge,
Hatch's division of cavalry, dismounted, had also pushed its way through the woods, and had gained the tops of two hills that commanded the rear of the enemy's works.
Here, with incredible labor, they had dragged, by hand, two pieces of artillery, and, just as
McMillen began his charge, these opened on the hill where
Bate was, up the opposite slope of which the infantry were scrambling . At the same time
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Coon's brigade of
Hatch's division with resounding cheers charged upon the enemy and poured such volleys of musketry from their repeating-rifles as I have never heard equaled.
Thus beset on both sides,
Bate's people broke out of the works, and ran down the hill toward their right and rear as fast as their legs could carry them.
It was more like a scene in a spectacular drama than a real incident in war. The hillside in front, still green, dotted with the boys in blue swarming up the slope; the dark background of high hills beyond; the lowering clouds; the waving flags; the smoke slowly rising through the leafless tree-tops and drifting across the valleys; the wonderful outburst of musketry; the ecstatic cheers; the multitude racing for life down into the valley below,--so exciting was it all, that the lookers — on instinctively clapped their hands, as at a brilliant and successful transformation scene, as indeed it was. For, in those few minutes, an army was changed into a mob, and the whole structure of the rebellion in the South-west, with all its possibilities, was utterly overthrown.
As soon as the other divisions farther to the left saw and heard the doings on their right, they did not wait for orders.
Everywhere, by a common impulse, they charged the works in front, and carried them in a twinkling.
General Edward Johnson and nearly all his division and his artillery were captured.
Over the very ground where, but a little while before,
Post's assault had been repulsed, the same troops now charged with resistless force, capturing fourteen guns and one thousand prisoners.
Steedman's colored brigades also rallied and brought in their share of prisoners and other spoils of war. Everywhere the success was complete.
Foremost among the rejoicing victors was
General Steedman, under whose command were the colored troops.
Steedman had been a life-long Democrat and was one of the delegates, in 1860, to the Charleston convention, at which ultimately
Breckinridge was nominated for
President.
As he rode over the field, immediately after the rout of the enemy, he asked, with a grim smile, as he pointed to the fleeing hosts, “I wonder what my Democratic friends over there would think of me if they knew I was fighting them with ‘nigger’ troops?”
I have not space to tell the story of the pursuit, which only ended, ten days later, at the
Tennessee River.
About a month before,
General Hood had triumphantly begun his northward movement.
Now, in his disastrous retreat, he was leaving behind him, as prisoners or deserters, a larger number of men than
General Thomas had been able to place at
Pulaski to hinder his advance — to say nothing of his terrific losses in killed at
Franklin.
The loss to the
Union army, in all its fighting,--from the
Tennessee River to
Nashville and back again,--was less than six thousand killed, wounded, and missing. At so small a cost, counting the chances of war, the whole North-west was saved from an invasion that, if
Hood had succeeded, would have more than neutralized all
Sherman's successes in
Georgia and the Carolinas; saved by the steadfast labors, the untiring energy, the rapid combinations, the skillful evolutions, the heroic courage and the tremendous force of one man, whose name will yet rank among the great captains of all time.
